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Abstract 
In the climate of insecurity post 9/11states sought to limit the operational capacity of 
terrorist groups by restricting their access to funds. Alternative remittance systems 
such as Hawala, were suspected to have been used to transfer the funds for use in 
the 9/11 attack.  Consequently they became a source of international concern in 
light of the ‘new models’ of terrorism that emerged which have since warranted a 
review of national and international counter terrorist strategies. This work has 
sought to investigate the historical origins and model of operation of traditional 
Hawala, considering the risks these system pose for assisting terrorist financing.  A 
normative framework has been presented against which counter terrorist strategies 
and the measures enacting their aims are considered for their protection of 
fundamental rights and their capacity for promoting financial inclusion.  This 
framework has been presented as a driver to international action to address the 
international threat posed from terrorism in order to protect human rights and human 
security. This thesis has considered the UK remittance population and the capacity 
of the UK remittance operators, regulated as money services businesses, to 
promote financial inclusion within the UK. The central focus and originality of this 
work has been the critical review of the UK regulatory framework for terrorist finance 
relating to remittance services. This work has presented a critical review of the 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework for these businesses which was 
investigated through fieldwork research. This investigated the views of money 
service business operators and regulators as to the effectiveness of the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 for preventing terrorist finance. Additionally this 
fieldwork research aimed to consider the impact of regulation on these businesses 
and the money service sector. This work has drawn on the findings from the 
research fieldwork to conclude as to whether the regulatory framework has been 
effective in controlling the risks of misuse for terrorism associated with traditional 
hawala, in relation to money services businesses in the UK context. The work has 
concluded as to whether regulation in the UK context has effective for and 
normatively compliant in the regulation money service businesses in the UK.  
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Chapter 1  
The modern terrorist threat – reconsidering the suppression of terrorist 
finance. 
 
1.0 Introduction and context 
 
Remittance systems are century old systems that pre-date western formal 
banking systems. Whilst having a common core method of operation, they 
are subject to regional and local variations derived from local customs and 
practices reflecting the social context of their operation. Alternative 
remittance systems (ARS) are culturally entrenched value transfer systems 
that remain in use in third world and developing countries, where access to 
modern banking services is limited. They are also commonly used by the 
migrant diaspora now settled in developed states, to send money ‘back 
home’ to support their families. ARS have provided a central lifeline for 
developing countries in assisting in the dissemination of much needed 
financial development and humanitarian aid. The cultural context of their 
operation and association with specific cultural and ethnic groups, and their 
informality, has been misunderstood by western economies with developed 
and sophisticated financial sectors. ARS came under scrutiny in the wake of 
9/11 where concerns focused on their potential misuse for terrorist finance, 
including the US assertion that the funds for the 9/11 attack were in part 
transferred using these systems. The US responded swiftly in regulating 
these systems, with the expectation that the international community would 
replicate this action. Their subsequent exposure to wider international 
scrutiny has been a catalyst to their regulation, prompting the recognition by 
remittance providers of the need to promote a greater understanding of these 
systems generally. Remittance operators in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
agreed through the ‘Abu Dhabi declaration’,1 on the adoption of international 
FATF standards. 
                                                          
1Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala , International Conference on Hawala UAE, 16 May 2002  
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This thesis considers the impact of the UK anti-money laundering and 
counter terrorist finance (AML/CTF) framework for the regulation of ARS. 
This chapter sets out the central research question and outlines the structure 
of this thesis, detailing the content and focus of each chapter and its 
contribution to the originality of this work. This chapter reviews the research 
to date into the nature and context of the operation of ARS, to justify the 
focus of this thesis and identify its unique and original approach and 
contribution to the research question. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter presents an overview of the relevant counter 
terrorist finance agenda and policy as a backdrop to the context of regulation 
of ARS at international and UK level, identifying the global concerns and 
international approaches to addressing the current terrorist threat. These are 
reviewed in light of the concept of ‘new style/model’ terrorism and the rise in 
fundamentalist terrorism which informs both international and UK counter-
terrorist strategy (CTS), to which the suppression of terrorist finance is a key 
element. The relevant international stakeholders and their roles in supporting 
and driving the international counter terrorist finance agenda are identified in 
outline, regarding their contribution to the post 9/11 counter terrorist finance 
(CTF) agenda. The chapter concludes with a review of the terminology used 
to refer to these systems and provides a clear definition of ARS for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
 
1.1 Aim of thesis 
 
This thesis aims to consider the risks posed by ARS regarding their potential 
misuse for the laundering of terrorist funds. For the purposes of this study, 
misuse includes the deliberate and intentional transfer of funds in the 
knowledge of the terrorist purpose2 by customers or ARS providers, and 
additionally, where providers may be unaware of the terrorist purpose. The 
                                                          
2Terrorism Act 2000 s18 defines the offence of laundering of terrorist property. s14 defines terrorist       
 property as including s14(1)(a) money or property likely to be used to the purposes of terrorism. 
3 
 
general criminal misuse of these systems is also considered. This thesis 
aims to identify the risks posed by ARS systems, analysed in light of the ‘new 
model’ terrorism, which demands a review of existing legislation and policy 
approaches to combating the suppression of terrorist finance, to ensure that 
they remain effective.  ARS are analysed to consider whether the risks they 
present justify the need for their regulation. A normative framework of rights 
and values is presented against which the regulatory framework for ARS is 
critically appraised to review the effectiveness of CTF strategies for 
preventing terrorism and its finance, and maintaining the balance between 
preserving peace and security and the protection of fundamental human 
rights engaged by these measures. The impact and effectiveness of 
AML/CTF measures is investigated through fieldwork research, which 
focuses on the application of the MLR 2007 and their regulation of alternative 
remittance services, termed Money Service Businesses (MSBs) within the 
UK. 
 
 
1.2 Originality 
 
To date there has been little research into ARS; that which has been 
undertaken has largely focused on the description of ARS from an ethno-
cultural perspective, mainly confined to their operation in areas of historical 
origin. Few studies have sought to investigate the effect of AML regulation on 
remittance services within an international context and there is no research 
into ARS operation in the UK, nor has research to date investigated the 
views of remittance operators as to the impact of regulation on these 
businesses. 
 
Research by Passas3 has focused on the collation of evidence as to the 
vulnerability of ARS misuse, with evidence of cited misuse confined to 
general money laundering. This research draws on this evidence to justify 
                                                          
3N Passas, ‘Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations; a study into so-called    
 underground banking networks’ (2004) SSRN December 1999  N Passas N, ‘Informal Value        
 Transfer Systems Terrorism and Money Laundering’ (2003) November Northeastern University. 
4 
 
ARS regulation without reference to any specific jurisdiction or form of 
regulatory regime. Research by Sharma4 has explored the operation of ARS 
from a socio-cultural perspective considering both legitimate use and criminal 
misuse of Hawala. This exploratory research has investigated the 
socioeconomic factors influencing the use of Hawala providing a ‘descriptive 
and multifaceted’ analysis of 5 ARS drawn from qualitative6 interviews of a 
small sample of twelve operators and twenty seven customers in the Punjab 
and Delhi areas of India. 
 
Qualitative research by Caroll for Interpol7 was based on survey 
questionnaires and telephone interviews and focused on determining the 
extent of ARS activity in countries in the Indian sub-continent and the Asia 
Pacific region. This study aimed to ‘delineate the operational characteristics’ 
of ARS and to classify these systems by their operational type, as either 
Hawala/Hundi or Asian/Oriental systems. This classification was designed to 
identify their prevalence, characteristics of operation and vulnerability 
according to their identified type, outlining the efforts of authorities as to their 
regulation. This study did not assess the need for regulation nor did it 
evaluate any existing regulatory frameworks for ARS. The research aimed to 
categorise methods of ARS operation by type, risk and prevalence over 
broad geographical areas to identify and assess their operational 
characteristics to indicate their potential misuse. 
 
Further research by Passas for the International Monetary Fund (IMF)8 
focused on broad concerns arising from international and national regulation 
but without reference to any specific jurisdiction. Maimbo has also 
investigated the regulation of Hawala within Afghanistan, but this study did 
not address the issue of regulatory impact.9 
                                                          
4D Sharma ‘Historical Traces of Hundi, Sociocultural Understanding,and Criminal Abuse of Hawala’     
 September (2006) 16 (2) IJCJR 103 
5Sharma (n4) 
6Sharma (n4) 
7L Carroll, ‘Alternative remittance systems distinguishing sub-systems of ethnic money laundering in  
 Interpol member countries on the Asian continent’  Interpol June (2004)   
8N Passas N, ‘Formalizing the Informal? Problems in the National and international Regulation of  
  Hawala’ IMF Regulatory Frameworks for Hawala and Other Remittance Systems (IMF  2005)  
9SM Maimbo, ‘Challenges of regulating Hawala’ IMF Regulatory Frameworks for Hawala and Other     
 Remittance Systems (IMF 2005)  
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Sharma has conducted descriptive and exploratory research into ARS in 
India, focusing on the historical origins of Hawala, drawing on the existing 
research and literature relating to these systems and their method of 
operation. This jurisdictional focus was problematic given that Hawala has for 
some time been indirectly prohibited10 in India, and has little application in 
the UK context, and the research did not address the form and effectiveness 
of regulation. 
 
The only research to date that has addressed the effectiveness of regulation 
of ARS in relation to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist 
finance, is that by Rees11 in Australia. This funded study investigated the 
views of operators and customers and can be distinguished from the UK 
context, given the jurisdictional  differences in the population composition 
and the regulatory framework. 
 
Research by Muller12 into the misuse of ARS for terrorist finance merged 
considerations of the regulatory form and sources of fundraising alongside a 
critique of Hawala as a method of transfer. There was no examination of the 
CTS linked to the legislative aims and the impact of regulation in achieving 
these outside a consideration of US policy. This research did not draw on 
fieldwork data to support its findings. 
 
The originality of this thesis lies in the investigation, through fieldwork 
research, of the impact and effectiveness of the regulatory regime. This is 
gained through fieldwork investigation of the views and attitudes of ARS 
operators, and stakeholders who have an interest or role in the 
implementation of the regulatory framework for CTF as applied to remittance 
services in the UK. The originality of this work is its focus on the CTF regime 
                                                          
10The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 which criminalised hawala transactions was repealed  
   but the Foreign Exchange and Management Act 1999 The latter FEMA  provision provide for a  
   financial civil penalty on breach of its provision prohibiting the transfer of acquisition of assets outside  
   India of transfer of assets from  this jurisdiction. 
11D Rees, ‘Money Laundering and terrorism Financing risks posed by alternative remittance in  
   Australia’ Australian Government, AIC Research and Policy Series 106 (2010) 
12SR Muller, Hawala: An Informal Payment System and its Use to Finance Terrorism (1st edn,  
   Lightening Source  2006)  
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for ARS, drawing on fieldwork research to assess the impact and 
effectiveness of the regulation of ARS in the UK with particular reference to 
the MLR 2007. 
 
This work intends to consider the effectiveness of the current AML/CTF 
regulatory regime in the UK for enabling the detection of terrorist funds to 
enable their seizure and confiscation. Whilst there has been some limited 
research by Vaccani13 into ARS and terrorist finance from a risk 
management and regulatory perspective, this was limited to a consideration 
of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendation VI 
contrasting licensing and registration regimes. By comparison, the originality 
of this work lies in a critical evaluation of the UK legislative framework as to 
its compliance with the normative framework presented, in ensuring CTF 
measures are justified and operate proportionately in protecting human 
rights. 
 
This work will consider the justification of, and necessity for, specific 
legislation for the suppression of terrorist funding, rather than resorting to 
general AML provisions, which are considered in the context of the nexus 
between organised crime14 and the funding of terrorism. 
 
This thesis aims to identify and consider any cultural factors relevant to the 
users and operators of these services in the UK, assessing the relevance of 
this context to the relationships between the service users, operators and 
regulators.  The impact of regulation on these relationships and the 
operational context are considered to assess the effectiveness of regulation 
in controlling the risk of terrorist finance that these systems present. 
 
Respect for fundamental human rights is at the core of any democracy; the 
protection of these rights is increasingly articulated within counter terrorism 
policy and strategy at international and regional level. This study will review 
                                                          
13M Vaccini, ‘Alternative remittance Systems and Terrorist Finance; Issues in Risk management’ Paper  
  No.180, (World Bank Nov. 2009) 
14I Bantekas,‘Current Developments: the International Law of Terrorist Finance’(2003) 97 Am.J Int'l L  
   315, 318 
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the current AML/CTF framework within the UK in the context of the 
international CTF agenda, to consider the international obligations by which 
the UK is bound. The effectiveness of UK CTF measures and their 
concordance with the protection of the normative values presented is 
considered and necessitates an enquiry into the relationship between 
international, regional EU CTS15 and UK CTS. 
 
 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
 
The following section details the specific focus and substance of each 
chapter and outlines their contribution to the research aims. 
 
1.3.1 Chapter 2 The nature and operation of ARS by specific reference  
 to Hawala. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the historical 
development of Hawala, drawn from a review of the current literature, to 
consider the reasons for its continued use to date and the socio-economic 
and cultural context of its current operation. Reference is made to Hawala as 
the dominant remittance transfer system. The objective is to identify the 
nature, structure and characteristics of Hawala operation, identifying the 
potential risks for misuse for terrorist finance. This risk of misuse is 
contextualised by reference to the geographical extent, frequency of use as 
well as the social, economic and cultural relevance of ARS. This chapter will 
critically evaluate the interplay between these factors identifying the degree 
of risk these systems pose. Evidence of the misuse of these systems, both 
generally and specifically for terrorist finance is presented within a 
consideration of the challenge posed to regulators seeking to manage the 
risks these systems present. 
 
                                                          
15EC, ‘The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges’ Brussels 20 July  
  2010 SEC (2010) 911 para11 
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1.3.2 Chapter 3 – Research methodology: design and application. 
 
This chapter presents and justifies the selected qualitative methodology by 
reference to the research aims and objectives and the overall research 
question, to demonstrate a robust approach to the fieldwork research and the 
data generated. The aim is to capture the values, attitudes and perspectives 
of operators and regulators, who are directly involved in the regulation of 
ARS in the UK. The fieldwork is critical to this and central to the originality of 
this work in enabling an assessment of the impact and effectiveness of 
regulation on ARS, which cannot be accurately ascertained without 
generating data from interviews undertaken with the selected participant 
groups. 
 
The methodology outlines the ethical issues arising from undertaking the 
proposed fieldwork and details how these have been incorporated into the 
research design to secure ethical approval. The potential difficulties and 
challenges in undertaking the fieldwork research, including risks to 
researcher and participant recruitment confidentiality, and the process for 
providing information to potential participants to secure consent, are detailed. 
 
The research design is presented, justifying the selection of participants and 
the use of semi-structured interviews for data collection. The research design 
demonstrates the selection and the accommodation of specific variables, 
including the geographical areas, ethic population, business sizes, relevant 
to producing a viable participant sample group to justify the sampling 
strategy and the selected methodology as appropriate for the research 
question. The strategies for managing confidentiality and research ethics in 
relation to the development of interview schedules, interview transcription 
and subsequent thematic analysis, data handling and storage, are also 
detailed. The Money Laundering Regulations (MLR) 2007  were the selected 
focus for interview schedules since they afforded an accessible  contact point 
for the participant groups, limiting the ethical constraints that may have 
arisen in relation to the investigation of other aspects of the regulatory 
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framework for CTF in the UK. The MLR were selected since they most 
directly influence and control the operation of ARS in the UK and would be a 
dimension within the experience and knowledge of the participant groups. 
 
 
1.3.3 Chapter 4 – A normative framework for the regulation of ARS 
 
Chapter four considers the justification and mandate for the regulation of 
remittance services as part of an international approach to security and to 
developing an international CTS, and in light of the UK’s commitment to 
implementing international obligations. A normative framework of critical 
values is proposed to guide this internationalised and cosmopolitan approach 
to suppressing terrorist finance and preserving security. This chapter 
contributes to the thesis by proposing clear normative standards as rights, 
the protection of which justifies the imposition of the regulation of ARS. This 
framework is applied to assess the extent to which these systems are ethical 
in their operation and concordant with protection required of the normative 
framework, identifying operational characteristics which render this protection 
weak. The normativity of these systems is assessed, to consider whether 
they should be tolerated and their risks managed through regulation. 
 
A case study of the Al-Barakaat Somali remittance operator is presented by 
way of analysis of the humanitarian and economic consequences of 
regulatory action, which are critically reviewed to assess the normativity of 
international CTF responses. An overview of the remittance sector in the UK 
is presented to assess the capacity of these systems for financial inclusion 
and to evaluate their normative compliance. The chapter concludes with a 
brief consideration of new technologies and services that offer the possibility 
for enhanced financial inclusion within the UK and beyond. 
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1.3.4 Chapter 5 - Critical analysis of the legal framework for the  
         regulation of ARS in the UK. 
 
This chapter critiques the effectiveness of the UK regulatory framework for 
suppression of terrorist finance, considering a variety of modes of regulation, 
drawing on the role of the criminal law, civil and criminal powers of 
confiscation and quasi criminal asset freezing measures. The chapter 
considers international  measures, such sanctions, which are critically 
evaluated as to their normative compliance and the degree of protection of 
fundamental rights they afford. These are considered as to their 
implementation and impact within the UK context and are evaluated to 
assess their compliance within the normative framework presented in 
chapter four. The UK AML/CTF framework is critically evaluated for its 
effectiveness in achieving its intended aims in suppressing terrorist finance 
 
Particular reference is made to the MLR 2007, since these require the 
registration   and control of ARS, regulated as MSBs, imposing AML 
standards on these businesses within the UK. The application of the MLR16 
and the risk based approach they adopt is critiqued in relation to the 
regulation of MSBs. The chapter further considers the SARs reporting regime 
and its capacity to yield financial intelligence in relation to terrorist finance 
and the privacy concerns this raises in relation to personal financial data. 
 
 
1.3.5 Chapter 6 – A critical analysis of the fieldwork research data. 
 
Having analysed and critiqued the regulatory framework, this chapter 
presents a robust analysis of the data from the fieldwork research. The 
chapter briefly critically reviews the challenges in applying the research 
methodology in practice, identifying the resulting constraints and their impact 
and bearing on the quality of data yielded. 
                                                          
16Money Laundering Regulations 2007 In force from 15th December 2007. 
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The data is presented in two sections; the first dealing with the findings from 
the operator interviews and the second section dealing with the regulator and 
stakeholder interviews. Brief biographical outlines of these participant groups 
are provided followed by a critical analysis of the data from the interviews; 
this analysis is presented thematically. The selected themes allow for 
comparison across interview groups and alignment with the aims of the 
central research question. 
 
The chapter critiques the relationships, attitudes, values, processes and 
structures revealed to analyse their relevance to and support of the 
effectiveness of the MLR 2007 in contributing to the suppression of terrorist 
finance. The challenges identified from the impact of regulation that hinder or 
assist regulatory efficacy are analysed from the perspective of both 
participant groups. The chapter considers the effectiveness of the current 
regulatory and supervisory model for securing the effective application of 
regulatory framework and the RBA. Chapter six concludes with an overall 
critique of key themes relevant to the central research question and identifies 
issues which require further enquiry for the future. 
 
 
1.3.6 Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
This final chapter concludes by considering the extent to which the research 
aims and objectives have been achieved, highlighting the key issues and 
concerns revealed by the fieldwork research. The chapter reviews the 
capacity of the current regime to respond to new terrorist threats and new 
models of terrorist operation and funding to conclude as to the effectiveness 
of the existing international and UK CTF regime.  The chapter considers the 
normativity of the international and UK regime for CTF to identify policy 
considerations for relevant stakeholders for any future review of this 
framework. This chapter summarises the impact of regulation on ARS and its 
model of operation within the UK, highlighting the implications raised and the 
challenges presented within the UK context of operation. This chapter 
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reviews the aims of the legislative framework within the UK, critically 
evaluating its ‘fitness for purpose’ generally, and in enabling the UK to 
comply with international standards. The chapter further considers potential 
improvements or changes to the current regime to enhance its effectiveness 
in preventing the financing of terrorism, whilst also providing protection of 
fundamental rights. 
 
The chapter concludes by identifying areas for further comparative research 
in relation to developing more fully some of the concerns and issues raised 
by the   fieldwork research and the UK CTF regime in general. These are 
relevant in adding value to the national and international CTF agenda and 
policy development and regulatory oversight of this area. 
 
 
1.4 The global terrorist threat 
 
The terrorist threat is one that has challenged a number of states, including 
Ireland, Spain and Sri Lanka, who have grappled with the threat from ‘home 
grown’ state confined terrorist groups, at some point in the past. The more 
recent trend has been to international terrorism, with attacks on targets and 
civilians outside the state of origin to effect political pressure for change. In 
the past this transnational element has been relatively predictable and 
confined. The move from right wing and politically motivated terrorism to 
fundamentalist, religious based terrorism has highlighted the transnational 
dimension and raised concerns internationally as to this threat. 
 
Terrorist organisations (TO) target specific states, their citizens, or public 
officials perceived as representing the targeted state, whom the organisation 
considers to be at odds with their ideology or posing an obstacle to the 
furtherance of their cause.17Terrorist attacks, even where small scale, can 
cause significant loss of life and injury. The World Trade Centre bombing on 
                                                          
17House of Commons ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’ HC  
  1087 11th  May 2006 [5] [8] [28 ] refers to Al Qaida issuing a fatwa 1998 calling for ‘jihad’ to ‘kill  
  Americans and their allies’   
13 
 
Feb 26th1993, for which radical Islamists were subsequently held 
responsible, killed 26 and injured 1,000. The Bali bombings of 2002 killed 
202 people, including 24 British nationals, estimated to have required US 
$74,000 to fund.18 The Istanbul bombings of November 2003 were estimated 
to have cost US $40,000 and killed over 40, including British consulate staff. 
The London bombings carried out by four individuals resulted in 56 deaths, 
injuring over 70019 and yet only required £8,000. The more recent US Boston 
bomb on 15th April 2013 killed three and wounded 250, making use of a 
homemade device at minimal cost. The challenge to CTF is preventing 
access to funds, where the cost of terrorist attacks is very low, yet these 
have the potential for significant loss of life. 
 
Globally there were 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009 resulting in over 15,000 
fatalities, injuring over 30,000 individuals,20 with over 200 arrests for all forms 
of terrorism in the UK alone. In Europe for 2008 there were over 750 arrests 
for terrorism, over 200 of these were linked to Al Qa’ida.21These figures do 
not reveal the organisational bases of the terrorist groups or their targets. 
Whilst the number of attacks appear to be relatively modest when reported 
as isolated incidents, what is critical in light of the ‘new model’ terrorism 
referred to later in this chapter, is that figures indicate a threat posed to 
British nationals abroad. 
 
The 9/11 attack has been the most significant single terrorist attack for its 
unprecedented loss of 2,973 lives22 and the scale of injuries, causing a 
sense of shock worldwide by striking against a world super power on its own 
soil. The 9/11 attack refocused world attention on the international dimension 
of terrorism, having the capacity to reach beyond borders and compromising 
international peace, security, and stability. It illustrated the potential of 
terrorist groups to draw membership from numerous jurisdictions; 9/11 
                                                          
18Muller(n12)39 
19 1087 (n17)1 
20SoS Home Dept, Annual Report ‘United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’  
   (Cm 7833,  March 2010) 7 
21CM 7833 (n20) 
22Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ‘The  9/11  
   Commission  Report’ July 22nd (2004) U.S. Government Printing Office Washington DC  311, [9.2] 
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involved 26 conspirators from seven different states.23 The network model 
adopted by Al Qa’ida relies on individual cells operating at arm’s length from 
the main organisation, allowing for coordinated support and action, posing a 
challenge to detect. The 9/11 attackers spent some time in the US prior to 
the attack, hidden in plain sight but equally could have drawn more 
operational support from supporters within the US.  The concerns raised by 
the 9/11 attack were considered to represent a change in the ‘trend’ in the 
operational activity of terrorist organisations, suggestive of a ‘new model’ of  
terrorism which is critiqued below. 
 
 
1.5 ‘New model’ terrorism – emerging trends and new threats 
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that terrorism represents a global international 
threat, there has been considerable debate as to whether 9/11 signified the 
emergence of a ‘new style’ of terrorism. Terrorist groups of the 1970’s/1980’s 
have disbanded, or abandoned their violent campaigns, in favour of political 
engagement to secure political influence to achieve their goals. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) have called a ‘permanent cease fire’, 
decommissioned their arsenal and are now engaged in a power sharing 
executive. Whilst there remains a need for vigilance due to a continued 
threat from a small number of dissident Republicans, it is acknowledged that 
the current terrorist threat to the UK is largely from international terrorism.24 
Other organisations such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, at one 
time perceived to be a terrorist group, are now legitimately recognised as 
representatives of the Palestinian people since their acknowledgment of the 
state of Israel and their public denouncement of terrorism. As ‘old’ terrorist 
groups have disbanded new groups such as Al Qa’ida have raised their 
profile and their operational capacity to full effect. 
                                                          
23J Roth, D Greenburg, S Willie. ‘Staff report to the Commission on terrorist Attacks Upon the United  
   States- Monograph on Terrorist Financing.’   Of the 26 membership of the 9/11 terrorist plot support  
   the notion of the breath and reach of terrorist organisations rarely confined to one geographical  
   location and included one Lebanese, one Egyptian, two Yemenese, one Moroccan, one Pakistani,18  
   Saudies, 2 Emiratis citizens. 
24 Government Reply to Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ (CM 7058,  
    2007) 5 
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This ‘new style’ terrorism proposes a shift in the structure and operational 
activity of terrorist groups, the selected targets and degree of violence 
differing from previously. The ‘new style’ terrorism favours ‘soft targets’ and 
more indiscriminate attacks, using violence to increase mass casualties. Acts 
perpetrated by ‘new style’ groups support different ends, religious 
fundamentalist ideological aims prevail, linked to greater violence and 
unpredictability, with targets more widespread. These organisations are 
perceived as being more dangerous,25 in light of the socio-political context 
and circumstances in which they operate. The concept of ‘new model’ 
terrorism has been subject to considerable academic criticism, suggesting 
the key characteristics delineating this model have been watered down and 
used to justify political rhetoric and ill-conceived CT policy and counter 
measures. The concept of ‘new’ is more reflective of a ‘shift’ in the paradigm 
of terrorist groups and their context of operation with a different interplay 
between their emerging characteristics; structural, operational and 
organisational.26 The context and circumstances of social change are 
relevant for triggers to the changing nature of terrorist organisations and this 
‘new style’ terrorism is indicative of the political and social climate of decision 
making and policy, which determines the response to the suppression of 
terrorism. 
 
This ‘new style’ terrorism requires a reassessment of existing counter-
terrorist strategies and policies27 in light of these emerging trends and the 
changing structure of terrorist organisations. This is essential to secure the 
continued effectiveness of CTS in suppressing all forms of terrorism, 
including this ‘new model’ of terrorism. The ‘evolutionary change’28 raised by 
the ‘emerging trends’ raises implications for the suppression of terrorist 
financing. ‘New style’ terrorism has the characteristics of a horizontal not 
hierarchical structure29 rendering detection of individual cells and members 
                                                          
25P Neumann, Old and New Style Terrorism, (1st Edn, Polity Press  2009) [3] 
26EN Kurtulus, ‘The “New Terrorism” and its Critics’ (2011) 34 (6) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism  
   476-500, 477-484 
27(n15) para 1 
28Neumann(n25)12 
29Kurtulus (n26) 490 
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more difficult. The more fluid organisational structure results in a different 
selection of operational targets, communication and funding of activity within 
the organisation. These structural changes affect the nature and demands of 
terrorist financing, sources of funds, methods of transfer and costs of 
operational activities. ‘New terrorism’ requires a reassessment of the 
approaches to preventing the raising and movement of funds, in response to 
the distinct characteristics of the underlying structure of these ‘new style’ 
networks. 
 
 
1.5.1 The changing nature of the terrorist threat 
 
The threat from international ‘new style’ model terrorism derives largely from 
Al Qa’ida represented by its core leadership, offering guidance to an 
organisation more closely resembling a ‘movement’ consisting of affiliated 
groups loosely bound by a shared ideology.30 This ensures the survival of 
the ‘organisation’ beyond any fragmentation of its structure and in absence of 
its leader, following the death of Osama Bin Laden.31 Al Qa’ida desires 
revenge against the US and those perceived to be its allies. International 
pressure has been brought to bear on countries, including Pakistan, who 
previously offered support to terrorist groups. International action has been 
successful in limiting access to funds and the operational capacity of Al 
Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has also disrupted activity in the 
UK, US, Europe, Africa and South East Asia. As Al Qa’ida affiliates and 
associated groups continue to expand, new sub groups such as the AQ-AP 
and AQ-M have emerged in Algeria.32 Other terrorist groups including Al-
Shabaab operating in Africa, have sprung from this shared ideology. The 
death of Osama Bin Laden may have little impact long term on the 
ideological goals of Al Qa’ida and its ‘cause’ since the ‘new style’ terrorism 
relies on leadership for strategic guidance only, ‘middle managers’ of 
                                                          
30LK Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (1st edn, Cambridge  
  University Press,2008) 154 
31<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13257972> reporting death of Osma bin Laden on 2nd May 2012 
32Cm 7833 (n20) [ 6],[7] AQ-M was responsible for the kidnap and subsequent murder of British  
   national Edwin Dyer in 2009 
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individual networks and groups enjoy autonomous decision making, funding 
and operational freedom.  Al Qa’ida relies on a core of respected scholars 
acting as lieutenants to promote ideology and engage in central fundraising 
and provide training. ‘Middle managers’ develop local strategies in line with 
pronouncements from the central leadership as whole.33 
 
Fundamentalist ideology binds these separate groups creating a fragmented 
network of terrorist groups operating in isolation from each other, having 
separate and distinct membership; self-funding cells are connected by their 
shared ideology.34 These networks have considerable geographical 
coverage, offering the possibility of combined operational efforts and the 
potential for additional recruitment and development of new cells, requiring a 
reconsideration of existing CTS to address this. This structure has led to the 
emergence of small cells and lone terrorist operatives engaging in attacks35 
from within the UK, a form of ‘neighbour’ terrorism in support of a shared 
terrorist ideology.36 
 
Al Qa’ida funds have been provided from the personal wealth of Osama bin 
Laden, from illicit drugs, the diamond trade and misuse of charitable 
donations. Whilst some terrorist groups have strong links with the use of 
organised crime to fund their activities, Al Qa’ida operations draw on different 
funding sources to support their international reach, their operational 
capacity assisted by access to a worldwide network of ethnically based 
informal ARS to transfer funds; this makes these systems a key concern in 
limiting terrorist funding. 
 
1.6 International counter-terrorist strategy 
 
The 9/11 attack galvanised international commitment in the fight against 
terrorism, evident in the increased number of ratifications to the terrorist 
                                                          
33Neumann (n25) 58 
34TJ Biersteker and S  Eckert, Countering the Financing of Terrorism, (1st edn, Routledge  2008) 57 
35Secretary of State for Home Department ‘CONTEST-The UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism’ (Cm  
   8123, 2011) [2.23], [5.73] 
36Walker C, ‘Neighbor Terrorism and the All Risks Policing of Terrorism’ Journal (2009) Dec  3 National  
   security Law and Policy 121, 123 
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finance convention in the six months following 9/11.37 The convention 
illustrates the impetus to international cooperation and a common 
international framework for the criminalisation of terrorist acts and the 
harmonisation of measures to seize, confiscate and forfeit terrorist funds. 
This required states to enact measures to prevent the use of terrorist 
property and remove access to terrorist funds. 38 The importance of funding 
for the operational effectiveness of terrorist groups for recruitment, training, 
and attack, is increasingly recognised as is the potential for international 
action targeting terrorist finance to reduce the terrorist threat. Given the 
international nature of the terrorist threat and the speed with which funds can 
be moved through different jurisdictions to the sites of operational activity, a 
coordinated international response to CTF is needed to incapacitate terrorist 
groups and their supporters and secure global security. 
 
The threat from international terrorism extends beyond the borders of 
individual states and requires a global response to ensure pro-active states 
are not compromised by the inaction, inadequate strategy and lack of 
effective legislation in other jurisdictions, that may create terrorist ‘safe 
havens’. The 9/11 attack resulted in the US, UK and many other states 
reappraising their national assessments of the terrorist threat, these 
informing the assessment of the international threat. Effective CTS requires 
the alignment of national and international CTS and the legislative 
infrastructures on which these are reliant for their implementation.39 
 
The 9/11 enquiry scrutinised the financial intelligence and data40 to identify 
how the  funds for this operation were transferred to, and accessed within, 
the US, given the attack required an estimated US $400,000 to $500,000.41 
The possible misuse of informal remittance systems to transfer funds for 9/11 
                                                          
37<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
11&chapter=18&lang=en>date accessed 29/04/2014 
38UNGA  International Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Financing (adopted 9th December 1999  
  opened for signature 10th January 2000 ) (2000) 39 ILM 270 Articles 2, 8 
39Staff Statement No.12 ‘Reforming Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Collection in  
   the United  States’ Tenth Public Hearing on "Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community" was  
  held April 13- 14,  2004 in Washington, DC      
40TR Eldridge and others ‘Staff report to the Commission on terrorist Attacks Upon the United states-   
   Monograph- 9/11 and Terrorist Travel’ 2 
41(n22) 169 [5.4] 
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was investigated, highlighting the risk these systems pose as a vehicle for 
assisting terrorist finance,42 placing ARS at the centre of international 
scrutiny. The religious and cultural context of these services became 
politically and socially sensitive in the aftermath of 9/11, the US promptly 
enacting the Patriot Act43 to strengthen its AML provisions and secure the 
regulation of informal ARS. The US reviewed its CTS44 to restrict terrorist 
funds entering the US, and sought to influence the international CTF agenda, 
in an effort to secure internal security by protecting its borders and its 
financial systems against the threat of terrorism from other jurisdictions. 
 
The US sought to disrupt future terrorist operations by deploying measures 
aimed to  detect and freeze terrorist assets, working to exert pressure within 
the UN,45 to robustly apply the sanctions regimes. The US continues to be a 
significant political and economic force in the international fight against 
terrorism, to which end it has developed specific jurisdictional agreements 
with the EU and indirectly the UK.46 This has not been without its problems 
given the divergence in the level of rights protection afforded by these 
parties. 
 
The UN mandate to protect international peace and security places the UN 
as a key stakeholder in developing the international CTS47 to secure a 
coordinated and consistent approach to CTF internationally, avoiding 
fragmented unilateral state responses. UN CTS is rooted in strengthening 
coordination and cooperation48 both internationally and regionally, ensuring 
full implementation of existing CT measures, supporting the adoption of 
FATF standards, drawing additionally on the support of the World Bank 
                                                          
42G Bush , ‘Bush Announces Al Qaeda Crackdown:  Transcript of an Address to the White House’,  
   The Washington post 7th November 2001 
43The Patriot Act 2001 (PL -107-56) 
44Staff Statement No.9 ‘Law Enforcement, Counter terrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United  
   States prior to 9/11’ 9 /11 Commission Tenth Public Hearing on "Law  Enforcement and the  
   Intelligence Community"  was held April 13-14, 2004 in Washington, DC, 4 
45Y Terlingen, ‘The United States and the UN's Targeted Sanctions of Suspected Terrorists: What Role  
   for Human Rights?’ (2010) 24(2) Ethics and International Affairs 
46Commission (EC) ‘Agreement between the US and the EU on the processing and transfer of financial  
   messaging data from the EU to the EU for the purposes of the TFTP’ 27 July 2010 OJ L 195/5 – L  
   195/14  
47UNCTC ‘Conference Report Special Meeting Hosted by OSCE’ 6th (2003) Vienna 
48UNGA ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ (20 September2006) UN Doc  
   A/Res/60/288 
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(WB), IMF and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to 
implement these. The CTS is implemented through the sharing of best 
practices and the provision of technical and financial support for capacity 
building. Implementation aims to be complimentary to, and reinforce the 
protection of, fundamental rights in accordance with international obligations 
supported by the role of the United Nations (UN)  Special Rapporteur (SR). 
The UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Finance makes specific 
reference to the need for supervision and licensing of all money transmission 
agents.49 CTF measures include the strengthening of the specific 1267 
sanctions regime and the general UNSCR 137350 requires states to 
criminalise terrorist fundraising and enact measures to enable the tracing 
and freezing of terrorist funds. Whilst the strategy does not make specific 
reference to an international risk assessment, it draws on state reports to the 
Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and interstate dialogue to secure 
effective implementation. 
 
 
1.6.1 International stakeholders 
 
Terrorism presents an international threat, but not all members of the 
international community have the political will or the financial or structural 
capacity to effectively prevent terrorism and its finance. Some stakeholders 
have no territorial claim or legislative capacity but offer effective support and 
guidance as to policy and international CTS. Through their international 
presence they have exerted pressure to develop international standards of 
financial regulation, guiding legislative action by states to underpin CTS. 
 
FATF, as an international intergovernmental organisation, has been the 
driving force in the development of global AML standards; its mandate is now 
inclusive of CTF51  It exerts international pressure to secure implementation 
of its standards, supported by the European Commission, the Gulf Co-
                                                          
49International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism New York, 9 December    
  1999 No. 38349 Article 18(2)(a) 
50UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373[f] [g] 
51FATF ‘Revised Mandate 2008-2012’ (2012) 
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operation council and international and regional organisations. Membership 
is conditional upon a state’s political commitment to implementation,52 
participation in regional bodies and submission to multilateral assessment 
and evaluation to secure compliance. 53 Non-cooperative and high risk 
jurisdictions are identified by the International Cooperation Review Group, 
with other states expected to protect against any dealings with these 
jurisdictions. FATF’s ‘soft law’ standards developed and informed by the risk 
assessments and typologies of its membership, contribute to the 
development of international CTS. Its requirement for national ML and TF 
risk assessments54 are a critical pre-requisite to developing AML/CTF 
strategies to effectively address jurisdictional risks. They also provide an 
evidence base from state contributions, to assess the risk of money 
laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) at regional and international 
level. Its standardised approach to the assessment of these risks enables the 
consistent and effective application of CTF strategy, drawn from consultation 
with relevant national bodies and securing political support to enable a wider 
dissemination of findings. 
 
The World Bank’s focus on poverty reduction and financial development 
supporting third world developing or transition countries with financial aid, 
aims to avoid state debt in establishing economic and financial 
infrastructures, critical to economic development. Its role requires that state 
financial systems and infrastructures are protected from the risk of ML and 
TF, providing technical assistance to develop financial capacity to recognised 
FATF standards to securely develop the financial governance necessary for 
sustainable economic development central to achieving its Millennium 
goals.55 Robust financial systems have the necessary financial integrity and 
sound governance to implement measures to protect against the risk of 
                                                          
52FAFT ‘40 Recommendations’ June 2003. FATF ‘Special Recommendations on Terrorist  
   Financing,’22 October 2004. FAFT IX Special Recommendations October 2001(Incorporating all  
   subsequent Amendments until February (2008) 
53FATF ‘Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and  (Special  
   Recommendations’ 27th February 2004 (Updated February 2009) 
54FATF ‘FATF Guidance National Money Laundering and  Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment’  
   February  2013  
55World Bank ‘The Millennium Development Goals and the Road to 2015: Building on Progress and  
   Responding to Crisis’ 2010 
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money laundering or terrorist finance. The WB and the IMF have, in 
conjunction with FATF, adopted a single assessment methodology to assess 
the AML/CTF risks. This policy takes account of the pre-existing financial 
structures, both formal and informal, the latter more the norm in under-
developed countries, conflict zones and weak states. 
 
The WB56 endorses FATF standards exerting political and economic 
pressure on countries to secure compliance, conditional to financial support. 
It supports the research of the Asia Pacific ARS working group disseminating 
its findings,57 and works with other stakeholders, including the Egmont 
group, to develop AML and CTF practice. It works collaboratively at policy 
level with the IMF, undertaking research into Hawala to ascertain the 
monetary flows of these systems and their economic and financial impact, 
and their propensity for misuse.58 Further partnership with states (UK 
Department For International Development (DFID) for example) has sought 
to implement best practices within the current regulatory framework. The 
capacity of all states to address the AML/CTF agenda is critical given the 
globalised nature of the financial system, for which the support of the WB for 
capacity building is critical. 
 
The IMF, having almost near worldwide membership,59 oversees the 
international monetary exchange system, securing exchange rate stability 
and removing the individual controls which restrict international trade. It 
promotes economic development through microeconomic policy and 
economic co-operation. Globalisation of financial markets has increased the 
financial interdependence between countries which are now susceptible to 
economic instability, destabilising the global financial economy. This impacts 
on the trade and development of states who have terrorist ‘hotspots,’ posing 
a risk to the international financial system. The IMF seeks to improve the 
                                                          
56FATF ‘Policy on Observers’ June 2008 
57P Schott P, ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Finance of Terrorism:  
  Second Edition and Supplement to Special Recommendation IX’ (IMF, 2006) [x-10]  
58World Bank ‘The World Bank in the Global Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’   
   2003,15 
59IMF, ‘The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, March 2011 
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resilience of states with undeveloped and vulnerable financial systems.60 It 
recognises the complexity of ARS in posing a challenge for regulation, which 
is not seen as a panacea for their misuse.61 The IMF promotes economic 
development and resilience through financial and technical assistance and 
policy surveillance, endorsing FATF standards62 and the regulation of ARS.63 
 
 
1.6.2 The European dimension 
 
UK membership of the EU requires a consideration of the EU context and the 
influence of the EU CTS and its aims. The EU is founded on the concept of 
freedom of movement within a single European area to facilitate trade, 
evident in the creation of the borderless ‘Schengen Area’.64 EU policy aims 
to reduce obstacles to the provision of financial services to assist cross-
border financial transactions to promote economic development. EU 
legislation aims to facilitate the movement of funds through the 
harmonisation of financial regulation and institutional practice, supervision 
and regulatory control. 
Erosion of financial borders has led to the risk of terrorist funds potentially 
being moved more readily within the EU. This requires measures to promote 
the exchange of investigatory information65 and financial intelligence66 
between supervisory and investigatory bodies of member states and third 
parties, such as the US.67These measures aim to promote the prompt 
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detection and seizure of terrorist funds to suppress terrorist finance. 68 The 
collation and dissemination of financial intelligence by MS is supported by 
Europol and cooperation between FIU across the EU. 
 
A common EU threat assessment derives from the intelligence from MS and 
third parties69 enabling the EU to respond dynamically to disrupt new threats 
and vulnerabilities, given the shift in the nature of terrorist activity since the 
1990’s. Tracking terrorist assets facilitates the detection of terrorist 
membership, preventing attacks and promoting financial investigation central 
to the EU CTS. The EU CTS recognises the different funding methods of 
terrorist groups, dependent on their ideological base, some having links to 
organised crime.70 Islamist TOs are more successful in raising funds, largely 
from fraud71 suspected to be channelled through ARS to move funds within, 
and external to, the EU. 
 
Separatist terrorism continues to be a concern from attacks by right-wing 
groups totalling 257arrests and 278 convictions for 2012,72 with 397 attacks 
associated with internal separatist groups for 2009 reduced to 167 for 2012.  
These were mainly perpetrated by EU citizens in France and Spain. There 
has, however, been a rise in Islamist terrorism with 50% of the 384 verdicts 
related to terrorist offences in 2008 linked to Islamist terrorism.73 The number 
of groups associated with ‘home-grown terrorism’ is rising, linked to MS 
involvement in ‘conflict zones’. In 2008 there were 515 failed, foiled or 
successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks;74 by 2012 only six related to 
religiously inspired terrorism. Convictions in relation to Islamist terrorist 
groups are higher in the UK, Germany, Spain and Belgium.75 In terms of 
arrests, 159 for religiously inspired terrorist suspects for 2012 reveal plots by 
home grown Islamist groups aiming to cause mass casualties. These were 
                                                          
68Council (EC) 2007/845/JHA 6 December [2007] OJ L 332/103 
69Council (EC), ‘EU Action plan on Combating terrorism’ 13 February 2006 5771/1/06 REV 1 paras  
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planned by small autonomous cells bound to a central ideology rather than 
controlled specifically by the network or the membership of the TO. The 
majority of those arrested on suspicion of Islamist terrorism in the EU for 
2008 were suspects of non-EU states76 and could not be linked to a known 
TO but demonstrated an adherence to ‘global Jihad’. 
 
The EU aims to protect its citizens from the internal and external terrorist 
threats, requiring a common response through solidarity77 drawn from the 
cooperation of Member States (MS),78 who maintain responsibility for 
combating terrorism within their own territories based on subsidiarity.79 The 
EU is committed to combating terrorism globally and promoting security 
through the principles of freedom, security and justice,80 and the adoption of 
a criminal justice model81 which is sensitive to the protection of fundamental 
rights. Mutual recognition of legal measures promotes cooperation, drawing 
on the requirement for a mix of judicial, military and intelligence responses.82 
EU CTS like, that of the UK, aims to disrupt existing networks by limiting their 
access to funds, underpinned by an intelligence led approach supported by 
the implementation of AML/CTF legislation across all states in accordance 
with FAFT standards,83 to enable the freezing of terrorist assets84 within the 
EU. 
 
The EU recognises modern terrorism aims to use ‘unlimited violence’85 to 
cause mass casualties. Europe remains a potential target and a base for 
terrorist activities, with Al Qa’ida bases being uncovered in the UK, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Belgium. The EU CTS has four key dimensions; protect, 
prevent, pursue and respond,86 mirroring the UK CTS. The ‘new model 
terrorism’ may require EU states, including the UK, to reappraise their CTS 
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not least because of the number of persons of Muslim faith in Europe 
estimated to be 15-20 million87 and 41% of those arrested in the period 
1993-2004 were naturalised citizens and second generation converts to 
Islam, a potential source for radicalisation. To this end the EU supports the 
implementation of FATF standards and the regulation of ARS, recognising 
the need to balance their misuse for TF with ‘safeguarding legitimate use.’88 
 
The EU acknowledges the need for collaboration with the UN in developing 
and implementing an international CTS89 and has adopted measures 
complying with UN financial sanctions90 in addition to the autonomous EU 
regime.91 
 
 
1.6.3  The UK perspective 
 
The UK has historical experience of dealing with the terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, the IRA posing a threat until the mid1990’s, associated with the 
struggle for rule in Northern Ireland. This threat has reduced considerably 
following the declaration of a ceasefire and the progress of the peace making 
and power sharing process. A lesser threat still remains from dissident 
republican groups aiming to disrupt the peace making process,92 but this 
terrorist activity is now confined to Northern Ireland. The events of 7/7, the 
London suicide bombings of 2005 in which 56 people died, brought the 
vulnerability of the UK from terrorist attack into sharp focus. The UK has 
experienced a credible terrorist attack about once a year since 9/11,93 foiled 
plots including the ‘Airline liquid plot’ 2006,94 ‘Fertiliser plot’ and ‘Gas Limos’ 
plots lead to successful prosecutions in 2007, and more recently the 
‘Birmingham ruck sack plot’ 2010 and the ‘Luton Territorial Arms Base plot ‘ 
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2012.95 The murder of Lee Rigby is a stark reminder of the threat from ‘home 
grown’ Al-Qa’ida inspired terrorists. UK nationals in conflict zones in Africa 
also remain at risk; these incidents are reflected in a UK threat level, which is 
currently assessed as substantial. 
 
The UK Government accepts that the international terrorist threat will 
continue to be determined by four factors: conflict, instability, ideology and 
associated radicalisation. The UK ‘Contest’ CTS comprises of four key 
objectives: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare, which continue to be 
informed by the identified threats, conflicts, instability, ideology and 
associated radicalisation and technology. The UK CTS aims to prevent 
terrorism by disrupting the operational capacity of terrorist groups by limiting 
their access to funds, and also by seeking to tackle the underlying causes of 
terrorism96 and the support of the selected ideology and its links with violent 
extremism.97 The effectiveness of the CTS is assessed by reference to an 
outcomes based agreement linked to ‘Contest’ aims, Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism overseeing this.98 Central to the delivery of the UK CTS, 
as with the UN and the EU, is in recognition that CTS responses must be 
implemented with regard to respect for human rights and the rule of law.99 
 
The Government recognises that the threat to the UK from Al Qa’ida will 
remain despite the loss of the leadership of Bin Laden and despite changes 
in the organisational structure, since broad support for the core ideology 
remains.100 The Prevent strand of the ‘Contest’ strategy, launched in 2007, 
aims to prevent the spread of terrorist ideology and radicalisation by 
disrupting recruitment and building community resilience. This is particularly 
significant given that the UK Muslim population is currently 2.9 million but is 
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set to more than double from 4.6% to 8.2% of the UK population by 
2030.101The fact of being of Muslim faith is not determinant of the propensity 
to terrorist activity or shared ideology, but is viewed as an indicator of the 
potential for shared religious ideology; Islamist. This may lead to the 
adoption of, or radicalisation to, fundamentalist ideology, and allegiance to 
groups in support of such views, linked to identified terrorist groups. It also 
enables terrorists to blend invisibly into a cultural group under the guise of 
mainstream religious doctrine and within the ethnic diaspora communities 
that now exist. The concept of Al Qa’ida as an international terrorist 
organisation also lends itself to consideration as a domestic one, as evident 
in the 7/7 London bombings. Here, a global ideology and cause were the 
triggers for an attack by ‘home grown terrorists’.102 
 
The strategies developed to limit the finance of terrorist organisations need 
to be considered in light of the changing nature of terrorist finance, state 
sponsored terrorism being less significant than previously.103 The Pursue 
element of the UK ‘Contest’ strategy aims to disrupt terrorist activity by 
drawing on measures to limit access and use of terrorist funds. The report 
into the 7/7 bombings cited intelligence agencies as inadequate in their 
contribution to suppressing terrorism and its finance. The report prioritised 
the need to identify and limit terrorist funding activities seen as  critical to 
identifying the ‘next plot,’104and preventing the move from facilitation to 
attack. A recent review of ‘Contest’ highlighted concerns about the misuse of 
charitable funds diverted for terrorist support; the MSB sector was also 
identified as at risk for misuse for the transfer and diversion of charitable and 
migrant support overseas105 for terrorism. 
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Within the UK Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) supervises the 
registration of MSBs for the purposes of the MLR 2007, and works co-
operatively alongside the National Crime Agency (NCA) to collate, 
disseminate and act on intelligence derived from SARs and investigation to 
indicate MSB sector and TF risks. AML / CTF regulatory standards and best 
practices are supported and guided by professional and industry bodies, 
including the Wolfsberg Group and the Basel Banking Committee. The UK 
Money Transmitters Association UKMTA provides sector 
representation106and has adopted a charter of customer satisfaction107  and 
promotes ‘best practices’ in relation to AML standards. 
 
A UK, as a member of the EU, actively contributes to the development and 
implementation of the EU CTS, 108 with UK legislation now mirrored in EU 
measures109  to provide equivalence for terrorist offences.  The UK, however, 
retains an opt-out to criminal justice measures under the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which may jeopardise its contribution to the development of CTS for the 
future. 
 
 
1.7 Defining terminology - alternative remittance services 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the impact of the MLR on alternative 
remittance services, the term money service business applying to 
businesses regulated under the MLR 2007. This section justifies the selected 
terminology relevant to defining the scope and focus of this work. 
Remittances are ordinary financial transactions which can be processed 
through the formal banking sector or ARS. ARS derive from, and operate 
within a particular socio-cultural and ethnic context, aligned to that from 
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which they originated.110 Their historical development, method of operation 
and     their socio-cultural context of operation is critiqued in chapter 2. 
Formal sector processing of remittances lacks these ethnic and cultural 
characteristics. 
 
Terminology reflects the different types of ARS,111 their mode or operation 
and the distinct context of their operation and its characteristics for 
transferring funds or value from one location to another.112The landscape of 
terminology is problematic given there is no single accepted definition of 
ARS, but a clear and selected definition is required for the purposes of this 
study. The terminology used refers to the nature of the systems or the form 
of property transferred or their degree of formality; ‘informal’ is, however, an 
imprecise term.113 
 
The IMF refers to ‘remittances’ as including the transfer of funds or value 
through the formal or informal sectors, and encompasses ARS such as 
Hawala if limited to cash, and branded operators such as Western Union. 
The IMF refers to ‘remittance providers’ to overcome the conceptual 
difficulties associated with defining remittance services by the nature of the 
transfer or degree of formality utilised.114 It identifies informal remittance 
systems115 and services,116 as those not subject to regulation, but does not 
distinguish between jurisdictions lacking regulation as opposed to the 
avoidance of regulation by the provider. There is a lack of consistent 
distinction between formal and informal remittance services derived from 
variations in the transaction purpose.117 Remittance operators in some 
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jurisdictions118 are recognised as formal and regulated involving transfers of 
the same form. ARS offer the capacity to transfer equivalent values in a 
different form and provide remittances for the ethnic diaspora, but also 
includes those systems operating in contravention of regulatory frameworks, 
as well as those prohibited entirely. 119 
 
FATF defines an ARS as an ‘informal money or value transfer system …also 
refers to financial services whereby funds or value are moved from one 
geographic location to another,’120 referring to Hawala within this category. 
FATF refers to an alternative remittance as: 
 
A financial service... provided by a distinct category of non-bank 
financial institutions – whereby funds are moved for individuals or 
entities through a dedicated network or through the regulated banking 
system.121 
 
FAFT’s definition of ‘Money Value Transfer’ (MVT) is limited to cash 
transfers122: 
 
A financial service that accepts cash, cheques, other monetary 
instruments or other stores of value in one location and pays a 
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary in another 
location by means of a communication, message, transfer or through a 
clearing network.123 
 
MVT may be provided ‘formally through the regulated financial system or 
informally through entities that operate outside the regulated system’124 
including transactions performed by intermediaries or third party payments. 
FATF acknowledges the lack of clarity in the term ‘Hawala’ and now refers to 
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Hawala and other similar service providers (HOSSP) characterised by their 
settlement methods, which are transfers of equivalent value by systems with 
ties to ‘specific geographic regions or ethnic communities’ defined by service 
not by legal status.125 The typology elaborates the definition to include 
legitimate regulated, and unwitting and wittingly complicit modes of 
operation. It is unfortunate that FATF have sought to refine their definition by 
reference to the criminal misuse rather than the operational characteristics, 
given that all financial transactions, whether formal or informal, are capable 
of misuse for ML or TF.126 The new categorisation fails to distinguish 
between Hawala as legitimate in origin,127 with the risk of subsequent 
misuse, and other systems such as the Black Market Peso Exchange 
System (BMPE), which was created to facilitate criminality and lacks the 
cultural and ethnic context of operation. The latter systems are not within the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
The lack of distinction between Hawala and the formal sector in the provision 
of MVT is perhaps illustrative of the need for regulation of all MVT 
systems.128 ARS have been identified as: 
 
Underground (or parallel) banking systems. Often these systems have 
ties to particular geographic regions and are therefore described using 
a variety of specific terms. Some examples of these terms include 
Hawala.129 
 
FinCen refers to networks facilitating the transfer of value that operate: 
 
Outside of the conventional banking system through non-bank financial 
institutions or other business entities whose primary business activity 
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may not be the transmission of money. The IVTS transactions 
occasionally interconnect with formal banking systems.130 
 
This definition clearly includes Hawala but distinguishes IVTS from those 
remittance services offered by regulated businesses, referring to the 
transmission of funds of equivalent value. 
 
Austrac refers to registrable remittance services,131 whilst Interpol uses the 
term remittance system.132 The APG refers to alternative remittance systems 
including Hawala as ‘financial services, traditionally operating outside the 
regulated financial sector, where value or funds are moved from one 
geographic location to another’.133 
 
The term informal value transfer system (IVTS) is favoured in some quarters 
given the term ‘alternative remittance’ suggests an alternative to formal 
banking, which these systems pre-date, and an association with diaspora 
transfers.134 
 
The variance in the terminology reflects the method and form of funds 
moved, the degree of ‘informality’ of the provider to regulatory requirements 
and the interface with formal banking institutions. Some terms additionally 
refer to the ethnic context of the user group. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis the term ARS is selected to denote the 
transfer of equivalent value of the same or different form, from one location 
to another where remitted through a system operator who secures the 
resulting payment of equivalent value by another system operator to the end 
beneficiary. ARS refers to systems that include informal and/or regulated 
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systems as an ‘alternative’ to remittances solely made through the formal 
sector. Reference to Hawala illustrates an identified form of ARS activity. 
 
 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to present a clear and cogent rationale for this 
thesis in considering the misuse of ARS for terrorist finance. The chapter has 
presented a clear outline of the thesis, justifying the originality of this 
research within the consideration of the regulation of alternative remittance 
systems in the UK. 
 
This chapter has sought to identify the concept of ‘new model style terrorism’ 
and outlined its relevance to the development of CTS and measures which 
need to be flexible in addressing the changes in terrorist operational activity 
and the new and emerging terrorist threats. It also provides a premise for 
further re-evaluation of existing CTS. The UK CTS has been reviewed briefly 
alongside EU level and international CTS; this is justified by the threat and 
concern raised by international terrorism. This provides a platform for a more 
in depth critical review of the concordance of the UK legislative and 
regulatory framework for CTF and its normative compliance, and the 
relationship of UK counter terrorist strategy with obligations at EU level, and 
internationally, in enacting measures to suppress terrorist finance. This 
enables more in depth scrutiny of specific measures to assess their 
compliance with the normative framework which is presented and analysed 
later in chapter 4. 
 
This chapter has purposefully reviewed the terminology currently employed 
by existing stakeholders to clarify the selected meaning of alternative 
remittance systems for the purposes of this work. The definition of ARS 
enables a distinction to be made between the discussion of the historical 
origins and current socio-cultural context of their operation, which is analysed 
in chapter 2. The characteristics identified as associated with ARS will be 
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analysed alongside their method of operation in chapter 2, forming the basis 
of critique and comparison for the fieldwork analysis in chapter 6 and the 
identification of any impact of regulation on the model of operation of ARS on 
the UK, which is the critical scope of this work. 
 
This chapter has sought to present a clear and cogent rationale for this 
thesis in considering the misuse of ARS for terrorist finance. A brief overview 
of the socio- economic, ethnic context and geographical relevance of ARS 
operations linked the heightened state of security and concerns for their 
misuse for terrorist finance, post 9/11 has been presented. These concerns 
have been linked to the allegations as to their use in supporting the 9/11 
attack. 
 
This introductory chapter has considered the events of 9/11 within the 
context of the new and emerging trends in terrorist operational activity, and 
the ‘new model’ terrorism, outlining the need for CTS to address new and 
emerging threats and the increasingly international dimension of terrorist 
activity. The chapter has sought to illustrate the need for a robust 
international CTS and the alignment of national CTS and legislative 
measures to support the effective implementation of CTS at national and 
international level. The relevant stakeholders and their contribution to the 
international CTS have been critiqued, and the relationship and between 
international strategies and the aims of the UK CTS have been outlined. 
 
The chapter has presented a clear context within which the central research 
question is situated and has, through the critical overview of the relevant 
research to date into ARS, sought to justify the originality of this research. 
This work uniquely aimed to investigate the impact and effectiveness of UK 
regulation of alternative remittance systems as money service businesses in 
the UK. The chapter has outlined the structure of this work by presenting a 
brief overview of each chapter, identifying their relevant themes and 
substantive content, and clarifying the distinct focus of each chapter and its 
contribution to the central research question. 
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This chapter has purposefully reviewed the terminology used by existing 
stakeholders to clarify the selected meaning of ARS for the purposes of this 
work. The definition of ARS enables a distinction to be made between the 
discussion of the historical origins and the current socio-cultural context of 
their operation, which is analysed in chapter two. It also provides for clarity, 
distinction and critique in the analysis of the fieldwork data in chapter six. 
The fieldwork is critical to the originality of this work in its investigation of the 
impact and effectiveness of the MLR as the selected element of the 
regulatory framework for ARS as MSBs within the UK. 
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Chapter 2   
The nature and operation of alternative remittance systems 
with specific reference to Hawala 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Post 9/11, efforts have increasingly focused on pre-emptive strategies to 
prevent the financing of terrorism to limit the operational capacity of terrorist 
groups by restricting their access to funds.1 This strategy can impede the 
operation of terrorist groups, denying them funds and so restricting their 
recruitment, training and capacity for physical attack on the civilian 
population,2 particularly on the unprecedented scale of 9/11. Governments 
and international bodies3 increasingly espouse the potential effectiveness of 
strategies tailored to disrupting terrorist finance, by identifying the 
mechanisms used to transfer funds,4 which facilitate their potential 
operational capacity internationally.5 The assets of known terrorist 
organisations and their supporters need to be identified, frozen or 
confiscated, in line with UN measures requiring that ‘the international 
community should take the necessary steps to enhance co-operation to 
prevent and combat terrorism’.6 The $112 million dollars of ‘Al Qa’ida and 
Taliban’ funds frozen since 9/11 is estimated to be only a fraction of the 
available funds. The movement of money is critical to the ‘new model’ and 
network based operation of groups such as Al Qa’ida, who require the 
means to move funds from their source to operational locations, since 
terrorist funds are not generally generated from within the target countries.7  
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Terrorists seek anonymity, preferring fund transfer methods and jurisdictions 
that lack transparency and scrutiny. The 9/118 investigation sought to identify 
the funding sources and the methods of transfer used in the attack to identify 
areas at risk of future abuse. ARS, and Hawala9 in particular, were 
suspected to have been used to finance the 9/11 attack, giving rise to 
international concerns for their regulation. The climate of insecurity and 
moral panic post 9/11, in particular within the US, and internal pressure on 
US agencies to be seen as acting to address perceived insecurities, led to 
the targeting of Hawala by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). US 
concerns led to raids on Hawala operators associated with Somali 
communities across the US, in particular in Minnesota, Washington and 
Massachusetts, as part of Operation Green Quest, based on their supposed 
links with Al Qa’ida. US pressure also secured the subsequent listing of the 
Al-Barakaat operator at UN level bringing Hawala to the attention of the 
international community, on the basis of the 9/11 association which was 
never substantiated. This form of precautionary logic stems from an absence 
of evidence that authorities appear unwilling to accept as evidence of an 
absence of criminality. 10 The sensationalising of ARS post 9/11has led to 
numerous misconceptions about the nature and risk these systems present. 
It is, however, the perception of risk post 9/11 that has come to dominate the 
security agenda and drive their regulation. 
 
This chapter will begin by considering the historical, social and cultural 
context that is associated and recognised as a characteristic of Hawala 
operation, relevant to the development of these systems over many 
centuries, illustrating their flexible accommodation to changing 
circumstances over time. The chapter then analyses their mode of operation 
and the risks arising from this, specifically in relation to terrorist finance. The 
operational method and context of these systems is compared and 
contrasted with the formal banking sector to consider the risks ARS pose in 
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their intersection with the formal sector. This is necessary in order to fully 
appreciate the concerns for the regulation of these systems internationally 
and to critically review the validity and justifications provided for this by 
domestic and international regulatory bodies. This critique aims to provide a 
nuanced understanding of their operation11 avoiding reliance on myths12 and 
mistaken facts perpetuated by repetition.13 This analysis and outline of the 
risks these systems present, enables a later review of the UK regulatory 
regimes capacity for minimising these risks as presented in chapter five, and  
adds to the consideration of the effectiveness of regulation for achieving this 
as revealed by the fieldwork presented in chapter six.  
 
The chapter also considers the normative values which underpin these 
systems to bind operators and service users through the social and cultural 
context of their operation, setting the scene for their further consideration in 
chapter four. These normative values are considered in more detail in 
chapter four which presents the normative framework. Data is presented to 
indicate the prevalence of these systems and to identify the significance of 
their usage within specific geographical areas. Reasons for the continued 
use of these systems today, linked to the advantages they afford are 
considered as to their importance in determining their selection over the 
formal banking sector. 
 
2.1 Historical origins and cultural dimensions of alternative remittance  
      systems 
Hawala is the most prevalent type of ARS, often inaccurately termed an 
alternative or parallel banking system,14 which is misleading since these 
systems pre-date formal banking when no ‘alternative’ systems were 
available.15ARS originated in about 5800 B.C.16 and from about 1327 A.D.17 
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12S Keene, September ‘Hawala and related Informal Value Transfer Systems – An assessment in  
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they were subject to Islamic law, having originated as payment systems in 
the Middle East,18 Africa and the Indian subcontinent. They remain grounded 
in Islamic culture and law, and are prevalent today throughout the Middle 
East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Africa.19   
 
Hawala developed to facilitate trade20 amongst merchants along the silk 
route and Indian Ocean, facilitating payment for goods and services. As Arab 
and Muslim traders became established in the Mediterranean and Red Sea 
areas, these systems became more prolific expanding through Iran, central 
Asia and China. ‘Hawala’ means ‘transfer’ or ‘transform’21 representing a bill 
of exchange or promissory note, a ‘Hawala Safar’.22  Specific terms denote 
the systems common to specific locations, ‘hundi’ being common to India, ‘fei 
ch’ien’ is indigenous to China and ‘phoe kuan’ operates in Thailand. These 
systems are rooted in the trade and socio-cultural practices of the regions in 
which they developed and continue to operate.23  
 
Hawala and hundi differ, the former refers to the process whereas the latter 
denotes the instrument utilised to effect the transfer.24 ARS used exchanges 
of promissory notes or bills of exchange, with the value paid on later receipt, 
often in different locations, to different persons, with payments between 
operators settled later. The promissory note (‘hundi’) or bill of exchange was 
honoured on presentation to any operator within that same ‘coalition’ or 
network. As trade expanded and competition increased, distinct networks of 
operation developed, co-operating with each other to honour the financial 
instruments inherent to each system. These systems have lawful origins, 
                                                                                                                                               
   Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
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   Other  Remittance Systems’  Washington DC (2005) 9 
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having developed to facilitate the safe transfer of goods25 and monies for 
traders, avoiding the problems of currency exchange and the need for large 
quantities of goods for exchange, safeguarding transactions in the absence 
of formal institutions and law enforcement. 26  
     
Remittance activity now extends worldwide, prevalent in countries of origin 
such as Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and China, but is now also evident in 
Paraguay, Mexico, Jamaica, Surinam, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, Nepal, 
Japan, Turkey, the US, the UK and some European countries. ARS are now 
linked to the economic migration of the diaspora who make use of these 
culturally familiar systems, which have a vital role alongside the formal 
sector, contributing significantly to international remittance activity.27 Their 
continued use, despite the development of the formal financial sector, stems 
from their social and cultural context as practices common to the regions in 
which they are embedded and their flexibility in accommodating different 
business, practices28 operating effectively in different legal jurisdictions.  
 
2.2 Method of operation  
ARS are not ‘underground banking systems,’29 a common misconception 
arising that from the lack of visibility of their operation. They do not however 
offer the lending, deposit or the range of services associated with modern 
western banking. The term though is informative of the suspicion they are 
viewed with generally and the suggestions of illegality due to their informality 
and lack of transparency.30  
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These systems transfer cash or equivalent value31 often operating within a 
primary business that provides goods or services32 with varied methods of 
operation.33 The formal sector relies on deposit services to fund its capacity 
for loans and investment activity, profit incentivising the core business 
purpose. The formal sector is market focused, profit driven, and in a modern 
context any claim to personal banking is generally within an ‘arm’s length’ 
customer relationship with little face to face interaction. ARS such as Hawala 
are the very antithesis of formal sector services. Their operational activity is 
not defined by the provision of loans or deposit services. Any micro-finance 
offered is limited, supported from the primary business activity within which 
ARS operate34 and is generally interest free35 aligning with the principles of 
Islamic law  where the charging of interest or ‘riba’ is forbidden.36 In contrast, 
western banking is founded on the charging of interest derived from the early 
banking systems originating and operating in Greece and Rome in the fourth 
century B.C., which were regulated from around the second century A.D. The 
charging of usury by the Christians and Jewish faiths was prohibited, but 
Jewish bankers flourished in Europe during the 11th to 13th centuries, 
charging interest to non-Jews.   
 
Modern banking in the formal sector focuses on product development and 
the marketing of services to generate demand and maximise profit, 
predicated on the normative values of commercialism, increased commercial 
presence and market share and growth, derived from considered fiscal and 
corporate planning and risk control.  
 
ARS emerge as services designed to meet customer needs through their  
opportunistic operation tailored to customer demand, based on the strong 
social and commercial relationships and context that underpin their 
operation. The normative values and model of practice are predominantly 
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social, not commercial, serving customers as members of a social group; the 
social context and the relationships are central to their mode of operation 
and use. Western banking operates according to a corporate or 
conglomerate model; competition not co-operation between banks is the 
norm, with relationships driven by objective financial, not social, criteria.   
 
 
2.2.1 Form and practice 
 
ARS operate as an adjunct to another primary business, providing a cash 
pool to facilitate remittance payments. Hawaladars (Hawala operators) can 
offer cash/value transfers, currency exchange, trade finance or microfinance, 
according to their structure and size of their operations and ancillary 
business. Whilst these services bear similarities to formal banking services, 
research suggests that Afghanistan ‘money exchange dealers’ developed 
historically according to the business opportunities, offering microfinance 37 
only where necessary to further their business interests and where in 
accordance with ethnic and religious practice.38 ARS are not completely 
uniform and vary according to the prevailing cultural and social context of 
their operation, posing a challenge for authorities in firstly identifying what 
constitutes ARS activity, and further in seeking to regulate them within this 
context.  
 
The formal sector is readily identifiable by its physical presence, market 
dominance, and product diversification aimed to generate product demand. It 
is however subject to considerable regulation nationally and internationally, 
having formal mechanisms of arbitration, scrutiny and accountability, with 
external supervision, monitoring and control exerted through legal regulation. 
Operational methods and practices are uniformly regulated through national 
and international standards applied across the sector rendering the formal 
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sector less susceptible to risk but operationally less adaptable to social 
conditions, than ARS. Banking services are less individually tailored; they are 
designed for specific ‘groups’ and ‘markets’ and therefore less culturally, 
geographically and socially sensitive. 
 
The transfer of funds without their direct physical movement is not a defining 
feature of ARS;39 banks also perform this function. Whilst FATF defines 
‘remittance services’ by reference to cash transfers only,40 ARS allow for the 
transfer of the value of goods or services or different currencies between 
locations, whereas banks mostly process cash transfers.41 ARS are more 
flexible in settling transfers over a period of time through multiple 
transactions42 making the detection of their activity problematic. 
 
Modern banking practice is dependent on market penetration and sector 
reputation, evidenced by the quality and range of services offered and 
compliance with sector and regulatory standards, with profitability and 
financial stability viewed as signs of success. ARS operate through networks 
of locally based Hawaladars and individual client transaction agreements. 
The delivery of value to the recipient is through a Hawaladar in the 
destination location, across geographical boundaries43 and legal 
jurisdictions,44 effected with speed and accessing remote regions to deliver 
within 24 hours. In the absence of any physical movement of funds ARS 
transactions pose a problem for authorities and regulators in terms of the 
visibility of their activity. They are an ideal vehicle for circumventing currency 
controls,45 import / export duties and reporting requirements. Tracing the 
transaction pathway and value from source to destination is more accessible 
through the formal sector, each jurisdiction having their own regulatory 
framework guided by international banking standards regulating cross-border 
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banking activity. In the absence of regulation, ARS lack the compulsion to 
apply and adhere to standardised methods of operation, and recording and 
accounting processes, relying solely on their normative values and the 
informality of established custom and practice to determine their operation.   
 
ARS are often ancillary to cash intensive businesses 46 including the 
import/export of goods, sale of high value goods, travel services and 
currency exchange. A symbiotic relationship exists between the two;47 the 
core business provides a ‘cash pool’ for remittance operation, enabling the 
payment of funds to the recipient in advance of receipt of payment from the 
sender. The ‘core business’ enhances the customer base and evidences 
‘trust’ in the Hawaladar for entry into the network. This social status and 
business reputation represents a personal ‘stake’ as ‘community capital’ in 
the network subject to the local accountability of the network, customers, and 
community. 
 
Conversely, the formal sector is defined by a ‘corporate personality’ as the 
basis for operational engagement, employees and managers largely 
remaining unidentified and indistinct, with limited face to face customer 
contact. Formal sector compliance is governed by legal regulatory 
requirements determining operational status, activity and business 
relationships. Accountability is to shareholders for performance and profit, 
with ethics and social norms being less relevant and accountability managed 
through external supervision. For formal institutions market share, profit and 
commercial viability are commensurate with reputation, and longevity of 
operation is managed through regulation and risk management. The formal 
sector is less sensitive to cultural practice or preference, and customer trust 
is expressed and evident within service delivery and regulatory enforcement 
creating customer confidence.  
 
The Hawala relationships are dynamic and multidirectional, operating both 
horizontally between Hawaladars and their clients, and vertically and 
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horizontally between Hawaladars to enable the consolidation of debts owed 
between Hawaladars and fulfilment of transactions at different levels of the 
network. This requires the presence and support of Hawaladars from within 
the same network (network relationships) covering specific geographical 
locations and those forged with other networks providing services in different 
locations. These latter peripheral structural relationships extend the 
operational capacity and geographical reach of networks resulting in an 
extensive and complex hierarchical network.48 
 
The systems are premised on trust essential to maintaining network 
cohesion and relationships between operators across different networks, 
creating a vast operational network, a ‘Hawala community’. In similar ways 
the formal sector is comprised of individual branches, local or regional banks 
or building societies, and national and multinational corporate groups. Formal 
sector relationships are driven by formalised commercial contractual and 
legal relationships. Transactions between regulated financial institutions are 
facilitated by CHAPS, SWIFT49 and use of ATMs by customers of any group 
member. The distinction between the formal sector and ARS is that the latter 
can provide single transactions at any time without the client needing to 
become a member. Transactions in the formal sector require membership via 
a bank account and customer allegiance is often predicated on the ‘best 
deal’ and the ‘commercial context’. ARS have no obvious membership 
requirements for service use, access is determined by the commitment to the 
shared social values and cultural context.  
 
ARS can accommodate delivery to the recipient’s home using couriers, 
including bus drivers,50 taxi drivers and local merchants, widening their 
penetration into rural areas, unmatched by the formal sector. Remittances 
are often made to households where the male family members have 
migrated, with females remaining in the country of origin. ARS accommodate 
delivery where travel to a bank location by unescorted females would be a 
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hindrance and contravene religious observance and social practice. Couriers 
move funds in the course of their ordinary business activity, couriers forming 
a peripheral network of relationships. This places ARS at risk of smuggling 
and support of terrorist finance, since there are no restrictions on the 
personnel used as couriers,51 and, given the lack of transparency as to 
network membership, this poses a concern for regulators.  
 
2.2.2 Typology of alternative remittance systems 
 
Two models of operation have been identified, the ‘basic’ or ‘traditional’ 
model (see appendix 1) and the ‘contemporary’ or ‘modern’ model (see 
appendix 2), the difference between these being that the interface with the 
formal sector is only present in the ‘contemporary’ model.52 The basic model 
operates in accordance with the diagram in appendix 1. The sender contacts 
Hawaladar A in location A, requesting a transfer of funds to recipient B in 
location B. The sender may be known to the Hawaladar personally, or 
referred by mutual acquaintance. Customer identity checks are not usual, an 
advantage in areas such as Africa where formal identity documents are 
difficult to obtain. This does, however, promote a ‘take on trust approach’ 
where trust is presumed in those of the same ethnic group or applied to 
those known only superficially. 
 
Hawaladar A contacts counterpart Hawaladar B in location B, who delivers to 
the recipient who confirms receipt with the sender. On confirmation the 
sender pays the value to Hawaladar A. Neither the client nor the recipient 
need be in the same geographical location or legal jurisdiction53 for the 
transfer.54 Hawaladar A has received payment for the transaction which 
Hawaladar B has paid to the recipient, creating a debt from one Hawaladar 
to another and an asymmetry.55 This promotes reciprocal trust, co-
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dependence and network cohesion to generate network allegiance and co-
operative working for future settlements of debts between Hawaladars.  
 
System transactions utilise two transmission pathways, one relating to the 
transfer of the goods/value and one pertaining to the transaction information; 
these are separate and distinct transmission pathways. In the formal sector 
the transaction information follows the same pathway as the funds 
transferred, supported by SWIFT technology and legal regulation56 securing 
the capacity to trace and track transaction information. The fragmentation of 
the transaction pathway compromises the tracing of transactions made 
problematic by lack of standardised record keeping within ARS. 
 
ARS have mistakenly been termed ‘paperless’ systems, in light of the lack of 
uniform methods for verifying and recording transactions. Records may be 
handwritten making use of mutually agreed codes, usually banknote serial 
numbers, passport numbers or unique information known only to the parties 
to the transaction. Records can be idiosyncratic, often meaningful only to the 
parties and impenetrable to outsiders making the identification of clients and 
the tracing of transactions problematic for regulators, hampered by the lack 
of consistent methods for central data collection. 
 
The transaction code, when received by the recipient, enables verification of 
their identity allowing the collection of funds from Hawaladar B, the recipient 
then confirms payment to the sender. Single transactions of small value may 
not be recorded,57 with records often only kept until the transaction is 
complete,58 except in relation to relief aid and development payment 
transactions, where detailed records are maintained59 for accountability. 
 
This informality of record keeping is commensurate with the values and 
informality of the system and the nature of trust between parties. In the 
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formal sector, regulation imposes mandatory transaction and ‘identification’ 
checks and data recording, mostly automated, the form determined by 
institutional practice. Identification and tracking of transactions in the formal 
sector is easier due to consistent standardised practices and central 
computerised data recording systems. These features are absent in ARS 
since transaction verification and recording methods vary between 
Hawaladars and potentially offer anonymity to client and Hawaladar 
transactions.  
 
The formal sector retains transaction information including the transaction 
amount, identification/originator information and other features pertaining to 
the transmission pathway. This facilitates the identification and tracking of 
transactions in relation to value, source, destination and parties, and 
connects the identities60 of the sender and beneficiary. In the formal sector 
payment into the client account signals transaction completion to which 
clients have access to records and receipts for all transactions. Transaction 
information is critical to successful CTF strategy, providing vital intelligence 
for authorities to draw on to identify the terrorist financial footprint 61 and 
disrupt terrorist networks, enabling the tracing of transactions between 
terrorist cells and supporters in order to identify membership. 
 
Hawaladars are viewed as ‘ordinary’ businessmen, the primary business 
providing the ARS business with legitimacy. The presence of ARS is difficult 
to identify, often only visible to other operators and customers. Access to the 
network is dependent on recognised socio-economic status and community 
standing controlled informally with the assumption of integrity regarding 
transactions, based on a ‘no questions’ asked, approach to trust.62 
Operational relationships lack impartiality and objectivity in assuming the 
legitimacy of transactions on the basis of shared ethnicity, where enquiry as 
to the transaction purpose may transgress social norms. Since ARS operate 
as social networks with extensive geographical reach they offer potentially 
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unhindered access, a concern for authorities seeking to exclude access to 
ARS by criminal elements and terrorist organisations, to prevent their 
misuse. 
 
Roles within the formal sector are more transparent with information 
concerning corporate structures required to be publically accessible, and with 
more stringent controls of employee/management selection and 
accountability. The operation of ARS as socially rather than commercially 
driven networks poses challenges for regulators in managing risks that these 
systems present whilst also preserving the benefits of their efficiency. 
 
 
2.2.3 Consolidation and settlement 
 
The basic model has no interface with the formal sector, the debt between 
Hawaladars is fulfilled by reverse or parallel transactions63 for clients of 
Hawaladar B64 through a ‘settlement process’. Hawaladars rely on mutual 
repeat business and repayment of debts to re-stock their cash pool, unless 
drawing on cash from a primary business, which is necessary since 
payments by Hawaladar B are made in advance of any receipt of funds from 
Hawaladar A, evidencing reciprocal trust between clients65 and Hawaladars. 
The formal sector requires all funds to be paid over and transaction chain is 
followed in advance of pay out, with no prior presumption of trust to waive 
this requirement, acting as a safeguard against default of payment. This 
raises no concern for ARS66 since their alignment to Islamic principles allows 
for the transfer of funds for ‘usufruct,’ where there is a right to their use 
stemming from debts in the settlement process.67 
 
The contemporary model (see appendix 2) offers greater flexibility and 
sharing of commitments, with Hawaladars acting co-operatively and 
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collectively to consolidate and settle debts for each other or for third parties. 
A pre-requisite to consolidation and settlement is access to a bank account, 
either business or personal,68unless the operator has a sufficient cash pool. 
The funds transferred indirectly represent the payment to the client, 
facilitating covert access to accounts by outsiders69 with clients free from the 
usual checks applying to account ownership. Hawaladars may use business 
accounts for larger transfers, avoiding the suspicion of illicit purposes if these 
are connected to cash intensive ancillary businesses. Third party accounts 
may also be used for payment, consolidation or settlement, limiting 
transparency as to parties’ identities and hindering financial audits.  
 
Transactions are settled on behalf of Hawaladars in different networks or 
regions by consolidating the debts of several operatives into one settlement 
payment, this being   timely, cost effective and manageable. The formal 
sector’s ability to move funds between businesses to support operational 
activities of ‘sister’ companies is restricted by regulation. Hawaladars 
determine the timing and methods for consolidation and settlement,70 and 
bilateral or ‘reverse’ consolidation and settlement between networks is 
common.71 Settlement offers flexibility given the volume and number of 
transactions and flexible time frames. The lapse of time between the 
transactions and later settlement and the volume and scale of batched low 
value individual transactions 72 fractures individual transaction pathways. 
Preserving the originator and recipient information along the transaction 
pathway is necessary to provide meaningful financial intelligence. ARS 
methods leave systems vulnerable to systematic placement and integration 
of illicit funds through low value multiple transactions. These become 
disguised amid transaction volumes, and consolidated without detection.73 
The settlement process exposes these systems to the potential layering of 
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illicit transactions, disguising the origins of funds and parties beyond 
detection, with third parties and intermediaries remaining anonymous. 
Authorities wishing to undertake the financial investigation of property 
ownership and transaction purpose require transparency of the parties’ 
identity and the transaction purpose.74 The speed of transactions and use of 
third parties without scrutiny potentially places these aspects beyond 
detection and untraceable post placement, critical given that the terrorist 
purpose is hidden at the placement stage with detection of TF dependent on 
the backward tracing of transactions. 
 
Settlement in the contemporary model interfaces with the formal sector, 
which is functional and minimal, since Islamic principles prohibit the 
exchange of interest, allowing service charges only.75 Consolidation prior to 
settlement is through ‘wholesale’ Hawaladars’ who make single large 
payments from combined transaction settlements76 through their personal or 
business accounts. Large amounts transferred frequently through personal 
accounts indicate a suspicion of Hawala.77 Wholesale Hawaladars, as 
international operatives at the pinnacle of the network, capitalise on their 
geographical reach and network contacts to facilitate settlement, often 
through multiple accounts.78 
 
The interface with the formal sector increases the transparency of 
transactions and their capacity for monitoring, but this is outweighed by the 
layered and aggregated nature of the prior consolidation and settlement 
processes whose fragmentation leads to lack of discernible transaction 
information. Individual remittance transactions are submerged and 
indistinguishable amongst the volume of consolidated transactions, and 
subsequently merged with formal sector funds.79 Tracing of remittance 
transactions in the formal sector is limited to the segment of the transaction 
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processed at this point, having limited value. The vulnerabilities and risks 
identified within the ARS settlement process are transferred to the formal 
sector, disabling the protection of its regulation. Consequently these systems 
transfer the risk of handling illicit funds, possibly terrorist funds, through the 
comingling of funds within the formal sector during the settlement process.80 
This makes both systems vulnerable to the transfer of illicit, potentially 
terrorist, funds particularly in jurisdictions with weak regulation of the formal 
sector.81 Customer identity and transaction purpose, connected to the 
legitimacy of funds, is a pre-requisite to ensuring the credibility of the 
‘financial system’ to limit access by terrorist groups.   
 
Isolating the relevant factors to link or distinguish transactions forming the 
consolidated value is impossible for an outsider and without adequate 
records. Bifurcation of pathways relating to funds and transaction information 
preceding consolidation and settlement, and later de-consolidation hinder the 
capacity to trace the transaction pathways to identify those related to 
individual halawadas and their customers. Large settlement transactions are 
made by ‘corporate Hawaladars’ through major clearing houses located in 
New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland, and are 
particularly prevalent in the UAE, and Dubai.82 In 2003 105 Hawala 
‘exchange houses’ were located in Dubai.83 The high volumes require 
Hawaladars to draw on the ‘formal sector’ for currency exchange through 
clearing houses. Following settlement further disruption of the transaction 
pathway occurs on deconsolidation when the original amounts paid over to 
settle the debts of Hawaladars in other networks or locations are 
redistributed. 
 
Transactions through the formal sector are between accounts by wire 
transfer, in areas where banking services are accessible. ARS consolidation 
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draws on currency conversion furthering the risk of the comingling84 of lawful 
and unlawful funds and their integration into the formal sector and the wider 
ARS network on deconsolidation. This is problematic in jurisdictions where 
the authenticity of domestic currency cannot be guaranteed,85 and where 
currency restrictions operate. Increased volumes through structured cash 
deposits and wire transfers by Hawaladars inconsistent with account activity 
indicate ARS operation,86 but the benefit of this indicator is lost, disguised 
within the operation of the primary business.  
 
 
2.2.4 Use of business accounts  
 
Migrant remittances are one way transactions from the diaspora to the 
country of origin, commonly balanced by reverse trade based transactions, 
here the contemporary model dominates given that remittance are mainly 
unidirectional. This practice makes it difficult to differentiate ARS from 
ordinary business activity, undermining the potential scrutiny provided by the 
regulated formal sector. Suspicious transactions87 are submerged and 
disguised within ordinary business transactions,88 since it is the business 
rather than the parties to the transaction which are visible. 
 
ARS developed in furtherance of lawful trade and in the context of business 
practice, so their use today is unsurprising and are viewed as culturally and 
socially acceptable. Use of mis-invoicing through the under or over valuation 
of goods imported/exported is a common settlement method, and one of a 
number of methods identified89 and used to disguise ARS activity. In the 
Middle East and Turkey mis-invoicing accounted for 30.7% of the total 
exports from these countries for the period 1970-1979, and 17.4% for 1980-
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1990.90 Mis-invoicing itself is difficult to identify within the operation of a 
lawful business, often only evident through auditing and specialist forensic 
accounting. Inspection by the authorities may reveal an imbalance in 
payments to unrelated traders or businesses. Illicit smuggling of goods, 
particularly of high value commodities or drugs, yielding proceeds on their 
sale, can be used for ‘settlement’. The use of illegal methods for settlement 
compromises the integrity of ARS exposing them to the laundering of illicit 
funds and may become an operative form of ARS. These risks concern 
regulators as to the potential risk of the laundering of terrorist funds since 
ARS methods of operation disguise the purpose of the transaction, and the 
legitimacy of the existing business can enable the operation of ARS for illicit 
purposes without raising suspicion. 
  
 
2.3 The concept of trust 
 
A key feature of ARS is their informality, and their role of trust and honour in 
their operational relationships, considered to pose a risk of their misuse for 
terrorist financing. Reliance on honour and trust is common to many cultures, 
particularly those relying on Islamic principles, where speculative behaviour 
is prohibited, contractual duties are sacred and the sharing of information 
and co-operative behaviour91 underpins commercial relationships. 
 
Operators and clients share the risk of non-payment for the mutual benefit 
and promotion of long term relationships based upon the duty to maintain the 
sanctity of their agreements.92 Modern banking systems also evidence a 
commitment to honour their obligations through their operational 
management, trust here being contractually based with legislation pre-
determining the boundaries of commercial relationships and securing the 
enforcement of obligations. The robust regulation and oversight of the 
financial sector at all levels by independent bodies furthers this ‘calculative 
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trust’ arising from the compulsion of legal regulation and the threat of loss of 
market share.93  
 
The notion of trust associated with Hawala is voluntary94 and known as 
‘guanxi’,95  stemming from conformity to the prevailing social values and 
norms. It is internally, not externally, driven, and is self-serving and self-
regulating for mutual support and commercial benefit. This ‘altruistic trust’ 
arises from the conduct and behaviour of the parties in the context of socio-
economic relationships that have existed over time96 observing the ethnic 
and social norms to honour transactions. It is often misconceived when 
compared to western banking, from which it differs markedly. Compliance 
between Hawaladars is driven by the need to obtain settlement of 
outstanding debts, creating a ‘lock-in contract’ and risk laden relationship.97 
Admission to the system is determined by past conduct demonstrating 
honour, integrity and social allegiance to ARS or families’ operations98and 
shared socio-cultural or religious affiliation and values, demonstrating social 
acceptance and allegiance to the network.99 Fear of social and economic 
exclusion secures compliance, protecting entry to and misuse of the system 
by ‘outsiders’. 100 ARS appear to operate as a ‘cultural clan’, in limiting 
access to those with shared ethnicity. The normativity of their operation is 
analysed more fully in chapter 4. More favourable transaction terms are 
offered to ‘known’ customers and other Hawaladars.101 The formal sector, in 
contrast, relies on legal formalities and contracts for dispute resolution, 
prevented from imposing cultural restrictions but doing so indirectly through 
its operational formalities (the pre-requisite of customer literacy and provision 
of identity).  
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Hawaladars are motivated to adhere to the unwritten code of practice to 
maintain business relationships and preserving their personal reputation and 
social standing. This network of operation requires the sharing of sensitive 
commercial information, promoting allegiance and compliance to secure 
confidentiality for all.   
 
It is ironic that an ancient South Asian banking system which had 
earned a reputation for trust should today be widely regarded as an 
opprobrious marker of the black market economy.102 
 
Western mistrust of ARS stems from the climate of insecurity post 9/11 
where risk has come to be regarded requiring control and governance 
through transparency, accountability, proof of provenance and a traceability 
of the movement of funds. The lack of enforceable service standards, 
external control and impartial scrutiny also raise the presumption of 
increased risk. The formal sector operates through clear transparent 
standardised procedures for dealing with complaints and misconduct. ARS 
are self-regulating, focusing on the ‘trust’ relating to external social and 
cultural obligations, which, whilst functional and self-serving, lacks uniformity. 
Little research has been undertaken to investigate how allegiance to religious 
and cultural values assists self-regulation given these can be feigned to gain 
access to the system. The cultural and religious values on which ARS are 
based are relevant to large geographical areas, including the Middle East 
and South East Asia, binding local operators and promoting ‘cross-ethnic 
collaboration’103across networks. This challenges regulators seeking to 
minimise the risks through compliance to formalise ARS, whilst also 
‘respecting’ their cultural and religious context, values and the social 
conditions of operation over centuries. Regulation needs to avoid the 
perception of discrimination in targeting the nature of these risks assisted by 
objective typologies of risk indicators104 to avoid alienating the communities 
that use these systems. Regulation therefore needs to be uniform105 in form 
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and effect and be effective in its capacity to address risk inherent to ARS 
operation and accountable for  its effectiveness here. 106 
 
The popularity of and lack of dissatisfaction with ARS by customers or 
operators, even where they operate in areas of high corruption, raises 
questions as to the motivation and compulsion for genuine operation and 
formal investigation of their potential misuse.107 The lack of a formal 
regulatory framework imposing procedures, compelling audits and external 
oversight and investigation, fails to secure valuable information for CTF.108 
The normativity of these systems in their reliance on ‘trust’ exclusively and 
internal self-regulation is analysed more fully in chapter 4 in light of the 
normative framework presented. The lack of formal monitoring, accountability 
and scrutiny of ARS afforded by regulation has raised concerns as to their 
integrity, leading to a sense of mistrust by the formal sector and of the 
communities making use of these systems. This risk of misuse can only be 
quantified by reference to their prevalence and presence globally, balanced 
against the benefits they afford to the communities that use them, which is 
now considered. 
 
 
2.4 Prevalence of alternative remittance systems - data collection 
 
In assessing the risk that ARS present it is relevant to consider the areas and 
prevalence of their operation as to the volumes of remittances channelled 
through these systems. Specific data is, however, difficult to obtain, since the 
nature of ARS activity makes the detection and monitoring of these systems 
challenging in the absence of regulation. The lack of consensus and 
consistency as to data collection across different jurisdictions hinders 
meaningful comparison of ARS data with data relating to the formal sector. 
The legal status of Hawala affects its visibility making any assessment of the 
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scale of its activity across geographical areas challenging, unless as in the 
UAE, it is perceived as a valuable commercial activity. Remittance activity 
through the formal sector is recorded in the balance of payments figures,109 
and by international bodies, but this excludes informal ARS activity.110 Data 
relating to ARS activity is often based on ‘estimates’ assessed by drawing on 
data relating to general remittance within the formal sector. Current data is 
insufficient to fully indicate the scale of ARS activity to inform policy and 
regulatory decisions necessary to maintain the economic balance between 
remittance sending and receiving countries. Regulation is often a pre-
requisite to compulsory data collation, with regulation preceded by impact 
assessments. The recording of formal remittance activity yields data but 
compromises its integrity since the interface of ARS with the formal sector111 
is not identified and isolated within this. 
 
Annual global remittance flows are vast, increasing as a significant revenue 
source for economically reliant countries. Individual remittance amounts are 
low value averaging $200-$300 a month in 2002.112 Total formal remittance 
volumes were $401 billion for 2012, increasing by 5.3% from 2011 with an 
expected increase of 8.85%.113 Informal remittance flows are estimated to be 
half of formal flows.114 Remittance volumes to developing countries are 
expected to total $ 515 billion for 2015,115 Pakistan and Bangladesh are 
dominant remittance receiving countries, with SE Asia being the largest 
remittance receiving region for 2012.116 Assessments of private capital 
transfers estimate the annual value of Hawala transactions for the twenty 
year period from 1981-2000 to be $10-$35 billion.117 Remittance activity is 
prevalent in Pakistan, India and the Persian Gulf States, home to the largest 
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concentration of Hawala operators. Forty percent of Pakistani migrants 
transfer remittances through the Hawala system,118 estimated to value $5 
billion; remittances comprise the country’s largest source of hard currency.119 
Pakistani nationals hold an estimated $40-$60 billion in overseas assets, 
equivalent to the country’s GDP, some of which is remitted to Pakistan 
having created a reliance on foreign currency.  
 
The dynamic economic relationships between remittance sending and 
receiving countries and the social value of cultural systems present 
challenges for policy makers120 in regulating these vast volumes in countries 
that may lack the institutional and technological infrastructures to implement 
regulation.  
 
2.4.1 Alternative remittance systems – selection and advantages  
 
Alternative remittance systems, despite having operated over many 
centuries, remain in use today. The factors that determine their selection and 
continued use are now considered, as these are relevant to their regulation 
and to ensure the benefits of these systems are not lost through their 
formalisation. The identification of these factors is important in sensitising 
regulators to the need to tailor regulation to maintain or replicate these within 
the formal sector, and to anticipate and compensate for any potential socio-
economic consequences where this cannot be achieved. 
 
 
2.4.1.1 The development of ‘remittance corridors’  
 
Two stages in the development of remittance corridors have been 
identified,121 ‘nascent’ and ‘mature’. Mature remittance corridors arise where  
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informal remittances have ‘shifted’ to predominantly operate through the 
formal sector. Nascent remittance corridors are those sufficiently developed 
to provide for a shift from the informal to the formal sector. Whilst some 
features are specific to particular remittance corridors, general incentives and 
customer preferences promote the transfer from the informal to the formal 
sector. Remittance transactions have three stages: ‘first mile,’ ‘intermediary’ 
and ‘last mile’ stages.122 
 
The ‘first mile’ refers to reasons123 for the selection of ARS at the point of 
placing the funds for transfer, with the following features relevant to their 
selection: anonymity, cultural familiarity, personal characteristics, and 
accessibility. The ‘intermediary stage’ focuses on the range of services, and 
their profitability and method of funds transfer, either electronically by wire 
transfer or the formal fund transfers (FFT) or by communication between 
operatives for ARS. The ‘last mile’ stage represents the deconsolidation and 
delivery to destination.  
 
Client preference for formal fund transfer FFT depends on the frequency, 
type and purpose of the transaction and the amounts remitted.124 In the initial 
first mile stage the following factors were identified as being relevant: 
personal, economic and customer service levels. Cultural familiarity was 
identified as an important personal factor in the selection of ARS over 
FFT.125 Personal contact and valued social and business relationships were 
factors positively lending to the selection of ARS. The need for women to 
interact in a culturally appropriate context126 in accordance with cultural 
traditions through trusted intermediaries and a service offering home delivery 
were also important. Access to FFT is limited where formal services are 
centred in large cities necessitating travel. The strength of ARS lie in their 
cultural sensitivity and the promotion of a shared sense of community identity 
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and heritage for migrants. A ‘cultural inertia’127 exists with preference 
determined as much by familiarity and previous use as by distrust by some 
cultures of western banking systems, whose principles conflict with traditional 
Islamic and Muslim values. 
 
 
2.4.1.2 Accessibility 
 
Accessibility is also relevant to the use of ARS, which is critical for funds 
transfer in zones of conflict and instability and remote areas where the formal 
sector is unable to operate. Accessibility is critical where ARS may be the 
only means of moving funds, these systems having been used by aid 
agencies in Thailand after the 2005 tsunami,128 when the formal banking 
system was decimated.  ARS operate within networks of structured 
relationships, not infrastructure networks. The efforts of regulators to attract 
remittances to the formal sector is misguided, in supposing that all the 
advantages of ARS, such as the cultural context, can be replicated by the 
formal sector. The increasing use of IT by the formal sector is appropriate for 
clients in developed countries, but operates as a barrier where access to and 
use of technology is limited and unfamiliar in developing countries. Language 
difficulties may compound customer access to the formal sector influencing 
the selection of ARS where operators often have language skills or can 
access interpreters from the local diaspora. The extent to which this is 
relevant in the UK context will be confirmed by the field work research. 
 
2.4.1.3 Preference for alternative remittance systems 
 
The continued use of ARS stems from several factors, but critical are culture 
and ethnicity. The cultural obligations and associated family duties, deriving 
in part from Islamic principles are common to many cultures in the area of 
the Middle East that requires the honouring of ‘zakat’, charitable giving,129 
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requiring Muslims to donate a percentage of their income. This charitable 
and family obligation amongst the diaspora binds them to continued 
remittance, often over ten years130 after their settlement, the frequency and 
value of remittances increasing with income.  
 
Economic and individual factors are key to the continued use of ARS131 
allowing the support of social needs and facilitating microeconomic 
development through property purchases, poverty reduction, access to 
education and medical services and cultural practices and commitments 
(dowry).132 Maintaining these benefits in unstable, remittance dependent and 
developing economies, where these systems are prevalent, is not without its 
difficulties given the popularity of ARS amongst the diaspora in enabling the 
fulfilment of cultural and religious obligations.133 The perils of regulation 
restricting the operation of the Al-Barakaat remittance providers in relation to 
Somalia and the challenge of requiring regulation where states lack the 
financial capacity are considered more fully in chapter 4. 
 
  
2.4.1.4 Customer satisfaction 
 
Customer satisfaction with ARS service levels appears to be high, 
underpinned by the personal nature of the client/operator relationship, and 
trust in the operators evidenced by their reputation for honouring the loss of 
funds and reliance on informal dispute resolution.134 The complaints system 
in the formal sector is formalised, less personal, and inaccessible to those 
with limited literacy and education, despite the diverse range of financial 
services offered. Cultural familiarity with ARS is a strong factor in their 
selection135 but in some areas there simply is no accessible alternative. The 
low, almost absent, incidence of complaints reported in the literature may 
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suggest that customers see little value in complaining in the absence of an 
alternative provider and the lack of process to support this. An inherent 
distrust of western banking also adds to the perception of ‘satisfaction’. 
 
 
 
2.4.1.5 Efficiency and cost  
 
ARS are efficient and cost effective fund transfer systems, charging 
considerably less than the formal banking sector, with charges increasing for 
transactions to regions where ARS are prohibited or problematic. Flat fee 
rates are proportionate to the small amounts remitted, increasing the end 
value and accommodating single transfers of variable forms of value and 
variable transfer patterns without penalty.136 Profit margins per transaction 
are low, with operators gaining on volume and repeat business.137 The use 
of ‘bartering’ over the transaction rates is common in the traditional context. 
Costs are supported by the primary business within which the ARS is 
situated.138 Bank accounts, credit balances or identification documents are 
not required and paperwork is minimal;139and it can be completed by the 
operator on behalf of the customer, in contrast to reliance on identification 
documentation in the formal sector.140 Documentation is difficult to obtain in 
some remittance areas, being unavailable or unreliable. 50% of South 
Africans do not have a bank account and only 44% have a formal address; 
38% of those with existing accounts have low incomes. ARS readily 
accommodate the limitations of the variety of languages and dialects across 
areas of operation and the lower standards of literacy and education that 
affect the completion of documentation.141  
 
                                                          
136Maimbo(n38) 4 ARS can support sums as large as US$1,000,000 in a single transaction. 
137Maimbo(n38)11 Author  suggests regular customer s are offered more favourable rates and  
    hawaladars bid for the service of agencies  who use ARS regularly. 
138Bowers(n22) 
139El-Qorchi (n25) 
140Martin (n93) 928, 937 
141Mc Clusker (n120) 2 
65 
 
ARS remain in use largely due to their informality and ease of access, 
(flexible operating hours). As social networks they have cultural familiarity 
promoting social allegiance and shared religious ideology. The formal sector 
operation is separate from civic and religious duties contractual duties 
dominate. This in contrast to areas of ARS operation where the separation of 
these values is contrary to Islamic principles142 and no such distinction is 
made within financial transactions. Banks operate as profit driven corporate 
entities143 and are often reluctant to commit resources to developing 
infrastructures where the financial returns are low, in areas of political unrest 
or economic instability, due to shareholder accountability and their regulatory 
burden.  The low operating cost of ARS within existing infrastructures and 
networks provide greater geographical reach,144 filling the gap in formal 
banking services. 
 
2.5 The threat posed from Hawala 
 
The threat posed from Hawala relates to potential misuse for terrorism and 
ML, the former a significant focus post 9/11, with authorities also concerned 
as to the potential illicit diversion of ‘charitable donations’ through ARS. 
Scrutiny of the nexus of terrorist fund-raising derived from general criminal 
activity and organised crime145 is essential given the ease of misuse of these 
systems for general criminal purposes.  
 
Chapter one proposed the ‘new model’ of operation of terrorist groups 
requiring extensive transmission networks with geographical reach enabling 
rapid transaction processing to deliver funds to locations ‘just in time’ as 
needed, so reducing the opportunity for prior detection and operational 
disruption. Terrorists require anonymity of their organisation, supporters and 
activities, targeting opaque systems lacking regulatory oversight, which offer 
easy penetration without regulatory protection and so exploiting ‘regulatory 
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arbitrage’.146 Systems making use of third parties and beneficiary accounts 
can be readily used, where requests for references or identification are 
absent or waived. Terrorists seek methods that offer minimal records and 
flexibility in delivery, timing and volumes of transactions, guaranteed through 
‘trusted’ personnel.  
 
ARS such as Hawala satisfy the very criteria terrorists seek, in offering 
locally based services with international reach capable of transferring funds 
at speed to virtually anywhere in the world.147 Their lack of regulation waives 
the compulsion for verification of identity, offering anonymity of the ultimate 
beneficiary and transaction purpose. Their informality allows for the 
modification of procedures on request with shared kinship receiving 
preferential treatment. The lack of uniform records148 and the fractured 
transmission149 pathways prevent post transaction event analysis failing to 
deliver a ‘financial footprint’ and actionable intelligence. In the absence of 
regulation they offer an ideal vehicle for misuse by terrorists, where the 
shared values, religion150and ethnicity relevant to their operation places 
penetration by terrorists above suspicion.151 Their lack of regulation paces 
them beyond the control of international and regional CTS compromising the 
protection of the formal sector. 152 A review of the risks presented by these 
systems supports the assertion that they are ‘efficient system[s] for the 
laundering of money,’ 153 and for terrorism. The extent of risks entails a 
review of not just what may go wrong but how likely this is to occur quantified 
by evidence of actual misuse, which further justifies international policy 
towards regulatory intervention. The following section will analyse the 
evidence base for the misuse of ARS to date. 
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2.6 Evidence of misuse of ARS 
 
The previous sections have vigorously analysed the operation methods and 
mode and structures of ARS as to the risk they give rise to in relation to 
terrorist finance and general money laundering. This section now moves 
from the scrutiny of the potential risk of these systems to a consideration of 
the evidence base indicating actual misuse, firstly in relation to general 
criminal misuse, and subsequently, in relation to the specific misuse for 
terrorist finance as well as a wider consideration of unsubstantiated claims of 
misuse. This is necessary to support the justification for the international 
regulation of these systems.   
 
 
2.6.1 Substantiated general risk of misuse of ARS 
 
ARS have lawful origins in contrast to systems such as the BMPE, but their  
regulation requires justification on the basis of established risk of misuse. 
Research into ‘informal funds transfer’ have summarised the key risks as: 
 
        speed, lower transaction costs, cultural convenience, versatility, and  
        potential anonymity, contribute to their widespread legal and illegal  
        use.154 
 
Evidence of general criminal misuse lies in the practice of mis-invoicing in a 
business context to settle remittance transactions, countering unidirectional 
remittances, often associated with general fraud and tax and revenue 
evasion,155 common where ARS operate within import/export businesses. 
They have also been misused to avoid currency controls, effect payment of 
bribes to corrupt officials and facilitate human trafficking,156 the smuggling of 
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aliens,157 and payments for the trade in human organs. Passas has identified 
eleven forms of criminal activity served by IVTS on the basis of documented 
cases, which additionally include: evasion of currency controls, payment for 
illegal commodities,158 ransom payments, intellectual property violations and 
fraud, laundering of criminal proceeds159 and the financing of terrorist 
attacks. 
  
The evidence illustrating their misuse for the laundering of general criminal 
funds is substantial but it does not justify the policy approach necessitated 
and oft applied in response to the increased security risks posed by terrorism 
and the consequently  more stringent regulatory controls applied. Funds from 
general criminal activity can be diverted for terrorist purposes, remaining 
hidden within the large volumes laundered. Terrorist organisations have 
been aligned to criminal groups and large scale criminal activity to source 
their operations, favouring drugs, arms and human trafficking and 
smuggling;160 the Madrid bombings were financed entirely from the proceeds 
of drug trafficking.161 Whilst evidence suggests some nexus between general 
criminal activity and terrorist funding, this is largely confined to specific 
locations such as Afghanistan, where the terrorists exert control over the 
criminal organisations and their illicit activity. Evidence of general criminal 
misuse can inform the parallel risk of misuse for terrorist finance, an 
approach developed by FATF in their typologies of ARS misuse identifying 
seven types of ARS operation.162 The incidence of criminality and risk of 
ARS misuse for terrorist financing are higher in the absence of regulation 
and where ARS are an adjunct to the illegal operation of other businesses. 
 
Allegations of specific terrorist misuse of ARS are largely unsubstantiated or 
scant; the evidence of general criminal misuse identifies the presence of 
ARS and their operators with subsequent investigation deterring and 
disrupting their misuse for TF. FATF indicators, include smurfing, anomalous 
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use of bank accounts and unusual bookkeeping practices, assist the 
identification of general criminal misuse offering potential indicators for 
previously unidentified risks of TF, but the typologies focus on the 
operational processes linked to criminal not terrorist methods of operation. 
Effective CTS needs to take account of not only the use of ARS as a means 
of transferring funds but also their vulnerability related to the specific sources 
of criminal funds.  
 
The aftermath of 9/11 has driven pre-emptive approaches to CTF 
endeavouring to disrupt terrorist activity by denying access to funds, 
requiring intelligence on the nature, source and transmission of terrorist 
funds to achieve this. FAFT concerns remain: 
 
the disruption of terrorist finance is naturally harder when authorities are 
confronted by “informal” support networks that do not operate as part of 
well-structured organisations with clear roles and lines of accountability. 
In such circumstances, the links between financial activity and terrorist 
activity become more opaque and the targets for disruption harder to 
identify.163 
 
FATF164 consider remittance systems, formal and alternative to be ‘attractive 
to terrorists for funding their activities’, the risk of misuse is however not 
hypothetical and requires further quantification. FAFT have reported the 
misuse of ‘network[s] of registered and world-wide operating money transfer 
companies to send or receive money’ by terrorist groups in case studies. The 
term ‘registered’ would suggest that this evidence is confined to the 
regulated sector only, with little evidence of the actual misuse of unregulated 
ARS from relevant international bodies and governments. This demonstrates 
that regulation does not fully eradicate risk. The interface between the formal 
and informal sector at the point of settlement may be the point at which the 
current regulation actually detects successfully the misuse of the informal 
sector, but the degree of misuse of ARS remains difficult to quantify as 
studies lack precision and detail.  
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The evidence of general criminal misuse of ARS merged may give rise to the 
irresistible inference of the heightened risk of misuse for TF, the recent 
merger of the AML/CTF regimes fuelling this derivative risk, despite of the 
lack of evidence to indicate that ARS are more predisposed to the risk of 
misuse for TF than the formal financial sector.165  The UN 1267 sanctions 
committee166 has reported the misuse of ARS for TF as fact, with little 
evidence is cited in support of this. That cited by US Government 
departments has sometimes been questionable where evidence relates to a 
breach of MSB registration requirements where no terrorist charges were 
brought.167 Such a breach may indicate the overall business or sector risk 
but it is a leap to infer a risk of terrorist finance and falls far short of 
evidencing it.  Policy makers need to guard against unfounded allegations of 
misuse of ARS, and whilst the lack of transparency and accountability posed 
places them at risk of potential abuse of by terrorists,  it falls short of 
evidencing this168  and activities exemplifies the dangers of unsubstantiated 
allegations.169 
 
2.6.2 Unsubstantiated misuse of ARS for terrorist purposes 
 
Despite the clear risk of misuse of ARS, evidence of their misuse for 
terrorism is scant at best. APG typologies170 refer to some limited misuse of  
Hawala, which was also suspected to have  funded  the assassination of an 
Indian politician,171 and provided the explosives used in the Indian bombings 
of 1993. The subsequent attacks on the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salam in1998 were also suspected to have made use of funds transferred 
through ARS and Hawaladars in the UK, Dubai and India. Both the 2000 Red 
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Fort and the 2008 Mumbai attacks172are alleged to have been supported by 
funding payments received through Hawala.  
 
Following the East African bombings, attention focused heavily on the formal 
financial network, and latterly unregulated ARS, with 9/11 marking a re-
evaluation of the regulatory framework for suppression of terrorist finance 
and terrorist finance methods. Al Qa’ida are held to have made use of ARS to 
transfer funds whilst based in Afghanistan and ARS were suspected to have 
been the main vehicle for the movement of Al Qa’ida  funds for the 9/11 
attack. It was, however, subsequently revealed that the $400,000 to 
$500,000 required to fund 9/11 was transferred to the nineteen attackers in 
the US using the formal sector through wire transfers or by cash; $300,000 of 
this was transferred through their own bank accounts.173 These funds were 
moved, stored and spent in ordinary ways that did not arouse and would not 
today raise any suspicion of terrorist activity. The only unconfirmed use of 
ARS related to $120,000 transferred to one of the ‘plot facilitators’ in the UAE 
and subsequently wired to the U.S. hijackers,174 but the latter transfer would 
likely be contextually relevant to the jurisdictions in question.  
 
The 9/11 terrorists obtained bank accounts in their own names, used them to 
purchase their flights, made ready use of ATMs for cash withdraws and 
made credit card payments. All transactions were processed through the 
banking system and failed to arouse suspicion.175 Access to financial 
information of the 9/11 plotters would not have been available in time to 
disrupt the plot, despite stringent regulation, even if suspicion had been 
raised. The original source of the funds remains unknown, with the US 
Government citing the unconfirmed use of Hawala to transfer funds to the 
UAE for later support of the 9/11 attack, but this allegation has not been 
evidenced.176 
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2.6.3 The Al-Barakaat case  
 
The Al Barakaat case is briefly mentioned here to demonstrate the perils of 
CTF measures applied on the basis of ‘suspicion’ absent any supporting 
factual basis. Subsequent to 9/11, US attention focused on the Al-Barakaat 
remittance provider, monitored by the FBI since 1999 and suspected of 
having terrorist affiliations. Three Minneapolis Al-Barakaat operators had 
SARs filed against them in 1996 bringing them and the Al-Barakaat 
organisation under US investigation. Al-Barakaat an international ARS  
operator177 was alleged  to have connections with suspected terror group Al-
Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and Osama Bin Laden (suspected to have been a 
silent partner in Al-Barakaat). Despite Fincen analysis, the purpose and 
source of the suspect transfers to the UAE prior to the 9/11 attack remains 
unknown.  The suspicion of Al-Barakaat role in financing terrorism178 led to 
the closure of eight of its US offices and the seizure of over $1.1million, 
disrupting the flow of $65 million in remittances from the US.179  
 
The US exerted pressure for the international listing of Al-Barakaat to 
support US internal action, however concerns arose given that  the suspicion 
that charitable cash transfers used for the building of a mosque, made 
through Al-Barakaat, had been diverted for terrorist purposes remained 
unsubstantiated. The severity of international action against Al-Barakaat, 
which had led to the collapse of the Al-Barakaat operation, required that 
suspicion be well founded. Despite OFAC having received the benefit of full 
disclosure and cooperation by the UAE,180 it was unable to provide sufficient 
evidence to support criminal charges against Al-Barakaat operatives in the 
US, raising doubts over the seizure of funds in other locations. 
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Minneapolis operators filed181 suit against OFAC leading to the delisting of 
Al-Barakaat and two Swiss remitters, by the US.  The normativity of UN 
listing of Al-Barakaat, at US insistence, and the consequences of this listing 
in terms of the protection of fundamental rights and values, is critiqued in 
detail in chapter four.182 The Al-Barakaat case exemplifies the difficulties in 
investigating financial transactions and the complexities in gathering 
information regarding terrorist organisations and their supporters, 
demonstrating the need for authorities to be accountable for evidencing and 
so justifying their actions. The inability of the authorities to adduce evidence 
of the misuse of ARS for terrorist finance does not mitigate the risks 
previously identified as inherent in ARS aligning with the characteristics 
sought by terrorists in transferring funds. Nor does it render the need for 
regulation to manage this risk redundant183 as the regulatory process aims to 
enhance the ability to trace and track the terrorists’ financial footprint in this 
capacity, deterring their misuse. 
 
 
2.6.4 Substantiated misuse of alternative remittance systems  
 
There is limited evidence or reference to prosecutions of ARS operators for 
misuse relating to terrorist finance or evidence to substantiate this in 
absence of prosecution but this is unsurprising given their covert operational 
methods. In the absence of regulation what is regarded as suspicious to 
warrant reporting external to the system is unlikely to raise suspicion 
amongst operatives and clients, given the cultural and ethnic allegiance 
associated with ARS operation. Some have argued that the focus on the 
vulnerability of ARS within the financial ‘system’ is misplaced and diverts 
attention from the effectiveness of the compliance regime in the formal 
sector,184 the misuse of which is supported by a clear body of evidence. 
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Evidence of the misuse of ARS for TF has been cited in relation to attacks in 
North East India by its Central Bureau of investigation185 citing ARS having 
been misused for transferring $23,000 - $108,000 to India for terrorist 
purposes from1992 to 1997.186 In Sweden in 2004 two Iraqi citizens, Ferman 
Abdulla and Ali Kemal Berzengi, were arrested for transferring US $148,000 
to Northern Iraq using these systems in Malmo.187 Further investigation 
resulted in the arrest in 2006 of Khalid al-Yousef on suspicion of terrorist 
finance.188 FATF also cites evidence of money transfers by terrorist groups in 
the Netherlands by wire transfer, but is not clear as to whether these are 
ARS transactions interfacing with the formal sector or solely formal sector 
transactions.189 The FATF 2008 typologies only evidence one case of 
misuse in Belgium relating to terrorism by an African national.190 
 
Prosecutions involving ARS are rare, but in 2008 a Pakistani national, Anjum 
Ranhja191 residing in the US was convicted of activities relating to TF for his 
involvement in providing remittances for terrorist purposes,192 and 21 
transactions relating to US $13,000 - US $300,000 to support Al Qa’ida 193 
were made during 2003 - 2007 using ARS. 
 
The evidence of actual misuse of ARS for terrorist finance to date is limited. 
The evidence to support the argument that regulation is necessary to identify 
and trace TF transactions and to support prosecution of TF, remains elusive. 
CTS and regulation do not rely solely on prosecution; these also enable 
valuable intelligence gathering and the monitoring and of financial 
transaction patterns to enable the tracing and freezing of terrorist assets. The 
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capacity and effectiveness of regulation to achieve this is considered more 
fully in relation to the UK context in chapter 5. 
 
 
2.7 UK remittance communities  
 
The migrant diaspora are the main users of ARS in the UK and globally, 
since over 175 million persons worldwide live outside their home 
countries.194 India has a migration of 10 million and was ranked third for 
emigration in 2005, Bangladesh 4.9 million, ranked 6th and Pakistan ranked 
13th with a migration population of 3.4 million.195 The use of ARS is culturally 
and ethnically engrained, appearing to survive relocation. 
 
The risk of misuse of any part of the financial system for terrorist finance is of 
international concern given the transnational nature of terrorism. This 
requires an assessment of the UK relationship as a remittance 
receiving/sending country and its contribution to global remittance activity, 
the UK being placed fourteenth worldwide as a remittance recipient country 
and seventh within the EU. Since 2004, remittance flows from the UK have 
reached a growth rate of 12% in 2008. UK remittances totalled GBP 2,735 
million in 2005, twice that of the previous decade.196 High volume remittance 
destinations include Pakistan, accounting for 7-10% of the total UK 
remittances for 2006/07 and for Bangladesh 8-15% for the same period, 
linked to the prevalence of ARS in these countries and their migration to the 
UK. 
 
In order to quantify the UK risk from ARS, it is necessary to consider 
statistical evidence relating to the value, volumes and relevant remittance 
corridors. Remittance inflows for the UK totalled GBP 4,230 million for 2005. 
Inflows are generally higher than the outflows for Australia, Canada, the US, 
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Ireland, Spain and New Zealand.197 As a developed country the UK is not 
economically dependent on remittances for income in contrast to other 
states. 198 In 2009, the UK population comprised of 303,000 Indian, 190,000 
Pakistan, 99,000 South Africa, 98,000 Nigeria, 77,000 Bangladeshi and 
59,000 Somali nationals resident in the UK.199 The UK’s population 
comprises 11.2% of immigrants, mainly from India, Africa, Bangladesh, 
Jamaica, and Kenya.200  Remittances are supplemented by second 
generation migrants, who potentially maintain the cultural and traditional use 
of ARS. The UK remittance population for 2005 was estimated to be 2.78 
million201 resulting in a total value for potential remittances estimated at 
£13.8bn for the UK market,202 based on the salary estimates for this group. 
The data on the amounts remitted by migrant workers is variable at best, and 
balance of payment figures suggest a range of £1,042 - £1,303 per annum 
per migrant worker.203 
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Table1 : Population Statistics 2001/2011  Source : Office National Statistics  
Religious 
groups 
Population 
% 2001  
E & W 
Population 
% 2011  
E & W   
Ethnicity 
 
Population 
% 2011 E & 
W 
Christian 71.7 59.3   White 86 
Muslim 3 4.8   Mixed 2.2 
Hindu 1.1 1.5   Black African 3.4 
Sikh 0.6 0.8   Asian Chinese 0.7 
Jewish 0.5 0.5   
Asian 
Bangladeshi 0.8 
   
  Asian Pakistani 2 
   
  Asian Indian 2.5 
        Other 1 
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The UK population in 2011 was 56.1 million;204 the WB estimates the UK 
population of 61.8 million will increase by 4.3 million by 2018, 45% due to 
migration to the UK. The UK has 4.6 million persons of ethnic minorities (2.3 
million born in the UK) and 4.90 million (only 1.7 million born in developed 
countries) born abroad and living in the UK.205 See the table below for 
census data relating to the percentage of population relative to religious and 
ethnic groups. 
 
Census statistics for 2001 reveal that whilst the UK remains predominantly 
Christian, Muslims comprised 51% of the non-Christian population, the main 
religious group after Christianity, and Hindus comprised 18% of the total 11% 
non-Christian population.206  Statistics for the distribution of ethnic groups 
show ethnically mixed populations dominated in the North East, with Asian 
groups centred in the East Midlands and York and Humber; Black African 
and Caribbean communities are concentrated in East England and the 
Midlands. 
 
                                                          
204Office of National Statistics 2014 
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Ethnicity Distribution England and Wales 2011 Source : Office National Statistics 
  White Mixed Asian Black African Other 
Wales 95.6 1 2.3 0.6 0.5 
South West 95.4 1.4 2 0.9 0.3 
South East 95.3 0.9 2.9 0.5 0.4 
North East 90.8 1.9 4.8 2 0.5 
East England 90.7 1.9 5.2 1.6 0.6 
North west 90.2 1.6 6.2 1.4 0.6 
East Midlands 89.3 1.9 6.5 1.8 0.6 
York & Humber 88.8 1.6 7.3 1.5 0.8 
West Midlands 82.7 2.4 10.8 3.3 0.9 
London 59.8 5 18.5 13.3 3.4 
England/ Wales 86 2.2 7.5 3.3 1 
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Distribution of religious groups living in the UK for 2001 indicated that 38% 
Muslims were located in London, 14% in W. Midlands, N. West 14%, and 
Yorkshire & Humber 12%.The highest concentrations of Sikhs were in 
London 31% and the S. East 52%. Hindus were centred mainly in E. 
Midlands 56%, Midlands, 12%, W Midlands10% with the greatest number in 
London and E. England. Of those who described themselves as Muslim, 
74% are of Asian heritage207 and 6% of Muslims are of Black African 
descent; 92% of all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are of Muslim faith.208 The 
following groups of specific ethnic origins indicate the percentage of the 
group that are likely to remit as follows: Caribbean (37%), Pakistani (30%), 
Chinese (27%), Bangladeshi (21%) and Indians (14%).209 This data not only 
illustrates the potential ARS community of consumers within the UK, but 
further informs the locations selected for the fieldwork research, set out 
within the research methodology and design outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
The temporary and settled migrant population are more likely to remit in 
accordance with entrenched cultural, social and religious practice associated 
with their country of origin. A third of non-British citizens are from EU 
countries210 associated with increased internal migration from countries such 
as Poland, to which the UK contributed a third of inbound Polish remittances 
for 2007. This remittance activity takes place almost exclusively through the 
formal sector. The use of ARS according to the manner of operation and 
context referred to earlier in this chapter is not aligned with this location and 
population group. Given that ARS activity is largely confined to the migrant 
diaspora and given the ethnic and religious composition of the UK population 
and UK migration statistics, the potential remitting population in the UK is 
considerable. The country of birth and length of time in the UK have been 
identified as relevant to the duration of use of remittance services, formal or 
otherwise.211 Remittance destinations do indicate that transactions dominate 
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for destinations correlating to areas of significant terrorist activity or support, 
in particular Pakistan and India.  
 
Shared religious beliefs as a basis for extended ideology connected to the 
strategy of radicalisation align with the concept of new style model terrorism. 
The UK migrant population and religious and ethnic composition of the UK 
population aligns with locations in South Asia and the Middle East associated 
with the support of terrorist groups such as Al Qa’ida. It would however, be 
naïve, unfair and a discriminatory generalisation to suppose that shared 
ethnicity or religion is confined only to areas where new model style terrorist 
groups have originated or operate, indicating terrorist support. The cultural 
entrenchment and familiarity of ARS and their common use within areas of 
terrorist support/activity does, however, render them susceptible to the risk of 
misuse for terrorist finance.  
 
There is little information on the characteristics of UK remittance activity and 
UK remitters.212 Remittance provision is regulated in the UK, with 3,628 
MSBs registered with HMRC for 2011.213 The UKMTA at March 2011 has 
750 money transfer payment companies registered.214 There are no recent 
accurate figures available to indicate the number of unregistered operators or 
the value of remittances made through the unregulated sector. HMRC 
estimated remittance flows through MSBs for 2005 to total £5.56 bn.215 Of 
the MSBs registered in 2005, 810 were sole traders,174 had between 2- 4 
outlets and only 15 had over 40 plus outlets. This suggests that UK MSBs 
service locally based communities, aligning with the characteristics of the 
traditional models referred to earlier. UK population centres identified as 
associated with particular ethnic groups indicate potential remittance sending 
locations and are relevant to the methodology outlined chapter three and the 
selection of areas of the  areas for the fieldwork research. 
 
                                                          
212Silva (n196) 2 
213See Letter from HMCR 10th June in2011 Appendix B. 
214<http://www.ukmta.org/About/Regulation.aspx> date accessed 13/06/2011 
215UKWG (n194)  4 
80 
 
The UK regulatory regime aims to effectively protect the integrity of the UK 
financial system and secure compliance with international standards 
requiring the regulation of ARS. The UK is driven to protect the safety of UK 
citizens and the reputation of the UK as a major financial centre from the 
security risks and the economic and political damage resulting from misuse 
of the sector for terrorist finance. This chapter has sought to outline the risks 
of ARS and their potential misuse for terrorism, justifying the need for their 
regulation within the UK and internationally, in line with the global CTS. 
 
New style terrorism is predicated on the furtherance of a global cause 
through local support. Relevant to this is the concern that UK citizens and 
diaspora who share a common religion or ethnicity with communities in 
overseas jurisdictions, may be targeted for recruitment or innocently misused 
for terrorist finance, through charitable giving associated with and driving 
remittance activity. 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion    
 
This chapter has sought to consider the risks associated with Hawala 
presented from the context of perceived insecurity that has dominated the 
security agenda and financial regulatory landscape post 9/11. This insecurity 
has created increased suspicion about the provenance of funds, reflected in 
the need to trace transactions, verify their purpose and the source funds, 
problematic for economies reliant on cash based transactions. Indeed, 
western communities have become deeply suspicious of Hawala systems 
given their suggested but unconfirmed association with the funding of 9/11. 
Whilst this chapter has clearly outlined the evidence of their misuse for ML, 
there is little evidence to support their actual misuse for terrorist finance. It is, 
however, their actual risk and the perception of this that drives the suspicion 
of these systems, despite the lack of evidence to suggest that they are any 
more disposed to misuse for TF than the formal financial sector.  
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The drive to regulate these informal systems is predicated on their risk for 
misuse for the financing of terrorism; whilst there is no evidence to suggest 
that they are the preferred method of choice of terrorists, the critique of their 
operational risks has demonstrated that they have many characteristics that 
would be desirable to terrorists. This chapter has presented their unique 
method of operation considered within the ethnic and social context in which 
these systems developed and continue to operate today. The general 
characteristics that distinguish their operation from the formal sector have 
been outlined and have been considered in light of the concerns they present 
given their distance from western values and styles of regulation. 
 
These systems have shown to have continued relevance in supporting the 
economies of developing countries which lack a developed formal sector with 
sufficient geographical penetration. These systems, whilst informal, offer 
tangible economic and commercial benefits in terms of efficiency, cost, 
speed and service coverage, the very characteristics that many globalised 
western businesses and terrorists aspire to. The presenting risks have been 
qualified and quantified in light of their prevalence, geographical extent and 
monetary volumes associated with these systems at international and UK 
level. In the context of insecurity post 9/11 these benefits in relation to the 
considerable worldwide remittance flows and those populations who remain 
economically reliant on these, have largely remained unacknowledged, but 
need to be considered more fully in balance with the risks these systems 
have been shown to pose.  Despite the benefits of these systems, they 
present clear risks to the formal sector and raise concerns in western states 
as systems that they are potentially culturally familiar to terrorists and create 
doubt concerning the dual loyalties of the migrant diaspora. 
 
The risks associated with ARS operation have been analysed to consider the 
challenges they present to regulators in seeking to manage these through a 
national regulatory frameworks, which support the international CFT agenda. 
The risks have been further analysed in relation the UK’s remittance sending 
status and the UK’s ethnic, racial and religious population that indicates 
potential remittance communities. Although there is scant data on informal 
82 
 
flows and UK customer characteristics for this sector, the data presented 
does indicate the value of remittances and potential risk to UK remittances 
and provides a platform for the consideration of the impact of regulation in 
addressing these risks, considered in future chapters.  
 
The challenge at international level is to achieve a uniform approach to the 
regulation of remittances and regulation for CTF generally, preventing 
‘regulatory arbitrage’ for exploitation by terrorists, which increases security 
risks. Further regulation needs to ensure that it does not remove the tangible 
benefits these systems offer including the valued socio-cultural practices 
they represent, and so result in driving these systems underground. 
 
Any regulatory framework must be accountable in its capacity and 
effectiveness for addressing the operational risks which these systems 
present whilst being sensitive to maintaining the advantages of and values 
relevant to these systems.  The capacity of the regulatory framework to 
achieve this and protect the fundamental human rights connected with their 
use to protect those who remain economically reliant on remittances and 
ARS, is considered more fully in chapter four.  
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Chapter 3    
Research methodology 
 
3.0 Introduction  
 
The previous chapters have outlined the overall aims and objectives of this thesis as 
a critical investigation into the impact of the current regulatory framework for the 
prevention of money laundering for terrorist finance using ARS. The previous 
chapters have reviewed the definitions of Hawala, with particular reference to that 
drawn upon by the relevant stakeholders, to justify the selected terminology for the 
purpose of this research. Previous chapters have reviewed both the mode and 
context of the operation of ARS by reference to a review of the literature and 
research to date, to consider both their historical and modern day operation. The 
literature review confirmed that whilst ARS have been the subject of academic 
critique on an international scale in relation to their risk of misuse for money 
laundering for general purposes, there is an absence of research into their misuse 
for terrorist finance, in particular within the UK context. Nor had previous research 
considered the effectiveness of regulation and its impact on these systems. The 
originality of this thesis lies in the investigation by fieldwork research into the impact 
and effectiveness of the regulation of ARS, now termed Money Service Businesses 
(MSBs) as regulated by the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (MLR 2007). 
Having outlined the phenomena of ARS in chapter 2, this chapter details the specific 
research questions and the selected methodology applied to the research design, 
which is justified against each stage of the research process to demonstrate that it is 
both robust and appropriate in fulfilling these research aims and is ethical in its 
application. 
   
 
3.1 Research aims and objectives 
 
This work aimed to explore and identify the effect of the regulation of ARS under the 
MLR 2007, which require the registration of remittance businesses as MSBs which 
are supervised by HMRC for the purpose of the regulations.  The research aimed to 
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investigate the impact of regulation on MSBs, informed directly by the fieldwork to 
capture the views of operators as to the application and impact of regulation on their 
businesses. Additionally the research aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of UK 
regulation for preventing the misuse of MSBs for ML and TF the latter the primary  
focus of this study to which the fieldwork research was critical. 
 
Firstly, the research aimed to identify the relevant characteristics of MSB operation 
within the socio-cultural context relevant to the UK. Secondly research additionally 
aimed to investigate the perceptions of MSBs as to the need for regulation in the first 
instance, as well as their views on the form of regulation and its enforcement. This 
would enable an effective comparison of this context along with the operational 
characteristics, risks and pertaining to these businesses within the UK, alongside 
those identified as relevant to the traditional context as analysed in chapter 2.  
 
Thirdly, in relation to these aims, any enquiry into the regulatory impact would draw 
on an investigation into any perceived cultural impact of regulation, and the nature of 
this. This is relevant to the cultural context in which ARS have traditionally operated 
and have been associated and to a consideration of its relevance to MSB operation 
with the UK and the regulatory impact on this.   
 
Fourthly, the fieldwork research aimed to investigate the relationships critical to UK 
MSB operation, namely those between MSBs, their customers and the regulators,  
to identify the nature of any impact, if any, of regulation upon these. This additionally 
included operators’ perceptions and understanding of their customer’s reasons for 
selecting MSBs and their views on the impact of regulation on service use and 
patterns of remittance activity.  
 
The research also aimed to gain the views and insights of stakeholders as parties 
directly involved in the development of regulatory policy and the supervision of 
MSBs. Finally, the research aimed to identify relevant areas for future research 
including factors which may impact on future policy development and identify the 
need for any further regulatory changes. 
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These research objectives were determined following a systematic and extensive 
review and analysis of the literature in this area, including visits to access the 
collections and materials held by the British library. This has ensured that literature 
and research material that related specifically to the UK context was reviewed as 
part of the research process, along with additional international sources. 
 
There was limited research on ARS prior to this research project and this remains 
the case. That which had been undertaken to date was largely at the behest of 
stakeholders such as the IMF and the World Bank and therefore had a distinct 
economic focus. Previous research had centred on the historical origins and nature 
of ARS in locations of origin identifying the need for regulation and considering the 
challenges in applying this, drawing on Hawala as the main example. Chapter 2 
illustrated the macroeconomic benefits of ARS in supporting migrant labour 
remittances in South Asia, but did not illustrate their importance in the UK context, 
beyond data as to remittance volumes, which was central to this work.1 The only 
research that has previously investigated the impact of regulation on ARS, focused 
on Australia2 and arguably has little relevance to the UK given the different 
geographical location and population composition. This research aims to address the 
lacuna in the research into the effect of AML/ CTF regulation of ARS in the UK.  
 
 
3.2 Model of practice in the UK 
 
Chapter 2 considered the operation of remittance services and the roles of operators 
working cooperatively as part of larger remittance networks. In seeking to address 
the impact of legislation on ARS in the UK, this thesis needed to consider the nature 
of ARS operation within the UK, and the characteristics pertaining to UK businesses. 
There were no models of operation identifying characteristics relevant to the UK, nor 
research into the values and attitudes that pertaining to these systems or their 
actors. This research aimed to focus on the effects of regulation of ARS through a 
                                                          
1IMF S Hagan, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)—Report on the  
  Review of the Effectiveness of the Program’  May (2011)  
 < http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/051111.pdf > date accessed 10/07/2011 
2D Rees, ‘Money Laundering and terrorism Financing risks posed by alternative remittance in    
  Australia’ Australian Government, AIC Research and Policy Series 106 (2010) 
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consideration of their method of operation, the normative values relevant to these 
systems and their presenting risks, in order to shed light on the impact of regulation 
of these systems within the UK. The fieldwork also aimed to investigate the 
effectiveness of the MLR for addressing the risks presented by these systems in 
relation to general money laundering and specifically for terrorist finance, none of 
which had previously been investigated in the UK context. 
 
The fieldwork was grounded in the socio-legal approach, which required a 
consideration of the legal framework in form and substance within the social context 
of its operation, recognised as appropriate since it is ‘inextricably linked to the 
proposition that legal institutions cannot be understood without consideration of their 
role and operation within their entire social environment’.3 The socio-legal approach 
is driven by need to secure answers to research questions from direct investigation 
of the context and application of the law in practice. This is most valuably gained 
from investigating the attitudes and values of those directly involved in this sphere of 
activity and who, in terms of regulatory impact, are most affected by this.  
 
The socio-legal approach enabled a more effective consideration of the social 
context of the legal framework, to capture the dynamics resulting from its 
implementation and the interrelationships between operational method, form, and the 
relevant social actors. This was critical to investigating and evaluating the impact of 
regulation within the social and commercial context, rather than being confined to a 
hypothetical and theoretical analysis of the issues. The socio-legal approach enabled 
the construction of a robust research strategy and methodology capturing not only 
the nature of the legal processes, but the attitudes of operators concerning the 
impact of regulation and its effectiveness for preventing terrorist finance. 
 
Fieldwork enabled a probing of the relationship between the MSB and regulator 
groups, informing as to the management of risk and the degree of support and 
oversight provided by regulators. The aim was to explore the nature of ‘regulatory 
capture’ of MSBs and to explore the ‘symbiotic nature’ of the relationships between 
                                                          
3Boor A The ‘Formalisation of Research Ethics’ Bankers R Travers M Theory and Methods in Socio-legal  
 Research (1st edn, Hart 2005) 308 
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MSBs and regulators and the relevant drivers. The degree of interdependence 
between MSBs post regulation was a further source of enquiry. 
 
The study also aimed to analyse the complex relationship between the regulated 
MSBs and the regulators to discover the perceptions and attitudes of MSBs, not only 
as to the need and mode of regulation, but the challenges, benefits and burdens 
presented by subsequent compliance. This aimed to assess whether the impact of 
regulation was justified by terms of the effectiveness of measures for addressing the 
relevant risks. This was intended to illuminate as to the perceptions of both operators 
and regulators as to the effect of regulation and its impact, where the interests of 
these groups were possibly diametrically opposed.  
 
It was also crucial that the social as well as the commercial context of operation 
relating to remittance services in the UK was investigated. Research into these 
systems in other jurisdictions had indicated a clear social and ethnic dimension to 
remittance activity influencing their operation. The more commercial UK context and 
its influence on MSB operation therefore required investigation. 
 
Investigation of the social, ethnic and cultural context is only possible through 
fieldwork and direct interviews of operators and stakeholders, providing the basis for 
comparison with the analysis of ARS presented in chapter 2. Specific research into 
the UK perspective would assist in identifying where possible, the characteristics of 
ARS practice that were universal or geographically specific, the latter being relevant 
to the application of regulation in ensuring its effectiveness. The values and attitudes 
of MSB operators, regulators, and customers were important in contributing to 
developing a typology of MSB operation in the UK, drawing on these multiple 
perspectives.  
 
The research, by necessity needed to include a consideration of any impact of 
regulation on customers, but since access to this group was limited by commercial 
sensitivity and Data Protection, this perspective was gained indirectly from the views 
of MSB operators. The reasons for this approach will be justified in 3.4.2, the section 
on sampling strategy. The assessment of regulatory impact further augmented the 
consideration of MSBs’ perceptions of their relationships with their customers, the 
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impact of regulation on the servicing of their customers, and a consideration of the 
risk of their misuse by clients.   
 
The perspective of the regulators was relevant to the perceived need for regulation 
and its effectiveness in practice, contributing to the central research question 
regarding the aims, form and impact of regulation, and the nature of the relationship 
of the regulators with MSBs in shaping MSB operation and regulatory compliance.  
The perspective of the regulator was intended to clarify the organisational culture of 
regulatory enforcement, central to the research question as to the supervisory 
approach adopted. The research aimed to identify the extent to which MSBs protect 
the integrity of their commercial activity and the role and influence of regulators in 
enforcing standards, and the resulting dynamic relationship between these two 
groups. Information about the expertise needed by regulators and their experience of 
enforcement was also perceived as crucial.4 The relationship between organisational 
culture and attitudes to regulation and organisational operation, and the strategy and 
policy in which these were situated, were considered pertinent to the research 
question.5 These issues could not be fully discovered from the documentary analysis 
of this policy area. Fieldwork was necessary to investigate these perspectives 
through interview, to address the research objectives. 
 
The relationship and possible tensions between the perceptions of MSBs and 
regulators as to the aims and methods used to achieve regulatory compliance were 
then evaluated in line with the normative framework presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.3 Qualitative or quantitative methods 
 
This section considers the two main approaches to the design of the research 
methodology and the suitability of each for effectively addressing the research 
questions and achieving the intended aims and objectives, justifying the selected 
approach. The relevant research methods and techniques derived from the selected 
                                                          
4JF Gubruin J,  JA Holstein , Handbook of Interview Research Context and Method (1edt Sage London 2011)   
 476,477 
5Gubruin (n4) 478 
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approach are presented and evaluated for their ‘fitness for purpose’ in addressing 
the central research question. 
 
The quantitative approach relies heavily on the generation and /or collection of data 
to test out and investigate specific hypotheses, usually applied to large samples 
sizes, often requiring a control sample. The quantitative approach is highly structured 
proposing in advance a particular consequence arising from the impact of regulation 
on MSBs. The quantitative method based on deductive reasoning6 is used to 
develop a hypothesis which is then tested out. This would be particularly problematic 
for the investigation of any sphere of activity and practice where there was no clear 
outcome or specific result in mind, given that the impact of any regulation of MSBs 
was the very essence of the investigatory process. In a broad sense, whilst the 
researcher sought to identify particular areas of likely impact, the research question 
was not confined to any one particular dimension, given the limitations of time, 
funding and access to research participants. The central research question was to 
identify the impact of regulation, not from a scientific measure of activity, but by 
assessing this impact from the views expressed by those involved in this sphere of 
activity. This required a multi-faceted approach rather than a single standard 
measure, and a methodology which did not focus on a single dimension of activity, or 
assume any preconceptions as to what the nature of the regulatory impact on MSBs 
was at the outset.  
 
Further, the quantitative approach requires the possibility of measurements of 
activity to generate data, which can then be analysed statistically for successful 
application. Limited access to data to support quantitative research would limit the 
investigation of this work, leaving the research methodology dictating the success of 
the research and the practicalities of its implementation. There was insufficient data 
available relating to MSB operation to support quantitative analysis. Essential 
information from the main supervisor relating to the date of registration of MSBs, 
their previous history of practice in this area, the volume of transactions and the 
specific locations was limited or unavailable and compounded by the lack of 
comparable data relating to MSBs pre and post regulation. This made it impossible 
                                                          
6A Bryman, Social Research Methods, (3rd edn, OUP 2008)12 
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to adequately assess impact. Requests were made in relation to specific categories 
of data under the Freedom of Information Act (FIA), but since the agencies within the 
regulator group are classed as public bodies, exemptions applied7 to prevent the 
release of this.  Requests were not able to yield sufficient data to support a 
quantitative approach and even where the relevant agencies were able to collate and 
release this data, the considerable cost prohibited access for this unfunded research 
project. In some instances the burden of provision outweighed the obligations of the 
relevant organisations to provide information, as its collation and retention were not 
connected to the organisation’s business purpose. Even if data had been available, 
access to this was no guarantee that it would be in a form that would allow 
meaningful comparison with that of other regulators to support the adoption of a 
quantitative approach overall, which relies on a standardised approach to data 
collection and analysis. 
  
The generation of data through quantitative research design would have been 
difficult to construct in the commercial environment in which MSBs operate, 
constrained by the DPA 1998, with commercial sensitivity hindering participant 
involvement. Quantitative data collection would have been time consuming to 
generate, requiring a larger participant sample population than was realistically 
available given the anticipated number of MSBs the researcher had access to. 
Additionally, successful data generation would have been reliant on its supply by 
participants, limited by confidentiality and commercial sensitivity and, furthermore, 
subject to possible errors that the researcher would be unable to detect or to rectify. 
This would have led to inconsistencies affecting the quality and reliability of the 
overall data. 
 
Crucially, quantitative research methodology is not designed to explain social 
phenomena nor to identify and explain the characteristics of behaviours or activity 
relevant to the research question for this thesis.8 It is also limited by its reliance on 
numerical data and does not lend itself to the consideration of attitudes, perceptions 
and values demanded by the research question. This research objective was best 
                                                          
7FOA 2000 Schedule 1 
8M Hennink M, Hutter I, Bailey A, Qualitative Research Methods (1st edn, Sage 2011) 9 
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suited to the qualitative not quantitative method of enquiry, based on inductive 
reasoning and social enquiry.  
 
 
3.3.1 The selection of a qualitative approach 
 
Qualitative research is useful for generating a theory as to the impact of regulation to 
inform further research questions.9 Qualitative methods can be drawn on to generate 
and test a theory and a hypothesis, or a construct of issues10 without reliance on 
statistical data. The investigation of the regulatory impact on MSBs, possibly 
negative, was the general hypothesis. The investigation of this was supported by  
qualitative research which enabled a consideration of the effectiveness of regulation 
on the MSB sector, gained through interviews of those directly affected by the 
regulatory framework. 
 
Qualitative methods provided the possibility of rich data, gained from in-depth 
interviews, having the capacity to describe the phenomenon investigated through the 
participants’ perceptions, values and attitudes in relation to this,11 to yield resulting 
data that was descriptive of this.12 This approach had the potential to identify not 
merely those affected by regulation but the source, nature and extent of these views, 
by capturing their explicit and tacit perceptions.13 Qualitative methods were therefore 
more appropriate to formulating an understanding of the meaning ascribed to 
participant’s views and using these to form a construct of MSB practice in the UK. 
This was drawn from the insights into their ‘inner world’ of perceptions and attitudes 
which influence their external relationships and operational activity,14 provided by the 
interviews. Qualitative methods allowed for a more flexible capture of the strength 
and variety of the views of both operators and regulators to examine any tensions 
within these groups.15 Qualitative fieldwork drawing on interviews offered the 
possibility of eliciting a depth of research data which would not have otherwise been 
                                                          
9Bryman (n6) 23 
10Bryman (n6) 141 
11JW Creswell, Research Design :Qualitative ,Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (3rd edn, Sage  
  2009) 195 
12Creswell (n11) 95 
13H Arskey,  P Knight, Interviewing for Social Sciences (1st edn, Sage 1999) 32 
14Gubruin (n4) 106 
15Rees (n2)10 
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accessible. Quantitative methods were too rigid to accurately measure and 
categorise personal perspectives; the statistical approach is confined to explaining 
relationships through, and between, fixed or identified variables, failing to fully 
explain the extent or the context of variables or the source and nature of individual 
perceptions. Neither do they explain how these are formed or allow analysis of 
external relationships with other participants and stakeholders,16 per the practice of 
socio-legal research. 
 
Qualitative methods allow scrutiny of ‘relationships’ linked to the attitudes and values 
on which these rest and enable the sensitive probing of the relevance of ethnicity 
between MSBs and their customers.17 These methods potentially reveal what is 
important to participants, and their interpretations of their environment.’18 This 
methodology aligned with the research question, and enabled an interpretative and 
evaluative approach to the meanings of relationships and events, by investigating 
and ‘exploring and understanding of the meaning ascribed by individuals or groups, 
to a social or human problem.’19 This approach enables probing, exploration and 
clarification20 of issues central to the research question across small sample sizes 
and different participant groups, facilitating an understanding of these complex 
relationships and actions within their social context. Qualitative methodology was 
therefore more appropriately placed to enable the investigation of methods of MSB 
operation through fieldwork research, essential to the examination of the effects of 
regulation on this sphere of activity.  
 
 
3.3.2 The selection of semi-structured interviews  
 
The data was gathered using semi-structured interviews. The use of questionnaires 
was discounted in not facilitating the exploration of issues relevant to the research 
aims. Whilst questionnaires are easier to collate, they require large samples since 
they often yield a low response rate. Participants would have been limited by the 
                                                          
16Rees (n2) 10 
17Hennink (n8)10 
18A Bryman , Research Methods and Organisation Studies (1st edn, Routledge1995) 25 
19Creswell (n11) 4 
20Gubruin (n4) 113 
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number and structure of questions, with detailed written responses not likely 
forthcoming and time consuming for participants to provide. They are more suited to 
gaining factual information drawn from closed questions, or limited pre-selected 
optional responses,21 and are not appropriate for eliciting in-depth, personal 
perspectives and attitudes.22 Questionnaires also excluded the development and  
exploration of the topics relevant to the research aims and required to produce 
quality data.23 
 
Fieldwork involving interviews of participants in their workplace offered the possibility 
of more in-depth responses and richer data, the interaction with the interviewer 
capturing the participants’ views and enabling further exploration and clarification of 
these. Interviews were therefore the preferred research method given the anticipated 
sample size, enabling information to be gained instantly, in a less time intensive 
manner for participants. Questionnaires unhelpfully afford the opportunity for 
respondents to revisit and amend their answers to that which they considered the 
researcher was seeking and lacked the stimulus and motivation 24 of interview 
interaction, which instils a sense of contribution and purpose, engaging the 
participant.25  
 
Telephone interviewing was considered to be used as a ‘last resort’ to enable access 
to interviewees at a distance, maximising time and reducing travel costs, and 
enabled out of hours access at the participant’s request. This method is challenging 
in synchronising responses, relying heavily on the researcher’s verbal utterances to 
maintain the flow. Telephone interviews can be vulnerable to inadvertent 
interruptions, the lack of non-verbal communication leaves them appearing ‘stilted’, 
but they at least offered the opportunity to capture an interview at a distance.  
 
Semi-structured interviews enabled participants to feel relaxed, and engaged 
through the rapport with, and interest shown by the researcher, offering a flexible 
                                                          
21B Gillham, The Research Interview (1st edn, Continuum 2000) 14 -17 
22L Noakes, E Wincup , Criminological Research Understanding Qualitative Methods (1st edn, Sage 2004) 76 
23Rees (n2) 11-12 
24Noakes (n22) 75 
25Gillham (n21)15 
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method of enquiry beyond the confines of the individual questions, to gain an 
authentic participant perspective.  
 
Interviews were carefully designed to ensure that they elicited the relevant 
perspectives, attitudes, values and the underlying rationale and justification for 
these.26 Schedules for each participant group are located in appendix 3. Factors 
influencing the individual’s experiences of the impact of regulation were also 
important. Latent content analysis reveals the rationale for the values ascribed to the 
views expressed during interviews.27 The data analysis and critique of the interview 
data is presented in chapter 6. 
 
Semi-structured interviews are a reliable method for the small sample sizes relevant 
to this study,28 where simple one phrase answers do not suffice and where views 
cannot be conveyed through questionnaires. This captured the depth of explanations 
and nuanced29 meanings crucial to this study, with attitudinal reasoning and 
intensity,30 and the relationship between factors impacting on these.31 This flexibly 
allowed unexpected responses to be revealed avoiding confining answers to only 
what the researcher hopes or expects to discover.32 Participant views were later 
illustrated by the use of quotes, ‘general statements no matter how well written, can 
convey less, and with less impact, than a direct quotation from an interview’.33 
 
The impact of regulation on MSB operators was not overly sensitive, but was 
personal to the participants’ mode of income and lifestyle, and required consideration 
through sensitive interviewing. Semi-structured interviews were particularly 
appropriate for canvassing participants’ perceptions, attitudes and values and their 
individual insights.  
 
                                                          
26J Miller, B Glassner, ‘The “Inside” and the “Outside” : Finding Realities in interviews’ Chapter 2 Silverman D,    
  Qualitative Research, ( 3rd edn, Sage 2011) 131 -133 
27Miller (n26) 137 
28Gillham (n21) 11 
29H Arskey H, P Knight, Interviewing for Social Sciences (1st edn, Sage 1999)  34 
30CM Judd, and others Research Methods in Social Sciences (6th end,  Harcourt1991) 231 
31JA Holstein, JF Gubrium, ‘Animating Interview Narratives’ Silverman D, Qualitative  
  Research, ( 3rdedn, Sage 2011) 157 
32FJ Fowler, Survey Research Methods, Applied Social Research Methods Series Vol 1 (3rd edn,  
   Sage, 2002)  91 
33Gillham (n21) 10, 11 
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Interviewing is a complex process requiring an underpinning structure to direct the 
data collection process34 and ensured reliability using questions aligned to identified 
themes relevant to both participant groups. Standardised question sets used a 
balance of closed and open questions reflecting subsidiary aims35 reviewed by PhD 
supervisors in place of participant testing (given a small participant population) to 
ensure impact.36 Question content was informed by the interviewer’s knowledge of 
the participant group to ensure responses on subject matter were within the 
participant’s knowledge. Sequencing and wording were standardised to ensure 
consistency of meaning and clarity.37 Standard prompts elicited clarification, 
reflection and prompted elaboration of participant explanations38 where responses 
were incomplete, and enabled a ‘teasing out’ of views without resorting to leading 
questions.39 This approach avoided the interviewer providing feedback as to the 
‘required’ response.  
 
The semi-structured process provided a degree of standardisation through the  
underpinning structure giving the interview focus,40 balanced with the flexibility,41that 
ensured the interviews were dynamic, generating valuable relevant data by allowing 
the researcher to ‘pin down’ emerging themes from the interview dialogue. 
 
Developing the interview schedules, accessing participants, conducting the 
interviews, post-interview transcription and subsequent analysis were all time 
intensive. Despite this, the interviews offered the potential for capturing the ‘richness 
and vividness’42 of data to achieve the research aims.   
 
Semi-structured interviews were particularly appropriate for the elite regulator 
interview group43 who required the ‘freedom’ and discursive interview style this 
approach yielded. This necessitated greater flexibility and management by the 
                                                          
34Arskey (n29) 44 
35Noakes (n22) 80 
36R Andrews, Research Questions ( 1st edn, Continuum Publishing 2003) 10 
37BL Berg Qualitative Research Methods For the Social Sciences (7th edn, Pearson 2009) 118 
38Hennink (n8) 131 
39Judd (n30) 238 
40Houtkoop- Steenstar, Interaction and the Standardized Survey Interview: The Living Questionnaire  
   (1st edn Cambridge University Press,  2000) [9-13] 
41N King, C Horrocks , Interviews in Qualitative Research (1stedn, Sage 2010) 53 
42Noakes (n22)80 
43Gubruin (n4) 302 
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interviewer in controlling the question structure.44 The interviewer’s demonstration of 
interest, active listening, knowledge and respect for their contribution were relevant 
during this process.45 This group required a specific question set (see appendix 3) 
designed to capture their expert knowledge and experience,46 and their role in 
relation to the regulatory framework. Elite groups are usually highly motivated to 
participate but their roles make great demands on their time, restricting their 
availability for interviewing.47 These were therefore conducted in the elite groups’ 
work environment to afford control and privacy, or by telephone.48   
 
 
3.4 Generating the data 
 
This section deals with specific aspects of the qualitative methodology that were 
applied to address the research question within the fieldwork research. The following 
sections detail how the fieldwork was undertaken. The development of the interview 
schedules (see appendix 3) and the accompanying sample strategy that provided 
the selection of the participant groups for interview. The subsequent classification of 
data yielded from the data generation process in relation to the individual participants 
and the presentation of key generic demographic information that was obtained by 
this process, is discussed. The findings from the field work research process are 
presented in chapter 6, where this data is robustly analysed and critically evaluated 
in relation to the participant and stakeholder groups. 
 
 
3.4.1 The interview schedule 
 
The interview schedule standardises the information given to the participants 
outlining the overall project aims and providing an explanation of the process for 
obtaining participant consent and withdrawal supported by the relevant 
documentation. Copies of these were given to the participants before consent, at the 
                                                          
44King (n41) 56  
45King (n41) 52 
46C Marshall, G Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (5th edn, Sage 2011) 155 
47Marshall (n47) 156  
48King (n48) 42 
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point of the face to face interviews or in advance of telephone interviews, or by 
email.   
 
Each of the schedules for each participant group, operator, regulator, and 
stakeholder was supported by standardised explanations of key terms and use of 
prompts.49 Questions were designed to align to the research objectives and each set 
sought to collect participant demographic information pertaining to role and 
experience, both current and previous.50 The questions focused on gaining the 
views, attitudes, and perceptions of participants in relation to the processes, 
practices, relationships, and roles, relevant to the regulatory framework, in particular 
focusing on the impact of roles. The questions were structured around core sections 
linked to themes applicable to both participant groups to enable cross-comparison. 
Prompts were used for development and investigation of issues revealed in relation 
to the core questions. 
 
The interview schedules provided some degree of structure to secure a degree of 
reliability derived from this standardisation,51 avoiding ‘interview drift’, leading 
questions, or endorsement of participant opinions.52 The schedule focused primarily 
on relevant issues but the semi-structured process enabled participants to talk freely 
within the predefined topics and set questions, supported by the further probing of 
responses. The interview schedule was reviewed and amended in light of its 
application to the first geographical area. This provided an opportunity for the 
researcher to reflect on the emerging themes and concerns raised by participants,53 
enabling adjustment to incorporate new dimensions where they had not been 
anticipated but where these emerged as significant to the research and the existing 
themes. This enabled the researcher to compile additional questions phrased in 
different ways and adjust the language used where this was needed to 
accommodate the participants’ experiences and promote clarity. 
 
 
                                                          
49King (n41) 40 
50Berg (n37) 113 
51Noakes(n22)79 
52King (n4) 38 
53Rees (n2) 12 
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3.4.2 Sampling strategy 
 
The sample strategy requires consideration of the following characteristics: 
comprehensiveness, probability and efficiency. The core interview group should fairly 
represent the total MSB population, demonstrate comprehensiveness and reflect any 
relevant distinction within this group. The ‘comprehensiveness’ of the sample and the 
effects on the individual probability of selection were considered.54 
 
The identification of the target research population was essential prior to selection of 
the interview sample, based on the quality of the contribution that the group could 
offer, perceived as a form of intensity sampling55 where participants were selected 
with characteristics relevant to the research aims. To this end the period of 
experience of being directly engaged operationally or managerially in the provision of 
remittance services pre and post implementation of the MLR 2007 regulations was 
important. Also relevant was the provision of remittance services by the MSB, since 
this legal category is inclusive of other business types such as currency exchange. 
There was also a need to isolate the business purpose to those businesses 
specifically dealing with private customers, not solely business clients. This was 
justified56 by reference to the research aims. Steps were taken to ensure the 
application of the sampling techniques did not include sample groups/individuals that 
were not relevant to the research aims or the target participant group. A phone call 
prior to interview clarified the nature of the business and the operator’s experience 
before selection. 
 
The total sample group for the fieldwork was the number of MSBs currently 
registered with HMRC. Disclosure of information by HMRC was restricted by 
legislation57and a duty of confidentiality owed to registered MSBs,58 and some 
information was not available where HMRC considered this to be outside their 
identified business purpose. The accessible data provided the total number of MSBs 
within specific post code areas which were mapped to indicate the density of MSBs 
                                                          
54Fowler (n32) 13 
55Marshall (n46)111 
56Hennink(n8) 84 
57Freedom of Information Act 2000, Schedule 1  
58Data Protection Act 1998  
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across the UK. This was cross-referenced against geographical areas within the UK 
that were identified from census data as having the relevant population aligned to UK 
remittance receiving countries,59 narrowed to five areas for sampling for the fieldwork 
research (see Table 2).These five areas were selected which corresponded to 
known remittance populations and user groups within the UK; these were identified 
as the geographical areas M1, M2, M3, M4 and M5. This convenient and purposive 
sample population was representative of the group of MSBs most likely to be 
engaged in remittance activity with an ethnic dimension.60 To further guarantee the 
reliability and quality of the data, the research was to be undertaken within the same 
time frame/period. 
 
This sampling strategy enabled the construction of sampling groups within 
geographical areas where remittance businesses with an ethnic dimension were 
located and ensured that the research sample had the relevant expertise aligned to 
the research aims. Within each sample area a list was compiled of remittance 
operators from open source material/information, which facilitated access to the final 
sample group.61  The open source information accessed included: telephone and 
commercial and business directories, internet searches, newspapers, advertising 
media, and the UKMTA membership list. From this list a target sample of 5 MSBs 
per location was selected at random, see Table 2. The use of multiple locations 
ensured that the results could be compared for reliability across different locations. 
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Table 2 The geographical construction of the operator interview groups. 
 
 
Sample 
Locations 
 
 
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
 
M4 
 
M5 
Total No. 
registered 
MSBs 
 
30 
 
21 
 
78 
 
136 
 
29 
Total No. 
MSBs 
identified 
for 
sample 
 
 
15 
 
 
10 
 
 
25 
 
 
30 
 
 
4 
Actual 
Sample 
Size 
 
5 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
0 
 
 
The total sample of MSBs selected for interview was confined to 25, after which 
‘theoretical sufficiency’ or saturation was likely to be reached, enabling a size that 
met the research aims without being onerous in terms of cost, time and effort.62 The 
latter are important in a time constrained project for which there was no external 
funding,63 and where subsequent transcription and data analysis constraints were 
also relevant.64 The areas sampled were in fact confined to M1- M4. Area M5 was 
not included since the ‘saturation’ point was reached rendering its inclusion 
unnecessary.  
 
This strategy did not conform to the true principles of probability sampling, but was 
not considered to compromise generalisation of the wider population since it 
reflected the possible variance of the total population. Additionally, generalisation is 
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limited to the UK MSB population included in the core population sample,65 with no 
de-selection on arbitrary grounds.66 Those not included in the final interview sample 
were those who did not wish to participate or who did, but arrangement for interview 
was problematic. The possibility of ‘snowball sampling’ to widen the sample using 
contacts provided by participant MSB operators who had already been interviewed,  
where they were willing to provide this contact, was limited by the knowledge that the 
contact would be agreeable and their identity as the referrer could be disclosed.  
 
The stakeholder groups’ participants were identified by their community associations 
relevant to each geographical area, examples are cited in the ethics proposal (see 
appendix 5). Regulator participants as elite groups are defined by their network 
relationships which are difficult for outsiders to penetrate, so ‘referral’ was usually 
from a gatekeeper of this network, approached by telephone, email, or letter. 
Additionally, ‘snowball sampling’ enabled further access67 to this elite group. 
 
 
3.4.3 The interview format 
 
The general recruitment procedure was to approach the participants in the sample   
by telephone or email as the means of enlisting their participation; this is more 
practical given the distance between the sample areas, and their distance in relation 
to the researcher’s base. This also prevented the disruption of appearing 
unannounced at the place of business.  
 
There were discrete phases in the interviews that relate directly to the integrity of the 
research process. This included the introductory phase where the interviewer 
outlined the research project and its aims, and the interview process. At this point the 
researcher also provided participants with information about the interview process 
and completed the relevant consent and documentary requirements. Explanation 
was not limited solely to the purpose of the interview but the purpose of the research 
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itself.68 The success of the semi-structured interview rests on the skill of the 
interviewer to establish a rapport69 with the participant, gaining their trust,70 as well in 
seizing opportunities to probe the participants’ views to determine the reasons for 
these.71  
 
The researcher drew on the rapport throughout72 the interview to develop themes, 
given that questions were not limited to those within the schedule, nor any particular 
time frame, aiming to assess the impact of legislation on their operational role.73 The 
rich subjective and personal viewpoints were subsequently captured in quotes as 
valuable illustrative examples, representing the unique views of participants and 
revealing ‘interview discoveries’ and the subtlety and ‘shades’ of opinions. 
 
The use of prompts as key words and suggested variables provoked thoughts and 
comments about the topics under consideration. This ensured that all valuable 
opportunities to explore participant responses were captured. Probing questions 
enabled further justification for answers, rationale for thinking, and explanation of 
perceived attitudes and understandings, eliciting further detail, accuracy and 
specificity, and enabling the contextualisation of responses to ascertain relevance.74 
The interview schedule led to the interviews falling into sections: the introductory 
phase, the biographical phase, the data collection phase and the closing phase.   
 
The investigation of underlying attitudes and perceptions requires skilful ‘question 
wording, question sequence and interviewer effects’.75 Participants are most 
engaged when the questions are presented with interest and when their relevance 
and importance is clear. Thematic grouping of questions and transitional comments 
linked questions to proceeding topics and the ‘funnel effect’ moved participants from 
general issues to greater specificity, focusing attention on pertinent issues.  
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The elite interview group were particularly important to the central research question 
in considering the impact of regulation, requiring those interviewed to have a special 
knowledge of the regulatory process and a direct role in relation to its 
implementation. This group offered a potentially unique and varied perspective of 
their roles within different organisations. They offered credibility and authority to the 
research from their privileged access to information and processes, and their views 
on these, which were not transparent or accessible to outsiders. These interviews 
demanded greater preparation, with the interviewees exerting great autonomy over 
the process and demanding more flexibility from the interviewer. They had the 
potential to reveal previously unconsidered issues and required a dynamic 
response.76 
 
The interview process was concluded with a broad and concise overview of the 
questions/content covered and a check with participants as to their wishes to 
comment or clarify further. Participants were thanked for their contribution and 
provided with information about the withdrawal process should they need this. The 
interviewer also had to comply with strategies outlined in their risk management 
process detailed in the approved ethics application (see appendix 5) where this was 
relevant.  
 
 
3.5 Data collection and analysis  
 
This section seeks to outline how the data collected from the fieldwork investigation  
was prepared for subsequent analysis and evaluation, which is presented in chapter  
6. Although the in-depth analysis of research findings will be considered in future  
chapters, a justification of the selected coding methods and consequent thematic  
analysis is relevant, since this enabled the later thematic analysis and comparison of 
data from which later conclusions are drawn.  
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3.5.1 Transcribing the data  
 
All audio interviews were transcribed word for word77 maintaining participant 
anonymity and redacting information that would compromise this, accommodating 
the ‘inductive’ approach to data analysis.78 Interview notes (none - audio interviews) 
were typed up as soon as possible after the interview. Transcripts were uniformly 
coded, and notations to mode, tone, feelings where relevant and discernable from 
the audio, including paralinguistic features79 were originally intended to be added but 
were not. This was due to the audio distortion and the lack of value these would 
have added to responses and existing interview content. The anonymised transcripts 
were stored on an encrypted USB device. Although time consuming, the transcripts 
could not be created using voice activated software given the variance in accents 
and dialects in the participants’ voices. The aim was for transcribing and analysis to 
take place as soon as possible after the interview to preserve the researcher’s 
knowledge of participant replies. Transcribing was all undertaken by the researcher 
to preserve confidentiality allowing familiarity with the data prior to coding. Participant 
responses remain unaltered, retaining their authenticity and avoiding selection of 
phrases, preventing distortion of data.   
 
 
3.5.2 Coding and content analysis  
 
Following transcription, the interviews were read and reread in preparation for 
analysis by content coding. This was achieved through the process that is often 
referred to as ‘immersion’80 where the researcher develops familiarity with the data 
enabling selection and identification themes within the data, which were allocated 
individual codes. Codes were exhaustive prior to analysis and deductive, whilst also 
being exclusive where possible. The themes conceived were essential to the 
question of impact of the relevant legislation as well as to the participant ideas and 
concepts expressed in relation to this. In particular, coding was divided into several 
themes based on the relationships between participants, the perceived roles of 
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participants, regulatory purpose, regulatory impact and transaction processes such 
as compliance or enforcement.81 A starting point for coding was that which was 
‘expected’ to arise following the literature review and in line with the research 
question, as well as that which was revealed in the data, as initial categories that 
would hold across the participant groups.82  
 
The interviews were deconstructed according to similarities and differences in the 
views expressed by the participant groups83 and the nature of the issues that arose. 
A single set of categories was developed distinctly for each group with some 
elements common to both participant groups. The use of both core and 
differentiating categories/codes ensured that there was a universal thematic 
approach to content analysis, which also reflected the individuality and distinctly 
differing roles and perspectives emanating from the participant groups in practice.  
 
Coding was an important pre-requisite for structuring and ordering data prior to 
analysis, enabling the identification and categorisation of themes relating to 
relationships, patterns, communalities and also differences in perceptions and views. 
Additional categories were developed as data analysis progressed.84 This grounded 
theory approach allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the data, allowing 
refinement and addition of categories inductively.85  
 
The grounded theory approach was considered relevant since it aims to develop 
conceptual categories for analysis that shed light on the relationships and process 
dynamics,86 allowing for the development of a theory to emerge from the data 
analysis.87 This was relevant since this thesis sought to investigate the regulatory 
impact of the MLR 2007 on MSBs, but had no pre-conceived notion of the form of 
this impact, if any. Grounded theory allows for the creation of a theoretical 
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construct/framework in a particular context of practice,88 in this case a consideration 
of influencing factors and relationships in the context of financial regulation.89 The 
theory that emerges is grounded in the data90 supported by the phases of coding 
and cross comparison of transcripts, as well as the researcher’s perceptions from 
any fieldwork notes. It therefore offers credibility, originality and resonance91 within a 
small sample where there are considerable differences in experience, knowledge 
and positioning of participants in terms of their roles. 
 
Categories were developed as themes and sub-themes to reflect the 
interrelationships between participants and their views as to the nature of the impact 
on practices, processes, and the economic, social and commercial aspects of 
activity. This way the narrative was broken down in a systematic and reliable manner 
to reveal further emerging patterns and themes to facilitate analysis, which were then 
compared. This constant comparison of data generates the coding and facilitates the 
analysis and theory of relationships and practices. Transcripts were reread, recoded 
and compared with each other, this comparison revealing further themes for coding 
as the latent meaning in the individual transcripts was revealed. Discerning the 
meaning from transcripts was a subjective process involving a high inference of 
content analysis with the meanings discerned from the participants’ narratives. The 
subjective aspect of this coding process was underpinned by the overarching 
objective methodology for data analysis.92 However, care was taken not to distort 
participant views by applying meaning and inference within the content that this 
could not reasonably support, in order to ensure that the processes, practices and 
relationships identified within the data were analysed from the participants’ 
perspectives.93 
 
Quotes from transcripts were noted for possible use, preserving authenticity and the 
individuality of the participant’s ‘voice’ and were carefully selected to preserve 
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participant anonymity.94 The final stage was the identification of overarching themes 
as summaries of key issues.95 
 
Coding ensured that the data was treated thematically in a comparable and 
consistent way allowing for a range of views to be identified and recognised as 
themes. This ensured that the interconnectedness of the data and its meaning was 
retained.96 Other than the codes/categories referred to above relating to the content 
analysis, an attempt was made to construct measurement codes to indicate the 
frequency of comments relating to a particular theme,97 in order to illustrate the 
intensity or importance to the participant. These codes were, however, difficult and 
time consuming to construct and were not drawn on in the final analysis as they 
failed to add to what was already obvious to the researcher from the data analysis 
process. Frequency categories98 can add an additional element in terms of reliability, 
uniformity, enhancing validity and removing distortion of content analysis, ensuring a 
balanced consideration of the ‘facts’ and the emotion and meaning which 
accompanied this.99 This is, however,  more applicable and useful across a narrower 
range of themes and a larger sample size. 
 
Analysis relied on the skilled and systematic use and construction of categories to 
identify themes relevant to the various aspects of the research question. These 
categories should be both exhaustive and exclusive to enable the allocation of 
responses to a single category. The data yielded comments that related to several 
categories, responses are usually allocated to a single category on assessment of 
the ‘latent’ meaning, but since some comments related to more than one category, 
they were rightfully considered in relation to each.100    
 
Data analysis was robust and holistic, with the data viewed in segments but related 
to its totality to avoid distortion, which is imperative, since research is a process of 
impact and influence based on interpretation and associations by the researcher, 
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which must be genuine,101 sustainable and capable of defence.102 Data analysis 
conveys the researcher’s subjective interpretation103 of relationships and attitudes 
between participants, and the analysis must convey this by demonstrating respect 
for participants104 without bias.105 Data analysis is presented in chapter 6 
accompanied by the demographic information and interview group characteristics.   
 
The quality of the data coding and analysis was achieved throughout the research 
supervision process, and triangulation by the reflection of the researcher against the 
recognised parameters of credibility, transferability and conformability. The utilisation 
of different data and analytical triangulation methods was inappropriate given the 
size of the research sample and the restrictions on time and funding for this research 
project.106 
 
Sound data coding was a pre-requisite to the later analysis of findings and the ability 
to construct typologies of practice for participant groups107 Coding using several 
variables enabled analysis by topic, themes, sub themes, relationships, experience, 
context, process, and attitudes,  to  ensure that later analysis offered comparison, 
breadth and depth, and retained the context of the data to assist the development of 
typologies of practice. 
 
Computer assisted packages such as Nvivo are available to assist data coding but 
were not used due to the small sample size; samples were coded using word 
searches and colour and letter coding and, additionally, Microsoft Excel.  
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3.6 Ethical issues  
 
All research must have validity and credibility in relation to research design, 
derived from a clear methodology complying with local108 and nationally109 
recognised standards of research practice110 evidencing integrity. This  
was secured by addressing consent, confidentiality and data protection, and the  
principles of honesty, openness, fairness and respect for the participant. Approval of 
the research design was a crucial stage in this process but the application of the 
preceding principles applied throughout the whole research process. The consent of 
the participants and transparency as to the research aims and voluntary participation 
were seen as the cornerstone to ensuring the ethical compliance of this research.111  
 
 
3.6.1 Confidentiality and data handling  
 
The primary consideration in any qualitative research study is the protection of the  
identity and anonymity of all participants engaged in the research process.112 This  
was essential since ethical approval for this research was sought and granted113  
conditional upon this. This requires disclosure of the research purpose and gaining 
informed consent114 from the participants (see patient information and  
consent sheets appendix 6). Anonymity was only guaranteed in relation to the MSB  
group, since the roles and specialism of the elite regulator group may reveal their 
identities115 despite anonymisation, and the participants were warned about this 
risk116 for which all reasonable steps were taken to minimise this.117 Participants 
were made aware that consent to the interview also included consent to the use of 
anonymised quotes118 from the interviews and the use of the interview material and 
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quotes for subsequent academic publication119 (see participant information leaflet 
interview schedule appendix 3).  
 
Anonymity was secured by the allocation of participant identity numbers used at all 
stages of data handling. Access to research data was restricted to the researcher120 
for the purposes of transcription and data analysis, and to supervisors for the 
supervision process as needed.121 Since confidentiality is a crucial element of 
respect for and protection of the participant’s identity, this was extended to the 
protection of research material at all stages of the research process. Data was 
secured on an encrypted USB storage device, accessible to the researcher only.122 
Any handwritten notes relevant to the study were scanned and loaded into the 
encrypted USB and the paper notes were then destroyed. Paper copies of the 
participant consent forms were similarly dealt with. 
  
Whilst confidentiality is a core principle of ethical research, there are circumstances 
in which the researcher is obligated to disclose specific kinds of information. All 
participants were made aware of the researcher’s duty in this respect prior to the 
commencement of the interview,123 although this was not a condition of ethical 
approval. This warning was also included in the participant information sheet (see 
appendix 3.) Despite careful question design it was recognised that the participants 
may inadvertently have disclosed an aspect of their behaviour that the researcher 
was under a legal obligation to report.124 In this study the discussion of legal 
measures aimed at suppressing an aspect of terrorist finance were anticipated as 
possibly leading to a participant revealing knowledge of terrorist activity or support of 
a ‘terrorist cause’ that may amount to a criminal offence required to be reported by 
the researcher.125 In addition to warning the participants of this in advance of their 
consent to be interviewed, the participants were informed that any perceived 
possibility of such information being divulged would result in the researcher 
suspending the interview. The researcher would then have to explain the kind of 
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disclosure that would invoke the duty of the researcher to report such activity, 
enabling the participant to decide as to what to disclose before the interview 
recommenced.126 
 
Confidentiality also extends to the conduct of the interview.127 If a participant reveals 
information after the end of the interview when recording has ceased, that is valuable 
to the research aims, the researcher is required to negotiate the inclusion of this 
information with the participant and the participant should indicate this inclusion on 
consent form provided. Participants were additionally asked to give specific consent 
to the use of audio recording of the interview which in most instances provides for a 
more accurate reflection of interview content. Where consent to audio recording was 
not forthcoming hand written interview notes were taken instead.128  
 
The interview location needs to be secure, offer privacy and maintain confidentiality. 
Participants were invited to select their work location for this purpose,129 minimising 
the burden of participation.130 However, interruptions were commonplace and one 
interview was terminated for this reason. Relevant to this was the fact that the 
researcher shared a work environment that necessitated the careful timing of 
interviews to ensure that there was no disruption and that the confidentiality of 
parties was not compromised, maintaining privacy. 
 
 
3.6.2 Research relationship 
 
The concept of the protection of participant autonomy extends to the right of the 
subject to withdraw from the study.131 Participants were provided with information on 
this at the outset (see participant withdrawal sheet appendix 3). For the purposes of 
this study the right to withdraw was limited to 12 months from the date of the 
interview, as otherwise the validity and reliability of the sample size would be 
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compromised and the researcher would have insufficient time to remedy this without 
compromising the integrity of the research project.132  
 
The principle of ‘do no harm’ emerges in all research design133 where the 
participants should not be exposed to any form of degradation or humiliation134 and 
the risk of this to the participant should be minimised.135 Respect for the participant’s 
was demonstrated during the interview process and follows on to the integrity of the 
data analysis reflected in seeking separate consent for subsequent use of quotes in 
research findings. Some participants provided full and informed consent but one 
requested a copy of the interview and another requested a verification of the quotes 
to ensure confidentiality was maintained. These requests were complied with. 
 
The researcher is obligated analyse the data fairly, without distorting the accuracy of 
the context underpinning the disclosures by the participants.136 This also extends to 
the sector of activity and the relevant ethnic community from which the participants 
are drawn. The researcher must present a balanced analysis, forming conclusions 
capable of defence from the evidence the research yielded. Whilst some aspects of 
research were anticipated as possibly impacting negatively on those whose interests 
were affected, the researcher took all steps to present the findings with sensitivity as 
to the impact and its context. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology underpinning this research 
thesis, describing in detail the reasons for selection of the qualitative approach a as 
the overarching methodological approach. It has further sought to justify the 
relevance of qualitative approach by reference to the overall research aims and 
objectives, to demonstrate its appropriateness for ascertaining the views and 
                                                          
132UREC (University of Leeds research Ethics Committee) – ‘Draft  Amended Guidance upon ethical  
    issues’ April 2008 
133Belmont Report, ‘Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research’ The  
    National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research US Dept  
    Health and Human Sciences April 18, 1979 
134(109)Point 4(i) 
135(n92)3(d) 
136(n114)35  
113 
 
attitudes of the two distinct participant groups to enable the fulfilment of the research 
aims. This application of the qualitative methodology and in particular the socio- legal   
approach ensured the fieldwork research was designed in a methodologically sound 
manner to apply the most relevant to the fulfilling  the research aims in assessing the 
impact of an effectiveness of the MLR. Further the incorporation of the ‘grounded 
theory’ approach within this ensured that interviews offered the flexibility to capture 
new and emerging themes given that the nature of the impact of regulation and 
degree and  dimensions relevant to regulatory efficacy were unknown in advance. 
 
It also ensured that the research was conducted in an ethically sound manner.  
Addressing ethical considerations is a key element of the research design that 
underpins the legitimacy and integrity of the design process and the implementation 
of the research in practice, and a necessary pre requisite to ethical approval. It 
demonstrates a robust protection of the interests of the participant groups. This 
reliability of the research was further supported by the consistency of the approach 
afforded by a single researcher undertaking all interviews, transcription, coding and 
analysis. This has delivered continuity and consistency to all aspects of the 
methodology adopted for this thesis. 
 
At all stages, from the formulation of the sampling strategy, the development of  the 
interview schedule, the interviews and subsequent  coding and data analysis,  have 
all been reviewed by reference to the research aims and objectives. The challenges 
and constraints of applying the research strategy in practice and the relevance of the 
grounded theory approach to enable the adjustment of the interview schedules to 
capture emerging and unforeseen concerns, will be briefly considered in chapter 6. 
The analysis of data yielded and the relevant findings are presented in chapter 6, to 
enable a comparison on the perspectives of the different participant groups and 
enabled  the construction a typology of MSBs operation in the UK.   
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Chapter 4    
A normative framework for the regulation of alternative 
remittance systems 
 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to present a normative framework for the regulation of 
alternative remittance systems such as Hawala, having at its central core 
the protection of fundamental rights as the values recognised by the 
international community and within the UK. The normative framework is 
relevant to the central research question of this thesis, which focuses on 
the impact of the regulation on remittance services regulated as MSB’s. 
This research seeks to assess the legitimacy of regulation, internationally 
driven and implemented at national level, as being necessary to prevent 
the misuse of these systems for money laundering and terrorist finance. 
The normative framework goes beyond justification of the necessity for 
regulation of these systems based on the risks they present, which was 
considered in chapter 2. The framework presents relevant standards and 
values that should guide the form of regulation to ensure it protects 
existing fundamental rights. This framework is the critical point of 
reference from which this central research question and issues of 
regulatory impact are considered, critiqued and addressed in later 
chapters. 
 
Previous chapters have considered the terrorist threat, models of 
terrorism and CTS, (see chapter 1). Chapter 2 focused on critiquing the 
operational model of ARS, setting out their potential risk of their misuse 
for terrorist finance. In order to fully address the impact and value of the 
MLR 2007 in regulating MSBs, it is now necessary to set out the 
normative standards against which legislative measures and state action 
are to be reviewed. This chapter presents a normative framework of 
rights, against which the regulatory framework for ARS is assessed and 
analysed as to its effectiveness in protecting these values. This enables 
the further consideration of the capacity of legal measures to effectively 
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manage the risks inherent to ARS and to effectively control these. The 
effectiveness of regulation cannot, however, be considered without first 
offering a normative framework against which the regulatory framework  
is to be assessed. 
 
The normative framework presents fundamental human rights as core 
values and standards that are viewed as integral to an ethically sound 
approach to the development of counter-terrorism strategy. This 
framework acts as a guide to ensuring that responses to the threat of 
terrorism are normatively compliant at both national and international 
level. 
 
The normative values of ARS are analysed to consider the ethical 
dimension of their operation and the extent to which this is concordant 
with fundamental rights, in order to evaluate whether, in light of the risks 
they pose, they should be tolerated at all within the current financial and 
regulatory climate. The chapter also considers the normativity of 
alternative remittance systems as to their capacity for financial inclusion 
and their normative capacity for protecting fundamental rights aligned to 
this. A case study of Al-Barakaat is considered within the Somali context 
as a backdrop to critiquing the normativity of the international CTS and 
the legitimacy of the regulatory action as to its protection of fundamental 
rights. This is distinct from the previous consideration of the Al-Barakaat   
case in chapter 2 which focused on the evidential basis to justify action. 
The analysis of Al-Barakaat  in the Somali context questions the ethics of 
regulation in relation to state capacity and financial inclusion necessary to 
enable states to comply with regulation in a normative manner. The 
context in which alternative remittance systems operate is used to 
illustrate the jeopardy caused to normative values by the listing of the Al-
Barakaat remittance operator. The chapter concludes by considering the 
normative compliance of remittance services in the UK and their capacity 
for financial inclusion. It briefly reviews the potential of new technologies 
to address system risks and maximise the benefits of these services in a 
normatively compliant way.  
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4.1 Fundamental rights - a normative guide to governmental action  
      and the need for protection 
 
The normative framework presented is premised on the need for 
legitimacy of state action as an aspect of sound governance including 
preventing the risk of misuse of remittance systems. The framework 
derives from internationally recognised standards of fundamental 
entitlements and inalienable rights1 ‘predicated on individualism’ and a 
‘sense of right and of rights’2 derived from human value and respect for 
humanity and human autonomy. The framework offers an objective 
standard, a ‘cloak’ of protection, as a fundamental safeguard against 
which governmental action can be assessed. State responses to 
countering the threat of terrorism need to be ethically sound in protecting 
rights, not merely offering a ‘lowest common denominator compromise’.3 
Rights are most vulnerable at times of emergency when increased 
security threats require states to reassess their action.  
 
At times of insecurity the level of rights protection is commonly readjusted 
with the content of rights ‘recalibrated’ risking indirectly importing a 
proportionality test in relation to unqualified rights, eroding their 
protection.4 Rights are often ‘downgraded’ as security is prioritised. The 
normative framework requires security to be preserved without subverting 
rights, enhancing both, and ensuring rights cannot be ‘balanced away’. 
Tony Blair commented in the wake of the 7/7 London bombings: ‘the rules 
                                                          
1S Yankson ‘Starving terrorists of their financial oxygen: at all costs?’  (2010) 13(3), JMLC 282- 
 306, 293 
2D Mc Bernal, ‘Transnational transactions, legal work, cross border commerce and global  
 regulation’(1edn) Likosky M., ‘Transnational legal processes-globalisation and power disparities’   
(Butterworths London 2002) 37, 38 
3Commission on a Bill of Rights, ‘A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us’ Vol 1 December  
  2012,6 
4H Fenwick, 'Recalibrating ECHR rights and the role of the Human Rights Act post 9/11:  
 Reasserting international human rights norms in the 'war on terror' ?' (2010)  63 (1) Current legal  
 problems 153- 234 153-157  
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of the game are changing’5 but the values that underpin rights protection 
should remain steadfast. 
 
The normative framework offers a guide to regulation, which is necessary 
given the political pressure on states to address the challenge that 
terrorism poses to the fabric of democracy and the need to address 
security concerns. State action needs to continue to protect rights to 
avoid their alienation through responses derived from the perceived 
sense of ‘emergency’ that terrorism creates.6 Successive governments 
have enacted measures countering terrorism that have compromised 
individuals’ rights,7 a position not unique to the UK. The normative 
framework requires balanced constitutional protection of rights limiting the 
extent of governmental action8 in the name of security. This is critical 
since the UK, having an unwritten constitution, has no higher order of 
rights. Executive power does not countenance the suspension or 
unjustified interference of rights protected in domestic and international 
law. The perception of the terrorist threat has traditionally expanded 
executive powers9 through control measures that act pre-emptively, often 
narrowing and compromising rights protection to achieve these ends. The 
normative framework ensures that legal and executive measures are 
scrutinised and accountable for standards of rights protection and counter 
terrorism norms which operate as a check on executive power. 
 
The UK has a long tradition of rights protection dating back to the Magna 
Carta, illustrating the need for a prior commitment from states to 
determine the boundaries of legitimate use and accountability of state 
power in times of crisis. The UK, a signatory to the ECHR, has 
recognised its existing commitments to rights protection through the 
                                                          
5Times (London)6 August 2005,1 
6D Anderson,‘Shielding the compass: how to fight terrorism without defeating the law’ (2013)  3  
 European Human Rights Law Review 233-246,235 
7Commission on a Bill of Rights, ‘A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us’ Vol 1 December     
 2012, 8  
8E Gross, ‘Fighting Terrorism with one hand tied behind the back: delineating the normative    
 frameworkfor conducting the struggle against terrorism within a democratic paradigm’  (2011- 
 2012) 29(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal, 23  
9LK Donohue‘ The Perilous Dialogue’ (2009) 97 Cal L Rev 357-392, 559-360 
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Human Rights Act 1998, enhanced by the incorporation of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights within the Lisbon Treaty.10  
 
The UK recently considered a UK Bill of Rights to strengthen convention 
rights, a pre-requisite from which national ‘core values which give us our 
identity as a free nation’11 could be developed. This appeared to be 
driven by political concerns as to the role of the ECrHT and its 
jurisprudence reflecting its view that the convention is a ‘living instrument’ 
of rights protection. ‘Expanding interpretations’ of rights challenge the 
UK’s capacity to deal with security interests,12 which is evident in the 
legal difficulties the UK has encountered concerning the deportation of 
terror suspects.13 The suggested resolution that the UK withdraw from the 
ECHR14 is problematic, since these rights are recognized internationally15 
and regionally.  
 
The UN Declaration of Human Rights outlines the inalienable, ‘inherent or 
natural rights of man’ connected to human dignity and applicable to ‘all 
people by virtue of their common humanity’.16 International consensus 
recognises the need for rights protection and the ‘rule of law,’ as 
fundamental determinants of legitimate governance and accountability.17 
Universally recognised rights include the right to equal protection by the 
law and equality before the law, secured without discrimination; rights to 
life, freedom from torture, and the liberty and security of persons are 
relevant to human security. Additionally, the right to a fair hearing, the 
protection of property, privacy and the freedom of association and 
                                                          
10Art 51 of Charter  see also NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-411/10 [2012]  
  All ER  (EC) 1011 (Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) and EM and MA  
  (Eritrea) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1336 
11Commission on a Bill of Rights, ‘A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us’ Vol 1 December  
   2012,6, 2 Citing David Cameron on 2006, 13  
12Buckley v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101 [75]  
13Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom (Application no. 8139/09) Final judgment  
   09/05/2012 
14Hansard 24 Apr 2013: Columns  893-894  899-898 Theresa May  
15Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989) 44th session UNGA Res 44/25   
16Commission on a Bill of Rights, ‘A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us’ Vol 1 December  
  2012 53 
17J Rawls, ‘Theory of Justice’ (1st edn, Belknap Press 2005) 4    
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participation in the community and cultural life18have all been recognised 
internationally, subject to varying degrees of protection. The UN has 
pledged to protect these fundamental freedoms, acknowledged as central 
to and reflective of legitimate governance.19 
 
UK membership of the EU imports a hierarchy of rights norms akin to 
those recognised by the international community.20 UK integration of the 
ECHR requires the reconciliation of qualified and limited, but not non-
derogable rights, within the national context. Their protection is critical to, 
but not conditional upon, legal citizenship, as ‘indivisible, universal values 
of human dignity, freedom and equality,’21 to ensure that governmental 
action aligns to protect these.  
 
Counter terrorist finance measures engage the right to a fair trial (Art 6), a 
limited right that cannot be balanced against or overridden by individual 
or public interests. Its scope is defined within the right itself and is 
engaged by criminal justice and quasi-criminal administrative measures, 
providing procedural guarantees critical to the determination and 
protection of the substance of other rights.   
 
Qualified rights are subject to legitimate restriction in balancing these with 
recognised public interests. The right to a private and family life (Art 8), 
has become a more critical issue within the deployment of pre-emptive 
precautionary strategies. These strategies rely upon intelligence some of 
which is yielded from the extensive reporting obligations in the financial 
sector, allowing scrutiny and requiring disclosure of private financial data. 
Article 1, Protocol 1,22 of the ECHR protects property rights, and whilst 
not absolute, limits the circumstances of their lawful interference allowing 
                                                          
18UNGA ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 1948) UN Doc A/Res/3/217 Art  
  12,17, 27 
19UN Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools (2011) para 2 UN Charter  
 Article 1(2)(3) 
20UNGA ‘World Leaders Adopt declaration Reaffirming Rule of Law as Foundation for Building  
   Equitable State Relations, Just Societies’ (24 September 2012) UN Doc GA/11500  
21European Charter of Fundamental Rights C 83/392  30.3.2010 Preamble 
22Marckx v Belgium (Application no.6833/74) 13 June 1979, Series A No. 31 
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deprivations, confiscation or forfeiture where necessary in the ‘public 
interest,’ subject to proportionality. Remittance practices reflect religious 
adherence (Article 9) and all rights, once engaged, draw on the protection 
of Article 14 ECHR, prohibiting discrimination in their protection.  
 
Art 15 ECHR allows for the suspension of limited and qualified rights in 
times of emergency, preferable to ‘their unadmitted erosion, which may 
never be reversed.’23 UK parliamentary process requires HRA 
certification of legislation and the independent review of terrorist 
measures is secured through the Independent Reviewer for Terrorism 
and ongoing judicial scrutiny. These independent and impartial reviews of 
measures are critical processes which offer a check on the protection of 
rights.   
 
Protection of qualified rights in the context of security measures and 
terrorism requires the necessity and proportionality of measures,24 
restraining unnecessary action beyond the balancing of public interests.25 
Promoting fundamental rights, autonomy and freedom, as part of the 
greater protection of liberty26 and security legitimises public goals in the 
prevention of terrorism. The normative framework provides a platform for 
scrutiny of state action to ensure that the values threatened by terrorism 
also underpin the protection of human security as a reflection of 
democratic and international values whose protection is enduring across 
time and geographical boundaries.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23O Gross ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be  
  Constitutional?’(2013)112 Yale LJ 1096 -1130  
24Secretary of State for Home Department ‘CONTEST-The UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism’  
  (Cm 8123,  2011) [1.14],[1.17]  
25UNGA ‘United Nations Global Counter -Terrorism Strategy Review’ (26 June 2012) UN Doc        
   A/ 66 /L53 9 
26A Coben, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights  (1st  
   edn, Ashgate Publishing 2004) 80 
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4.1.1 Imperative for action - preserving human security 
 
Terrorism poses the risk of catastrophic loss of life, demanding that 
states27 respond to protect28 their citizens29 from national and 
international terrorist threats,30 both actual and potential, to fulfil their 
governmental duty31 and sovereign responsibility.32 This accountability 
and responsibility to protect under the human security paradigm33 
extends beyond national borders, to the protection of the wider 
international community. The responsibility to protect is reflective of 
national sovereignty, supported at international level by UN membership 
and a commitment to preserving international peace and security. 
Individual protection is afforded through the state’s protection of its, 
citizens but terrorism as an international concern invokes a consensus for 
protection by the international community derived from respect for 
individual rights, irrespective of nationality or residence. The UN has 
pledged to guarantee34 to protect security and rights within the 
cosmopolitan community and to include these as a key concern shaping 
the international security agenda. 
 
Human security paradigm places citizens35 at the centre of security 
debates and concerns:36 
 
safeguarding persons from terrorist acts and respecting human 
rights both form part of a seamless web of protection incumbent 
upon the state.37  
                                                          
27HM Lomell ‘Punishing the uncommitted crime’ Hudson B, UgelvikS, (1st edn ) Justice and  
  Security    in the 21st Century rights Risks and the rule of law. (Routledge 2012) 93 
28Human Rights Watch ‘In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide since  
  September (2012 US)   
29Government Reply to Report by Lord Carlisle of Berriew QC ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ (CM  
   7058, 2007) [16] 
30A Zwitter, ‘Human Security and the prevention of Terrorism’ (1st edn, Routledge 2011) 8 
31I Pacewicz, ‘Human rights in the state of nature: indeterminacy in the resolution of the conflict  
   between security and liberty’ (2011) 17 UCL Juris Rev, 36 
32A Ashworth, ‘Crime Community and creeping consequentialism’(1996) Apr Crim LR 220-230,220 
33Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Final Report (2003) 4   
34G Evans,  ‘Responsibility to Protect ‘ (1 edn, Brookings Institution Press 2008)  37 
35V Mitsilegas , ‘Security versus justice and the  individualisation of security and the erosion of  
   citizenship and fundamental rights.’ (1st edn ) Justice and Security in the 21st Century rights  
   Risks  and the rule of law. (Routledge 2012) 200 
36D Roberts D,’ Global Governance and Biopolitics Regulating Human Security’ (1edn, Zen Books     
   2010)15 
37International Commission of Jurists, 'Assessing Damage Urging Action Report of the Eminent  
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The human security framework extends beyond physical security.38 This 
protection is premised on the empowerment of individuals within 
conditions enhancing human fulfilment and freedoms fostering the 
protection rights, conceived of as a ‘bundle’ of inseparable needs and 
rights, denying the prioritisation of physical security. Human security 
redefines the relationship of individual needs and state obligations, 
viewed as interdependent39 and inclusive of rights protection, not 
competitive and hierarchical. Human ‘security without respect for human 
rights, does not exist,’40 since rights are entitlements arising from 
citizenship and are not conceived as varying in substance according to 
the threat posed.41 Rights act as normative standards and principles 
defining the legitimacy of state governance, transcending nationality in 
their universal value and justifying the necessity for state action and 
cooperation42 to protect international security. 
 
The human security paradigm has been criticised for being vacuous and 
opaque, a loose framework of connected but elastic values and 
principles, which are difficult to transpose into policy and action. The 
vagueness of its concepts leaves them open to flexible interpretation that 
may lack consensus and lead to variable protection. The human security 
paradigm has been questioned as to whether it is capable of effective 
protection of its norms or whether it merely operates as a policy guide for 
consideration.43 Despite these criticisms it offers a normative position for 
assessing international action to protect community security interests 
                                                                                                                                                             
   Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights - Executive Summary, Geneva  
  (2009) 
38UNHSU, ‘Human Security Theory and Practice’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian  
  Affairs United Nations (2009) 6 
39S Tadjbakhsh, AM Chenoy, ‘Human Security Concepts Implications’ (Rouledge 2007) 18, 28  
40Alberto Iribarne, Ministry of Justice, ‘Security and Human Rights’ 13 November 2006 EJP  
  Southern Cone Hearing 
41M Pash, ‘Human Security and Exceptionalism (s): Securitisation ; Neo-Liberalism and Islam’  
   (1edn)  G Shani G, M Sato, M Pash, ‘Protecting Human Security in the post 9/11 World. Critical  
   and Global Insights’ (Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire 2007) 
42G Shani, ‘ Democratic Imperialism’  Neo Liberal Globalisation and Human (In)Security in the  
  Global  South’ (1edn Shani G, M Sato,  Pash M, ‘Protecting Human Security in the post 9/11  
  World. Critical and Global Insights’ (Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire 2007) 17 
43M McDonanld ‘Human Security and the Construction of Security’ (2002)16 (3) Global Society  
  277- 295,280 
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concordant with the parallel protection of internationally recognised 
individual rights, avoiding the prioritisation of either.  
 
The framing of security threats ‘remain[s] sealed from within, by those 
who stipulate what may constitute security.’44 The security/liberty divide is 
evident where state responses conceive of security as ‘low threshold’ 
justifying state intervention. The human security paradigm balances the 
physical insecurity threatened by terrorism as an obligation requiring the 
paternalistic approach of states and the international community since 
rights protection is itself a security concern. The paradigm is not 
geographically bound, and neither is the protection it justifies. The weight 
attached to rights in developing security policy is consequentialist, 
defined by the presenting risk to justify pre-emptive action, and the 
curtailment of their operation is itself unjust. Rights should not be 
‘squeezed out by the imperatives of security and public safety’45 which 
the impact of post 9/11 CTS has threatened. The duty to protect goes 
beyond the criminalisation of terrorist acts, inclusive of pre-emptive 
measures to suppress terrorist finance;46  both approaches  require the 
avoidance of ‘curtailing hard won rights, and pursuing practices,’ which 
fail to respect fundamental rights.47 Rights as entitlements of citizenship48 
and are integrated into the protective cloak of the human security 
paradigm. They are not ‘elastic’ and the substance of their protection 
should not be compromised to accommodate CTS even where there is a 
responsibility to protect.49 This paradigm resolves the juxtaposition in 
balancing rights and security, by conceiving of rights as complementary50 
not conflicting51 with security concerns.  
                                                          
44Roberts(n36) 11 
45Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights’, HL (2009-10)  
  HL 86 HC 111 Summary 
46UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9   
   December 1999, opened for signature 10 January 2000) (2000) 39 ILM 270 the Preamable  and  
   Article 4    
47International Commission of Jurists, 'Assessing Damage Urging Action Report of the Eminent  
  Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights. Geneva (2009) 
48HMSO ‘The national security Strategy of the United Kingdom: update 2009: Security for the  
  Next Generation’ (Cm 7590, 2009) [3.4] 
49International Commission of Jurists, ‘Berlin Declaration’ (August 2004) para 3 
50UNGA ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ (20 September 2006) UN Doc  
   A/Res/60/288 
51Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights’, HL (2009-10)  
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The UN Global CTS illustrates the commitment of states to universal 
security and the parallel protection of rights, in drawing on the ‘sovereign 
equality of states’ in acting to address terrorism through unanimous 
recognition and cooperation in a coordinated effective response to 
maintain international peace and security. This strategy directly reflects 
the values and commitment of the international community in protecting 
human security within an international counter terrorism framework that 
promotes rights protection and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism.52 This reflects international solidarity and a commitment to the 
international community as a ‘globalized society’ in protecting shared 
security interests, shared values and fundamental rights53 in accordance 
with existing international obligations aligning with the human security 
paradigm. 
 
The normative standards presented act as a brake on excessively broad 
international policy, safeguarding fundamental rights in line with principles 
of fairness, natural justice54 and the rule of law. As an international 
normative framework, it provides accountability against which global 
financial governance and AML and CTF measures can be evaluated (see 
chapter 5).  It offers an ethical gateway to international governance and 
citizenship and is therefore relevant to promoting financial inclusion, 
considered in the Somali context later in this chapter (see 4.3). Inclusion 
is a necessary element of the normative framework, reaffirming the 
essential non-discriminatory requirement of individual rights protection, 
and is central to the fair opportunity and the capacity of states to apply 
CTF measures. It justifies and is justified by the concept of global 
constitutionalism and citizenship,55 reflecting international consensus in 
framing CTF policy and the rights protection within this. 
                                                                                                                                                             
   HL 86 HC 111, 5 
52UNGA ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ (15 September 2008)  
   UN Doc  A/Res/62/272 Para 7 
53UNGA ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review’ (12 July 2012) Un Doc  
   A/Res/66/282 para 9 
54(n48) paras 53-55 Executive summary 
55The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights Adopted by UNGA on 10 December 1948 Article 22 
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4.1.2 Securitisation - balancing liberty and security   
 
The justification for regulation of ARS in the ‘fight against terrorism’56 
stems from the threat of terrorism to individual and community interests. 
The states’ conception57 of this and the perceived vulnerability shapes 
subsequent responses 58 and justifies the form of measures adopted to 
meet this threat, but often at the compromise of rights protection.59  
 
The perception of an unknown and uncertain terrorist threat, which is 
difficult to quantify with accuracy, renders the assessment of the extent of 
the response to address this threat problematic, particularly where the 
threat is dynamic and pervasive.60 Political pressure demands executive 
action to provide security reassurance in times of increased insecurity 
and risk, and may result in symbolic measures that lack efficacy. The 
climate of fear generated by terrorism and the consequent insecurity is 
powerful, the threat vivid and immediate, impacting on the public and the 
executive’s consciousness. The nature of this threat can lead to ‘cognitive 
panic and biases’ increasing the fear of the prescient threat and the 
perceived value of security measures61 to address this. Such ‘cognitive 
failings’ drive the often reactive and consequent symbolic responses to 
public ‘panic’. This perceived insecurity requires executive reassurance, 
physical and psychological, that this threat is addressed and contained.62  
 
Executive risk based management, addressing the collective threat of 
terrorism, lends to tipping the balance between security and liberty in 
favour of prioritising security, the latter being an immediate community 
concern. The danger is that ‘prospective risk always threatens to 
                                                          
56Directive 2005/60/EC 26 October 2005 OJ L309 of 25 November 2005, recital 5  
57UNHSU, ‘Human Security Theory and Practice’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian  
  Affairs United Nations (2009),8 
58E Van Brunschot, EGibbs,  L Kennedy, ‘Risk, Balance and Security’ (1edn, Sage  2008)  
59D Bigo, A Tsoukala, Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11  
  (1st edn, Routledge 2008) 15 
60Walker C ‘Keeping control of terrorist without losing control of constitutionalism’ (2007) Vol 59   
   Stanford Law Review 1395-1463, 1396 
61EA Posner, A Vermeule, Terror in the Balance (1st edn, OUP 2007) 27 
62Posner (n61)1100 
126 
 
outweigh present interest[s].’63 The notion of balancing security and 
liberty sets these as competing, not complimentary, interests,64 failing to 
deliver an adequate solution, since neither liberty nor security can be 
protected without regard to both,65 requiring these interests be carefully 
weighed against future risks.   
 
Action taken in a climate of panic may lack rationality, and be over 
reactive since the presenting threat is an immeasurable representation of 
the increased insecurity. Current and future risks more readily outweigh 
rights protection, without scrutiny of whether restrictions on rights yield 
security benefits. The harm from restrictions on rights is less immediate, 
only emerging when measures are applied; their effects are less 
quantifiable but enduring often through permanent measures maintained 
long after the threat has abated.66 
 
Security is the context for the operation and protection of rights since the 
former has little value without the latter. The balancing of security and 
rights implies that these values are separate, incompatible and competing 
elements. The concept of ‘balance’ recognises the need for increased 
security in the face of an increased threat from terrorism which ‘makes 
necessary a new equilibrium’67 and may rightly necessitate a change in 
the operation of rights as norms, but not their extinction. This 
reconfiguration prompted by fear and panic in responding to the 
immediate or prospective security interests often leads to measures 
constraining rights, normalizing this response as one that is necessary to 
address the terrorist threat.   
 
Protection from terrorism should be conceived and delivered from a 
prevention orientated and rights centred framework, which places equal 
                                                          
63L Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice’ (2005) 32(4)  
  Journal of Law and Society, 516 
64LK Donohue, ‘The Perilous Dialogue’ (2009) 97 Cal L Rev 357-392, 358 
65Posner EA, Vermeule A, Terror in the Balance (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 20-22 
66Posner EA, Vermeule A,  ‘Emergencies and democratic failure’(2006) 92 Virginia Law Review  
  1091,1092 
67(n63) 509 
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importance to preserving rights within the securitisation process.68 The 
perception of terrorism as an exceptional threat legitimises exceptional 
responses, which risk eroding rights protection where rights are viewed 
as conditional upon prior security69 without the guarantee that measures 
will actually deliver this.   
 
Derogating from fundamental rights is often justified in the protection of 
the majority as a public interest issue operating disproportionately against 
the protection of rights, the impact of which often targets minority 
groups.70 The normative framework conceives security concerns equally 
alongside the protection of rights, with both as equal facets of human 
security. Any decision to depart from rights protection when faced with a 
terrorist threats and conditions of uncertainty is questionable. The 
resulting harm is not necessarily mitigated by justifying the effectiveness 
of measures if it can be achieved without this, in line with proportionality 
requirements.  
 
Alternative perspectives consider liberty and security as co-dependent 
elements of the human security approach, ‘security as a value for liberty, 
and liberty is a value for security’, encompassing a wider range of ‘rights’ 
concerns.71 This removes conflict in requiring their ‘balancing,’ one 
against the other, trading on the justification of their value. The notion of 
balancing these interests is an oversimplification; rights and security are 
both critical to the public interest. 
 
Reliance on executive trust in securing appropriate security has 
previously proven misguided. Parliament often lacks the necessary 
information to contest any threat, the executive having authority here, 
with time frames and processes for proposed measures limiting their 
                                                          
68UNHSU (n57)7,10 
69M Ignatieff The Lesser Evil  (1st edn, Princeton University Press 2004) 5 “the liberty of the  
   majority is utterly dependent upon their security” 
70A v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2004] UKHL 56 Lord Bingham of Cornhill at   
  237 
71C Walker, Terrorism and the Law, (1st edn, OUP  2011) [1.48], [1.55] 
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scrutiny.72 Constitutional mechanisms, both political and legal, need to 
exert control over executive action, through processes allowing fair, full 
and transparent accountability for addressing security interests. A rights 
framework enables assessment of the intrusiveness and proportionality of 
measures rather than sensitivity to risk.73 Constitutional mechanisms 
reviewing executive security measures need to yield structural and 
substantive accountability.74 Judicial oversight increasingly acts as a 
powerful control, deferring to policy but reviewing the limits in which it 
chooses to operate to protect rights as existing legal obligations.75 
Executive justification for action is constrained and bound by judicial 
review, a constitutional constraint, its limits bound by the degree of 
interference with rights and of what is considered constitutionally 
appropriate.76 
 
The normative framework presents rights as values that prevail even 
against the most extreme terrorist threat, remaining deserving of 
protection as standards against which international CTS and action can 
be assessed.  It ensures that international community and individual state 
security interests are delivered on the basis of protection of rights as 
community values. These values derive from consensus as to their 
protection and the cooperation to achieve this, ‘inclusion’ a pre-condition 
to the both. Inclusion requires CTS to align with existing rights protection 
and so refrain from marginalising minority groups or interests through 
action designed to protect the wider international community. 
 
 
 
                                                          
72AW Neal ‘Terrorism law making and democratic politics’ (2012) 24 Terrorism and Political  
   Violence 357,358 
73Walker (n60) 1456-1459 
74M Shepherd ‘Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight of the British War on Terror: From accretion  
   of executive power and evasion of scrutiny to embarrassment and concessions’ (2009) 14  
  Journal of Legislative Studies 191-218, 196 
75F De Londras, F Davis, ‘Controlling the executive in times of terrorism: competing perspectives  
   on effective oversight mechanisms’ (2010) 30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19-47, 44-46 
76A Kavanagh ‘Constitutionalism, counterterrorism and the courts: changes in British  
   Constitutional  landscape’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 172-199, 189,198  
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4.1.3 Cosmopolitan constitutionalism - the foundation for emerging                                                              
        norms 
 
Modern terrorism threatens international peace and security necessitating 
the cooperation of the international community to address this through a 
cosmopolitan approach that draws on shared values and concerns for the 
human security of citizens. The human security paradigm creates a 
commitment to protecting global citizens beyond individual state borders, 
recognising the interconnected nature of security concerns and rights, 
which drive cooperative action. 
 
Globally, states look to the actions of other states in assessing the limits 
of acceptable action and standards of expected protection. The normative 
framework presents universally accepted ‘constitutional’ values which 
have emerged from a ‘cosmopolitan’ and internationalised approach to 
guiding the protection of security and fundamental rights from terrorism.77 
These constitutional norms emerge from national values and collectively 
assert a form of international ‘governmentality’ marking out the right to 
protection, and placing limits on the exercising of international power in 
pursuance of CTS. 
 
 These constitutional norms, inclusive of jus cogens78 norms of customary 
international law, and respect for the rule of law, are ‘central to ensuring 
the predictability and legitimacy of international relations.’79 They include 
substantive rights and due process guarantees protected in international 
legal instruments. These rights are indicative of human value reflected in 
national citizenship within states across the international community, 
regardless of the differences in nationality, ethnicity, race or religion in the 
states within the cosmopolitan community. Cosmopolitan 
                                                          
77N Beekarry, ‘The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of  
  Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International  
   Law’ (2011) 31(1) North western Journal of International Law & Business 149 
78Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties United Nations 23 May 1969, Treaty Series, vol  
  1155, 331, Article 53 
79UNGA Report of the Secretary-General ‘Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen  
   the rule of law at the national and international levels’ (16 March 2012) UN Doc A/66/749 
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internationalised governance is drawn from the state consensus to 
participation in the international community in order to protect these 
mutually accepted cosmopolitan values from the threat of terrorism.80 
 
The normative framework presents cosmopolitan values as boundaries 
regulating action and decision making, and determining acceptable limits 
to confine action against normative conflict. This includes the 
presumption that existing international treaties and those measures 
promulgated under this framework to counter international terrorism, do 
not violate human rights and are interpreted as protective of these,81 
ensuring these ethical values secure regulatory justice.82 The 
constitutional norms sit aside from the lack of consensus as to the 
definition of terrorism,83 which should not detract from the need to protect 
inherent values. 
 
Increased globalisation has prompted international cooperation to 
address international terrorism and the challenge of developing a 
coordinated, integrated global response based on collective international 
action84 to provide security and protect fundamental values. Mutually 
recognised norms create a ‘pressure for conformity [and] desire to 
enhance international legitimation’, requiring adherence to and protection 
of these. These are elements on the basis of which a certain exercise of 
power is founded and legitimised,’85 which removes ‘undesirable moral 
subjectivity’,86 and the selective application of measures. This ensures 
that no state or individual within the cosmopolitan community should be 
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subject to unjustified differential treatment, since this framework requires 
inclusivity at all levels.  
 
The cosmopolitan approach provides a framework of values engaging the 
international community in delivering CTF legislative and juridical 
processes, through international treaties and specific legal measures,87 
which protect these norms88 and direct the scope of action.89 Rights are 
presented as cosmopolitan values, interconnected with security,90 and 
the credibility and justification of international action rests on the capacity 
of measures to protect these. States remain free to flex their own 
sovereignty, addressing national terrorist threats confined to avoiding 
conflict with cosmopolitan standards of protection. 
 
4.2 Alternative remittance systems – self regulation and normative 
compliance 
 
Having outlined the normative framework and standards of rights 
protection in the previous section, this section now seeks to critique the 
operation of ARS, such as Hawala against this normative framework to 
consider the protection they offer to fundamental rights and the obligation 
on states to address deficits in this protection. This draws on a critical 
analysis of the system values and their risks, as identified previously in 
chapter 2 to assess their normative compliance.  
 
Chapter two presented a critical analysis of the model of operation of 
ARS, identifying the following features as common to these systems: 
trust, informality, social status, network relationships, compliance, unique 
systems for record keeping, lack of standardised procedures, fast 
transaction speed, multiple operators, unrestricted transaction values and 
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the context of operational activity often ancillary to a main business. 
These features are now considered in more detail as to their alignment 
with the protection of human security and international standards in the 
prevention of terrorism and their normative compliance. 
 
 
4.2.1 Cosmopolitan networks and the protection of human security   
 
Remittance systems derive from and operate within particular socio-
cultural and ethnic contexts, supporting economic migration and serving 
the migrant diaspora in their preservation of cultural and family ties91 
within home countries, through financial support. They have become 
successful global cosmopolitan networks, reflecting their common 
community of values and shared morality internally and externally.92 This 
common value base is a strength, binding its members to an allegiance to 
the communities they serve.  They have provided community benefits 
beyond acting as a ‘financial conduit’ in facilitating the expression of 
religious and cultural heritage through mutual association. 
 
Although international in reach and sharing common characteristics, 
without regulation there are no standardised processes for procedural 
operation applying across all levels of these networks. They remain self-
regulated pursuant to unwritten understandings derived from a common 
model of operation and shared value base. Their independent method of 
operation does not invite a commitment to support the implementation of 
international standards to manage financial risk.   
 
These systems contribute to human security by providing access to 
financial services, offering a financial lifeline to vulnerable communities in 
developing countries, reducing poverty and supporting microfinance. ARS 
have been valuably exploited by international aid organisations and 
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NGOs to assist in the distribution of financial relief.93 In times of disaster 
they protect and sustain life.94 This protection of life and support of family 
grounds their claim of legitimacy and their tolerance by the international 
community for the financial support they provide to communities where 
alternatives are absent. They have the capacity to deliver large volumes 
of finance to developing countries, at low cost and with speed, 
contributing to the protection of human security when threatened by 
natural disasters or conflict.95  
 
The microfinance associated with remittances has delivered tangible 
quantitative and qualitative health, education, social and infrastructure 
benefits promoting regional stability and countering the very conditions 
giving rise to poverty, discrimination and exclusion, which further 
terrorism.  This point is increasingly noted by developed states as 
important in reducing the spread of terrorism, countered by the promotion 
of financial inclusion and a sense of citizenship, both locally and globally. 
Remittance systems have relevance in offering a secure and trusted 
transfer mechanism, seeming to offer financial security. The literature 
suggests a low default rate for the delivery of funds, securing property, 
with operators paying out for any loss regardless of fault.   
 
The effectiveness of these systems lies in their extensive geographical 
reach and penetration of rural areas through low cost methods drawing 
on the minimal but effective use of modern technology to transfer value at 
speed. Their low cost operational structures make them efficient, 
affordable and accessible for the financially impoverished. These 
networks facilitate connections with the migrant diaspora located in 
developed countries, promoting kinship across international migrant 
communities. Charitable gifting by these communities as part of religious 
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adherence drives outgoing remittance from the migrant diaspora, often 
through these systems. 
 
The underlying system values however are exclusive to specific ethnic, 
cultural and religious groups, not drawn from wider international 
consensus, and are not universally accessible and lack normativity. The 
system values prioritise internal values and interests over wider external 
global security concerns. Their risk of misuse for terrorism and risks to 
human security stem from the prevalence of ARS in conflict zones and 
areas of terrorist activity, where weak governance and corruption of both 
the formal and informal financial sector is rife. Their self-regulation in 
such circumstances is an inadequate safeguard against the threat from 
international terrorism where it derives from a value base that is 
subjective. This is at odds with the objective non-personal standards of 
the formal financial sector and the wider business community.  
 
Consequently, ARS present an international security risk96 as 
international networks allowing unregulated transactions which may 
compromise security.  Their lack of ability to address these risks in a 
uniform manner fails to accord with recognised international CTF 
standards for risk management. The states in which these systems 
operate are compelled to ensure these systems are normatively 
compliant with international normative values to protect human security 
by addressing the risk that these systems present. 
 
 
4.2.2 Self-regulation: adequacy of rights protection 
  
The normative values of ARS were presented in chapter 2 as including 
flexibility, reciprocity, co-dependence and trust. The trust identified related 
to service expectations and the reputation of operators to act according to 
the system values and aims. Self-regulation offered no formal system for 
                                                          
96Art 2 ECHR, Art 3 UDR, Art 6 ICCPR  
135 
 
guaranteeing adherence to this internal code of conduct to protect the 
property rights of operators and consumers.  
 
A key operational concern is the control over entry to these systems, 
which is subject to conditional factors including: social standing, shared 
culture, religion, with ethnicity and business contacts acting as signals 
demonstrating the shared values binding these systems. Social factors 
associated with caste, lineage and clan render ARS potentially 
inaccessible to outsiders. They appear to operate as a ‘closed shop’,97 
which is potentially discriminatory, rather than applying a neutral objective 
assessment of conduct related to service performance and presenting 
risks. 
 
The lack of transparency in their operation and internal regulation 
provides a protective shield of secrecy, potentially concealing criminality, 
rather than being necessary for shared religious observance.98 The 
strength and conviction of internal values and adherence to these has 
been considered to be more effective than the professional codes of 
conduct of the formal sector. These ASR however, lack a clear 
articulation of standards or the transparency required to secure their 
compliance and application in different settings/jurisdictions. The nature 
of their shared values is potentially discriminatory, excluding those who 
do not share these characteristics, contrary to the principles of non-
discrimination which states, pursuant to the normative framework are 
required to uphold.  These mutual values as an enforcement mechanism 
are a perilous reflection of the commitment to upholding these uniformly. 
This exposes ARS to exploitation for ‘individual’ ends, which may be 
illegitimate, placing personal allegiances and system values above wider 
security concerns, and risking the accusation of complicity for illicit ends, 
lacking normative compliance.   
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The values of remittance systems are self-selected, personal and 
culturally relevant, more enduring in being self-imposed and reflecting 
community values but vulnerable to indiscriminate application. Conditions 
of entry and operation do not relate to service requirements, mode of 
operation, or system or security risks in terms of AML and CTF. Nor do 
they secure the protection of property or privacy concerning transactions 
and ‘business’ information. They have the potential to be self-furthering 
without accountability or legitimacy. Informal self-regulation does not 
imply an absence or insufficiency of any internal governance, but does 
lack transparency and objective standardisation, review and enforcement 
to protect against the threat of misuse from terrorism. These deficiencies 
leave these systems vulnerable to internal and external misuse, lacking 
accountability for sanctions against internal transgression of conditions of 
membership. They lack the externality required of international networks 
of operation and the normative compliance necessary to counter terrorist 
finance and prevent their penetration for criminal misuse. 
 
Participation by Hawaladars is based on their existing community profile 
and reputation, relating to existing business interests without requiring 
any pre-requisite knowledge, skill or training.99 Community presence is 
linked to the perception of service quality, reliability and trustworthiness, 
acting as a gateway to system membership. Underlying objective 
assessment of membership against risk based criteria to guide as to 
operator suitability in order to protect the system from misuse, is absent. 
No account is taken of previous business history, competence, criminal 
wrong doing or associations with organised crime or terrorism. No AML or 
CTF assessment is made of the underlying business supporting the 
remittance activity in providing cash pools. The arbitrary nature of ‘values’ 
and ‘trust’ as pre-conditions of entry and continuing operation, is contrary 
to international regulatory standards that are required to be sufficiently 
certain, precise and consistent, and non-discriminatory. The normative 
compliance of these systems is questionable and perpetuated where 
                                                          
99Maimbo (n90) Box 1 see case studies of Hawaladars 
137 
 
‘entry’ is based on personal recommendation and approval of existing 
members, which is internally driven and lacking objectivity and 
impartiality.  
 
Unwritten and informal admission to the system can be revoked if the 
norms of operation are breached; failure to adhere to these is also 
considered a violation against the community. Community accountability 
as self-regulating standards of practice is a powerful ethical construct 
internally and externally but is ineffective in constraining action to secure 
compliance. Given that these systems operate in areas of prolific 
organised crime and terrorist activity, the concern is that ‘illicit’ values 
may permeate or reflect those of the wider community that these systems 
serve. Access to, or exclusion from, systems is not objectively based, 
lacking due process and transparency, challenging operator suitability 
and the sanctioning of operational transgressions.100 These are difficult to 
enforce at local level where the wrongdoer has pre-existing community 
and business status and where there is no capacity to prevent 
continuance.  
 
Disproportionate arbitrary penalties can potentially be applied to those 
operators who transgress system values, without accountability or 
redress contrary to the principles of natural justice and fairness. Internal 
sanctions appear to be an all or nothing approach, lacking proportionality 
in absence of a connection to the severity of the transgression, and failing 
to take account of the operator’s role and responsibilities. Potential 
exclusion of ‘wrong doers’ denies access to the system but is ineffective 
in lacking a rational connection to AML and CTF standards. There is no 
formal record of sanctions or regulation of the sharing of this information 
across the system network, or externally with law enforcement where 
sanctions relate to criminal activity or actors. Penalties can be applied 
which impact on the reputation and livelihood of the operators without any 
process for adjudication/appeal.101 The perception created is that self-
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regulation serves to protect and prioritise the commercial interests of 
individuals and the network, overriding wider security concerns. They are 
potentially self-furthering without external accountability, applying 
disproportionate arbitrary penalties that fail to protect the system in a 
normatively compliant way.  
 
The informality of their arbitrary self-regulation and lack of formal 
adjudication mechanisms supporting enforcement of internal regulation is 
contrary to the accepted notions of fairness and justice expected of an 
association of international reach. It fails to guarantee rights of redress for 
customers and the protection of property. Although sanctions may be 
imposed for breach, given their impact on livelihood, reputation and family 
life, mechanisms for adjudication and redress of complaints of 
misconduct and service quality go unaddressed. Given the volumes of 
transactions these systems handle, this lack of procedural protection for 
infringements of property rights, is a normative weakness. The exclusion 
of operators may be unenforceable in some areas where ARS are the 
only method of transfer, the financial inclusion they offer undermined. 
Allegations of misappropriation of property are rarely cited in the 
literature, suggestive of the practice of operators ‘honouring’ non-
payment of funds without fault, but may also operate to trade-off 
accountability through financial appeasement, contrary to the concept of 
fairness and justice. 
 
 
4.2.3 Balancing privacy and property rights 
 
Remittance services fail to secure the transparency of parties to the 
transaction or their purpose through the lack of uniform standards for 
record keeping, restricting the capacity to trace transactions internally and 
in the formal sector. This is further hindered by the consolidation and 
settlement phases of their operations. This lack of transparency 
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disproportionately protects the individual privacy of clients above wider 
community security, placing the community status, tied to the clan status, 
of the client above wider security risks. Since transactions with operators 
are based on existing relationships and client knowledge,102 further 
scrutiny is prohibited by social codes that would undermine the social 
capital on which these networks are founded. Privacy remains protected 
with no transparent criteria for displacing this. Operators are at risk of 
community pressure and self-serving financial interests, which may 
facilitate potentially ‘illicit’ transactions without any obligation to disclose 
or subject these to external scrutiny by authorities. Exposure to misuse 
can remain hidden contrary to the key principles of CTF. These require 
transparency and scrutiny of action to protect human security threatened 
by terrorism, where privacy rights can legitimately and justifiably be 
proportionately displaced to protect against international terrorism. 
 
Remittance systems as cosmopolitan networks of operation offer no 
mechanism for securing confidentiality of information related to business 
practices and customer transactions.  There is no procedure to regulate 
information sharing within the network or procedure for disclosure to 
external  law enforcement agencies, proportionate to the purpose or risk. 
Information appears to be communicated by word of mouth through 
informal networks without constraint. Records, uniquely personal, are 
traditionally kept until the completion of the transaction, then destroyed. 
Privacy, a social currency, is central to the system in preference to 
mandatory scrutiny, which would be perceived culturally as intrusive. ARS 
operate as a closed system to outsiders, raising concerns as to the 
motivation of operators to report illegality or misappropriation of property. 
This would likely be managed within the network itself, beyond external 
accountability, operating to their own standards and assessment in  
prioritising the  risks to be acted on. Whilst informality enhances system 
efficiency, it limits external investigation by law enforcement and places 
the protection of property and security risks on a ‘voluntary basis’. 
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These systems afford no protection against illicit transfers, since there is 
no protection against the risk of comingling of legitimate and illegitimate 
funds, to which customers have not consented and are entitled to 
protection against. The integrity of the whole financial system, and the 
formal banking sector and clearing houses, with which these systems 
interface, is therefore compromised. The lack of verification processes  
leave these systems reliant upon the individual ethics of the system 
operators for any detection and enforcement. States have an obligation to 
ensure the protection of the property rights of their citizens by providing a 
legal framework to protect these, contributing to the wider protection of 
the international financial system, rather than leaving this to the self-
regulation of informal ARS. The international reach of these systems 
requires all states in which ARS operate ensure the same parity of 
protection of property and security in accordance with the international 
CTF agenda, to prevent the misuse of funds.  
 
 
4.2.4   Servicing the community – promoting financial inclusion  
 
The values of ARS promote a sense of community identity, delivering 
unity and cohesion which may also enable the concealment of illicit acts 
in absence of enforceable standards of conduct defining network 
relationships. Compulsion, driven by the consensus of international 
standards of accountability, is a more effective driver of CTF compliance. 
The informality of these systems explains their survival and their inability 
to blend with technological innovation and formality. The use of the formal 
sector for making large settlements between networks suggests the 
selective use of technology for self-interest and a reluctance rather than 
inability to utilise technology derived from resistance rather than a lack of 
capacity for formalisation through regulation. Preference for ‘traditional’ 
models of operation cannot justify compromising human security that 
benefits all.  
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The success of ARS lies in the appropriate use of low cost technology 
and select service provision requiring minimal capital investment and 
supporting infrastructures. Systems are designed to be basic, accessible, 
fast and low cost relative to transaction volumes and low profit margins. 
Customers can structure payments to individual requirements unfettered 
by restrictions. Cash pools assist transaction advances and act as 
insurance. The lack of documentary requirements promotes financial 
inclusion in areas where access to this evidence is problematic, but may 
enable access by illicit actors. In developing countries reliant on cash 
based economies and word of mouth recommendation, remittances align 
with common cultural practices and community norms, promoting 
accessibility. They cater for small value periodic transactions or large one 
off payments and allow for seasonal delivery of funds for charitable 
purposes103 without minimum values. Provision of door to door services 
in remote areas aligns with religious customs critical to accessibility. They 
enable the financial inclusion of rural communities and enable developing 
countries to withstand economic volatility. 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness do not, however, equate with normative 
compliance. As community driven initiatives they operate within a familiar 
and recognised culturally and ethically sensitive framework of practice 
valued by the communities they serve. These values are not, however, 
transparent, transferable or shared across the wider global financial 
community. Their normative compliance poses challenges for regulators 
given the juxtapositions indicated above and raises the question as to 
whether these systems can be successfully regulated, but firstly as to 
whether it is ethical to do so.  
 
4.2.5 Squaring the circle – effectiveness and normative compliance  
 
The concern as to whether ARS should be tolerated, regulated or simply 
made unlawful has been much debated; their claim to legitimate 
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operation is connected to the balancing of benefits  and demand for their 
services with their operational risks. Familiarity, the cultural context and 
economic efficiency along with limited access to the formal sector have 
secured their continued operation. The legitimacy of their aims and 
purpose as genuinely ethical underpins the argument against outright 
prohibition, which is unjustified given their underlying lawful purpose 
where their weaknesses can potentially be addressed by regulation.  
 
The claim to legitimacy and tolerance is signalled by community benefits 
which give ease of access and system efficiency to their capacity to 
deliver large remittances volumes to developing countries. The micro-
financial benefits provided are tangible, they deliver quantifiable benefits 
in health, education, support of social infrastructure, cohesion and 
regional stability. This counters the conditions of poverty and 
discrimination that can further terrorist ideology and financial exclusion, 
relevant to the CTS of states in reducing the spread of terrorism by 
radicalisation, promoting of financial inclusion and citizenship, both local 
and global. 
 
These ethical dimensions and benefits would make their total prohibition 
lack proportionality given their considerable benefits and the possibility of 
mitigation of risk through regulation. Curtailing their operation removes 
their benefits without alternative. Western perspectives of risk and 
financial service provision have been tolerated by developing countries, 
who have struggled to accommodate this. Preventing the operation of 
ARS would be an unprincipled assertion of the dominance of the western 
values reflected in the formal sector’s post-modern approach to financial 
service provision. It would be an affront to the cultural, ethnic and 
religious values of certain jurisdictions, leading to financial exclusion, 
undermining the social construct of these communities.  
 
ARS remain rooted in a pre-modern context influencing the ethics of their 
operation. Their informality enables flexible adaption to changing 
economic and social contexts. The global cosmopolitan financial 
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community’s shared norms, responsive to global risks, including 
terrorism, required the protection of rights, supported by an inclusive 
commitment from states to addressing these. Cosmopolitanism conceives 
a shared normative framework of both inclusion and obligation to promote 
cooperation and respect for global human rights norms, to ensure that 
these are not applied differentially to different financial, social or 
jurisdictional contexts.104 Self-interest and selective normative 
compliance cannot be tolerated through failure to apply or adhere to 
international standards of rights protection and financial regulation. 
Normative compliance is based on equality of states, requiring the 
commitment of all to financial governance and risk management, to 
prevent terrorism and promote international security in order to claim the 
protection that the normative framework delivers. Equality also extends to 
the sharing of the burden and the cost of compliance across the 
international community, to prevent exclusion; whether this is currently 
proportionate is questionable. 
 
Regulation is essential to ensure that remittance systems operate to the 
same objective AML/CTF standards that afford comparable compliance 
with human rights. Cosmopolitan citizenship can only be maintained if all 
members act responsibly through normative adherence protecting 
property, due process guarantees, privacy rights and human security. 
Self-regulation fails to distinguish between appropriate confidentiality and 
anonymity, trust and risk, to balance the rights of privacy and religious 
and cultural association in a proportionate manner with international 
security concerns.105 State failure, in areas where these systems 
dominate, compromises the property rights of UK citizens especially 
within migrant diaspora communities. States need to ensure that 
remittance sending and receiving countries are not vulnerable to 
exploitation for terrorism or criminal misuse compromising community 
security. A balanced, proportionate and justified limitation of these risks to 
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secure increased protection from terrorism is necessary and can 
potentially be secured through regulation of these systems. States benefit 
from the protection of a cosmopolitan approach to global human security 
and must also adhere to their responsibilities to contribute to its delivery.  
 
The need for the regulation of ARS pre-supposes that these systems are 
capable of being regulated, a concept that is not unconceivable; the 
challenge is to preserve the cultural relevance within regulation to prevent 
financial exclusion. Regulation should be conceived as a shield, not a 
sword, to preserve the benefits offered by these resilient financial 
networks given their contribution to sustaining developing 
communities.106 This aim is for concordant regulatory standards to 
address risks through a normative framework that operates to protect 
rights without compromising the effectiveness of these systems. This 
should capitalise on the existing rights protection offered by ARS to avoid 
disenfranchising users and eroding the social capital and values 
underpinning these networks, and counter any potential for terrorist 
support.107 
 
 
4.3 A Case study of the Al-Barakaat remittance provider –       
     assessing the normativity and impact of international sanctions 
     and the need for financial inclusion 
 
This case study illustrates the need for cosmopolitan constitutionalism to 
unify the international communities’ implementation of CTF strategy and 
secure the protection of rights in its application. This case study considers 
the consequences of Al-Barakaat listing previously discussed in chapter 
2, for the Somali populous. It marks out the lack of proportionality of CT 
measures through a failure to consider and minimise the socio-economic 
impact of the listing decision. The Al-Barakaat listing is considered in 
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relation to Somalia, a remittance dependent economy,108 to assess its 
normativity and its effect on the protection of rights for the Somali 
populous, given the importance of the operator at the time of listing. This 
case study considers the wider impact associated with financial exclusion 
and the requirements for ‘financial capacity’ necessary to embed 
AML/CTF policy in a normatively complaint manner. Having considered 
the efficacy of the Al-Barakaat listing, this section concludes with a review 
of the UK context of remittance operation to compare its normative 
compliance. In particular, recent technological developments are 
considered for their potential to facilitate remittances in a normatively 
compliant manner and promoting further financial inclusion.   
 
 
4.3.1 Somalia – a remittance dependent economy   
 
Somalia, a ‘failed state’, had experienced three decades of war 
decimating its financial sector, and its legal and governmental institutions. 
Families were reliant on remittances to support Somali households and 
personal living costs. Incoming remittances were estimated to range from 
seven hundred million to one billion, with Somali operators handling US 
$700-800 million servicing a population of 6.8 million, of which 43% were 
confined to poverty.109   
 
Somali society is predicated on strong cultural traditions of family support, 
with social, moral, and religious duties, driving incoming migrant 
remittances. This ‘investment’ in human capital and the social networks 
underpinning Somali culture enhance social and economic prospects.  
The majority of transfers occur between spouses (16%), siblings (39%), 
and children (20%) directed to female household members for child 
support, reducing child mortality and poverty and increasing lifetime 
survival rates and quality of life. Remittances also service loans, maintain 
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businesses and secure funds for investment, the Somali diaspora 
providing 80% of the start-up costs for small and medium enterprises.110 
Remittances reduce the impact of critical shock events enabling the 
support of remote pastoral and rural communities, and promoting 
macroeconomic development. 111 
 
 
4.3.2 The economic and social context of the Al-Barakaat listing   
 
Al-Barakaat was the largest remittance operator and private employer in 
Somalia. Following listing, those rendered unemployed were reported to 
have re-joined militias, some with terrorist associations, as a means of 
financial survival. The listing alienated large sections of the Muslim 
population consequently leading to financial hardship. Other remittance 
providers were initially unable to bridge the service gap, with US $25-27 
million in incoming remittances lost. Kenya and Ethiopia also restricted 
inward Somalia remittance transfers, and the Somali currency value 
plummeted, leading to exchange rate volatility, critical for a weak 
remittance dependent state.112 
 
The Al-Barakaat listing compromised confidence in the transitional 
government. Remittance services were ‘vilified’ on an international scale; 
the US and Norway restricted outward remittances totalling US $7 million 
and US $7.6 million respectively denying much needed economic 
support.113 This action was overly inclusive and lacked legitimacy in 
absence of evidence as to Al-Barakaat’s support of terrorism.  Listing was 
at US insistence, based on weak intelligence, which later proved to be 
unreliable. Action was discriminatory, since Somali remittances from the 
ethnic diaspora were targeted based on a presumption of ‘community’ 
risk. Listing was based on proximity or presence in terrorist areas as a 
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presumed rather than proven association of terrorist financing. Rather 
than mandate control mechanisms, Al-Barakaat was prevented from 
operating.   
 
 
4.3.3 Evaluating normative compliance  
 
Somali remittance transfer systems (the ‘franco voluto’ trade based 
system and the Xawilaad remittance system) provide vital financial 
services. Listing failed to consider existing internal control of remittance 
operations according to ‘Xeer’, Somali customary law, requiring 
references for operation from respected and long standing clan elders. 
Listing was ineffective since Al-Barakaat agents continued operating 
informally, absent of any control, with risks remaining. Listing without 
purpose compromises the commitment of states to the enforcement of 
CTS, locally and internationally, and compromises communities’ 
economic security, lacking normativity and credibility. Somali providers 
protected property rights by facilitating ‘secure’ delivery to remote areas 
through trust based transactions, protecting rights.114 Remittances 
facilitated charitable donations115 providing community support. Zakat, 
however, was perceived as a potential source of terrorist revenue and the 
restrictions on remittances compromised local development initiatives and 
international aid programmes.116 Clan based post war injury 
compensation schemes (Diya) operating through remittance systems 
were limited, affecting rural communities. Remittances allowed for the 
observance of rights of property, religion, family and private life, 
observing cultural traditions connected to lineage and clan membership. 
Sanctions, whilst justified, offered a narrow protection of human security 
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in failing to address the humanitarian consequences and the resulting 
financial insecurity and instability. Normative compliance in the context of 
a civil society and according to the rule of law, promoting community 
engagement and security through stable governance, is more likely to 
lead to greater long term change. ARS offer a considerable degree of 
compliance in relation to many fundamental rights but unregulated they 
lack the capacity to deter misuse for terrorist finance.117 
 
Sanctions lacked normative compliance in failing to segregate the assets 
of individual customers which were frozen alongside those of the Al-
Barakaat, business. Normativity requires measures that do no more harm 
than the action seeks to prevent. Indefinite listing causing economic 
hardship in the face of a continuing terrorist threat to Somalia does not 
meet this requirement. Listing aimed to prevent potential support of the 
migrant diaspora for terrorism, discriminating on the basis of shared 
ethnicity and religion, targeting Muslim communities, with no distinction 
between ‘Islam, its institutions and its practices by the majority of the 
population’.118 This evidences the deep suspicion held towards Muslin 
communities immediately after 9/11, and the willingness of states, such 
as the US, to rely on vague intelligence fuelled this. Prevention of Somali 
terrorist finance was ineffective since funds were otherwise moved across 
Somalia’s borders. Selective application of UN counter terrorism 
measures undermined normative compliance since violations of arms 
embargoes by western states went unaddressed as did Ethiopia’s 
sponsorship of terrorism. 
 
Sanctions of indefinite duration were disproportionate and not conditional 
on procedural compliance by Al-Barakaat. The international conference 
on Hawala and the subsequent Abu Dhabi Declaration119 demonstrated 
the sector’s motivation to ‘effective but not overly restrictive’120 regulation, 
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not initially advanced in light of the listing. Sanctions offered no graduated 
or tailored approach to prevention and deterrence and were ineffective 
since other providers remained operational, the risks remaining. Listing 
lacked normative compliance since operators were made 
disproportionately accountable for ‘failed’ state governance and 
prevention of terrorist finance. 
 
 
4.3.4 Continuing security concerns – terrorism and piracy  
 
Somalia has recognised the inconsistency and unreliability of informal 
cooperation, which fails to protect human rights, and its membership of 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development aims assist the formal 
cooperative development of a legal framework for preventing terrorism.121 
 
Somali based Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat internally as well as 
a seepage of insecurity to bordering countries. Somalia remains politically 
unstable, subject to internal conflicts and periodic clashes between rival 
groups. The Eritrean Government is alleged to have used the Somali 
Xawilaad network for terrorist fundraising from the Somali diaspora for 
terrorist attacks. US Somali migrants have also been prosecuted for using 
MSBs to transfer funds for Al-Shabaab.122  
 
Piracy ransoms present a regional threat, but the low prosecution rates 
and high rewards justify the risk. Ransoms of US $ 4.7 million have been 
paid, with total payments for 2011 of  $135 million,123 suspected to have 
been used to fund the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, for Al Qa’ida training 
camps;124 this nexus confirmed by Al-Shabaab in 2012.125 Al Qa’ida 
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controlled ‘piracy’ vessels in the Somali region are used to transfer 
terrorist weaponry. UN resolutions126 condemning terrorism and piracy 
are supported by the Somalian Transitional Federal Government, 
preserving Somali involvement in international action, notably lacking in 
the Al-Barakaat case. The listing of Al-Barakaat has not had a significant 
or lasting effect in reducing the risk of Somali or international terrorism 
but has damaged the international perception and reputation of 
remittance services.  
 
UK government policy opposes ransom payments but hypocritically 
blocks UN sanctions to facilitate payments to terrorist groups to secure 
hostage release.127 Regulation of remittance providers cannot alone stem 
the flow of terrorist funds; piracy groups continue to launder funds 
through UAE financial institutions, highlighting the need for the 
implementation of AML/ CTF regulation internationally. Ironically, Somali 
remittances businesses now potentially enable the tracing of the illicit 
proceeds of piracy, assisting prosecution, and allowing for asset freezes 
against piracy leaders.  
 
 
4.3.5 Developing financial capacity and inclusion  
 
Financial inclusion is critical to the efficacy of any international financial 
regulatory regime. Post 9/11, reducing ‘risks’ ‘trended’ towards prioritising 
regulatory processes and standards, failing to sufficiently consider state 
capacity and the need to balance competing priorities and resources. 
FATF standards are disproportionately burdensome for developing 
countries with limited resources where they lack the financial architecture 
and governmental structures to implement these.  
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FATF membership is conditional upon a governmental commitment to the 
implementation of standards within three years. Capacity, enhanced by 
the sharing of expertise and technical assistance is confined largely to 
support between FAFT members,128 supported by the UN, IMF and WB. 
The high threshold of capacity for membership excludes states with the 
highest need for, and the least capacity for the implementation AML /CTF 
measures. This strategy fails to promote financial inclusion for states 
lacking capacity. FATF endorsement of the regulation of remittance 
services and the ‘cultural and pragmatic reasons’ for its operation in 
areas where banking infrastructures are weak or absent is at odds with 
an ‘all encompassing’ regulatory approach to risk management.129 A ‘one 
size fits all’ approach to the implementation of financial regulation is 
counter-productive. The effectiveness of standards designed for the 
formal banking sector requires reconfiguring to the Somali context and 
principles of Islamic and Sharia finance, to harness existing remittance 
services and sector commitment to regulation.130 
 
International financial inclusion is essential to secure an international 
harmonised regulatory framework. A phased implementation of standards 
is a more proportionate response for weak states, given the high 
threshold for financial ‘inclusion’,131 to address capacity from within a 
framework of ‘anticipated’ compliance.132 Peer review of compliance 
against a FATF methodology leaves non-compliant states subject to 
international pressure, sanctions and financial exclusion.133 There is little 
consideration of conditions and structures for effective implementation of 
fiscal and regulatory supervision, which Somalia lacks. Exclusion cannot 
deliver compliance where states lack capacity, but continuing exclusion 
perpetuates security risks.134 Current AML/CTF strategy focuses on 
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capacity, in relation to supporting states to implementation and needs 
additionally to address social inclusion.135 
 
 
4.3.5.1 Limitations to developing the regulatory capacity and 
promotion of social inclusion in Somalia  
 
Somalia’s regulatory structure requires a consideration of the competing 
demands for internal resources balanced against the pressure to develop 
financial governance. Limited internal capacity for investment in financial 
regulation is matched by demands for action to tackle poverty and poor 
social living conditions within a predominantly agricultural economy, 
which is vulnerable to famine. Somalia remains reliant on external aid for 
financial development136 and on the support of remittance systems to 
deliver incoming diaspora remittances totalling $1.6 billion annually. 
Financial inclusion should strive to capitalise on this support to prevent its 
misuse. 
 
Financial inclusion is problematic for Somalia, a cash based economy, 
having a poorly developed banking system. ARS promote inclusion in a 
culturally acceptable and accessible manner. Only 31% of the Somali 
population have a bank account, of which 20.5% are used for 
remittances.137 The Somali economy is consumption based with 26.2% of 
the population relying on family loans, creating financial dependence. The 
Somali population has little access to, and use of, financial products to 
drive the demand side of inclusion.138 The cultural context of regulation 
including the roles of customary law, Sharia courts, local elders and 
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clansmen139 is critical in supporting the merger of the formal and informal 
sectors140 supported by financial incentives. 
 
The normative framework drives inclusion but requires the capacity for 
implementation at national level. FATF standards require pre-requisite 
conditions, such as formal identity systems141 for customer identification, 
which are problematic in Somalia. Standards do not allow for phased or 
sequential implementation,142 leading to a disproportionate regulatory 
burden for low income countries lacking private sector support for the 
development of implementation.143 Regulation itself does not address the 
context and challenge of implementation, nor the overall status of a 
state’s economy and security. The issues of capacity are now beginning 
to be addressed by the IMF, WB and FATF, but this is largely based on 
assessing existing implementation strategies rather than addressing the 
social exclusion of the world’s most vulnerable states. 
 
Somalia’s weak political and financial governance and lack of 
regulation144 have afforded little protection against misuse for terrorism. 
The challenge is to secure financial compliance alongside developing 
citizenship, compliance with the rule of law, and political governance to 
counteract terrorism. Somalia needs to progress from an ‘economy 
without a state’,145 with financial inclusion forming part of its security 
approaches. International aid should be conditional upon promoting the 
rule of law, and access to justice but critically developing financial 
regulation.146 
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4.3.5.2 Conclusion as to normative compliance 
 
This case study has considered the listing of Al-Barakaat from a 
normative perspective, considering the ethics and impact of the listing 
decision. Whilst the decision was clearly justified in terms of CTF, it 
lacked proportionality and unfairly froze customer assets. The Al-
Barakaat listing had a negative effect on the Somali economy, hindering 
the delivery of financial humanitarian aid,147 but this has not been 
matched by a significant reduction in terrorism or associated risks and 
has led to the financial exclusion at both individual and state level. 
Concerns that shared cultural values148 risk terrorist support149 from the 
Somali diaspora, are discriminatory, assuming illicit purposes on behalf of 
whole communities150 rather than the specific evidence required to justify 
sanctions. Targeting risk by association follows the model of terrorist 
proscription, but here it has applied been disproportionately and 
inappropriately.  
 
Al-Barakaat was denied the opportunity to change its practice to avoid 
sanctions or conditional delisting. Listing was also not reviewed in light of 
the changing terrorist threat. Listing tainted the international reputation of 
remittances services, creating mistrust within western banks, who refused 
to process remittance payments. The case study illustrates the lack of 
understanding of the cultural context of remittances and their invaluable 
contribution to fragile economies, and their potential for financial 
inclusion. The targeting of remittance systems within CTF strategy has 
been selective, actions against charcoal exports a source of Al-Shabaab, 
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has not been as vociferous, with breaches of UNSCR going unpunished. 
The US has taken no action in relation to piracy, refusing to prosecute US 
businesses engaging in ransom payments which breach US law.151 This 
double standard is also reflected in the lack of enforcement of arms 
embargoes and the failure to deal with corruption152 in the financial sector 
furthering the misuse of financial aid and exclusion.153 The selective 
targeting of remittance services has had a high negative human impact; it 
has yielded little value in terms of the reduction of terrorism and risks a 
loss of credibility and political support for international sanctions. It also 
prevents states such as Somalia from using remittance income to 
develop a civil society, establish economic viability and reduce reliance 
on international financial support.154 
 
 
4.4 UK remittance services – assessing normative compliance and  
      financial inclusion  
 
Whilst the UK model of remittance operation may share similarities with 
Somalia, these are not presumed to operate or be relevant to the same 
extent in the UK context, given the economic and social differences 
between the two jurisdictions. The UK financial sector is one of the 
largest worldwide, having an international reputation, comprising of 39 
complex retail groups and 43 major wholesale groups securing 80% of 
retail business.155 As a sophisticated sector it is subject to comprehensive 
regulation and ‘accounted for 5.3% of national income’ for 2002.156  The 
reputational risk for this sector from the taint of unwittingly dealing with 
terrorist funds is significant. 
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The UK remittance sector performs a vital function in providing financial 
support from UK diaspora communities to developing countries. Migration 
fuelling remittance demand reflects the human aspects of globalisation, 
prompting further migration.157 Government policy encourages ‘migrants 
to remit and perhaps to return’, recognising that ‘remittances are private 
financial flows and recipients should be free to choose how they spend or 
invest their funds’.158 The UK needs to ensure that migrants have access 
to, and the capacity to send, funds back to their home countries and the 
communities and families with whom they maintain ties. Religious 
practice and charitable donation is also relevant to securing financial 
inclusion in the UK context which requires regulation of remittance 
providers in accordance with AML/CTF standards.159 This secures 
consumer protection within an environment that facilitates risk assessed 
remittance activity. 
 
UK remittance outflows from 1003 UK MSBs for 2005 was estimated at 
£5.56 bn.160 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development has identified US $1.32bn of remittances originating from 
the UK, of which US $0.40bn goes to non-OECD countries.161 Other 
more conservative estimates based on World Bank figures for 2009 
estimate total UK outflows of migrant transfers US $3,670 mn, of which 
US $1,160 mn were migrant transfers.162 UK outward remittance flows 
have not yet peaked, and although affected by the recent economic 
crisis,163 have increased annually by 4%. The amount available for UK 
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personal remittances is £13.8 bn,164 highlighting their considerable 
capacity for assisting development and humanitarian intervention. 
 
UK outflows accounted for 7% of the total remittances to Bangladesh and 
14% to Pakistan for 2012/13.165 Statistics indicate that 34% of black 
African, 14% of Indian, 12% of black Caribbean and 12% of the Pakistani 
population in the UK, remit funds abroad annually. Nigerians make up 
15% of the total UK remitting population, Indians 10% and Pakistanis 
8%.166 Mixed ethnicity households (12%) also increase the potential 
remittance capacity. Just over half of remitters are male, reversing for the 
Asian remitter group, with a peak age for remitters of 25-44, comprising 
68% total remitters, which is surprising given that these may be second 
generation migrants.167 Remitted values increase with customer age, with 
averages being: 24% remit over £1,000, 21% £500-£1000, and 32% 
under £500; 60% of remittances are for personal use. The sector is highly 
competitive but offers limited profitability given the low charges applied.  
 
Thirteen percent of the UK population are born outside the UK, half 
having arrived in the last ten years, with migration accounting for 55% of 
the UK population increase in the last 10 years.168 Surprisingly, in 
addition to this, one in four remitters were born in the UK,169 confirming 
that the cultural tradition and value of remittances is transferred across 
generations, linked especially to Muslim communities. The UK Muslim 
population is 1.5 million representing a significant potential user group, 
with Asians comprising 68%, Pakistanis 38%, and over half of all Muslims 
(53%) born outside the UK. The common UK ethnic groups engaged in 
remitting include Indian, Pakistani, Asian, and Bangladeshi communities, 
totalling over 4.5 million. Language is important to the selection of 
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operators; shared language and ethnicity facilitating access and trust in 
service quality.  
 
Although 91% of UK households speak English, the quality and number 
of household members who do so is not indicated; in 4% of households 
no household member speaks English, rising to 26% for some regions.170  
There are clear and distinct UK remittance communities that have and will 
continue to remit over the long term in considerable volumes. This 
support offers tangible benefits to overseas communities in line with UK 
Government policy on financial aid to support overseas development and 
as part of the UK’s ongoing financial commitment to the IMF and the UN. 
The UK supports humanitarian relief, governance development and debt 
relief as well as a variety of other development projects, contributing to 
the existing support and benefits delivered by UK remittances and their 
micro economic benefits.171  
 
 
4.4.1 UK models of operation 
 
The sector appears to be dominated by a franchise/agency model and 
cash to cash model, with larger companies dominating, and operating 
through agent franchises. The fieldwork research offers the opportunity to 
critically investigate and examine this in more detail. Market dominance is 
linked to UK network coverage promoted largely through Post Office 
outlets promoting accessibility and confidence through a familiar high 
street trusted brand to secure property. 
 
The agency model enables larger operators to extend their presence 
through small local businesses, promoting accessibility and increasing 
opportunities for financial inclusion. Operators are often members of the 
same ethnic groups served by the remittance business, speaking other 
languages and are generally known within their locality of operation and 
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well respected. Language is critical to developing financial inclusion and 
literacy, the UK remittance model would appear to support the preference 
of those who wish to transact in their first language.172  
 
Businesses rely on customer referral, and advertising is unusual amongst 
these low cost community businesses.173 It remains to be seen as to what 
extent ongoing regulation professionalises these services to which the 
fieldwork is relevant. 
 
Some operators specialise in servicing particular regions or remittance 
corridors174 and, whilst not discriminatory, this does lead to cultural 
entrenchment but also encourages confidence from specialisation; this is 
relevant given that 98% of Somalian and 94% of Brazilian remitters use a 
niche provider.175 In general, high street remittance providers have the 
highest level of service availability linked to their remittance preference 
with 62% use compared to 24% for high street banks with19% of these 
preferring to use a high street remitter.  
 
The relationship between regulation, its effectiveness and impact on the 
sector are discussed more fully in chapter 6 and in relation to the analysis 
of the fieldwork findings. Online service provision in the UK is limited, 
illustrating the preference of these communities for face to face contact. 
This highlights the continued importance of these services for maintaining 
contact within distinct and local communities, underscoring the value of 
smaller local remittance providers. 
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4.4.2 The need for financial inclusion  
The UK has a considerable choice of providers with less distinction 
between remittance services offered by MSBs and those by banks, 
compared to developing countries. All UK operators have to be registered 
and are subject to AML/CTF regulation requiring customer and 
transaction checks which may be perceived as intrusive of customers’ 
privacy but are limited to that necessary to confirm identity and 
transaction purpose. This information is exploited for marketing purposes 
by large brand MSBs through loyalty card schemes, with disclosure of 
customer data permissible for official reporting purposes. There appears 
little scrutiny of the protection of customer sensitive information amongst 
small MSB networks; limited only by competition, management of this 
across agencies may be problematic, but a formal mechanism for 
recourse is provided under the DPA 1998.  
 
UK MSBs remain more accessible than banks, the latter requiring an 
account, having higher costs and longer delivery times, offering less 
coverage and lacking flexible ID requirements. Over 33% of customers 
were refused a bank account due to failure to comply with ID 
requirements, which are not consistently applied across the sector. 
Account sharing overcomes this but this exposes vulnerable migrants to 
exploitation and denial of funds. No such issue arises in relation to 
property and use of MSBs. Mistrust of banks generally within the migrant 
population 176 deters their selection in preference for MSBs.  
 
MSBs remain the preferred remittance provider their selection being on 
the basis of service quality for 40% of customers, relevant factors being: 
ease of use 38%, transaction speed 34% and security 32%.177 Cost is 
important, not just in terms of charges but also the exchange rate offered, 
but this does not outweigh the concern for secure delivery. 
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The bank account requirements exclude undocumented migrant workers; 
MSBs a viable alternative. Remittances can be made by customers as a 
one-off visit providing easy access for newly located mobile migrants, in 
contrast to banks’ restrictions to existing customers. The strength of 
remittances is their flexibility and accessibility, promoting competition and 
service quality to incentivise repeat business. 
 
Around 2.8 million adults, representing 8% of UK households, are 
unbanked, 25% residing in areas of financial exclusion, ‘68 percent live in 
ten percent of the most financially excluded postcode districts.’178 
Remitters often maintain an overseas bank account but this is unused for 
remittances due to insecurity and limited geographical coverage.179 
Transaction costs are a potential barrier, which180 lend to the preference 
of MSBs over banks, given the frequency and amounts remitted to 
maximise end value.  
 
The UK migrants are generally well banked compared with other 
jurisdictions, with 78% of remitters having a bank account but only 47% a 
credit card. 62% remit using high street MSBs compared to 24% using 
UK banks, and 12% using foreign banks.181 Those unbanked include: 
failed asylum seekers, illegal entrants and ‘over stayers’ as well as 
students, the retired, unemployed and those working in the underground 
cash based economy. These groups need to retain access to MSB 
services to support outgoing remittances, which is preferable to the use of 
unregulated channels and the physical transport of cash by family.182  
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4.4.3 Normative compliance in the UK sector 
UK remittance services secure the protection of property from misuse 
through the AML and CTF regulatory standards and may offer greater 
protection than overseas banks given levels of overseas corruption.  
 
Trust relates to the reputation to deliver and the quality of service 
provided. Banks notably have a higher failure for delivery, and seeking 
compensation is arduous and often unforthcoming. Five percent of 
remitters reported a failure to deliver funds and security of property 
lending to a preference of MSBs over banks, even where jurisdiction 
specific. Prevention of property misuse determines provider selection. 
Financial exclusion is not as prevalent in the UK as in developing 
countries, but within the UK the migrant diaspora are the most exposed to 
financial exclusion. MSBs remain the preferred choice for remittances 
due to cultural preferences for cash based transactions. Regulatory 
requirements unfairly and indirectly discriminate against ethnic 
remittances since these fall within mainly Muslim communities, and are 
linked to areas of terrorist activity, leading to the potential for their 
categorisation as a ‘suspect community’.  Remitters are likely to arouse 
suspicion in being most likely to lack relevant ID, given the circumstances 
of migration and their mobility in the labour market. The risk profile of 
customers or products is linked to access to the formal sector and 
financial inclusion, creating a lack of trust and confidence in the informal 
sector.183  
 
MSBs are not bound by any code of confidentiality, only the DPA 1998, 
but confidentiality is relevant to securing a reputation and repeat custom 
in a highly competitive market. Reliance on word of mouth and the 
presence of agencies situated within other businesses ensures 
compliance for fear of loss of custom, or agency franchise. The UK has 
clear and more enforceable expectations of the protection of privacy 
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   Competition and Choice in the Banking Sector January 2011’Jaunuary 2011 [2.1] ,[2] ,[6.2] 
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rights where expectations have transposed from the public to the private 
sector. MSBs offer narrow but more competitive service products, with 
operators instilling confidence through their knowledge of the sector, 
providing information to assist customer choice. Network coverage, 
prompt delivery at convenient locations and a more personalised service 
are also strengths of MSB operation. MSBs are valued for their 
community presence and their community function, assisting the diaspora 
communities to improve the quality of life back home.184 This social 
function is one that UK MSBs could more effectively embrace to 
strengthen their market position. 185 
 
Barriers to financial inclusion include consumer financial literacy, product 
availability, and regulatory burden. The use of mobile phone technology 
to engage those who are financially excluded in relation to remittances 
has not been fully explored, and remains an opportunity for service 
expansion and increased inclusion. It may become critical to the survival 
of UK MSBs to capture levels of internet and mobile phone penetration in 
order to maintain low cost accessible and secure services. Remittance 
consumer groups indicate that 44% would consider using their mobile 
phone for remittances, and 63% would consider using pre-paid cards for 
remittances.186 The current cash to cash model promotes inclusion only if 
identification requirements are flexibly applied, cash requiring greater 
protection. It remains a weakness for financial exploitation that MSBs still 
focus on cash transactions through traditional models of operation in the 
UK given that banks are driving their technological investment, and with 
the payment of wages in cash now rare, the distinction between and 
advantages offered by MSBs over banks may be fading.   
 
The UK Financial Inclusion Task Force Working Group works alongside 
HM Treasury, ministerial groups and the Remittance Working Group187 to 
                                                          
184Boon (n166) 
185DFID(n179) 12-15 
186Isaccs (n172) 2  
187(n153) para 40 The Remittances working groups was set up by Government in June 2004  
    comprise  of representation from DFID, FSA, HM Treasury, Customs and Excise and  
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inform Government policy promoting financial inclusion. Policy oversight 
of remittances is fractured and issues of migration and benefits from 
remittances for humanitarian aid are separated from the context of 
financial regulation, despite the latter having an impact on the former. 
This fails to secure adequate protection of human security in financially 
dependent states. UK financial aid contributes to global human security to 
address the risk of poverty and terrorism. The UK provides financial 
assistance to countries such as Bangladesh and Nigeria, enhanced by 
reducing barriers to capture remittance payments, promoting financial 
inclusion,188 but warrants further development in scale and scope to be 
meaningful. UK MSBs could more purposefully act in association to 
promote these social benefits within the Government agenda. 
 
The UKMTA represents MSBs but lacks representation equivalent to the 
banking sector at policy level; operators servicing particular remittance 
corridors remain unrepresented as are the communities they serve. 189 UK 
MSBs lack representation internationally to effect sector change, the 
IAMTA has provided sector representation for international remitters at 
Westminster meetings to consider the relationship between the MSB 
sector and the banking sector; smaller providers are unrepresented.190  
Membership of trade associations is not currently linked to registration 
and poor sector representation limits MSB competition, excluding their 
customers’ interests also. A formal code of practice to regulate 
representation and consultation and the provision of banking services to 
the sector would prevent market dominance by banks jeopardising the 
benefits of remittances, but this lacks Government support for 
intervention in private commercial matters.191  
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Cultural factors and social norms associated with financial transactions 
and ‘cash based’ cultures192 can lead to exclusion. Cultural traditions are 
reinforced by co-ethnicity; migrants seeks out their own cultural 
communities, ‘ethnic enclaves’, in areas where they settle. Attitudes of 
migrant remitters are based on a ‘strong sense of cultural heritage that is 
embodied in religion, family values and manifested in their striving for 
financial security.’193 These rights and values are protected, preserved 
and enhanced by the UK MSB sector, with numerous MSBs offering 
bespoke services to distinct corridors. 
 
Remittances are driven by migration, the ‘extent of the migration 
….involves millions of people and affects a large number of states in the 
international community.’194 Migrant workers’ rights are protected by 
international law (not ratified by the UK); the convention on migrant 
workers’ right protects the fundamental rights parallel to the protection in 
the HRA1998, requiring the  equal treatment of migrants, free from 
discrimination based on language, race ethnicity or religion and protection 
and promotion of their cultural identity. Other international instruments 
protect minority rights,195 and social and cultural rights,196 but protection 
outside the limits of the HRA in the UK is weak. More could be done allied 
to this to promote financial inclusion and reduce the documentary burden 
to promote access to the financial sector and MSBs in the UK.  
 
The UK remittance context shares some parallels with the Somali context 
in terms of reasons for their selection. Regulation in the UK offers 
protection of property rights and has deterred, but not completely 
prevented, the misuse of MSBs by customers,197 operators198 and 
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criminal enterprises.199 Whilst the UK AML/CTF regime aims to improve 
the protection of MSBs and their property transfers, this is balanced by 
intrusive inroads into customer privacy where information from mandatory 
screening is a necessity justified on the basis of security. It remains the 
case that ‘if the potential of remittances is to be maximised,200 then more 
needs to be done to understand remittance use and increase their flows 
from the UK to harness financial inclusion.’201  
 
 
4.5. Modern approaches to securing normativity and financial  
       inclusion of remittance services 
 
The focus on the regulation of remittance services has now moved from 
the need to regulate to the form of regulation, which needs to enhance 
remittance activity in a normatively sound manner, securing rights 
protection and promoting financial inclusion, without compromising the 
distinct characteristics that are valued by users.  
 
Remittance providers continue to service developing countries, 
demonstrating their capacity to operate in a modern context and in line 
with regulatory compliance. The Dahabshiil Company, operating through 
a mix of agents and online presence, exemplifies family values and a 
continued commitment to the ethnic and cultural context of the Somali 
culture. The service is accessed through local agents, as part of a wider 
international network. Internet services and language support promote 
inclusion and accessibility. Service is based on transparency of regulatory 
compliance, customer service and a commitment to community projects, 
supported by 5% of annual profits. It combines the benefits of technology 
and local presence, engendering trust through customer care guarantees 
and preferential rates202 for repeat custom. Customer privacy is protected 
limiting disclosure to that necessary for mandatory reporting. Its success 
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has led to the provision of an Islamic bank in Djibouti, driving private 
sector development within the context of cultural values.  
 
This model could be readily be applied within the UK where Internet 
access is high, reducing transaction costs, enhancing access and 
removing the need for agents. Charitable donations could be maximized 
by pooling the profit contributions of several operators for donations to 
nominated ‘charities,’ ensuring funds are not diverted for illicit use. 
Discounted rates for repeat custom are already linked to loyalty card 
schemes and privacy is protected by home access. 
 
The Pakistani remittance initiative aims to support faster, cheaper, 
convenient and efficient flows of remittances though the State Bank of 
Pakistan, with Government contributions supporting transactions costs.203 
The bank may broker agreements with overseas banks to expand the 
formal sector capture of remittances. This provides opportunities for 
increased funds for savings and promotion of other financial products,204 
for investment. Profits are used to extend ATM networks. The scheme is 
normatively compliant, providing financial incentives for use by the formal 
sector, with guaranteed protection of funds and service levels with 
compensation for any delayed payment.  
 
The scheme allows for UK fiscal supervision and the sharing of AML 
expertise addressing and countering formal sector mistrust of overseas 
entities. Partnerships are, however, limited to other banks, but could 
possibly be extended to large international MSBs. The scheme could 
operate more widely based on agreements with other jurisdictions to 
improve their regulatory standards incentivised by mutual cooperation 
and financial support. 
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The Kenyan M-Pesa system205 initiative between the Safaricom and 
Vodafone mobile networks illustrates the use of modern technology to 
promote remittance transfers. This draws on high mobile phone access in 
developing countries such Kenya and Somalia (70%),206 despite the Al-
Shabab ban on these.207 Access requires a mobile phone ‘account’ for 
the security of funds, removing the possible illicit diversion of cash. This 
model supports personal, private accessible family communication and 
financial support.208  The cost of providing regulation is met by phone 
companies’ contract contributions and investment secure technological 
development, in return for a potential market share.   
The initiative offers accessibility through local agents offering ‘credit top 
up’. These systems have enabled the secure delivery of microfinance 
loans to impoverished rural communities.209 These mobile networks dealt 
with more transactions in Kenya than Western Union globally.210 This is 
readily applicable to the UK with mobile phone penetration of over 90%, 
but the regulatory model will need adaption to ensure security.211 M-Pesa 
was not initially subject to AML regulation but informal guidance,212 and 
regulation is essential for UK projects. ‘Pay As You Go’ services are  
most often used by the financially vulnerable, raise due diligence 
concerns as to their potential for cloning and criminal misuse. These 
services however offer a cost effective way of using existing regulation 
and services to bring remittances into the formal sector, aligning with 
government policy.213 This remote service model removes the need for 
agents but does not align well to cultural needs and would require a bank 
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account. Low operational costs remain attractive214 and UK MSBs are 
well placed given their current accessibility to the use of this model to 
retain their market share. 
Inclusion is fostered by recognising fundamental rights, beyond 
contractual property rights. Barclays’ service remittance operators in 
Africa require all MSBs to apply UN guiding principles on human rights, 
the ‘Thun declaration’, as a normative approach to inclusion. ‘Remittance 
operators have been successful in capitalizing on trust and the social 
capital’ used to rebuild war torn communities.215 They transect clan 
divisions and are well placed to foster cooperation and promote cohesion 
at an international level.  Inclusion in the UK has largely centred on 
transaction costs, and more needs to be done to improve the literacy of 
senders, given their conservative tendencies, and to extend Islamic 
banking services to remittances.  
 
Within the UK the credit union model has also not been fully exploited to 
include remittance services. Pre-paid cards potentially deliver secure 
transactions in the UK and abroad and could easily be integrated into UK 
utility pre-payment systems and access points. 
 
The challenge lies in tailoring regulation to mitigate specific risks from 
different service types and delivery approaches without imposing an 
undue burden.216 The challenge in securing normative compliance in the 
UK requires a consideration of the remittance operation in receiving 
countries having different jurisdictional and financial environments.217 
New initiatives need to respond to the challenge of meeting these 
operational contexts in an effective, inclusive and normatively compliant 
way. 
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4.6   Conclusion  
If our values are truly fundamental and enduring, they have to be 
relevant whatever the level of the threat.218 
 
‘Human rights are often the first casualties of a crisis.’219 This chapter has 
sought to consider the tensions and concerns arising in the presence of 
the threat of terrorism that requires a consideration of security alongside 
the protection of rights. The normative framework presented provides a 
set of predetermined principles and rights as values against which the 
boundaries of acceptable CTS can be assessed. These values are drawn 
from international consensus as necessary pre-conditions to sound 
governance and state action. This cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
transcends issues of sovereignty in recognition of shared community 
security interests and a commitment to human security. The human 
security paradigm presented views security as one of a bundle of equal 
rights to be protected. The normative framework provides protection for 
rights in accordance with international standards to ensure these do not 
become hostage to international security policy. Global security interests 
are subject to the democratic deficit of political power struggles in 
developing international CTS, from which rights need protection as 
individual entitlements. Their protection as an international concern 
prevents them falling victim to the unilateral political assessment of 
terrorist security threats. Security should rightly operate as a shield to 
protect human rights through normative compliance which acts as a 
moral compass and provides a permanent safeguard to secure future 
protection. CTS aiming to deliver protection from terrorism is a hollow 
gain, without the inclusive protection of fundamental rights to uphold the 
accepted standards of fairness and justice.  
 
The protection of the financial sector and the promulgation of financial 
standards to detect, prevent and deter terrorist laundering and financing 
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is a critical aspect of CTS. It is heavily reliant on risk focused compliance, 
which fails to consider the wider context of financial activity. The 
application of a rights based framework reconceptualises the presenting 
of the risks of alternative remittance services in light of their capacity to 
endanger fundamental rights, but is equally balanced in considering how 
alternative remittance systems protect rights and their social and financial 
benefits. The framework starts from a position of financial capacity and 
rights protection, addressing risks in relation to their capacity to threaten 
rights, removing these through normative action without removing existing 
protection. The case study of Somalia clearly demonstrated that the lack 
of proportionality of action resulting from the Al-Barakaat listing caused 
financial and social hardship, where political motivation for an instant 
result jeopardised human security, without any consideration of 
humanitarian exceptions. For CT regimes to have credibility they need to 
protect against the very ‘moral hazard of unintentionally reinforcing the 
very behaviour one is seeking to change’.220 Security concerns do not 
justify the waiving of rights protection that terrorism itself threatens, where 
this is a disproportionate interference without benefit. The normative 
framework secures rights protection, acting as a positive impetus to 
developing CTS and financial inclusion through regulation that is fair, just, 
and context specific. Developing CTS which fails to accommodate this 
based on services in a ‘failed and war torn state’ adopts an inappropriate 
‘one size fits all’ approach to CTS, ignoring the relevant context of 
operation.  
 
The Somali case study illustrates that securing the effectiveness of 
regulation is a multifaceted concern requiring a prior assessment of state 
capacity and the need for social and financial inclusion. The security 
interests of the international community may prevail over domestic 
interests, but the success of the implementation of CTF measures is 
conditional upon the capacity to implement these and the support of the 
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international community to achieve this. Measures to tackle global 
insecurity are only effective where they are applied internationally in a 
manner consistent with inclusion and the protection of fundamental rights. 
The consideration of the UK remittance context from a regulated 
perspective, demonstrates that regulation does not appear to hinder the 
benefits of their operation but enables the UK to protect rights with some 
gains in property exchanged for increased intrusion into privacy. The UK 
remains committed to financial inclusion, the accessibility and service 
design of UK remittance services promoting this. The UK context further 
reveals some of the burden of regulation for operators and customers, the 
relevance of will clarified by the fieldwork in chapter 6. The assessment of 
the normative compliance of CTF measures does not operate in a 
vacuum, but a social and financial context alongside political, economic, 
cultural and security considerations. The presentation of the Somali case 
study and a consideration of the UK context, has enabled a more 
meaningful critical analysis of the context of normative compliance of 
alternative remittance provision.  
 
Remittance systems present a bridge between financial services 
operating in different cultural contexts and with differing degrees of 
formality. Their global reach acts as an imperative for their commitment to 
protecting the global financial and physical security in applying CTF 
measures to address the risks they present in relation to terrorist finance. 
Modern technology challenges their mode of operation and their 
presenting risks, and requires adaptation in a purposeful way to continue 
to offer an efficient and cost effective means of transfer. The strength of 
these systems has often been highlighted as being the social capital of 
the network itself and its operators, a misnomer. The real social value is 
not internal but external, in the social networks promoted by these 
systems between the migrant diaspora who use these systems and   the 
value of the cultural heritage and social communities with whom they 
maintain ties across generations despite geographical cleavage.  
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This dimension needs to be the focus of approaches to counter terrorism 
finance and the need to regulate their operation, to ensure their capacity 
to continue to serve distinct communities and embrace their changing 
diversity. Whilst traditional methods of operation have been maintained 
through need, it is the remittance purpose and its value that ultimately 
sustains remittance activity. It would be a missed opportunity for the 
future if remittance services failed to capitalise on technological 
developments to maximise their effectiveness and reduce their misuse for 
terrorism, assisted by normatively compliant regulatory control. 
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Chapter 5    
A critical analysis of the legal framework for the regulation of 
alternative remittance systems 
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter critiques the counter terrorism finance regime in the UK and  the 
Government strategy and policy underpinning which aims to draw on the 
totality of counter terrorist finance measures available to protect the UK. It 
also aims to demonstrate a commitment to contributing to building an 
‘international framework of financial measures that now provides a critical 
bulwark’ against terrorism.1 This approach draws on criminal measures, 
reporting systems and asset freezes,2 to deter, detect and disrupt in an 
effective and proportionate manner. 
 
The chapter begins with a consideration of criminal law measures enabling 
prosecution for terrorist property offences, considering whether special 
terrorist offences are necessary, justified and effective in preventing terrorist 
finance. The chapter then considers administrative and quasi-criminal 
measures operating outside the criminal justice system, which are used to 
freeze terrorist assets. In particular the UN sanctions regime is highlighted 
for its lack of rights protection, and the resulting difficulties for UK 
implementation are considered in light of the changes needed to secure 
normative compliance. 
 
This chapter further considers the protection that CTF measures afford to 
rights, evaluating their effectiveness as an element of normative compliance. 
Effectiveness is relevant to the legitimacy of measures, requiring them to be 
capable of meeting their intended aims in a proportionate manner in relation 
to the effort and burden of compliance. Moreover the impact of any 
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interference with fundamental rights must also be justified as necessary in 
enhancing the effectiveness of CTF measures. 
 
The chapter also presents a critical overview of the scope and application of 
the MLR 2007 in regulating ARS services as MSBs. Central to the risk based 
approach is the consideration of the relevant guidance supporting its 
application within this sector. The effectiveness of the SARs regime is 
critiqued to consider its role in developing evidence based typologies and 
suspicion indicators to enhance the effectiveness of the regime. The 
importance of financial intelligence is considered in relation to the potential 
for the MLR and SARS reporting regimes to contribute to the collation and 
dissemination of this, and considers the implication raised for privacy rights. 
The chapter concludes by assessing the overall impact of the UK CTF 
regime, highlighting the key concerns relevant to the central research 
question and the fieldwork research presented in chapter 6. 
 
 
5.1 Criminalising terrorist finance – deterrence, prevention or 
symbolism 
 
Responses to terrorism have increasingly drawn on pre-emptive strategies 
for prevention. Whilst there remains a clear role for criminal law,3 the 
preferred approach is to draw on ordinary rather than special measures and 
procedures. The latter are more likely to impact on fundamental rights and 
require clear justification.4 Special measures carry the danger of becoming a 
normalised response to dealing with terrorism, with potential ‘seepage’ to 
non-terrorist activity. A range of potential responses to controlling terrorist 
finance is needed, to which criminal law contributes in enabling the UK to 
fulfil its international obligations. Criminal law is the ultimate ‘coercive tool’ 
within the criminal justice system, having ‘enormous symbolic power,’5 
marking out prohibited conduct recognised as harmful to society and 
                                                          
3D Anderson QC ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2011’ (London Stationary Office 2012) [10.1-10.2] 
4 Lord Carlile of Berriew QC‘The Definition of Terrorism’ (Cm 7052  London 2007 ) [25]  
5V Tadros ‘Criminal Responsibility’ (Oxford University Press Oxford 2005) 1   
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stigmatising offenders for transgressing socially accepted moral and legal 
values. It communicates state condemnation through public denunciation of 
acts, legitimising their punishment for their harm against society.6 
 
Resort to criminal law enables censure, sanction and punishment of terrorist 
conduct to deter future acts, having a strong declaratory, preventative and 
censuring role in incapacitating offenders through imprisonment. This 
paternalistic approach encompasses the risk of future ‘endangerment’ since 
terrorism poses as a threat to the ‘polity as whole’.7 Criminalisation signals 
‘symbolic solidarity’8 to cosmopolitan constitutionalism, driving the 
cooperation of the international community to implement this as a necessary 
‘common defence’9 within CTS. 
 
 
5.1.1 International obligations 
 
The Terrorist Financing10 Convention requires the criminalisation of the wilful 
collection or provision of funds, direct or indirect, where provided intentionally 
or with the knowledge that these may further terrorist ends11; this was 
reinforced by UNSCR 1373.12 Measures effectively target the anticipated use 
of funds, acting preventatively and capturing all modes of liability from 
assistance, cooperation, and direction of terrorist groups and members, 
connected to knowledge of the terrorist purpose, inclusive of liability for legal 
entities. Measures enable the identification, tracing, seizure and forfeiture of 
property without reliance on a conviction to trigger confiscation/forfeiture of 
property. The Council of Europe Convention reinforces these provisions, 
based on intentional provision of funds with knowledge of terrorist purpose, 
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with offences punishable by imprisonment of more than a year, linked to 
confiscation requirements.13   
 
UNSCR 1373 ensures that measures enable terrorist financiers to be 
‘brought to ‘justice’ and punished for ‘serious offences’, recognising the need 
to implement measures in accordance with national and international 
standards of human rights. UNSCR 162414 further criminalises the incitement 
of terrorism, including fundraising that may arise from targeting charitable 
donations provided from the migrant diaspora. 
 
Criminal law is increasingly necessary to deter ‘neighbour terrorism’ and the 
threat from ‘home grown’ terrorists15 following a re-evaluation of the control 
order regime. Criminal law measures secure legitimacy through a 
transparent and publically accountable process founded on due process 
guarantees supported by access to legal aid. It excludes the use of intercept 
evidence and CMP ‘balancing the interests of parties and interests of 
justice’16 to legitimise the label of ‘fair process.’ Criminalisation acts as a 
deterrent by focusing on individual culpability removed from the collective 
activity of the terrorist organisations, denying the glorification of terrorism and 
downgrading terrorists from martyrs to ordinary offenders. Pre-emptive, 
precautionary strategies penetrate measures, drawing on the mental 
elements of knowledge or suspicion of terrorist purpose, without proof of 
actual harm,17 normalising the criminalisation of the potential harm to provide 
security in the present. Terrorist offences, a ‘special category,’18 capture the 
unique dimension of terrorist acts, the criminal process providing a longer 
term solution to terrorist funding19 through deterrence and prevention.  
 
                                                          
13Council of Europe Convention on in Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds  
   of crime and Terrorism Art 9  
14UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1624  
15C Walker , ‘The Impact of Contemporary Security Agendas Against Terrorism on the Substantive  
   Criminal  Law’ Masferrer A (1st edn) Post 9/11 and the Sate of Permanent Legal Emergency  
   (Springer London 2012) 124  
16Ali v Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office [2008] EWCA Crim 1466 
17C Murphy , ‘EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law’ (1st  edn, 2012) 13 
18Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C.‘The Definition of Terrorism’ (Cm 7052  London 2007 ) [38],[40] 
19V Nguyen, ‘Stop the Money, Stop the Attacks: A Categorical Approach to Achieving an International  
   Terrorist  Financing Sanction Regime’ (2012) Vol1(1) Penn State Journal of Law and  International  
   Affairs , 159 
178 
 
Knowledge of ‘terrorist purpose’ can be supplanted by ‘reasonable cause to 
suspect’, which does not require proof of membership status, role, or 
membership of a prescribed group. Funds need not be used for terrorist 
purposes; liability is prospective as to the possibility and intention of future 
use. Criminalisation draws on inchoate liability, possession, ‘precursor 
crimes,’20 and preparatory offences linked to illicit purpose, without the 
commission of terrorist acts. Criminalisation is justified since future risk 
threatens ‘basal security’.21 This ‘net widening,’ approach is enhanced by the 
broad definition of terrorism and recourse to ‘special offences’ targeting 
terrorist support without any further acts of perpetration. 22 
 
Knowledge of the terrorist purpose23 removes the need for assessing the risk 
of the proximity of harm and likely consequences for the defendant’s acts.24 
Sections 11-13, TA 2000 illustrate offences based on the support of a 
proscribed organisation, drawing on knowledge of the organisations activities 
or reasonable suspicion of membership. Whilst rarely used, these terrorist 
offences remain important measures in the prosecutors’ armoury.25 
 
Criminal law measures fell behind the use of executive measures in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7; with distance they are preferred as 
effective measures in tackling terrorism in line with recognised normative 
values. 
 
 
5.1.2 Terrorist financing offences 
 
Terrorist property offences include terrorist fund raising, use and possession, 
arranging to deal with terrorist property, and the laundering of26 terrorist 
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funds including their removal from the UK. Intention as to terrorist use 
applies, but excludes requiring its use to advance terrorist goals. Knowledge 
or reasonable cause to suspect operate as alternatives to intention with 
liability also based on the reckless provision of funds where there is 
uncertainty as to future use.  ‘Reasonable cause’ acts as a negligence based 
test. The terrorist purpose is satisfied by proof of a terrorist association, 
combining subjective and objective mental elements to capture all scenarios. 
Entering into an arrangement to deal with terrorist property27 is criminalised 
despite being remote from any terrorist act or use of property. Property is 
widely construed, including tangible and intangible property, and including 
the sale of property,28 or providing funds, passports29or weapons.30  
 
Section 17 TA 2000 mirrors s328 POCA 2002, and relates to becoming 
concerned with an identified and concluded arrangement which may result in 
the transfer of property for terrorism.31 Section18 TA applies strict liability for 
assisting another to retain terrorist property; the defence of lack of 
knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect applying, with the defendant 
having the legal burden of proof 32 of facts, this being fair since these are 
within the defendant’s knowledge. 
 
The interference with property rights offers protection against terrorism, 
ensuring that individual rights do not oust wider ‘community’ security 
interests. The UK complies with international standards33 through a 
combination of ‘special’ and ordinary provisions.34 The TA 2000 allows for 
prosecution35 of fundraising and use of funds by proscribed organisations, 
lone terrorists, isolated terrorist plots and individual terrorist cells.   
 
                                                          
27TA 2000 s14, 17 
28R v Saleem [2009] EWCA Crim 920. 
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Criminal law offers public protection by targeting general funding capacity 
and support, protecting societal interests and deterring support through the 
transparent accountability of the criminal justice process,36 securing 
legitimacy through due process guarantees. Criminalisation communicates 
censure by illustrating the states determination to punish violent action, 
which threatens normative values and community security. The broad 
definition of terrorism does however draw the criminal process into the 
political arena, where media coverage and political commentary risk 
compromising fairness and jury objectivity. It does, however, offer the 
opportunity for social inclusion, rarely placing actors beyond ‘civil 
redemption’.37 The defendant’s rights are robustly protected by Art 6, 
contrasting with UN quasi-criminal sanctions, of indefinite duration. Executive 
measures, in contrast allow terrorist supporters to potentially continue to offer 
support and afford more limited due process guarantees. 
 
The criminal process adds ‘bite’ to the duty to disclose information which 
may assist in preventing terrorist acts or assist their investigation,38 and 
offences are ‘far reaching’39 including the duty to disclose information 
received in the course of a trade, profession, business or employment, s19.  
Employment is also inclusive of voluntary work, s77, CTA 2008, the latter 
capturing the charitable sector. The failure to disclose information has arisen 
in immigration cases and allegations of terrorist financing.40 It illustrates the 
drive by authorities for information related to terrorist activities and the ‘value’ 
placed on this to compelled by disclosure to assist investigation and deter 
support. The duty on the part of the regulated sector,41 including MSBs, is 
more onerous, triggered by ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’, and informed by 
sector guidance. This is proportionate, since property transactions affect third 
party property rights requiring protection from intermingling with terrorist 
funds. Criminal law42 secures the cooperation of the regulated sector through 
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38TA 2000 s19-22 
39 Anderson Report ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2011’ David Anderson Q.C ( Home Office 2012) [5.5] 
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compulsion, ensuring that protection against terrorism is not ousted by 
financial considerations, protecting the integrity of investigations to 
criminalise ‘tipping off’.43 Information received in the context of legal privilege 
is protected44 per Arts 8 and 6.45 The effectiveness of reporting requirements 
is however questionable, given the diverse range of terrorist funding 
sources.46 
 
A broad duty applies to ‘public’ disclosure, s38B, TA 2000 based on 
knowledge or belief of facts that may assist in preventing the commission of 
a terrorist act and has been used to prosecute the friends/family of terrorists 
for failure to report prior knowledge of terrorist activity, with criminalisation 
deterring passive encouragement.  
 
 
5.1.3 General versus specific laundering offences 
 
The FATF endorses an ‘all serious crimes’ approach47 to predicate ML 
offences in line with the Vienna Convention and EU Directive 2005/60.48 
General confiscation orders are triggered by proof of criminal 
conduct/property and the benefits thereof,49 including a criminal lifestyle. 
Offences of directing terrorism in relation to proscribed organisations apply to 
lifestyle assumptions.50 The UK adopts an ‘all crimes’ approach for predicate 
offences, including all terrorist offences.51 These52 do not require a 
conviction53 (satisfied by reliance on circumstantial evidence). Criminal 
proceeds need not derive from a particular offence54 drawing on the 
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‘irresistible inference’.55 Where fund transfers occur, or are attempted, in 
circumstances that evade the usual procedures, lacking transparency or 
suggesting concealment of the funds or the actor’s motives, then the general 
offences suffice. Terrorist laundering could be addressed by an aggravated 
sentence56 but given the complexity of POCA57 the incorporation of terrorist 
funding offences within general offences has previously been rejected.58 
  
Terrorist funding offences implement UK international obligations59 assisting 
international cooperation, and demonstrating solidarity to cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism and a commitment to human security. Terrorism differs 
from organised crime, in being an attack ‘on society and its democratic 
institutions’60 posing the threat of physical harm. General laundering is 
backward facing, aiming to hide the source of funds to preserve the criminal 
benefit. Terrorist laundering is forward facing, attempting to disguise the 
purpose and use, not the source of funds, to conceal the destination and 
protect the recipients’ identities. The placement, layering and integration 
processes also differ. General laundering involves large volumes integrated 
and converted to conceal their source, with layering assisting removal from 
the jurisdiction. Terrorist laundering targets the purpose, key to providing 
financial intelligence to prevent the intended use,61 and placement of funds is 
transparent but the terrorist purpose remains hidden. These elements are 
reflected in offence structures and definitions of property, which are wider for 
terrorist laundering where the benefit of possession and acquisition relate to 
the terrorist purpose, not the individual or prior criminality. The different 
qualities of these acts and threats favour separate offences, affording two 
opportunities for prosecution, particularly where terrorism is supported by 
criminal funds.62 Different risks reflect the differing mental elements; 
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subjective suspicion for general laundering need not be founded on 
reasonable grounds or specific facts.63 In comparison a more stringent 
burden operates for terrorist offences where liability requires proof of the 
terrorist purpose. 
 
A combined offence would capture the terror/crime nexus64 and the mirroring 
of current offences65 but oust critical distinctions. Section 17 has no 
counterpart under POCA,66 illustrating the different characteristics of 
criminality captured by the separate offences. Notification orders in the CTA 
200867 offer additional protection, which is not mirrored in POCA. Separate 
offences capture the differing policy aims and nature of criminality, whilst the 
‘terror label’ and specialist offences are not always justified.68 Where the act 
is mirrored in a general offence, property offences are marked out as an 
exception. The handling of property would not be unlawful without the fair 
labelling of the terrorist purpose connected to it. Terrorist offences  rely on an 
inchoate liability to target the underling terrorist purpose through special 
offences and procedures which ‘defend further up the field’69 where this 
mode of liability, absent the terrorist threat, would not be justified.   
 
Northern Ireland terrorism has traditionally demonstrated a clear nexus with 
organised criminal activity as a source of funding terrorist of paramilitary 
groups, with half the criminal gangs identified in Northern Ireland in 2002 
having links to paramilitary organisations, and with 80% of IRA activity at that 
time linked to crime.70 Here prosecutions under POCA were preferred,71 
despite the lesser penalties, in order to remove the difficulties in proving the 
terrorist connection, assisting effective confiscation72 and forfeiture of 
                                                          
63R v Bowman Fels [2005]  EWCA Civ 328 
64JMLSG ‘Prevention of money laundering/ combating terrorist  financing, Guidance for the UK  
   Financial Sector Part 1’ November 2009 [9] 
65R Alexander , ‘Money Laundering and terrorist financing: time for a combined offence’ (2009) 30(7)  
  Company Lawyer 202-204 
66TA 2000 s18 
67CTA 2008 s41 
68D Anderson  QC  ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2011’ (London Stationary Office 2012) paras 10.3, 11.3 
69D Anderson , ‘Shielding the compass: how to fight terrorism without defeating the law’ (2013)  3  
   European   Human Rights Law Review 233-246,237 
70HC Northern Ireland Affairs - The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland Fourth Report  HC                
   ( 2001-02) 978-I  [13-21] 
71Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: annual Statistics 2012/13 Table 4  
72Warnock & Ors, Re Proceeds Of Crime Act [2005] NIQB 16 
184 
 
assets.73 However, the nature and degree of this nexus to justify reliance on 
ordinary criminal measures does not translate to all terrorist groups and 
activity, since they have different and specific sources of funding. The use of 
general offences therefore requires caution. 
 
 
5.1.4 Seizure, restraint and forfeiture of terrorist funds  
 
The ATCSA 200174 enables cash seizures and forfeiture where investigating 
officers have reasonable grounds to suspect terrorism, enabling the 
detention of cash pending further investigation, which is reasonable in 
preventing the dissipation of assets alerted by investigative processes. 
Property is protected by procedures allowing for the release of funds up and 
until the commencement of criminal proceedings, preserving control through 
interim measures and allowing time for charging and prosecution. These 
measures assist civil forfeiture where no prosecution results, or on acquittal, 
but apply the lesser civil standards of proof. Terrorist cash includes property 
‘earmarked as terrorist property’ facilitating seizure of all proceeds from 
property obtained through terrorism, without proof of a link to the specific 
terrorist or the individual concerned. The interference with property is 
proportionate in being limited to that necessary to prevent terrorism with 
protection of third party rights. Earmarking provisions apply retrospectively 
but do not contravene Art 7 in being proceedings ‘in rem’ against the 
property not the person. 75 
 
Restraint orders are directed to named persons during investigation76 and 
prosecution, aiming to prevent the dissipation of terrorist property 77 on 
evidencing proof of terrorist purpose on the balance of probabilities78 
                                                          
73(n2) 
 
74Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
75ATCSA 2001 Pt sd1,5,7 Sch 1 
76ATCSA 2001  
77TA 2000 schedule 4 
78R (on the application of Director of the Assets Recovery Agency) v Jia Jin He (No.2) [2004] EWHC  
   302 
185 
 
compliant with Art 679 as a reasonable constraint on property rights. 
Application by the prosecution80 before the court allows for ex parte 
hearings, with orders reviewed after 14 days, preventing the dissipation of 
assets81 removing control of property until the making of forfeiture orders82 
fulfilling international obligations83 and enabling the enforcement of overseas 
orders.84 The interference with property rights is justified by the need for 
public protection where reasonable grounds for suspicion as to the terrorist 
intention and propose of use are connected to the named person,85avoiding 
speculative infringement of property rights. Orders operate proportionately in 
allowing access to assets for ordinary living and legal expenses in 
accordance with Art 8 and A1-P1. 
 
Forfeiture orders during trial, or on conviction, for terrorist property offences 
apply where property has been or was intended for terrorist use, and s15 TA 
2000 applies reasonable cause to suspect this, ‘would or might’ be used in 
relation to the possession. Any reward obtained through ss15-18 can be 
forfeited. Forfeiture applies to offences with a ‘terrorist connection’ to the 
control or possession of the property held to facilitate terrorism, justifying 
forfeiture. Interference is constrained by protection of third party rights, 
s23B,86 and proof of the ‘terrorist connection’ to criminal standards. The 
ACTSA also 2001 provides for account monitoring orders and financial 
information orders87 to detect terrorist property identifying other assets for 
seizure and assisting the investigation stage. Forfeiture permanently 
removes terrorist assets from terrorist actors. Review of the TA 2000 has 
indicated a lack of clarity as to whether the £597,000 and US$18,000 
terrorist funds seized/forfeited for 2008 were under TA 2000 or POCA 
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powers88 reflecting the confusion and lack of accurate data about the 
usefulness of these measures.89 
 
 
5.1.5 Effectiveness of measures 
 
Despite the low thresholds for liability, the number of prosecutions for 
terrorist finance is quite low and conviction rates remain unpublished.90 
Assessing the effectiveness of criminal measures is problematic given that 
Home Office data collection is inadequate, therefore constraining an effective 
review.91  
 
Table 3 indicates the charges and convictions for terrorist funding offences 
ss15-19 compared to those for all offences under the TA 2000. For 2007, of 
15 prosecutions, two resulted in convictions under POCA s328 and three 
under s17, TA 2000.Data for the period 2001-2007 reveals that terrorist 
finance offences comprised 17% of 104 terrorist charges for the UK, 
averaging 18 charges per annum.92 Funding offences (s15-18) constituted 
15 principal charges, with 25 of the 47 terrorist funding offences being 
discontinued. Prosecutions for 2008 concerned s15, TA 2000, 2009 yielded 
one prosecution for s15, with a further one in 2011 along with one 
prosecution for s328 of POCA. Prosecutions for 2012 related to s15 
concerning the transfer of funds to Somalia through MSBs.93 Home Office 
statistics indicate161 terrorism charges for 2010-2012, 13% related to 
terrorist funding offences, resulting in only one trial.94 A total of 40 charges 
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have been brought for terrorist funding offences since 2001 resulting in a 
total of 16 convictions.95  
 
Appendix 4 indicates cases prosecuted by the CPS for the years from 2007-
2013,96 but must be viewed with caution since this includes prosecutions not 
terrorist related. For 2013 there were 40 trials with only 3 relating to terrorist 
funding.97 
 
 
 
The data indicates that a small percentage of charges lead to conviction, with 
property offences sacrificed for more serious offences attracting longer 
sentences. The former, offer valuable ‘back-up’ on acquittal or successful 
appeal,98 given that only half of the prosecutions succeed. Most charges 
occurred prior to 2008, and of the 384 charged since 2001, 10% comprise 
terrorist funding offences.99 Funding offences are often subsumed within 
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Table 3 : Home Office Statistics 2001-2012 
Charging of Terrorist  Fund Raising Offences  s15-19 
Year 2001-02  
 
01 
 
 
02 
 
03 
 
04 
 
05 
 
06 
 
07 
 
08 
 
09 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
Total 
 
Total No. of charges s15-19   
 
6 
 
8 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4 
 
2 
 
6 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
40 
 
Total No. of charges TA 2000 
all offences 
 
14 
 
40 
 
32 
 
15 
 
38 
 
40 
 
30 
 
9 
 
6 
 
3 
 
19 
 
19 
 
265 
 
Total No. of convictions 
s15-19  
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
16 
 
Total No. of  convictions 
all offences TA 2000 
 
5 
 
12 
 
4 
 
4 
 
25 
 
21 
 
15 
 
8 
 
3 
 
3 
 
14 
 
9 
 
123 
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other offences and are a small proportion100 of all terrorist charges.101 Their 
usefulness is difficult to quantify given the lamentable lack of transparent102 
quality data,103 which is much criticised, despite financial investigation104 
being an element of all terrorist investigations.  
 
Terrorist funding offences remain important tools105 for disrupting terrorist 
plots and enabling the incarceration of suspects and the freezing of their 
assets pending conviction.106 The length of investigations and resources 
required for detailed financial investigation makes successful prosecution 
problematic. Where terrorist funds derive from ordinary criminality, POCA 
2002107 offers broader scope for confiscation,108 although having a narrower 
concept of future use109 of criminal property.110 Different policy objectives 
here may preclude this application for terrorist finance. 
 
The UK AML/CTF strategy associated with the criminal process demands 
more in-depth evaluation, given the low111 conviction rates for terrorist 
funding offences. Assessment of the effectiveness and capacity of measures 
to disrupt networks, foil plots, and identify unknown associations adversely 
affecting critical roles112 and infrastructures, is needed. Security issues 
should not outweigh meaningful scrutiny of this113 and the policy and 
resource allocation controlling their use.  
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The effectiveness of seizure, forfeiture and restraint orders114 is difficult to 
assess115 given the lack of data at UK level and internationally. The AML 
regime has yielded small volumes of confiscated funds, given the even 
smaller amounts required to support terrorist plots the detection and seizure 
of terrorist funding is unlikely to fair better. Effectiveness is a critical 
justification for the intrusive interference with property rights and private life, 
central to the justification and proportionality of measures. 
 
The value of general criminal assets seized in the UK is small,116 and has 
been hindered by the poor enforcement of cross-border forfeiture orders 
within the EU. The values seized are low in relation to the cost of recovery, 
and there have been difficulties tracing assets and regarding state’s 
agreement as to division on confiscation.117 CTF is not central to policy and 
action plans at all levels, with terrorist funding measures watered down to 
become organised crime strategies,118 depriving CTS of the nuances for 
investigation, detection and confiscation. This raises concerns, given the lack 
of evidence to support the effectiveness of incorporating CTF alongside AML 
approaches. Recent EU proposals aim for improved statistical collation and 
analysis, presently confined to criminal funds.119 UK agencies break even in 
respect of service costs and recovery volumes120 for civil recovery121 but 
there are insufficient indicators for an effective review of terrorist finance.  
 
Terrorist funding offences are justified by the harm prevented. Their broad 
reach targeting remote harms122 requires a connection to the terrorist 
purpose to maintain confidence in their proportionate operation. This is 
                                                          
114LK Donohue, ‘Anti-Terrorist finance in the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2007) 96(3) JCLC  
   303-435,  405  
115EC’ Assessing the effectiveness of EU Member States’ practices in the identification, tracing,  
    freezing and confiscation of criminal assets’  Matrix ,June 2009, [6.1 ] 
116 (n47) [69] 
117 (n1) [75-77]  
118EC, ‘EU Efforts  in the fight against terrorist financing in the context of  Financial Action task force’s  
    nine special recommendations and the EU counter Terrorism finance strategy’ Financial report ,John  
    Howell 1 February 2007, 6 
119(n81) Annex 3 [7.4],[3.1] 
120CJJI ‘Joint Thematic Review of Asset Recovery : restraint and Confiscation Casework’ March 2010  
    [6.12]  
121EC’ Assessing the effectiveness of EU Member States’ practices in the identification, tracing,  
   freezing and confiscation of criminal assets’  Matrix ,June 2009, 58  
122Angus v United Kingdom Border Agency [2011] EWHC 461 
190 
 
questionable where targeted property relates to vague threats and low 
values. The Farooqi123 conviction and subsequent forfeiture proceedings 
against the family home124 expose the consequences of the net-widening 
approach where a terrorist connection, despite no actual harm or financial 
gain, also interferes with the property and family rights of third parties. It 
lacks proportionality where the terrorist purpose was restricted to the 
defendant’s use of the property and forfeiture operates to punish third 
parties. The broad definition of terrorism and reliance on the targeting of 
remote harms, require careful application to prevent over criminalisation.  
 
 
5.2 Sanctions and asset freezes - administrative or quasi-criminal  
      measures 
 
The 1267 international sanctions regime directed measures to the Taliban 
and Osama Bin Laden and subsequently Al Qa’ida, and associated 
individuals were brought within this. The progress towards reconciliation 
between the Taliban and the Afghan Government and a distancing of the 
Taliban from Al Qa’ida ideology, were the impetus for the cleaving of the 
1267 regime. UNSCR 1988 deals with Taliban extremists and UNSCR 1989 
now deals with Al Qa’ida.125 Sanction regimes, elaborated in the wake of 
9/11 aimed to ‘maintain and restore international peace and security,’126 
which is increasingly relevant to addressing the ‘new’ terrorist threat.127 
Smart sanctions128 required states to adopt ‘all means’ necessary to act pre-
emptively to suppress terrorist finance.129 Administrative measures are not 
dependent upon a criminal conviction apply through legally binding UNSCR. 
,130  Asset freezes target individuals131 but have failed to secure full 
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protection of human rights,132 evoking criticism133 of UN action as ‘unworthy 
of an international institution’,134 committed to upholding fundamental rights 
in tackling terrorism.135 The regime worryingly136 failed to protect rights giving 
rise to a ‘double deficit’, with the UNSC lacking democratic legitimacy, 
scrutiny and accountability. 137 The deficits of UN measures were replicated 
at state level, creating tension between national and EU judicial oversight 
and the UNSC processes. The UN, a political not judicial body, in imposing 
binding measures138 absent from judicial oversight,139 failed to secure the 
necessary procedural and rights protection.140 Constitutionalism protecting 
human security must encompass core rights as values to guide policy and 
action. 141 
 
 
5.2.1 Interference with fundamental rights 
 
Property rights are protected within international142 and regional treaties, 
such as the ECHR,143 and within the UK.144 A1-P1 ECHR secures property 
rights without discrimination145 preventing arbitrary interference. Non-
discrimination and the proportionality146 of UN sanctions are questionable, 
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where the majority listed are Muslim.147 Property rights are not absolute,148 
deprivations are legitimate in the ‘public interest’ or ‘general interest’149 
affording states latitude150 in enacting CTF measures. Interference must be 
the minimum necessary151 to limit the use of property152 for effective 
reduction of the terrorist threat, balancing public and private interests.153 
Asset freezes as ‘precautionary measures’154 are disproportionate155 in being 
of indeterminate duration with ‘far reaching’ effects156 are not considered to 
extinguish property rights. This is questionable given their indeterminate 
duration157 and the problems with securing delisting that would rendering 
them akin to a punishment’158or a confiscation as ‘quasi-criminal’ measures. 
They impose severe restrictions on family159 and private life, Art 8,160 
mitigated by licences which provide access to funds for basic living and 
medical legal expenses.161 States often lack effective procedures for 
implementing humanitarian exceptions and licences and there is little 
monitoring of exemptions within the UN regime. 162  These measures are 
constrained to limiting access to funds163 for terrorist use only, and the 
targeting of funds essential for survival164 lacks proportionality. Resolution 
1267 required states to freeze assets owned or controlled by the Taliban, 
Osama Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida,165 and associated individuals/entities. 
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States propose listing, 166 providing supporting information167 through 
national focal points,168 to demonstrate the required threshold of threat169 
promoting consistent application170 and avoiding arbitrary proposal derived 
from subjective political motivations.171 Proposals draw on ‘intelligence, law 
enforcement and judicial,’172 information to evidence the terrorist association. 
UK designation requires a ‘terrorist association’, not current involvement,173 
and association174 is proportionately limited to the aims of the measures. 
 
The UN listing regime  requires unanimity;175 the political nature of the UNSC 
and the sanctions committee (SCe) lends to deference to proposing states, 
who are able to remain anonymous. 176  The suppression of evidence on the 
basis of security concerns,177is critical to challenging listings and 
compromises transparency and the rights of defence.178 This violates the 
right to know your accuser in accordance with core due process guarantees 
protected in customary law.179 Individuals unable to challenge the evidential 
basis of a listing are left to adduce evidence to counter the listing, reversing 
the burden of proof. Inadequate procedural guarantees fail to protect 
property rights limiting challenges to, and remedies180 for wrongful listing.181 
Failure to provide reasons is only justified in advance of listing to avoid 
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compromising the ‘surprise effect’ of measures.182 Summary narratives 
provided by states183 on listing,184 are ‘unsubstantiated, vague and 
unparticularised’ failing to meet the required standards185 and lacking 
specificity.186 Delisting was reliant on securing the commitment of petitioning 
states187 through diplomatic not judicial process, leaving delisting hostage to 
executive discretion, and compromised where support would undermine 
diplomatic relations188 underpinning the enforcement of CT measures 
between states reliant on mutual cooperation.  
 
The delisting required SCe to review its previous decisions, contrary to the 
principle ‘no man shall be judge his own case’.189 The lack of judicial review 
contrasts starkly with EU rights protection190 with the ECJ annulling 
implementing measures in Kadi,191 to uphold constitutional guarantees 
securing the right to reasons for listing. This includes scrutiny of the evidence 
on which listing is based. In derogating from internationally recognised 
normative values and standards of rights protection, the UN compromised its 
authority and credibility to act on behalf of the international community, 
indirectly determining those qualifying for rights protection.192 
 
Petitions for delisting are now reviewed by the Ombudsperson193 who gives 
recommendations as to delisting, although the SCe are not bound to accept 
this, but absent any objection recommendations are final.194 States may veto 
evidence195 and the regime remains hostage to secrecy and political 
pressures, failing to deliver adequate procedural protection. Delisting should 
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include a review of all relevant material, including exculpatory evidence, 
assessing its quantity, quality, factual accuracy,196 and probative value,197  to 
evaluate if this is reasonably and credibly justifies continued listing.198 
Petition for delisting under the Taliban regime now reliant on the Afghanistan 
Government for briefing as to individuals meeting the relevant reconciliation 
criteria for delisting, operating according to different procedures and criteria. 
This undermines the normative standards that should inform the uniformity of 
the UN sanction regimes. 
 
 
5.2.2 Rectification - responding to protect fundamental rights 
 
These improvements in the 1267 regime still fall short of impartial and 
independent judicial review,199 and adequate procedural protection reflecting 
international standards of justice and fairness. They lack disclosure of 
exculpatory material or opportunity for cross examination, procedurally 
imbalanced and unfair in failing to afford ‘equality of arms’ and rights of 
defence. Recommendations remain confidential countering principles of 
transparency and due process. The Special Rapporteur has recommended 
‘sunset clauses’200 fixing the term of sanctions with states having the burden 
of justifying continued listing. This limits the capacity of sanctions to amount 
to a ‘punishment’ triggered by past association disconnected from present 
threats. Reform of UN processes has led to delistings, totalling: 29 (2010), 26 
(2011), and 43 (2012). 201 Delisting is an arduous process, with the petitioner 
bearing their legal costs in challenging the SC, an international organisation, 
which is problematic given that funds are frozen, and given the lack of 
timeframes securing prompt state ‘cooperation’.  
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Resolutions now address human rights202 mandating that implementation of 
counter terrorism legislation should fully respect rights and comply with 
international law203  to operate proportionately.204  CTS is ‘rooted in a legal 
approach’ to protecting human rights205 in order to improve procedural 
fairness and accountability.206 Deficits identified at national level in failing to 
provide ‘effective judicial mechanisms’ to challenge asset freezes and secure 
humanitarian exceptions, need to be addressed by a ‘top down and bottom 
up’ securing of normative compliance. 207 
 
Kadi208 highlighted deficits in the UN regime, with the ECJ confirming that EU 
regulations implementing UN sanctions remain subject to judicial review to 
guarantee the protection of fundamental rights. Effective challenge requires 
reasons for listing including the totality of supporting evidence to assess the 
legality of listing, with the absence of this risking ECJ ruling that evidence 
available does not justify the listing decision.209 Where ECJ declares EU 
implementing measures unlawful, a conflict arises given that member states 
remain bound to adhere to UN resolutions, resulting in [de]listing that is 
prone to becoming a revolving door with the individuals potentially relisted at 
EU level.   
 
ECJ enforcement has secured some degree of UN accountability for 
addressing rights protection within terrorist measures as normative values of 
constitutional governance which the UN charged itself with protecting. 
Although the UN is not legally bound by international human rights treaties, 
its commitment to observing these international norms is integral to its 
strategy, authority and credibility in enacting counter terrorism measures. 
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Securing normative compliance legitimises action securing global human 
security, to ensure that security concerns are addressed from within a 
framework of rights compliance through effective and consistent 
implementation.210  
 
Kadi, however, offers no compensation at EU level for the infringement of Art 
8 and A1-P1 and the resulting hardship and reputational damage from 
unlawful listing.  This requires proof of ‘flagrant inexcusable misconduct’ and 
a ‘manifest disregard’ 211 not applicable to EU actions implementing UN 
measures in accordance with constitutional commitments and binding 
international law obligations.212  
 
 
5.2.3 International sanctions: evaluating effectiveness 
 
Efficacy of international measures is assessed by crude indicators including 
treaty ratification, rather than a nuanced results driven review. The UN 
pressed for state213 ratification and implementation of terrorist suppression 
conventions, which increased significantly post 9/11. 214 The CTITF is 
responsible for implementation of UN measures, overseeing effectiveness 
through interstate cooperation and coordination, providing technical 
assistance to ‘weak’ states. Recent focus aims to secure rights protection 
within UN CTS through pooling expertise and cooperation. More needs to be 
done to assess the effectiveness of UN CTS, which drives international 
effort, directing resource allocation and warranting a cost/benefit 
assessment. 215 
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Data indicating the volumes of assets frozen internationally and at state level 
under sanctions regimes,216 is notably lacking; $136 million is estimated to 
have been frozen internationally of which $36 million was by the US.217 By 
2002, 80% of assets frozen worldwide were blocked immediately following 
9/11, and a further $80 million was frozen in the following eighteen months, 
with the worldwide total estimated at $200 million.218 Volumes are crude 
indicators failing to illuminate as to the impact of sanctions in disrupting 
specific organisations, threats or identified ‘plots’. 
 
Legal challenges to the UN regime have compromised confidence in 
measures, and their efficacy and effectiveness in targeting individuals. Since 
the inception of the Al Qa’ida list there have been 137 delistings, from a peak 
of over 500, with 488 listed at 2010.219 Rights protection may be 
compromised where states act unilaterally and politically in maintaining 
national designation220 following international delisting221 without justification. 
The decline in listings indicates a more purposeful use of sanctions against 
individuals associated with international terrorism, with measures applied 
where necessary and justified in relation to the threat. The lack of overall 
transparency has hindered the assessment of the ‘appropriateness’ of 
measures to address the threat where past terrorist involvement justifies 
measures. Concerns remain as to whether sanctions are an appropriate and 
effective response, given the various methods deployed to raise, move and 
use funds.   
 
The lack of procedural consistency regarding identifying information has 
compromised the effectiveness and integrity of the regime, leading to 
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mistaken listings, which has now been addressed.222 A single process for all 
sanctions regimes with comparable procedural safeguards and timeframes is 
needed. Instances of individuals223delisted from the1267 regime but added 
to other regimes raise concerns where based on Al Qa’ida association. UN 
credibility relies on consistency, transparency, and effective application 
based on ‘current’ threats, to which past terrorist involvement and national 
threats requires assessment for relevance at international level. 
 
The UN high level panel previously noted that the sanctions regime is 
ineffective, the array of UN terrorism measures leading to ‘sanctions 
fatigue’. 224 Sanctions remain a necessary tool to deter and prevent 
international terrorism, symbolically reflecting the global commitment and 
condemnation of terrorism, despite the difficulty in demonstrating impact. 
  
A recent review of the1373 regime concluded that the effectiveness of law 
enforcement measures requires additional integration within legal and social 
policy at state level. Effectiveness requires the coordination of all states’ 
CTS.225 Clear, complete and consistent legal frameworks for implementation, 
specifying terrorist acts as serious criminal offences with penalties 
establishing a ‘comprehensive legal regime’226 to combat the financing of 
terrorism are needed. States’ failure to implement sanctions creates ‘safe 
havens’ damaging the efficacy of international efforts to prevent and deter. 
Expertise and experience of investigation and prosecution are key to 
underpinning effectiveness, sabotaged where states lack procedures for the 
prompt freezing of terrorist assets.227 The risk based approach applied 
across the financial sector secures the detection of terrorist property, which 
is critical for successful prevention and deterrence of the 1373 prosecution 
model.  
 
                                                          
222(n125)  
223Ahmed Ali Jim’ale delisted on 17 February 2012 
224 (n216) [77], [81],[179 ]  
225UNSC Res 1963 (20 December 2010) S/RES/1963(2010) 
226(n214) [7], [71], [73] 
227S/2012/729 [49] [16] Member States have been rated compliant or largely compliant with Special  
    Recommendation III 
200 
 
 
 
5.2.4 UK measures - implementing international obligations 
 
Deficiencies in UN sanctions have been replicated at UK level by enactment 
of TO 2006 giving effect to UNSCR 1373, and Al-Qaida Order 2006 
implementing UNSCR 1267. Both orders, considered in Ahmed, were 
enacted as Orders in Council228 under the UN Act 1946 giving effect to 
international obligations.229 TO 2006230 adopted procedures not suited for 
primary legislation, lacking parliamentary scrutiny contrary to the rule of law 
and the separation of powers. This is essential to guaranteeing democratic 
accountability and protecting fundamental rights, described as ‘an attempt to 
effect the basic rights of the citizen without the clear authority of 
parliament.’ 231  TO 2006 applied to those who ‘may’ be involved in terrorism 
on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and widened the scope of UNSCR 
1373 beyond that necessary under the UN resolution; the TO was held ultra 
vires re the UN Act.  The replacement TO 2009 required designation be 
‘necessary’ for the public protection and measures be rationally connected to 
this. This prevented the executive drawing on distant past terrorist 
involvement unconnected to current threats for designation, but Ahmed 
confirmed that had the 2009 Order232 been before the court, it too would 
have been quashed.   
 
The Al Qa’ida Order (AQO) giving effect to UNSCR 1267 was held to be 
permissible in relation to the UN Act but lacked procedural safeguards for 
effective challenge of those listed at UN level, failing to afford a right of 
appeal against AQO 2006. The UK proposed G’s listing in the Ahmed case. 
The court suggested a merits based review of the delisting to assess UK 
support for this, but this fell short of the procedural protection obligated within 
UK measures. It would also not avail any challenge by a UK citizen against 
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listing by another state, which may veto the availability of evidence for listing. 
The AQO was held not held to be disproportionate in its interference with A1-
P1, and Art 8. The failure of the UNSC to separate delisting from reliance on 
the diplomatic support of the proposing state denied a legal remedy.  
 
Ahmed held that ‘even in the face of international terrorism the safety of the 
people is not the supreme law. We must be careful to guard against 
unconstrained encroachments on personal liberty.’233 Ahmed illustrates the 
lack of normative compliance of the Orders, the interference with property 
rights ‘when the intrusion upon the right to enjoyment of one’s property is so 
great, so overwhelming and so timeless that the absence of any effective 
means of challenging it means that this can only be brought about under the 
express authority of Parliament.’234 The deficiencies in the UN regime were 
replicated at UK level eroding normative compliance of the procedural 
safeguards secured by Art 6.  
 
Ahmed illustrates the dilemma for the UK in implementing the international  
sanctions regime, recognising that ‘parliament not the executive should make 
the final decision as to this system, with its inherent problems, should be 
introduced into our law.’235 The need for parliamentary accountability and 
endorsement is, however, more critical where ‘ordinary human rights 
restraints do not apply.’236 Fundamental rights were engaged but not 
breached, sidestepping the consideration of whether these were adequately 
protected at UN level. To leave the legal challenges and due process 
guarantees of rights protection dependent on intergovernmental cooperation, 
diplomacy and the need to enlist the support of national states was plainly 
unfair and unjust. Procedural deficiencies from lack of independent and 
impartial judicial review at UN level denied natural justice and procedural 
fairness, replicated at UK level and could not be remedied by UK judicial 
review which was fruitless. The UN regime unfairly and unacceptably 
                                                          
233(n231Lord Hope at 62  
234(n231)Lord Hope at 38,39,62 76 
235(n231)Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at 186 
236(n235)Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at 186 
202 
 
prioritised state political and security interests over the right to due process 
guarantees. 
 
5.2.4.1 The UK context - assessing effectiveness of the UK asset  
             freezing regime in combatting terrorist finance  
 
TAFA 2010 implements UN Res 1373 and EU regulation 2580, enabling the 
enforcement of EU listing and independent UK listing. Interference with 
property is proportionate, distinguishing between temporary and permanent 
designations. Temporary designation justifies the lesser threshold of 
reasonable suspicion (reasonable belief applying to permanent designation) 
enabling swift action to prevent the dissipation of funds. Measures prohibit 
dealing with funds or economic resources, limited to financial assets, and the 
benefits or provision of financial services to the designated person, inclusive 
of money remittances.237 
 
No conviction is required and current or past terrorist involvement need not 
be related to specific acts. Measures must be ‘necessary’ for and ‘connected’ 
to protecting the public from terrorism, limiting the use of past terrorist acts 
as a trigger for designation. Offences underpin the effectiveness and 
enforcement, criminalising the provision of funds, financial services or 
economic resources to those designated. This requires reasonable cause to 
suspect the individual is designated, an easy threshold to cross in the 
regulated sector. Licences ensure compliance with Art 8 allowing access to 
funds for legal and living expenses, specifying conditions of access and 
accountability.238 
 
Listing is subject to executive discretion rather than judicial authorisation for 
effectiveness and speed of application. Designated persons have no 
entitlement to reasons239 for listing, but HMT in practice provides these. 
Appeals against designation and renewal requires evidence, with security 
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sensitive information protected from disclosure to the designated persons 
through the use of closed material proceedings (CMP) using special 
advocates240 on the grounds of public interest and security. The danger of 
specialised terrorist security measures is their extension to ‘ordinary’ 
situations where the infringements in rights may not be proportionate the 
harm prevented. CMP have come to be applied to ordinary civil proceedings, 
arguably used to protect political rather than national security. 241 
 
Article 6 determines the level of disclosure242of evidence and reasons for 
TAFA listing, ensuring sufficient information to effectively refute the basis of 
designation. Bhutta243 viewed the infringement of convention rights244 as a 
‘side effect,’ Mastafa, however, held that Art 6 applies to the determination of 
civil rights, securing an ‘irreducible minimum’245 of protection. This includes 
access to sufficient information246 to effectively instruct his counsel 
‘gisting.’ 247  The proportionality and legality of asset freezes can only be 
tested against the evidence justifying the threat that the designated individual 
poses. The CMP remain inherently unfair, distorting the adversarial 
process.248 
 
TAFA secures compliance through offences criminalising breaches of its 
provisions. Mandatory reporting by the financial sector secures financial 
information to support the investigation of breaches249 and the production of 
financial documents; these offences are mirrored in the Al Qa’ida 
regulations.250 
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The Al Qa’ida regulations, 2011 implement UNSCR 1267 and EU Reg 
880/2002. Operationally they mirror TAFA but are silent on the appeals 
process since appeal against designation requires petition to the 
Ombudsperson, the support of the FCO, or petition to ECJ. Those listed 
under TAFA benefit from appeal before a UK court. Following Kadi III, the 
1267 regime and the 1373 regime are more concordant in limiting the impact 
of restricted access to security sensitive material, reflecting that the ‘interests 
of national security and of justice are not completely reconcilable.’251 The 
ECJ has secured procedural safeguards protecting due process, 252 property 
and Art 8 rights. Appeal for delisting at UN level is more onerous and cannot 
guarantee provision of all relevant information where security sensitive. The 
EU regime does, however, provide for judicial review. The disparity between 
the two regimes could be overcome by duplicate listing of 1267 under the 
1373 regime to afford greater accountability in cases of MS proposing listing, 
and would prompt more effective national application of exemptions. 
 
 
5.2.4.2 Discretionary directions  
 
The CTA 2008 applies Treasury directions against overseas Governments, 
corporations, or individuals reasonably believed to present a significant 
terrorist risk to UK interests, enabling UK action in accordance with FATF 
counter measures against high risk or non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
Directions are applied by regulated financial institutions, requiring enhanced 
due diligence, monitoring, reporting, or the cessation of trade. Measures are 
contained to that needed to address the risk with licences facilitating the 
continuance of legitimate business.253 
 
Mandatory production and disclosure of information is supported by powers 
to enter and seize information and deliver financial intelligence central to the 
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effectiveness of directions. Breach is an offence without having taken ‘all ’ 
reasonable steps to comply, with enforcement through ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ civil penalties as an alternative to prosecution. 
Appeals against directions allowed for CMP in the public interest.254  
 
The Mellat case considered a direction255 against Bank Mellat’s alleged 
provision of financial services to support Iran’s nuclear weapons 
programmes. The Supreme Court held that the statutory process for making 
the direction did not exclude the common law duty to consult, required by 
good administration and fairness, given the draconian effects of the 
measure. The direction itself was held to be arbitrary, irrational and 
disproportionate in targeting Mellat on the mistaken belief of its control by the 
Iranian Government. The risk of general financial sector misuse made the 
direction discriminatory, disproportionate and ineffective. 256 Mellat  illustrates 
differential treatment favouring financial institutions having advance notice of 
orders, denied to individual asset freezes. The Supreme Court  applied CMP 
to review ‘secret’ evidence to avoid potential injustice. These procedures 
remain inherently unfair.257  
 
 
5.2.4.3 UK CTF measures – assessing effectiveness 
 
The effectiveness of TAFA and the Al Qa’ida Regulations are enhanced by 
their hybrid nature with criminal liability for their breach.258 Adherence 
requires timely publication of HMT directions applied through AML/CTF 
processes and controls drawing on the RBA to identify and apply measures. 
Provision of funds to a designated person incurs criminal liability and invokes 
mandatory reporting to HMT and the filing of a SAR.  
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The impact of measures in contributing to disrupting terrorism in the UK and 
abroad is difficult to quantify. The 1267 regime requires states to inform the 
Monitoring Committee of assets frozen, but the UN reports a lack of detail 
and evidence to support effectiveness.259 Evidence as to the specific impact 
of asset freezes on terrorism is notably lacking. Data as to volumes frozen 
under this regime attributable to individual states would assist in monitoring 
compliance. The 1373 regime suffers similar treatment and effectiveness, 
and the UK contribution to this other than by domestic implementation, is 
impossible to quantify.   
 
Assets frozen under the Al Qa’ida regime have totalled £73,000 in relation to 
28 accounts and 290 designations. Assets frozen under TAFA have ranged 
from as little at £44,000260 up to £102,000, relating to 36 TAFA and 39 EU 
designations. The assets frozen under the 1373 regime within the UK totalled 
a mere £11,000 in relation to 10 accounts.261 UK designation triggered EU 
listing under the 1373 regime for a significant proportion of individuals and 
entities, reflecting the UK’s contribution to tackling international terrorism. 
Current listing at EU level requires a cross border dimension to terrorist 
activity, EU proposals drawing on Art 75 TFEU will allow ‘listing’ without 
this.262 
 
The volume of assets frozen provides some indication of effectiveness in 
removing funds available to support terrorism, but fails to illuminate as to the 
specific impact in disrupting operational roles within terrorist groups. 
Information, even in generalised redacted case study format, is unavailable. 
The volumes frozen have declined overall, to a modest £1,000 per account 
under TAFA and EU 2580 regime, and £3,000 for the A Q regime. Whilst 
values are low they are potentially significant in contributing to terrorism 
given the low costs of funding attacks. Designation marks the individual for 
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their terrorist support, reducing their operational effectiveness by limiting 
access to property. The decline in designations under TAFA263 reflects more 
selective use of measures, acknowledging the effects on property and family 
rights. The higher threshold of proof and mandatory review have contributed 
to their purposeful and justified application, with orders effective whilst the 
threat posed by individuals remains, therefore securing proportionality. Whilst 
the effectiveness of orders is questionable given the proportion of listed 
individuals in custody, they have been applied against five individuals at 
liberty in the UK. The new TPIMs regime also provides for financial 
restrictions264 and prohibitions on property, but operates in a different 
context. Most of the individuals listed under all regimes are overseas, with 
UK measures providing international support and cooperation to prevent the 
movement of assets between jurisdictions. HMT reports and scrutiny by the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism offer a review of their effectiveness, and 
TAFA appeals have added further judicial protection and impartial scrutiny of 
rights protection.   
 
Proscription offers a more comprehensive regime, based on the Home 
Secretary’s belief that organisations are concerned with terrorism, triggering 
provisions restricting terrorist property and criminal offences for terrorist 
funding, see sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.6. It provides a more transparent, 
accountable and arguably fairer process and justification for targeting the 
individual assets of members or supporters of proscribed organisations.265 
The use of quasi-criminal administrative measures against individuals is 
viewed as unfair in the absence of prosecution or proscription and given their 
harsh effects and the withholding of reasons for listing. Fifty two international 
organisations266 are currently proscribed, and forty were proscribed between 
2001 and 2005. Proscription is a single threshold test compared to measures 
in TAFA and TPIMS, but is limited in not being an international regime. It 
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does not therefore offer international support comparable to the UN and EU 
sanctions regimes. 267 
 
 
 
5.3 The application and scope of the MLR 2007 
 
The MLR implement EU directives requiring registration or licencing of 
MSBs, in recognition of their ‘witting and unwitting’268 misuse for ML and TF 
identified internationally;269 this risk having been identified through ML and 
TF investigations,270prosecutions and case law.271 MSB activity includes 
cheque cashing, money remittance and bureau de change businesses,272 
with registration a pre-condition to lawful operation. Exemptions for 
occasional/limited transactions do not benefit MSB operation.273 The high 
risk of misuse of MSBs for ML and TF arises from cross-border 
remittances274 and wire transfers, justifying this exclusion.275 Defining MSBs 
by their activity fails to distinguish between risks related to business size and 
provision of services, given that MSBs generally offer a discrete product 
range compared to banks. The regulations target risk but lack proportionality 
in their application to small businesses, as the majority of registered MSBs 
have a small turnover276 and limited resources.277 The fieldwork research 
aims to investigate the attitudes of MSBs to regulation and the impact of 
these constraints in applying the MLR. 
 
Banks can draw on more extensive expertise and resources and greater 
profit margins from a more diverse range of services to manage regulatory 
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costs. MSBs lack comparable resources for implementation, with high 
transaction volumes offset by low profit margins. 278 The RBA aims to 
targeting resources effectively to address existing and potentially new risks. 
MSBs are responsible for their agents compliance, the fieldwork aims to 
illuminate as to the impact of this approach and the responsibilities under the 
MLR. 279 
 
Registration or licensing280 identifies legitimate businesses for supervision of 
compliance281 connected to the ‘fit and proper’ test,282 preventing ownership 
or control283 of MSBs for illicit exploitation.284 FATF review of the UK 
implementation of its standards criticised the ‘fit and proper’ test as offering 
inadequate sanctions against directors of non-compliant businesses.285 
These deficits have recently been remedied,286 by a test assessing the 
‘suitability’ of MSB operators through accountability and screening. The PSR 
2009 requiring MSB registration with the FCA applying a more onerous test 
assessing competence and financial soundness.287 Objective registration 
criteria counter ethnic affiliations operating as a gateway to MSB control. 
Registration is denied on evidence of previous investigation of, or convictions 
for, ML,288 financial crime, proceedings under POCA 2002, disqualification as 
a company director and the ‘risk of terrorism’. ‘Suitability’ is also excluded for 
previous failures in supervisory compliance.289 Information shared between 
HMRC and the FCA290 accords with Art 8, limited to regulatory functions and 
business knowledge, governed by a MOU291 regulating disclosures.292  The 
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MLR enable action by HMRC against unregistered operators,293 ‘extending 
the hostile environment’.294 Failure to satisfy the fit and proper test results in 
deregistration. Intelligence as to unlawful or non-compliant operators may 
originate from the public sector whistle blowers, through SARs filing by 
registered businesses.295 The latter approach is supported by FATF.296 
 
The 2007 MLR apply an RBA in line with international FATF standards, 
which is necessary to manage global risks and secure financial intelligence 
through the compulsion of regulation. The RBA is central to embedding the 
regulatory framework, targeting resources to the areas of highest risk to 
prevent system abuse.297 The inclusion of MSBs within this framework is 
pivotal to the successful reduction of TF and ML risks,298 for securing 
compliance with Treasury directions299 to implement national and 
international sanctions. 
 
MSBs must apply the RBA to all levels of business activity, considering 
transaction type, nature of the business relationship, customer, product and 
jurisdictional risks, informed by industry,300 and supervisory guidance. Senior 
management301 through the role of MLRO302 must secure the application of 
policies to implement the RBA303 and mitigate risks through due diligence 
processes, providing staff education and resources to support effective 
implementation. Internal systems facilitate the detection, investigation and 
reporting of suspicious activity.304 Internal policies and customer records are 
retained to assist in assessing business compliance and enable investigation 
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of SARs. The burden of regulation is likely to be more onerous for small to 
medium sized businesses, where management and administrative support 
roles are merged across small staff teams. The fieldwork research presented 
in chapter 6 aims to ascertain whether this is the case in practice. 305 
 
The proportionality of the MLR and the RBA rests on the application of 
graduated tiers of due diligence (simplified and enhanced) to manage risks. 
Customer due diligence (CDD), requires the verification of identity for new 
and existing customers drawing on hierarchical independent306 and reliable 
original documentary sources307  as well as verifying the transaction purpose 
and nature of the business relationship,308 which is an ongoing requirement. 
CDD promotes transparency, reduces anonymity and deters the misuse of 
MSBs309 increasing detection through audit. The application to low 
transaction values is disproportionately burdensome as occasional 
transactions are time consuming and due diligence is intrusive given their 
brief transaction period,310 where the questioning of customers is intrusive 
and undermines customer/operator trust, potentially compromising repeat 
business. Further enquiry depends on the risks associated with particular 
customers or sectors. 
 
MSBs monitor transactions through customer accounts and loyalty cards, 
recording transaction details.311 Guidance312 requires verification of the 
source of funds, from bank statements, and clients’ business or employment 
details. If CDD cannot be applied, the business relationship must be 
terminated and transactions cannot proceed, and a SAR may need to be 
filed.313 CDD penalises the unbanked and those migrants who may lack 
appropriate documentation. 
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Simplified due diligence (SDD) for transactions under 15,000 Euros and 
occasional transactions,314 the mainstay of remittance services, is excluded 
unless allowing for the ‘timely’ application of CDD. This is difficult for MSBs’ 
activity315 given the brief transaction periods. SDD is also excluded where 
amounts are larger than the average transaction amount, penalising 
remittances with average low values with increases reflecting religious 
festivals and charitable gifting. Large remittance payments made on behalf of 
several persons require detailed checks and records of the separate but 
combined transactions.316 SDD applies to financial institutions in jurisdictions 
of equivalent regulation, determined by HM Treasury in conjunction with 
FATF. 
 
MSBs can ‘rely’ on the risk assessment of other MSBs but remain liable for 
‘any’ failures in compliance. MSBs interact with other financial institutions to 
consolidate transactions, exchange currency and/or make payments, 
requiring EDD and mutual compliance checks.317 HMRC guidance removes 
any presumption that banked funds are lawful, requiring the verification of 
banked funds resulting in a duplication of effort and further intrusion into 
customers’ private financial matters. It further deters cooperative 
relationships across the sector affecting service levels, 318 the impact of 
which can only be discerned from the fieldwork research.  
 
EDD applies for customers at arm’s length, or where the risk of ML or TF is 
high. Remittances as cross-border transactions necessitate CDD for third 
parties in non-EU states to ensure regulation in the destination/host 
country 319 mirrors that in the UK regulation, controlling risk. MSBs require 
knowledge of wider regulatory frameworks extending the protective reach of 
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the MLR. EDD applies to Treasury directions320 to which there is no relevant 
tipping off offence.  
 
While there appear to be elements of proportionality321 in terms of 
transaction thresholds, actual advice from regulators implies that guidance is 
not definitive and should be accompanied by further assessment to identify 
linked transactions; these are common where one person remits a single 
payment to a geographical area for distribution to several different persons, 
family members or business contacts,322 and commonly apply to remittance 
activity. Agents have to be registered323 by their principals, and separately 
where operating independently.324 Principals have responsibility for 
overseeing their agent’s compliance 325 requiring on site investigations and 
transaction monitoring to review AML/CTF compliance.  Regulations impose 
self-assessment for managing individual business risks within a common 
regulatory framework. Different perspectives of risk assessment and 
management within the sector compromise effectiveness, to which end 
external supervision is critical to offering guidance on the identification of risk 
to enforce regulatory standards. 
 
Proposals for a fourth ML directive elaborate the RBA despite the scant 
evidence as to its effectiveness for AML/CTF at UK or EU level. 326  Changes 
will further challenge MSBs, given their business size and the current 
economic climate.327 SDD is restricted to prescribed circumstances in 
recognition of too great a reliance on the customer’s word rather than 
objective verification. 328 A 1,000 euros threshold triggering due diligence 
requirements is proposed for occasional, single or linked transactions 
increasing the regulatory burden and capturing more remittance 
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transactions.329 UK data collection is currently confined to SARs, general ML 
confiscation and mutual cooperation requests,330 and will need to include 
prosecutions, investigations and judicial processes to review effectiveness 331 
for the future. States are required to produce AML/CTF threat assessments, 
detailing their internal risk linked to global risks, underpinning a cosmopolitan 
approach to CTF.332  
 
 
5.3.1 Effectiveness of regulation  
 
The commitment and motivation of businesses to apply the RBA is 
challenging; being time and resource intensive, this form of regulation is 
more usually associated with the banking sector. The MLR make no 
concession for business size except by transaction thresholds, and discretion 
in its application is moderated by HMRC guidance. Integrating AML/CTF 
processes in a fast paced sector dealing with high volumes at low profit, with 
short periods of customer contact offers little room for error, challenging 
small local and family based business. The fieldwork research in chapter 6 
will clarify the perception of the regulatory ‘burden’ and the adaption of MSBs 
to this. 
 
Effectiveness rests on proportionate implementation to ensure that effort, 
skill, resources, time and costs are matched by the delivery yielded in 
detection and prevention. To date there has been little data provided as to 
the effectiveness of the regime other than NCA SARs reports and 
supervision reports by HMRC. No system can eliminate risks completely.333 
The RBA requires expertise and sector knowledge, requiring small business 
to make use of FATF guidance, to establish beneficial ownership,334 without 
having had previously a central register to assist. The need to identify 
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PEPs335 through commercial databases or open source intelligence is time 
consuming and expensive, placing the resourcing of compliance beyond the 
reach of small firms.336 Treasury lists must be consulted to apply sanctions 
and licences, and automated screening systems are not cost effective for 
smaller businesses. 
 
A precondition to detecting ML and TF is the identification of normative 
behaviours of client groups to identify deviations arousing suspicion,337 to 
which the customer relationship is pivotal. Suspicion is individualised, hinging 
on the subjective assessment of the relevant circumstances and facts. The 
POCA 2002 and TA 2000 rely on reasonable suspicion, informed by HMRC 
guidance advising MSBs to take ‘all reasonable steps to ensure that 
transactions are not suspicious,’ in effect reversing the effect of the RBA. 
SARs have traditionally relied on preventing the placement of criminal funds; 
their usefulness in detecting terrorist activity at this stage can only be fully 
ascertained from the fieldwork.338  
 
Identification of TF is difficult where MSBs have little or no experience of 
detection or filing of SARs, and requires specific guidance based on 
characteristics relevant to TF as distinct processes. Customer data reveals 
transactional behaviour to arouse suspicion through deviations from 
normative standards assisted by HMRC guidance and FATF typologies. 
Developing standard customer profiles is time consuming given the 
transaction volumes across a range of remittance corridors.  
 
The AML regime has been applied to the MSB sector without consideration 
of its effectiveness for CTF purposes, since ML and TF operate as ‘distinct 
phenomena with differing drivers’.339 The financial monitoring and reporting 
regime aims to deter, detect and disrupt through proportionate application of 
regulation, effectiveness here can only be revealed by the fieldwork 
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research. Pre-emption is a critical element of CTF, and the detection of 
terrorist funds is an almost impossible task given they are lawful at the point 
of placement, rendering detection of the terrorist purpose problematic.340 The 
approach is best described as: 'trying to starve terrorists of money is like 
trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean,’341 despite the fact that 
‘financing may become decreasingly relevant to efforts to contain the 
threat.’342 
 
The regulatory regime requires holistic application for consistency removing 
‘loopholes’ for exploitation. Discretion as to the extent of measures to be 
adopted is informed by supervision, the sector largely policing itself. Sector 
commitment to the ongoing demands of the RBA requires compulsion 
through sanctions to act against inadequate compliance exposing the sector 
to risks. Sanctions are critical in a commercial sector where non-compliance 
may yield economic advantages.  
 
Regulation can only offer protection against AML and CTF if applied at all 
organisational levels within an internal compliance culture. The HSBC  £1.2 
billion fine pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)  343 for its 
failure to adhere to US AML and CTF provisions in respect of affiliate activity 
illustrates that even well resourced,  large international corporate financial 
institutions with access to expertise, can fall foul of non-compliance. Failures 
included inadequate due diligence, KYC, and resourcing of AML 
programmes leading to 17,000 unreviewed alerts, and 28,000 undisclosed 
STR344 disregarding terrorist connections and proceeding with suspicious 
transactions circumventing regulatory control. No senior management have 
been prosecuted, but the DPA at least secures a change in management, 
and the termination of high risk business. The case raises concerns 
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regarding the use of DPA against UK financial institutions,345 linked to the 
lack of individual accountability for non-compliance for larger businesses, 
which is denied to smaller one man operations. The collapse of the Crown 
Currency MSB with a loss of £16 million demonstrates accountability through 
criminal prosecution in relation to poor regulatory and business management 
that risks criminal exploitation.346  
 
 
5.3.2 Supervision and sanctions 
 
The RBA relies upon external hierarchical supervision and guidance to 
promote compliance. HMRC has a sector wide knowledge 347 to guide as to 
the relevant risks and draws on a variety of supervision techniques to instil 
sector confidence and secure compliance in light of changing risks. These 
include education, guidance348 and onsite inspections349 Sector compliance 
is underpinned by proportionate sanctions for breach,350enforcement of 
these standards351  is critical to maintaining long term sector compliance.352 
Supervision must be sensitive and informed as to the changing market 
dynamics and risks, and consistent 353  to be meaningful. HMRC has a range 
of effective, appropriate and dissuasive354 civil sanctions that can be applied 
to penalise regulatory infringements, all subject to final tribunal appeal.355 
Rights of appeal allow penalties to be cancelled, varied or upheld, with the 
MSBs able to make representations.356 The initial ‘stepped approach’ to 
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providing warnings before individual prosecution has been replaced by more 
rigorous enforcement due to an identified compliance gap. Prosecution for 
regulatory breaches357 is supported by evidence of compliance. HMRC 
guidance only applies to MSBs358 to support prosecution. HMRC has no 
prosecution powers but works closely with the CPS and NCA to provide 
evidence to support this and other than a peak for 12 for 2011-12 the number 
of positive charging decisions for the period 2010-14 is 5 a year.359 
 
The proposed fourth ML directive proposes to restrict the operation of non-
compliant businesses until effective controls are in place through temporary 
operational bans, but these may render small MSBs inoperative. Robust 
minimum sanctions are recommended for ‘systematic’ breaches with 
minimum fines relating to total annual turnover to remove profit from the 
breach. Fines are hefty and punitive deterring non-compliance and may 
terminate business viability.360 
 
 
Supervisory visits enable advice as to corrective action; HMRC visits 
revealed a 45% non-compliance rate for 2005.361  Insufficient guidance can 
lead to overzealous application of MLR countering proportionality. The 
current supervision adopts a RBA,362 targeting supervision where most 
needed and effective in managing resources. Supervision must be informed, 
of quality and consistent to promote effective application of regulations and  
confidence in the supervisory and the regulatory regime.  
 
A recent Government review of the AML/ CTF supervisory regime has 
identified that regulatory efficacy is not to be assessed by the extent of 
regulation but the effectiveness of supervision and compliance in reducing 
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the threat to the financial system from illicit transactions. Whilst the aim is for 
transparent and accountable supervision and enforcement a need for more 
robust supervision by public sector supervisors (PSS) is needed to align with 
the new FATF methodology for assessing compliance with FATF standards. 
This now focuses on the effective application of measures rather than the 
extent of regulation. PSS have the lowest compliance rate per the number of 
onsite audits and the highest number of partially compliance 
businesses. 363An element of effective supervision is the early identification 
of non-compliance, viewed as weak in the public sector, with low levels of 
enforcement action which is overly reliant on warning letters and fines, with 
the fit and proper status removed in only 86 cases, and little use of action 
plans to remediate poor practice.364 The review concludes that PSS need to 
apply a greater variety of risk profiling and supervisory strategies to deliver 
effective supervision and to deal more robustly with persistent breaches. A 
more effective application of the RBA approach to supervision may 
remediate these concerns, but the extent to which these are perceived as 
concerns within the MSB sector can only be realised through the fieldwork 
research. 
 
 
5.3.3 Suspicious activity and reporting  
 
The success of the MLR in stemming TF hinges on the capacity to accurately 
assess, detect and manage risks, and to yield information to support further 
investigation. To this end, SARs reporting is required before entering into any 
suspicious arrangement, unless reasonable excuse exists, with the failure to 
comply incurring criminal liability.365 The SARs regime funnels identified risks 
to the NCA366 for further investigation. The MLRO is key to securing the 
application of internal systems supporting the detection and internal 
investigation367 of SARs reporting and compliance with Treasury 
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directions.368 Shah confirms that suspicion does not have to be firmly 
grounded; once the MLRO has formed a relevant suspicion, a SAR must be 
filed. FATF recommendations reinforce the SARs process, and mandatory 
reporting, with criminal penalties for failure. Conflicts arise in connection with 
business obligations and the nature of the financial business relationship 
where refusal to process a transaction is protected from breach of contract 
where connected to SARs reporting.369 Consent is only presumed where 
refusal has not been granted to an on hold transaction within 7 days. The 30 
day moratorium period limiting transaction processing, allows NCA 
investigation and the opportunity for restraint or seizure orders, but rightly 
does not apply to SARs in connection with TF370 given the need to act 
promptly. Delay can incur financial losses for the customer, placing MSBs in 
a difficult position in dealing with customers face to face, given the tipping 
offence371 and confidentiality of SARs. 
 
Whilst FATF refers to suspicious transactions, the UK regime, HMRC and 
NCA guidance refers to suspicious ‘activity’ for ML and TF, the latter a 
broader category  widening the potential for policing from within and 
mandating reporting of any suspicious activity, including that of other 
financial institutions. 
 
Shah indicates the level of suspicion required to justify the filing of a SAR 
includes a  possibility that is more than fanciful, as to ML or TF, but need not 
be firmly grounded, nor based on reasonable grounds, since POCA and TA 
2000 offences are satisfied by the alternative of suspicion.372 Suspicion must 
be honestly and genuinely held, and evidenced.373 The issue of ‘negligently’ 
induced and mechanically generated SARs has not yet been considered by 
the courts. 
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An evidence based assessment of factors triggering suspicion derives from 
previous investigations, case studies, and prosecutions. Supervision, sector 
knowledge, and sector alerts assist the identification of risks.374 Knowledge 
of the business, supported by the MLRO, on the job training and regular 
business risk reviews are essential. Local knowledge of customer and 
business relationships is critical and possibly more relevant than guidance. 
Trade associations have a role in identifying sector risks from the pooling of 
experience and knowledge, which essential given the low incidence of SARs 
in the MSB sector. 
 
The forming of suspicion requires an understanding and awareness of the 
nature of risk and the capacity to identify this in practice, with subsequent 
action taken to address this. The subjective nature of risk renders 
identification likely to be inconsistent, to which training, education, and 
support, both internal and external, are important to businesses to support 
effective SARs reporting. Knowledge of reporting processes is important but 
less so than the capacity to spot and act on risk activity. 
 
Pre-existing transactional and behavioural patterns derived from customer 
knowledge establish deviations from the ‘norm’ to arouse suspicion for which 
the mandatory retention of records is essential. Transaction context and 
operator experience are relevant to forming suspicion and identifying unusual 
or non-routine transactions which may not be ‘suspicious’, ruled out by 
further scrutiny or reporting. Customer identity,375 behaviour, transaction 
difficulties, or concerns regarding destination may arouse suspicion; relevant 
factors are potentially limitless and checklists may promote reliance rather 
than critical reflective vigilance. 
 
The SARs system is integral to assessing sector risks, identifying emerging 
thematic trends, and contributing to the UK AML/CTF threat assessment and 
wider risks external to the UK. This requires inter agency cooperation 
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between NCA, HMRC and HMT supported by consultation and engagement 
with trade associations. The new model of engagement places MSBs in 
category three, with each category supported by a dialogue team working 
alongside supervisors to promote ‘member’ only feedback through tailored 
sector analysis of risks.376  
 
Despite the value of SARs to criminal investigations, their ‘sensitivity’ may 
limit disclosure for prosecution377 subject to Public Interest Immunity (PII).378 
This may be necessary where they relate to sensitive security issues and 
there is a need to  protect the ‘reporter’s’  and their physical safety. Judicial 
scrutiny of PII ensures protection of the defendant’s right to fair trial balanced 
against public interest and any security concerns evoked by the terrorist 
context. SARs may also be used in civil proceedings379 and may form 
evidence for asset freezes, and be subject to CMP.380 
 
 
5.3.3.1 Guidance  
 
Guidance sets out standard parameters for raising suspicion, where 
transactions are unusually complex in size or pattern, lack economic or 
lawful purpose or are terrorist related.381 Suspicion relating to TF can rarely 
rely on knowledge and experience as the terrorist intention remains hidden 
and problematic to detect.382 Transaction characteristics are generic to 
different types of criminality and generic guidance; identifying suspicion 
indicators may well align with increased risk but not for a specific sector. 
Transactions may trigger suspicion if they do not make commercial sense, 
but may signal cultural and religious practice representing the ‘norm’ rather 
than economic and commercial logic. Guidance is just that, the MLRO and 
supervisors have pivotal roles in educating and contextualising risk and 
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suspicion, bridging the gap between lack of experience and generic guidance 
to enhance vigilance. 
 
Criminal law measures ensure that gatekeepers to the financial sector are 
incentivised to robust application of the legislative framework, placing a 
heavy burden on individuals to monitor transactions and act on suspicions. 
The burden of regulation is unfavourably disproportionate and discriminatory 
for MSBs, given their size structure and model of operation. The extent of the 
impact of regulation on effective implementation of the regime can only be 
determined through the fieldwork research. The recent division of supervision 
between HMRC and the FCA adds to this burden fracturing the continuity of 
the supervisory relationship critical to consistency, confidence and 
effectiveness. 
 
The risk based approach intrudes into private personal financial transactions, 
and whilst due diligence checks may be proportionate, the sharing of data 
outside the SARs regime, however, lacks objective oversight and 
accountability to protect privacy rights. The proposed fourth ML directive 
does little to rectify this. 
 
Effectiveness is critical to justifying the interference with rights, and public 
sector tolerance of the burden of regulation founded on accountability for 
effectiveness of measures must be demonstrated. There is currently little 
evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of the MLR and SARs regimes for 
TF, which is critical in incentivising confidence and commitment to their 
application. 
 
 
5.3.3.2 Evidence based typologies and behaviour profiling  
 
Typologies assist effective identification of sector risk, activity and customer 
transaction risks, acting as bench marks for ‘typical’ behaviours and risks 
associated with categories and types of misuse in sector contexts. Where 
they rely solely on a conduct based approach they deliver more false 
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positives than those incorporating a risk assessment. Typologies are 
informed by SARs and prosecutions, guiding risk assessment through 
suspicion indictors to enhance reporting. Typologies are backward facing 
and their usefulness predictively is unquantifiable, yet they offer a common 
approach to articulate risk and suspicion, and consistent reporting.383 The 
value of typologies rests on their precision, underlying data quality and their 
focus on TF as a priority.384 HMRC revealed that of the 246 ML 
investigations undertaken between 2002 and 2005, one fifth directly involved 
MSBs. For NCA and HMRC combined investigations, one in five involved the 
misuse of MSBs, with 19% of SARs filed identifying this.385 
 
Typologies do not always distinguish between the profiling of terrorist 
supporters, and businesses misused for TF. Typologies indicate the misuse 
of MSBs, 11% using structured deposits, 5% using camouflage techniques 
and 3% through cash smuggling. The layering stage reveals a link between 
existing typologies and ML for TF. Only 1% of all typologies revealed 
connections to terrorist organisations. Typologies support links between TF 
and suspicion relating to customers. MSB misuse is indicated in 9% of 
typologies, with an additional 4% citing Hawala ‘underground banking’. The 
potential for laundering of large amounts, in excess of that relating to 9/11, 
by unlicensed remittance operators is suggested, but is questionable in 
relying on a single typology with no supporting data.386 The detection of 
amounts laundered for TF compared to general proceeds of crime are low, 
with terrorist financers relying on selected techniques and the use of 
gatekeepers. 
 
MSB misuse for TF was reported in 36% cases for 2008-2010,387 287 cases 
disclosing TF, and 34% involving suspected predicate ML offences. Fintrac 
TF profiles identify most operators as middle aged males, not generally 
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connected through business relationships, with businesses having familial 
ties, employed as professionals, in the service sector, in the food industry or 
students; this is too broad for meaningful application. For 2008-09, 197 out of 
556 SARs related to MSBs, and 12% related to TF, with 52 cases concerning 
MSBs.388 Other indicators of TF relate to multiple senders to the same 
beneficiary within the same time frame from a common address, and receipt 
of funds by the same beneficiary from more than one MSB in different 
locations.389 Again these typologies indicate risk but do not distinguish 
between terrorist facilitators internal and external to the financial sector.  
 
 
5.3.4 The effectiveness of the reporting regime 
 
Due diligence processes intrude on privacy and family rights, requiring data 
retention   to assist the identification of transaction norms, but their 
proportionate application to MSBs390 is questionable. They are, however, 
considered vital in enabling the detection of suspicion to enable the filing of 
SARs. 
 
The NCA entered 1.5 million SARs into the Elmer database in 2009.391 There 
has been an overall increase in the number of SARs filed since 2008 with 
316,527 filed for 2013, an increase of 38,000 on the previous year. MSBs 
were the second largest reporting sector with a 9.64 % increase in new 
reporters and 66.49% of the SARs relating to money remittance.  However, 
only 815 were forwarded to the NFIU, an 23% increase on the previous year 
representing a decline on the figures for 2007-09.392 SARs relating to money 
transmission totalled 25, 2.92% of the total TF SARs for 2013.393 Activity 
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rather than business type classification makes it impossible to discern the 
origins of SARs relating to remittances. The lack of purposeful sector 
feedback in annual reports is now being enhanced by a ‘case study’ type 
approach.394  
 
Agency agreements allow access to SARs by other FIU,395 and relevant UK 
public bodies through the Moneyweb platform. Data sharing raises concerns, 
per Art 8, as to subsequent dissemination and use connected to the reporting 
purpose. The Shah case indicates the importance of previous SARs to assist 
in forming suspicion. A review of the SARs regime recommended ending the 
ten year retention period,396 which lacked proportionality and usefulness for 
‘unsubstantiated’ SARs.397 Retention is justified only where actively and 
effectively assisting investigation, and is critical to consent cases.398 The 
fourth EU directive proposes extended data retention for AML/CTF purposes 
but is ‘light’ on procedural safeguards. The SARs regime enables the UK 
fulfilment of international obligations and standards regarding intelligence 
sharing. For 2013, 40% of requests through Elmer were from partner 
agencies, some overseas, which revealed ‘relevant information.’399 UK CTF 
data is limited400 suggesting that SARs relating to TF may be of limited value 
to instigate investigations, assisting conviction and seizure of assets, but 
adds to existing intelligence and ongoing investigations. A targeted review of 
35% of SARs for 2013, identified SARs potentially relevant to terrorism for 
further action and dissemination.401 
 
5.3.5 Data sharing  
 
The potential for the financial sector to reveal terrorist transactions and trace 
the terrorist financial footprint, has made suspicion a central tool for financial 
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investigation. A speculative security approach to financial intelligence has 
prompted the drive for actionable suspicion402 for pre-emptive action to limit 
terrorism. This drive for intelligence is limitless, limited only by its 
incompleteness,403 since not all of what is of value is accessible and not all 
that is accessible is of value. 404 The value of SARs and financial data as 
financial intelligence is linked to the extent to which this is accessible and 
shared across the financial sector and between the FIUs across jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictional agreements are usually brokered to regulate formal data 
sharing, with informal sharing through the Egmont group, and across the 
business sector. Both formal and informal systems reflect the public and 
private sector partnership necessitated by MLR and international AML/CTF 
standards. 
 
The cosmopolitan approach to CTF requires state cooperation to intelligence 
sharing to secure purposeful access to data but pursuant to the protection of 
security sensitive confidential data. The EU - US SWIFT 
agreement 405assists the US TFTP enables US access to EU financial data, 
initially criticised for its disproportionate interference with privacy rights, Art 8, 
protected at EU level.  It has been amended to secure procedural 
safeguards. Periodic reviews have revealed inadequate guarantees to curtail 
mass US data mining. Access based on over broad indicators failed to 
ensure an established link with existing data to demonstrate value. Deletion 
periods were overlong with weak review of end use, and systems did not 
allow for the correction of false information. Dissemination of data to third 
parties also needs regulating and the failure to direct EU requests through 
Europol devalues intelligence by fragmenting the assessment and response 
to this. More needs to be done to justify the effectiveness of the regime, the 
US reluctantly submitting to transparency and accountability. With increased 
data sharing at international level supporting the CTF agenda, there is a 
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case for international standards to ensure the protection of privacy rights 
which are easily overridden within the CTF agenda; interference needs to be 
bound by proportionality secured by procedural review and safeguards. 406 
 
While the SWIFT agreement regulates access to general financial data, 
excluding SARs, access to SARs requires the protection of confidentiality. 
Not all jurisdictions share SARs due to a lack of capacity, political will, or 
domestic legislative restrictions. The Egmont group promotes SARs 
exchange through the ‘enterprise approach’ bound by a set of agreed 
principles.407 This approach enables SARs sharing between global financial 
businesses408 across jurisdictions, limited to the individual jurisdictional 
controls. The aim is to improve capacity across global businesses in the 
financial sector in order to view risk holistically and internationally and is 
limited to larger financial institutions, best positioned to use information to 
inform risk and improve AML/CTF compliance. 
 
Concerns that dissemination may lack oversight, and may be self-selected in 
focusing on SARs that ‘add value’ to reporting, suppressing those that reveal 
poor internal performance,409 are reminiscent of the criticisms of internal 
reporting by ARS prior to regulation. SARs information may be used for 
adverse commercial action against competitors, and high risk businesses 
without knowledge of the outcome of the SAR process, and even where a 
SAR was not filed. 
 
Global data sharing supports the consistency of the RBA and SARs 
reporting, enhancing the FIU role. UK banks adopt this approach, sharing 
information on risk across their group, but their risk adverse attitude 
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highlights the gap between filed SARs and internal investigation of potential 
SARs, and has been linked to the withdrawal of bank accounts for some 
MSBs. The Dahabshiil Company410 has recently been awarded an interim 
injunction pending full trial, preventing closure of its Barclays account, 
challenging the rationality of the decision as an abuse of its market 
dominance since Barclays provides services to approximately 69% of 
MSBs.411  Funds transferred to Somalia through Dahabshiil were alleged to 
have been used for Al-Shabaab in Somalia,412 but it is unrealistic to make 
MSBs liable for the subsequent misuse of funds that does not arise from 
regulatory non-compliance.  If unsuccessful, the termination of Dahabshiil’s 
UK operations will act as a form of unregulated sanctions, but remains a 
contractual issue despite the considerable potential effects on the Somali 
populous and Oxfam. Banks operate a profit driven service model and the 
costs of risk management and reputational damage from any terrorist 
association outweigh moral and humanitarian considerations, in absence of 
any legal duty. 
 
The risk adverse attitude of the banks to suspicion mirrors the treatment of 
charitable organisations such as Interpal UK, listed by the US413 since 2006 
and subject to legal action in the US.414 This has prompted UK banks to 
close Interpal accounts despite Interpal being subject to two reviews by the 
Charity Commission also endorsed it continued operation.415 The needs 
served by Interpal and the service provided by Dahabshiil are important in 
supporting humanitarian relief. Dahabshiil remains lawfully operational and 
not subject to any national or international sanctions. 
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The financial sector adds an additional layer of regulation that lacks 
accountability, with action going beyond what is reasonable in relation to 
unsubstantiated risks. SARs sharing internationally increases the protection 
of the financial system, but may lead to economic sanctions against 
competitors and minority sector activity, disguised and legitimised as risk 
management endorsed by regulators.416 Informal mechanisms for sharing 
information relating to customer and business risk occur both within the 
criminal justice system and intelligence communities. Whilst unregulated, this 
is often a practical and purposeful strategy to protect commercial self-
interest, manage risk417 and proactively protect and deter criminality. 
 
The SARs regime is internationalised but not standardised and requires 
accountability and oversight with uniform safeguards for confidentiality, data 
use and retention. FATF mandates SARs reporting and information sharing 
between FIU but is silent about the management of these processes. SARs 
shared by corporate entities and foreign FIUs are constrained, lacking 
comparable domestic protection. The UK threshold for SARs reporting418 
aligns with the criteria for an interim freezing order,419 variable in other 
jurisdictions. SARs shared between several entities related to one business 
may duplicate the perception of risk. The EP approach420 enhances the 
support of the FIU role421 but requires risk management for implementation 
within internationalised businesses and should be inclusive of large 
internationalised MSBs,  subject to the same MLR regulations, but their 
operation in jurisdictions deemed high risk for  terrorism and regulatory non- 
compliance probably precludes this possibility. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to outline the regulatory framework for countering 
the finance of terrorism and the regulation of MSBs with particular reference 
to the MLR 2007, but not limited to these. What is evident is that the 
legislative and regulatory framework is complex and hierarchical, comprising 
of a web of interconnected measures. These operate in parallel at national, 
regional and international level but also in a complimentary manner, having 
different purposes and targeting different stages of terrorist funding 
activity. 422 This framework relies on criminal, quasi-criminal and civil 
measures to prevent the funding of terrorism. Criminal measures, confined to 
national level, are informed by and fulfil international obligations. UK 
measures rely on targeting remote harms with low thresholds relating to 
proof of the terrorist purpose or connection, to compensate for the high 
burden of proof required by prosecution. The criminal process offers more 
robust procedural protection, transparency and public accountability than 
administrative asset freezes, but funding offences are not often used and 
their effectiveness in disrupting terrorist activity is questionable and unlikely 
to deter hardened terrorists, offering punishment after the fact. Terrorist 
support offences triggered by the proscription of organisations, allow for the 
forfeiture of individual property, but Government preference appears to 
favour asset freezes. Criminal measures require the parallel support of 
seizure and forfeiture to prevent the dissipation of assets during the 
investigation and prosecution stage and beyond. Offences essentially 
underpin regulatory compliance, offering greater deterrence than regulatory 
sanctions and securing financial sector adherence to reporting obligations for 
fear of criminal liability.  
 
Sanctions as quasi-criminal and pre-emptive measures are compelled 
internationally by the UN, the 1267 regime having been subject to lengthy 
criticism for its infringement of due process guarantees and lack of rights 
protection. Judicial protection of rights at EU level has forced piecemeal 
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amendments to the UN regime, but still falls short of adequate protection. 
The ECJ and EU institutions, whilst protecting fundamental rights, have 
offered little support to member states bound to compliance with the 1267 
regime, leaving the schemes’ deficits to be reconciled at national level. 
Without further political pressure from states, further UN reform is unlikely. 
Continuing deficiencies in rights protection compromise state commitment to 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism and undermine confidence in the regime. The 
1373 implemented at national level highlights further the differential rights 
protection, and the need for a more robust UN oversight of its 
implementation, which is critical to its effectiveness. Lack of audit of the 
effectiveness of measures is common across all levels of the regulatory 
framework for CTF, but relevant to their necessity and justification. 
 
UK asset freezes have not been without controversy; initial measures have 
been implemented without parliamentary scrutiny and have gone beyond that 
required by international obligations. Judicial protection, independent review 
and legislative changes have secured the protection of human rights at UK 
level, but not without compromise to accommodate security sensitive 
procedures. These procedures cannot be adopted at UN level in the 1267 
regime absent judicial review, with reliance in the Ombudsperson’s role to fill 
this gap. UK asset freezes have, to some extent, been effective in freezing 
potential terrorist assets; their specific effectiveness is however, unclear, but 
necessary to justify their interference with property and family rights, given 
that their application is not reliant upon a conviction.  
 
The MLR, derived from EU directives and the influence of FATF international 
standards, enables the detection of ML and TF within the financial sector, 
reliant on the RBA for efficient and effective application. The merger of ML 
and TF within one framework has some advantages but, given the limited 
success in relation to facilitating the confiscation and seizure of criminal 
funds, is questionable. The   necessity of distinct terrorist laundering offences 
has been presented but, whilst in some specific contexts reliance on general 
measures may be appropriate, this is dependent on the funding sources for 
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each particular terrorist group. Specific terrorist offences are therefore 
preferred since the harm they protect against justifies their breadth. 
 
The merging of the CTF agenda with the AML regime enables the 
terror/crime nexus to exploit these measures; in some instances AML 
measures may be preferable and are likely to be more familiar to 
investigators and practitioners, and easier to prosecute, since not requiring 
proof of a terrorist purpose. Whilst a convenient merger, there remains a 
difference between these agendas and regimes that needs to be maintained, 
and more needs to be done in general to establish and isolate the 
effectiveness of the CTF regime overall in respect of the different measures 
within this.  
 
The scope of the financial sector has expanded to include MSBs within the 
regulatory framework to enable detection of both criminal and terrorist funds, 
but this needs the support of specific suspicion indicators. The detection of 
TF as the placement stage appears problematic and unlikely if not 
impossible, but the MLR offer further potential protection against wider risks 
of misuse. Critique indicates the RBA has a disproportionate effect on MSBs 
in practice, given it requires business skill, experience and resources .The 
recent HSBC case demonstrates that robust regulation is no guarantee to 
effective implementation and compliance, and demonstrates the favourable 
treatment of banks, fined but with individual actors  rarely subject to criminal 
sanctions. 
 
Sound supervision and guidance is needed to secure effective 
implementation and address new risks, to continue to yield actionable 
financial intelligence. Public sector supervision needs to adopt a more 
effective risk based approach to supervision based on more penetrating 
profiling of sector risks. Additionally it needs to underpin regulatory 
compliance by drawing on a wider range of penalties and to ensure 
persistence non-compliance is dealt with more robustly including resort to 
deregistration. 
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The current regulatory approach assumes that all ML and TF risks can be 
identified, managed effectively and proportionately, and be reported. This 
chapter has demonstrated that a range of specific CTF measures are 
needed at national and international level to effectively combat TF; the 
impact of these on human rights is only justified by the necessity of 
measures and their capacity to effectively address risk and prevent terrorist 
funding. The challenge for MSBs in applying the regulatory regime can only 
be confirmed through the fieldwork research presented in chapter 6.      
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Chapter 6 
Analysis of fieldwork research 
 
6.0 Research  
 
This chapter presents a critical review and thematic analysis of the fieldwork 
undertaken for this thesis, the aim of which was to investigate the impact of 
the MLR 2007 on the regulation of MSBs. The aims of this thesis were to 
assess the impact of the MLR as the main legislative provision regulating 
MSBs to prevent ML and TF, and to investigate the model of MSB operation 
in the UK, drawing on the literature review presented in chapter 2 for 
comparison. 
 
 
Access to unregistered providers was excluded since this was problematic in 
raising ethical considerations in interviewing participants who were operating 
outside the law, potentially triggering legal reporting requirements for the 
researcher.1 These operators would also be challenging to identify, given 
their covert presence, and consent was not likely to have been forthcoming 
from non-registered businesses for fear of reporting and subsequent 
investigation. 
 
 
Two participant groups were interviewed: MSB operators and a stakeholder 
group. The data for each is analysed separately, beginning with a brief 
biographical summary leading to a common thematic analysis for cross-
group comparison. The data analysis draws on: method of operation, 
perception and assessment of risk, legislative efficacy, impact of the 
regulatory regime, and attitudes to supervision and guidance. Quotes from 
interviews illustrate and support the data analysis, and are confined to 
interviews that were audio recorded and where consent to use was given. In 
other instances, analysis is supported by a review of interview transcripts. 
                                                              1S38B Terrorism Act 2000 
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The chapter concludes by drawing together the main findings of the fieldwork 
research to conclude as to the implications for academics policy makers, 
regulators and practitioners. Further areas of research, drawing on the 
findings of from this work are presented that will contribute to expanding on 
this work and offer a comparative perspective.  
 
6.1 MSB operator group research sample  
 
Twenty interviews were undertaken, with the sample derived from open 
source intelligence, advertising, and the UKMTA membership list. MSB 
registration data from HMRC or the FCA registers, which provide business 
contact details, was not available, despite a freedom of information request. 
Access was restricted by the DPA 1998.  Snowball sampling was not used 
because MSBs view each other competitively, and this method raised issues 
of consent in revealing the identity of the forwarding business. The final 
sample size is a reflection of limited data access, time frames, and difficulty 
in accessing interviewees in the context of the operating environment. 
Approaching businesses directly from identified street signage in sample 
areas where MSBs were known to be located was abandoned in favour of 
telephone contact due to the pressure of operating environments. Contact 
details were obtained from open sources, the UKMTA membership list, and 
advertising. Business names or addresses were ascertained, and HMRC and 
FCA registers were accessed to obtain specific contact details. Such access 
was limited to six searches per day, making this time consuming. Businesses 
were approachable and willing to participate, but access was limited by the 
logistics of the operating environment. Scheduling difficulties prevented a 
number of interviews. For each interview that was arranged, an additional  
two  hours were spent attempting to contact businesses, and the relevant 
people within these. Operators were selected at random, although any bias 
in the representation of businesses operating in the Pakistan or Bangladeshi 
corridors was purely coincidental.  
 
The interview environment was challenging, requiring travel, the 
arrangement of interviews, and their rearrangement with little notice. 
237  
Interviews were undertaken on business premises, and often disrupted by 
business activity, causing one interview to have to be abandoned. A 
significant number of interviews were conducted by telephone, and audio 
recorded. The availability of, and access to, quiet private areas also 
constrained the timing and length of interviews. One participant completed 
the questions in written form due to time constraints. 
 
Despite the small interview sample, interviews reached a natural ‘saturation’ 
point, with responses revealing little ‘new’ information or perspectives, 
adding only to the context rather than to critical issues. Sourcing a larger 
sample was therefore considered unnecessary. The sample represents a 
very small number of the approximate 3,600 MSBs registered in the UK. The 
sample as a total of those businesses which could be potentially contacted in 
the sample areas is indicated in Table 2 chapter 3. The methodology is not 
based on survey or representative samples; neither is there an intention to 
generalise findings across the population, since it would be impossible to 
obtain a representative sample due to the variation in key operational 
characteristics across the sector. The sample is valid only for generalisation 
within it. The sample is a random selection, reflecting the informed opinion of 
those involved in operational roles within MSB businesses in the UK, and 
who are able to potentially offer critical perspectives of MSB operations, and 
the regulatory, social, and ethnic context in which they operate. 
 
 
6.1.1 MSB operators - a biographical overview 
Table 4 below presents a summary of the biographical data from the 
operator interviews.  
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Table 4 MSB Operator group - Summary of biographical data and classification. 
Code Sex Age 
Ethnic 
 origin 
 
Experience 
Status 
 
Ethnic  
 
Other 
business 
Business 
remittances 
Incoming 
remittances 
Travel 
 
M101 M 30-40  P 2 A +/ SM Y * Y N  Y N 
M102 M 40-50 ME 2 I / M Y Y Y Y Y 
M103 M 60+ AB 4 A/ SM Y * Y N Y N 
M104 M 60+ I 3 A/ SM     F Y * Y N Y N 
M1105  F 30-40 S 1 A+/ SM   F N Y N Y N 
M106  M 60+ EA 4 A/ SM N Y N Y N 
M107  M 30-40 BP 2 A+/ SM Y Y N Y N 
M108 F 40-50 H 4 I/ M        F Y Y Y Y Y 
M109 M 40-50 BA 2 A+/ SM N Y N Y N 
M111 M 30-40 BP 2 I/ M Y Y Y N N 
M112 M 40-50 AP 2 A+/ SM Y * N Y Y N 
M113  M 30-40 P 2 A+/ SM Y Y Y Y N 
M114 M 30-40 B 1 A+/ SM Y Y 
 
 
N 
 
 
Y N 
M115 M 40-50 A 1 I /P/L Y * N 
 
N Y Y 
M116 F 20-30 B  4 I/ P/L Y* N Y N Y 
M117 M 50-60 W 2 I/ P/L N N Y N N 
M119 M 30-40 WB 2 I/P/L N N Y N Y 
M120 M 30-40 WB 2 I/P/L N N Y N N 
M121 M 50-60 WB  2 I/P/L N N N Y Y 
M122 M 20-30 B 1 P/L Y N N N N 
M123  M 50-60 W  4 I/M Y N N Y N 
Experience    1 = 0-5 yrs                   2 = 6-10 yrs          3 = 11-15 yrs       4 = over 15 yrs 
Y* link between operator's ethnicity and that of main corridor served and/or main used group 
Ethnicity Asian=A  Asian British = BA Asian Pakistani =AP   Bangladeshi =B East African = EA Hindu = H Indian = I   Middle 
Eastern = M  Pakistan = P Pakistani British = PB Somali = S  White= W  White British = WB 
SM = single man operation; M = medium one location, reliant on large staff team;  L = operates from several locations/use of 
agents  
Status   A = agent;  I = independent;  P= principal;  A+ = multi-agency relationship;  F = business has a family connection  
 
The distinction is made between principals and independent businesses, 
where the former make use of agents and the latter generally do not in the 
UK. The number of medium-sized independents was a small percentage of 
businesses across all areas. Larger principal businesses have an 
international presence, operating from several locations in the UK and 
overseas. They are located mainly in area M4, an area of dense population, 
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a mobile workforce, and mixed ethnicity. Smaller agent-type operators were 
located in areas M1, 2, and 3, with agents commonly having relationships 
with more than one principal. Agents lacked independent operational 
capacity outside their agency relationships.  
 
Of those interviewed, only three participants were female, two having an 
operational role in ‘family’ businesses, and one acting as a MLRO. This is in 
keeping with the status of males within the ethnic groups served by these 
businesses, and the male dominance of senior positions within the financial 
sector generally. MSB operators predominantly fell within the 30-40 age 
band, but there were also three in the over-60 band. The peak period of 
experience was six to ten years, suggesting that most enter the business in 
their late twenties and early thirties. Those aged over 60 had operated and 
lived in the same locality for the duration, the remittance business being a 
‘one-man’ operation.  Only two businesses had a family connection, contrary 
to expectations, the link between MSB and family associations was 
insignificant.   
 
The participant group represents the diverse nature of the business sector, 
having a clear ethnic focus, mainly Asian, Bangladeshi, or Pakistani. 
Ethnicity was highly relevant to the agent and independent category, the 
agents’ ethnicity correlating to the remittance corridors served, the main 
remittance areas,2 or the main customer groups. Interviews revealed this 
was relevant to the selection of these businesses by their consumers. Some 
operators (except the small number of white British), were first generation 
migrants, all of whom fell into the over-50 age bands, where in some cases 
previous experience of using remittance services was a critical impetus for 
their business operations and commitment to MSB provision. A few 
interviewees had made personal use of remittance services, enhancing their 
perspective of the customer experience. The interviewees from larger 
businesses were predominantly white British, and given the size of the 
businesses, drew on larger staff teams, where financial experience rather 
than ethnicity was the focus for key management roles.                                                               
2M3-114, M3-111, M3-113,  M2-107, M3-114 
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Fieldwork aimed to gain a perspective of the model of MSB operation within 
the UK, rather than rely on the historical model of Hawala, in order to 
consider the effectiveness of the current legal framework for UK regulation. 
 
The interviews reveal that the model of MSB operation in the UK is 
hierarchical, with larger business at the apex having a direct linear 
relationships with their agents below on whom they rely for geographical 
coverage. 
 
Independent MSBs are small businesses, present in all areas and isolated by 
their independent working, with operators having the longer operational 
experience.3  Whilst well established and having a strong reputation, they 
were regarded as a ‘dying breed’ given the recent regulatory changes and 
the difficulties for new businesses entering the sector.4  
 
The larger principal MSBs, in area M4, had a number of UK branches, an 
extensive network of UK agents and offices in other jurisdictions, and/or an 
internet presence. This group, along with the independent group, travelled 
abroad to develop relationships with overseas banks and agents, and to 
manage business affairs:.   
 
 We do every year travel back to Pakistan…, but that is normally to see how 
things are going over there; to date I have not actually met anybody in the 
regions we would use as agents.5 
Agents had no need for travel, their presence and operational capacity being 
confined to their immediate locale.  
 
MSBs considered themselves part of the wider community. For larger 
principals, this was the financial community, while small independents and 
agents focussed on the consumer and the local community, for whom trust 
was important.                                                               3M1-103 
4M1-102  
5M2-108 
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As a family we have been established in this part of xx for the last 40 
years by my grandparents who have set up businesses here. So the 
family name is well recognised. The vast majority of the community 
know who we are so there is a lot of trust based in us.6 
 
Principal MSBs identified with the financial, business, professional, and 
technological communities, with the sense of community defined by 
reference to the business context and successful business operation rather 
than to a cultural perspective, thereby evidencing a ‘sense’ of objectivity. 
Principal and independent businesses demonstrated a more sensitive and in-
depth sector knowledge and business confidence, which was evident in the 
quality of their responses and their capacity to objectively review the 
legislative framework. Their appreciation of the sector was more reflective, 
informed, and considered. The medium independent group were mixed, with 
one making use of overseas agents or banks. This group experienced the 
impact of regulation most acutely in terms of the demands of effort and cost. 
 
Just half of the interviewees were agencies run as one-man operations, with 
most selecting agency operation by choice, and only one expressing a desire 
for independent operation, but deterred by the legislative burden. ‘No, always 
been an agent here. It’s much easier to be an agent working with somebody 
else. Directly is a bit too much hassle I think.’7  
 
Agencies operated alongside other businesses, including export businesses, 
accountancy services, internet cafés, fax and photocopying services, and 
travel agencies. ‘The MSB was set up on the side to our travel agency based 
on the same premises. … our MSB business on a par with our travel agency 
is about 50:50.’ 
 
Business diversification enables exploitation of the existing customer base, 
providing additional income8 which acts as a ‘safety net’ to support the MSB 
business: ‘the margins are so low that it's hard to survive and you have to                                                              
6M3-111  
7M2-107  
8M1-101, M1-104, M1-1105  
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combine with another business’9 in recognition of it being ‘a very hard time 
for businesses'.10 These parallel businesses matched the operators' existing 
knowledge and skill sets, but this dual operation poses the risk of funds from 
MSB operations being diverted to support other business interests. 
Operators’ contact with customers provides the opportunity to identify risks 
and anomalies, which is critical for raising suspicion, but is potentially 
compromised where the operators' attention is challenged by running several 
businesses side-by-side in the same environment, thus impairing attention to 
detail, precision, and accuracy. The multi-agency model enablesrequires 
operators to capitalise on the selection of the most advantageous exchange 
rate, maximising the cost effectiveness of transactions, and enabling access 
to wider jurisdictional coverage.11 ‘So more range for customer. ... It’s all 
about the customer.’12 Whilst also allowing the selection of the most 
favourable commission rates,13 it does however require familiarity with the 
AML procedures of different principals, which may not be compatible overall 
with sound risk management.14 Only the agent group received incoming 
remittances. 
 
The role of wholesale MSBs, referred to in previous chapters, was not 
evident to any significant degree in the interviewees. Only a few interviewees 
made mention of this, as a minor aspect of their business roles.   
 
We do have some links with other bigger exchange companies in the UK 
who have better contacts or better buying power than us; we will use them 
to transmit to certain transactions overseas.15 
 
In conclusion, there appear to be four main types of MSBs: agents, 
independents, principals, and wholesalers, the latter lacking sector 
prominence and visibility. Small and medium independents are the smallest 
group; larger principals dominate the market share; whilst agents make up 
the largest number of operators, nearly all having multi-agency relationships.                                                              
9M1-101 
10M1-101 
11M1-101  
12M2-107  
13M113  
14M106 
15M111  
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Larger principals and their agents offer incoming remittances; independents 
and principals offer, on request, business remittances. Operators’ ethnicity 
was relevant to areas M1, M2, and M3 at agent and independent level, and 
the operation of the MSBs alongside other businesses was also common to 
these areas, but absent in area M4 for the principal group. OThe relevance 
of the operators’ ethnicity was most relevant at agency level, but appeared 
selected by the operator rather than the customer. The relevance to the 
customer was the operator’s perceived experience, and language capacity to 
assist transactions. 
 
 
6.2 Model of operation  
 
The UK MSB operational structure is hierarchical, with larger principal 
businesses having wide geographical coverage in the UK and overseas, 
confined to location M4. 
 The API and SPI structure has further entrenched this model of operation, 
with APIs as principals supervising their agents. 
 
Small independents remain operationally separate in all areas, isolated by 
their independence and having a durable reputation to safeguard their 
continued operation.16 The absence of a network model removes a number 
of risks, since the horizontal operational relationships at agent and principal 
levels appeared absent, given the limited use of wholesale MSBs. The linear 
model affords greater transparency in the identity of, and interaction between 
MSBs.   
 
A network structure appears absent, and is only evident amongst agents 
derived from the multi-agency model and overlapping principal relationships. 
The UK model of operation enhances geographical coverage through market 
dominance and agency coverage, rather than cooperation required for 
consolidation and settlement. Consolidation between agents and principals is 
confined to the ‘batching’ of customer transactions within individual                                                              
16M1-102  
244  
businesses. The settlement of transactions is undertaken by banks, with 
business accounts balancing transaction payments. Wholesale MSBs, 
common to other jurisdictions of origin  were necessary to enable settlement 
for agent and independents,  not so much of a concern in the UK. 
 
The independent/principal MSBs are characterised by remittance activity, 
with a few engaging in wholesale settlement and currency exchange activity, 
absent from the agency group. Some independents and principals engaged 
in a small proportion of business remittances (high value), undertaken as an 
occasional on request service where risk was low and customers trusted. 
IT systems were used at all levels for record keeping, with agents heavily 
reliant on these for compliance checks and accessing exchange rates. 
Agents and smaller independents made more use of open-source resources 
rather than bespoke packages. Larger independents and principals had 
sophisticated systems for transaction recording and screening, at 
considerable investment cost. A few operators kept paper records as 
‘backup’.  
 
The agent/principal relationship is formal, with operations contractually 
regulated. This formality permeates the agent/customer relationship, 
reducing risk, and increasing control and procedural compliance. Agency 
operation is motivated by economic factors, although one stated he operated 
‘just for fun’.17 There was a notable absence of trust between all MSBs at all 
levels of operation. Whilst aware of each other’s competitive presence or 
physical proximity, there was no shared operational activity or support, in 
stark contrast to traditional Hawala. All UK MSBs viewed themselves as 
separate entities, driven by competitive market forces and self-interest: ‘No, 
we don’t talk to them too much; there is a kind of rivalry here.’ The lack of 
trust protected business interests,18 was often born of having experienced 
‘poaching’ of business, to avoid the disapproval of the banks regarding the 
risk of cooperative working.19 Cooperative working was rare, arising from                                                              
17M1-103 
18M1-103  
19M1-102  
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reluctant acceptance of exceptional conditions of short-term necessity, which 
were viewed as compromising independence.20  
 
The duration and continuity of business presence were important sources of 
business recognition and reputation, reflecting the business presence and a 
commitment to delivering the expected service, and leading to repeat custom 
and community trust. Customer loyalty was only maintained whilst 
transaction rates remained competitive, suggesting price is important to the 
preference of MSBs to banks. Business competition through standards of 
customer service was the primary objective, contrasting with the community 
service focus presented in chapter 2.  
 
Agents had a local community presence and respect,21 whilst larger 
principals described their community as relevant to business, financially 
aware, professional, and familiar with technology.22 The sense of community 
articulated included references to ethnicity where operators’ ethnicity 
matched that of the main consumer group or remittance corridor served.23 
The possibility of ethnic allegiances posing a risk in ousting the ‘judgment’ of 
operators and their regulatory compliance was not evident from the 
interviews. Ethnicity was relevant, even where the operators’ ethnicity did not 
match that of the consumer group,24 to the reputation of niche operators, and 
reflected successful sector penetration. Operators cited the importance of 
customer rapport, ‘familiarity’, and putting customers at ease in securing 
repeat business. Trust was conceived from the quality of service delivery and 
customer relations,25 but customer loyalty or ethnicity did not circumvent 
AML requirements. 
 
Ethnicity was relevant to customers’ selection of operators and repeat 
business, with agents noting that MSBs were selected over banks for 
enabling customers to feel at ease because they were dealt with by                                                              
20M1-102 
21M1-103, M1-104  
22M4-119, M4-120 
23M1-105, M2-107, M2-109, M3-111, M3-112, M3-113, M3-114, M3-115, M4-117, M4-121 
24M4-121 
25M3-113 
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operators of the same ethnic/cultural backgrounds. Operators’ language 
skills were relevant in assisting customer transactions. In one instance, a 
conscious decision was taken by an operator not to service a particular  
corridor due to the expectation of credit and that their payments to be taken 
on trust. The interviewee acknowledged that UK regulations and business 
context prevented this approach, and that even friends and family using the 
service were subject to the relevant checks.26 One operator cited cultural 
practices as being at odds with MSB operations, with formal AML 
requirements causing ‘social problems’ in relation to ID checks of 
religious/community leaders.27  
 
There was a considerable and notable mistrust of the standards and ethical 
practice of other operators who were regarded as having inferior or 
questionable ethics,28 thereby posing compliance risks. This prompted 
independent operations, and countered cooperative working, to ensure 
adherence to personal standards and principles.29 The shared business 
context and operator ethnicity did not override an independent assessment 
of the risk and operator suitability. Some MSBs ‘come and go’,30 failing to 
offer long-term commitment, and compromising reputation. Lack of trust 
permeated all relationships, and was the antithesis of the model presented in 
chapter 2. 
  
UK operations are driven by risk management procedures and commercial 
relationships, and are pervaded by a sense of distrust between MSBs, 
stemming from the competitive context. There was a sense of unfairness 
where those unregistered were left unchallenged, thereby gaining 
commercial advantage and risking customers’ trust, service standards (the 
protection and delivery of property), and sector reputation. Interviewees had 
‘heard of instances where MSBs have disappeared overnight’.31  
                                                              
26M3-1105  
27M3-113   
28M1-103, see also M3-114  
29M2-114 
30M1-101 
31M3-111 
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6.3 The identification and management of risk 
 
The research aimed to explore the views of MSB businesses about their 
understanding of the business risks relative to ML and TF, and how these 
are identified and managed through the application of MLR 2007. The RBA 
assists this, to which end suspicion is critical, alongside policies and 
procedures guiding subsequent action. This section considers operators’ 
views of their business risks, and how these are managed.   
 
6.3.1 Identifying risks relating to terrorist financing 
 
The RBA requires the identification and management of sector and individual 
business risks, one interviewee stating that terrorist finance risks could not 
be assessed in isolation from business risks, the starting point being a 
thorough understanding of business operations.32  
 
Terrorist finance risks were more difficult to identify than ML risks, especially 
for agents, whose narrow role and local focus hindered the extent of their 
knowledge and experience. This explains the contrast in the attitudes, 
perception, and understanding of risks between agents and 
independent/principal groups. The latter played a more strategic role in the 
identification of business risks, exerting influence over internal AML strategy, 
and presented a more considered and holistic view of the risk of TF and the 
effectiveness of regulation in controlling this. 
 
Agents focussed on existing controls addressing ML risks, struggling to 
recognise the inherent operational risks from MSB activity, perhaps 
explained by the fact that   regulation is sufficiently embedded and the focus 
is now  successful  application of the MLR rather justification. ML rather than 
TF had more relevance to daily business activity and was at the forefront of 
operational decision making: ‘It's not something that has taken much of my 
                                                             
32M3-115 
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attention, which is far more geared toward money laundering.’33 This view 
likely results from the risk of ML being viewed as more likely with operators 
having direct experience of ML even if ‘small scale,’  this  being the focus of 
supervision.  
 
The main TF risk identified was jurisdictional risk,34 particularly high risk 
jurisdictions identified where relevant transactions were considered: ‘instantly 
suspicious of, or I would treat with my full attention.’35 The risk of remitting to 
large subcontinents which subsequently allowed free unhindered movement 
of funds on receipt,36 was seen high risk where these jurisdictions had less 
stringent regulation.37 Interviewees were unable to identify objective TF 
factors  here or  ‘country profiles’ that might warrant the assessment of a 
jurisdiction as ‘high risk’ nor could  they identify further action they would take 
to mitigate this TF risk. 
 
I think there are certain corridors that are much more high risk than 
others. If you are a remit to Somalia or Pakistan, there are Hawala 
operators that remit to Afghanistan and the Middle East. … we don’t 
operate in corridor that I consider to be even medium risk from a 
terrorist financing point of view.38 
 
The assessment of jurisdictional risk indicated some classification and 
differentiation of risk levels, but objective criteria related to this categorisation 
were not fully articulated nor were these transposed into operators risk 
management responses. The ability to identify, classify and rationalise 
jurisdictional risk is also relevant to the application of Treasury directions 
requiring action against non-cooperative countries. There was some 
evidence of assessment of the current corridor serviced and some examples 
of high risk jurisdictions were identified, but the detail or the rationale for this 
classification was not evident.  
 
                                                             
33M4-120 
34M4-121 
35M4-120 
36M1-103 
37M1-104 
38M3-112 
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Interviewees recognised the necessity post 9/11, of CTF measures to control 
TF risks. Independent operators referred to ‘Hawala’ as high risk, associated 
with jurisdictions where regulation was insufficient or absent.39  The was 
clear indication that regulation offered some general risk control, mitigation 
and protection against TF risks that unregulated high risk MSBs lacked: ‘On 
the unauthorised and unregulated side it's wide open to abuse, especially 
towards terrorism.’40  
 
Without the controls in place anyone can see that they [MSBs] would be 
open to abuse because you can transfer money around … with the 
minimum of information to actually do so.41 
 
MSBs risk for TF were linked to their international funds transfers, and whilst 
not explicitly stated the implication that UK communities may support 
overseas terrorist activity, illustrated by one interviewees referring to the 
previous funding of Irish attacks in the UK42 and vice versa. The specific TF 
risk for the MSB sector was difficult to identify and quantify,43 transaction 
speed was considered relevant.44 Some commented that TF risk were equal 
to those of banks, suggesting a sensitivity to MSBs being considered higher 
risk. 45 
 
Operators were reluctant to consider their ‘community’ of customers as 
potential terrorist supporters:46 ‘Most of the regular customers we know 
personally that they have jobs … but the people we don’t know well we are 
always checking.’ Operators regarded their customers as being free of 
suspicion of terrorist support, emphasising their sacrifice, good morals, 
sense of family commitment, and charitable support. These views were more 
pronounced where operators shared the same ethnicity as customer or 
match that of a corridor serviced.47 Discussion of TF provoked a defensive 
and protective response in some instances, the assessment interpreted as                                                              
39M1-102 
40M4-117 
41M4-117 
42M1-104  
43M2-107 
44M1-102 
45M4-117 
46M1-104  
47M3-111 
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implying that ethnicity and cultural values were linked to suspicion of 
selected communities, 48 and customer risk.49  The link between terrorism 
and religion was noted by one interviewee stating his customers' Muslim 
beliefs were opposed to terrorism.50 The interviews did not indicate any 
ethnic, community, or religious allegiance by customer or operators 
compromising regulatory compliance. The concept of suspicion is difficult to 
apply, and the perception of ‘suspicious communities’ is a dangerous route. 
The assessment of suspicion is influenced by the assessor’s position 
external or internal to the community and can be divisive of community 
relationships. 
 
This was illustrated by principal MSBs who considered that small MSBs were 
at risk from the ‘community pressure’ from shared ethnicity to waive 
regulatory compliance.51  
 
The money has to travel for terrorism so it is possible to travel by this 
method. I would have thought the ethnic element was quite important 
here although one isn’t supposed to say so … the focus should be on 
the ethnicity.52  
 
The quote does illustrate the difficulties inherent in the linkage of 
jurisdictional risk and cultural association. 
 
Most viewed the risk of misuse for terrorism53 as absent or unlikely54 mainly 
due to average remittance values of less £500 sent twice a month.  
 
There are limits on the money you can send nowadays … if you were a 
terrorist … who buys guns and ammunition … they don’t cost £500 … 
they cost hundreds of thousands.55 
 
Operators are insufficiently informed about terrorist funding requirements or 
sources, or the amounts operationally valuable for terrorist activity, lacking                                                              
48M2-108 
49M3-114  
50M3-113 
51M4-116   
52M3-117 
53M4-120 
54M3-112   
55M4-109  
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clear guidance,56 and information from recent prosecutions57 to illustrate the 
significance of low values. They were also unaware of the  low value single 
transactions  disguised as charitable donations.   
 
There was some awareness of the relevance of the political agenda, 
identification of conflict zones and areas of high-risk terrorist activity in TF 
and jurisdictional risk. The seriousness of the terrorist threat was viewed as 
justifying regulation as to the potential consequences:58 ‘The 9/11 bombers 
used many ….agents to receive their money and others could do so in the 
future.’59 
 
Screening of sanctions lists60was the most common TF compliance process 
applied verifying the identity of customer as non-terrorist.61 Detection of the 
terrorist purpose was seen a challenging and a specialist area beyond the 
current expertise of operators.62 Complicit MSBs supporting TF were 
considered difficult to detect, where the motivation is support, rather than 
financial gain,63 risks pertaining to other MSBs identified by due diligence 
checks are easily explained by the different business operations.  
 
The risk of MSB misuse for TF was considered the same as any other 
‘nefarious activity’ and akin to ML in general;64  but this was at odds with the 
perception of MSB a ‘high risk line of work'.65 This demonstrates a lack 
consistent perception of TF risk and consequential harm across the sector, 
linked to the lack of understanding of terrorist threat assessments relative to 
the extent, nature, and immediacy of risk. 
 
Detecting terrorism remains problematic. MSBs were unable to refer to 
specific guidance, typologies or risk/ suspicion indicators. Operators’ applied                                                              56Basel Committee on Banking Settlements, ‘Sound management of risks related to money    
    laundering and financing of terrorism’, January 2014 [59] 
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general compliance processes, motivated by their fear of personal criminal 
liability rather than regulatory sanctions.  Operators stated they would not 
‘turn a blind eye',66 and would report any TF suspicions, countering any 
concern of ethnic allegiance associate with Hawala. Interviewees identified 
that terrorist funds could be transferred to third parties without their 
knowledge,67 potentially compromising the regimes effectiveness. ‘If you can 
find five people in the migrant community that can all send money, however 
many thousand each, it is not going to look suspicious.’68 Whilst MSBs seem 
able to identify the ‘regulatory gaps,’ there was lack of clarity as to how these 
should be addressed.  
 
The lack of reference to specific TF guidance, typologies or risk or suspicion 
indicators for TF, reflects their absence at UK level, reflective of the 
international position, with few regulators making these available.69 The 
expectation is that general AML indicators70 apply and will suffice to guard 
against TF. However given that these indicators were not mentioned by 
interviewees in relation to assessing TF risks, this argument appears weak 
and questions the value of the merger of CTF within the AML regime. This 
will have an effect on the quality and extent of SARs reporting as analysed in 
6.2.2.4 
 
Operators had difficulty in identifying factors raising suspicion of TF other 
than ML indicators.71 The process-based customer interactions relying on 
standardised procedures, limit decision-making and do not appear linked to 
TF. Independents/principals had a more considered and informed perception 
of TF risk, considering risk beyond the UK aligned to their wider operational 
activities. Agents' narrower role confined their perspective of risk. All MSBs 
lacked direct experience of TF, none having filed a relevant SAR, although 
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one independent had been visited by counterterrorism officers,72 offering 
future contact/support, viewed as more beneficial than HMRC guidance. 
Only one independent MSB considered small transaction values as relevant 
for TF and cited attitude changes post 9/11 linked to a ‘misunderstanding of 
Hawala in other jurisdictions,'73 One MSB had dealt with a customer enquiry 
concerning a ‘blocked’ transaction due to a suggested ‘mismatch’ of 
customer name with the sanctions list.74 
 
Interviews do not support the MLR as effective in identifying TF risks linked 
to MSB operation a crucial first stage to the RBA and AML /CTF compliance 
and critical for the subsequent reporting of SARs. The construction of TF risk 
and suspicion indicators is challenging, but if beyond the capacity of 
supervisors and experts at national and international level, then it is 
unrealistic to expect this of MSBs.  
 
6.3.2 Identifying risks relating to money laundering  
 
The risk of ML was recognised as the impetus for MSB regulation given the 
need for their control as high risk as cash intensive businesses,75offering 
prompt transaction processing:76 ‘What you are doing is moving money 
around the world and its risk for anybody doing that.’77 One operator cited 
HMRC statistics, indicating that 40% of ML misuse arises from MSBs.78 
Agents considered larger MSBs as high risk: ‘I don’t think that people who 
have illegal money to launder will use a small business like this,’ 79 given the 
large sums that criminal groups would need to launder that would be readily 
transparent on collection and in requiring multiple transactions to 
launder.80Smaller MSBs were considered lower risk given that they dealt with 
lower personal transaction values.81 Operators had a greater appreciation                                                              
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and understanding of the nature of ML risks and how these arose, linked to 
transaction size. Agents’ perception of risk was narrowed by their limited 
experience and isolated operational role. Interviewees cited illegal migrant 
income as the most likely illicit source.82 The most significant risk to MSBs 
was their poor regulatory compliance considered as possibly evidencing 
criminal complicity.83 Customer trust was a potential source of exploitation, 
criminals relying on known, trusted MSBs willing to launder funds, unwilling 
to entrust large volumes of illicit cash to a stranger seen as ‘a gamble'.84 
Unregistered businesses were regarded as high risk: ‘It’s the unregulated 
ones which are the cause for concern and that is recognised by the 
industry.’ 85  
 
 
6.3.3 Indicators of suspicion  
 
Indicators of suspicion were much more informed in relation to ML than for 
TF across all operators, and were linked to the nature of compliance checks. 
TF measures are contained in separate legislative provisions, but TF 
Treasury directions rely on the ML framework for their application. 
 
The application of low thresholds triggering due diligence measures and 
operators knowledge of customers86assisted the arousal of suspicion for ML. 
Factors identified as relevant to triggering suspicion related to customer 
transaction characteristics, patterns, timings, average transaction amounts, 
and purposes, mandatory but not standardised record keeping critical to 
assisting the detection of anomalies and variations in customer behaviour. 
Interviews demonstrated an awareness and application of due diligence 
procedures and relevant transaction thresholds87 triggering suspicion but 
limited since: ‘you can’t prescribe … beyond a certain point’.88This illustrates 
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circularity between due diligence checks that assist in verifying suspicion and 
the need for suspicion to trigger further due diligence. 
 
Customer knowledge was important in underpinning suspicion and key to 
risk assessment,89 to identify deviation from the norm to trigger suspicion. 
Customers were mainly migrant workers, of temporary residence, and first 
and second-generation migrants permanently settled here. Most were 
employed in the service sector or IT. Larger independents had professional 
and business clients, and were exposed to the risk of dealing with PEPs.  
 
Average amounts remitted were under £500, and sometimes as little as £30-
100,90 timed to maximise exchange rates, with amounts sent ‘regularly’, often 
weekly, monthly, or twice monthly. Regular transactions were associated 
with general family support, living costs, and education, and occasionally 
with special occasions and religious festivals (Ramadan, Eid) relevant to the 
corridors served,91 or related to an international crisis.92 The Muslim religious 
obligation of ‘Zakaat’ was relevant to remittances for charitable support.93 
Larger ‘one-off’ amounts between £1000 and £5000, and ‘occasionally’ over 
£5,000,94 were linked with payment of medical bills, investments, purchase of 
property, and weddings. These sums represented ‘out of bank’ savings.95 
Business payments and those for property comprised the largest remittance 
values. Transaction patterns are easily discernible for static clients,96 and 
more problematic for transient groups.97 The jurisdictional aspect was less 
relevant for ML, suspicion raised by other transactions and customer 
characteristics. 
 
Knowledge of customer transaction patterns assists the detection of 
anomalies and raising suspicion, the presumption being: ‘We think our 
customers are law-abiding citizens sending money they have worked hard                                                              
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for.’98 Customer screening prior to the commencement of the business 
relationship and ongoing in  customer selection, important to mitigating risk: 
‘you have to choose your customer who you want to do service with and who 
you do not'.99 
 
For agents, over 80% of clients live locally,100 with a male to female ratio of 
60:40. The age of remitters varies according to the corridors served, and the 
timing of migration.101 In most instances, the general but individual specific 
transaction purposes were known: ‘Why they are sending is not absolutely 
known to me.’102  
  
Behavioural indicators triggering suspicion included customer non-
compliance:103 ‘People who are dodgy are the ones who have got illegal 
money and will not give you their ID.’104 Customers who put ‘pressure on you 
to execute transactions quickly’,105 or appear difficult, uncooperative, or 
resist providing information.106 Clients acting inconsistently, making mistakes 
and107 ‘often just a hunch at the way the customer presents’.108 A further 
trigger is anything unusual: ‘Looking for anomalies it is anomaly based';109 
and 'to highlight risks requiring further checks of the source of funds110 and 
customer'.111 Also, deviations from usual behaviour are a trigger, including 
variations in amounts112 and transaction frequency113 to the same person or 
jurisdictions.114 The ability to ‘engage with a client talk to them … can catch a 
client off guard’115 was an important check. New customers lacking a 
transaction history are treated with caution. In contrast to TF the identification                                                              
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of ML risk and triggers of suspicions were not seen as posing any challenge 
in practice: ‘so simplistic it's ludicrous.’ 116   
 
Larger volumes, more frequent transactions, volumes remitted which do not 
correspond to known purposes, and increased amounts exceeding known 
income, were suspicion indicators across all groups, requiring further scrutiny 
of funds.117 ‘If we get a new client off the street who wants to send hundred 
thousand pounds … theoretically that would automatically have alarm bells 
ringing.’118 
 
Agents focused on customer cooperation, transaction amounts, and 
transaction purpose. Principals and independents relied on sophisticated, 
random, automated, specifically configured checks using IT systems for data 
analysis of large transaction volumes to arouse suspicion as a back up to 
human assessment. 
 
We have a very sophisticated IT systems and central monitoring 
transactions here which on a daily basis we watch … if you asked for a 
pattern our system would produce it for you.119 
 
Initial suspicions raised by staff dealing with customers face-to-face are 
forwarded to the MLRO. Low remittance values increase the risk of illicit 
transfers without further checks.120 Due diligence was critical for internet 
based MSBs.  
 
But notwithstanding that we don’t meet our customers face-to-face we 
check where they are accessing the system from and we do a bunch of 
checks to make sure that we believe the documentation to be valid.121   
 
The effectiveness of IT systems depends on their search parameters: ‘We 
had to decide what was a regular customer … and we found we had few 
regular customers.’122 Such parameters need configuring for accuracy.                                                               
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Independents servicing business clients needed to verify that transactions 
made economic sense,123 identifying the risks of ‘structuring of a transaction, 
identifying the central beneficiary things to do with large values of cash, dirty 
used notes.’124Limited reference was made to HMRC guidance, perhaps due 
the knowledge and familiarity with AML process. Guidance prescribing 
mandatory screening thresholds125  was considered problematic in ousting 
individual business risk assessment, illustrating ‘regulatory creep’ extending 
the scope of regulation where supervisors deemed this necessary for 
managing sector risks, the necessity of this  was successfully challenged by 
some MSBs. 
 
Numerous factors were identified as potentially arousing suspicion126 with 
prescribed lists viewed as restricting vigilance. Principals rely on their agents’ 
vigilance and compliance: ‘The face-to-face pieces that verifies, yes we have 
seen them, they are who they say they are.’127 Agents and staff were audited 
to identify suspicious behaviours:128 ‘agent was doing perfectly ordinary 
business … small amounts of money and then this shot up suspiciously to 
thousands.’129 Selection and ongoing screening of staff including agents 
were linked to suspicion: ‘A point of weakness tends to be an agent who is 
"bent" for want of a better word’, or fails to apply due diligence. 130   
 
Due diligence is critical to managing risk and raising suspicion to preventing 
the placement of terrorist or criminal funds. The inability of operators to the 
identify in any depth the risk of MSB misuse for TF is also match by the 
failure to identify factual circumstances that should arouse suspicion of TF. 
Further the limited reference to specific guidance or typologies relating to 
terrorist finance was evident in the sole reference by operators to ML risk 
indicators which were not perceived as relevant TF, were transaction                                                              
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focused and were not aligned to any terrorist financing profile. This confirms 
the conclusion drawn in the 9/11 report that the detection of TF is difficult if 
not impossible to detect, and the development of indicators is key to 
assisting SARs reporting. There was little assessment of customer TF risk, 
linked to a customer acceptance policy.131 The Basel group has identified the 
need for distinction between ML and TF indicators to reflect their different 
processes,132 but this distinction was not evident in the operator interviews. 
The Basel group has recently asserted that TF screening should not be 
regarded as risk sensitive where reliant on due diligence derived from 
automatic processes, which is evident in operators’ sole reliance on 
sanctions screening. 
 
Suspicion permeates the financial sector, with UK banks highly suspicious of 
MSBs133  risk for the layering of illicit funds to facilitate integration. All MSBs 
reported UK banks as being risk aversive, querying MSBs' transactions,134 
imposing higher compliance standards135 than required by regulation,136 and 
restricting the operation of MSB bank accounts.137 Banks were viewed as 
having a lack of understanding of risk management outside their own 
sector,138 and posed significant ML139 and TF140 risks themselves which 
operators evidenced by reference to reported cases.141   
 
 
6.3.3.1 Suspicious activity reporting 
 
SAR is dependent on sound due diligence, internal compliance regimes, and 
robust records to assist internal investigation: ‘Business … is open to risk 
especially if the business concerned does not have the internal controls there                                                              
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necessary to pick up any suspicious transactions.’142 Agents had an onerous 
burden in ensuring their records were up to date to facilitate prompt 
reporting.143 
 
Some but not all MSBs were aware of circumstances which require reporting, 
having ‘investigated internally as far as you can to get … as much 
information from the customer to support the transaction’.144 Some,145 but 
not all, agents were aware of the reporting process: ‘Well the helpline I can 
report my suspicion that the money is not black’ and ‘report through the 
website or you can ring the crime stoppers’.146 Agents were a first line of 
defence,147needing to act promptly on suspicions raised. Interviewees were 
aware of the need to refrain from processing suspicious transactions, and 
that any money handed over, once suspicion was raised, could not be 
returned.148 Interviews indicated some confusion amongst agents about 
when to file a SAR,149 with agents seeking advice from head office, which 
then alerted other agents.150 The interviews raised concerns about whether 
the declining of transactions was accompanied by subsequent reporting: ‘I 
started the process but for some reason I did not like them, so I tell them that 
my computer had broken,’151 screening of customers’ risk operating 
informally. ‘Tell them to go away sorry mate I am not cooperating today',152 
but it was unclear whether a SAR has also been subsequently filed.153 The 
refusal of customers, commonly by offering an unfavourable rate, also 
required SARs filing but agents appeared uncertain about this. Agents 
policed from within alerting each other to suspicious customers who were 
known to have been declined service elsewhere  when they reported prior 
refusal  due to the  ‘system was down’.154 Informal monitoring between                                                              
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MSBs appears to operate in place of, rather than parallel to, the SARs 
regime, a concern for regulators and risk management. 
MSBs focused on suspicious ‘transactions’, mirrored until recently in HMRC 
guidance, and now amended to ‘activity’, a broader concern. Suspicions 
around the attempted placement of funds required operators to be warned of 
similar attempts. Independent businesses bridged the operational distance 
between cashiers or agents through internal reporting processes to alert the 
MLRO. Staff education and training were seen as important to SARs 
compliance, particularly by principals: ‘They are all trained to raise suspicious 
transaction reports.’155 Prompt internal reporting was seen as critical: ‘Right 
at the beginning before you figure it out even if you don’t quite know what it 
is.’156 One independent interviewed all staff who had raised suspicions to 
improve procedures.157 
 
Interviewees were aware of SARs confidentiality and the need to refrain from 
alerting customers,158   to avoid liability for ‘tipping off’. Agents were exposed 
as the initial point of customer contact, needing to balance caution in gaining 
more information to assist filing a SARs whilst dealing with customers' 
queries whilst awaiting consent. Few mentioned this as presenting any 
problems in practice, but this may due to refusal of custom rather than SARs 
filing. Some MSBs had the facility to discretely stop transactions without 
alerting customers.159 
 
Few agents had filed SARs for ML, possibly due to providing customer 
compliance information in advance of transactions.160 Larger operators had 
filed SARs, some relating to internet transactions:161 ‘I can say we are very 
au fait with the process.’ One example cited the reporting of unregulated 
Hawala.162 Some businesses had received approaches to undertake illicit 
business transactions at higher rates: ‘Send a couple of grand and he want                                                              
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to give extra for the safe transaction, people psychology … we don’t find 
anyone paying extra’,163 this instantly arousing suspicion. One MSB invested 
in telephone recording systems, to protect from such approaches for the 
future and to assist reporting.164 
 
Feedback on SARs was not expected: ‘very rarely do we get feedback from 
them or more information unless it’s a consent issue’,165 although some 
considered this potentially useful166 in relation to individual SARs and 
general sector feedback.  
 
Interviews indicate that some MSBs are not fully aware of the SARs process 
or may be circumventing this by refusing business in preference to acting on 
suspicion, since refusal is often linked to a suspicion, even if not firmly 
grounded. The inability of MSBs to identify TF risk and circumstances that 
would raise suspicion is likely hindered by the lack of specific TF indicators 
or guidance here, unless the transaction exhibits characteristics aligned to 
general ML indicators. If not in light of possible criminal sanctions, there are 
grounds to contest ‘reasonable cause’ in relation to suspicion of terrorist 
laundering, and raises concerns about the effectiveness  of the merger of the 
AML and CTF regimes, given the distinction between these processes. This 
also explains the concerns by supervisors in chapter 5 as to the low 
incidence of SAR reporting in the MSB sector for TF linked to the failure to 
identify suspicion, or where linked to the declining of transactions  to avoid 
filing.  
 
6.4 Effectiveness of regulation  
 
MSBs have been ‘nudged into the formal financial system’,167 regulation  
warranted due to the ‘illegality’ of the sector previously subject to: ‘very little 
regulation and [having] a lot of illegal players … what you saw were a lot of 
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customers being ripped off.’168 Informality posed considerable risks but the 
type and volume of cross-borders transactions necessitates control through 
regulation seen as a ‘good thing.’169 
 
Regulation is regarded as offering protection from illicit unregistered 
operators, thereby protecting customers’ property:170 ‘The clients were not 
very well protected … it has increased safety and protection for us as 
well.’171  
 
Compulsory compliance sets consistent sector standards to ‘police the 
system’172 to prevent exploitation for ML and TF. In a competitive 
environment, self-regulation potentially leads to a waiving of standards to 
gain commercial advantage turning a ‘blind eye’ to risk for profit.173 
Regulation provides a sense of ‘legitimacy’ in standards of operation and 
protection, customers now ask about registration:174 ‘They know we operate 
in a certain way with standards … is a good thing that this is the law we are 
bound by.’175 Regulation has imposed a commercial, formalised model of risk 
management and compliance, and trust is now conceived within risk.   
 
Regulation was viewed as positive,176 effective, and ‘imperative’177 in 
deterring and preventing illicit operation and reducing sector exploitation: 
‘The point of greatest resistance … sadly the criminal will always be trying to 
test the system rather … they will establish a point of vulnerability and attack 
it.’178 Regulation protects the sector's reputation179 and operators180 through 
registration,181 which is perceived as requiring minimum knowledge and 
competency.                                                                
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Interviewees were unsure as to the effectiveness of the MLR for addressing 
the ML and TF in particular, but these activities were however perceived as 
important goals: 
 
It’s a difficult thing to identify, these people take great effort to conceal 
their activities … the vast majority of it goes undetected … it's difficult to 
know how widespread a problem this is … nobody wants to quantify the 
problem. 
 
Some were sceptical of the effectiveness of regulation in reducing 
international terrorism,182 but agreed that it generally deterred and prevented 
TF: ‘The regulation definitely curtailed the extent of misuse.’183 The UK was 
regarded as well positioned compared to other jurisdictions having extensive 
regulation,184 making misuse for TF more difficult to undertake. 
 
It must have done a huge amount to frustrate terrorism … the 
sophisticated way this whole global infrastructure of AML … everybody 
coordinating their regulation must have caused an immense problem.185   
 
MSB were however aware that regulation did not afford watertight protection 
and could be circumvented by determined terrorists. 
 
I don’t think it would be difficult if you were a terrorist financier to bypass 
these things especially if you were in a close knit community … you 
could have x number of people … send money on your behalf.186 
 
The MLR were viewed as effective in disrupting general criminal laundering 
making this more difficult, with this now seen as easier through banks: ‘It is 
getting a lot more difficult for criminals to launder money through MSBs … 
easier to launder it through banks’,187 noting that ‘85% of the risk has been 
removed from within the industry simply because of the amount of regulation 
and the amount of compliance required’.188 Regulation may, however, 
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displace and not cure criminality,189 and lead to a ‘trade-off … greater 
regulation will potentially drive some of the remittance traffic underground’.190  
 
Effectiveness was viewed as linked to the regulatory compliance of other 
countries,191 UK MSB required to guard against risks associated with the use 
of overseas agents,  extending regulation to bridge the regulatory gaps in 
other jurisdictions: ‘When it comes down to compliance we tend to treat them 
like our own branches, so they have to adhere to the same [regulation].'192 
‘Our agent has to be on the top level of the AML side of things because we 
carry the can … it focuses you on the agents.’ There was little reference to 
guidance assisting the assessment of cross-border jurisdictional risks for 
larger principals with global business networks, a concern in relation to TF 
risk where jurisdiction risk was seen as important but there was a lack of 
clarity as to how to determine this (see 6.2.1). This is a concern given 
operators regarded regulatory efficacy as compromised by its complexity in 
requiring knowledge of other AML regimes.193 
 
Regulation promotes transparency, removing reliance on trust194 in requiring 
objective assessment of risk to provide an audit trail from standardised 
record keeping in order to yield intelligence for detection.195 ‘I think the fact 
that there is an audit trail in place is quite a worthwhile thing.’196 Due 
diligence was regarded as essential for monitoring and detection197 of risk. 
The vagueness of the RBA created uncertainty: ‘You can never get a straight 
answer out of the regulators on what you should do in a specific situation.’198 
Differential application also compromised effectiveness and confidence: ‘If 
you sit down with the policies and procedures of say five different companies 
you will see big difference between them.’199 The comment that regulation ‘in 
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past has been slightly vague in areas’200 suggests that guidance and 
supervision are key for the successful application of the RBA, necessary to 
‘make sure we focus resources on the areas that we consider to be the 
greatest risk’.201 The flexibility of the RBA in adapting to new risks and 
different business sizes is traded off against its ambiguity. It requires 
confidence, competence, business knowledge, and experience for 
application, not evident amongst all the operators: ‘It really comes done to 
there being no defined standard…completely subjective. It is very difficult … 
to be completely sure that what you are doing is ok.’202 
 
Regulatory compliance is underpinned sanctions203 compelling operators to 
be constantly vigilant204 to avoid inadvertent human error.205 ‘It’s not easy to 
be in this business.. … if you make a slight mistake you can be done with 
it.'206 Operators were mindful of sanctions even where they had done their 
best,207 concerned for the possible reputational damage from investigation or 
penalties leading to loss of registration or agency role,208promoting 
compliance.209  
 
Regulation does not capture nor contain all criminality, MSBs were aware of 
the methods used to circumvent regulation including,210 the use of false 
identification, and the use of third parties. MSBs who refused custom had no 
doubt that this would be accepted elsewhere. Sector dialogue is important in 
making regulators aware of potential loopholes, ensuring that regulatory 
‘gaps’ are addressed through supervision.  
 
Whilst the SARs regime was considered effective for ML, MSBs doubted 
they would ever have cause to report TF, uncertain as the effectiveness of 
regulation here with but criminal sanctions never the less securing                                                              
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compliance.211 The SARs regime is dependent on ‘internal controls … to pick 
up … suspicious transactions'.212 Some operators desired ‘more clarity as to 
what kind of issues’213 to report in relation to TF with only one operator 
having received SARs feedback,214 and the lack of sector feedback overall 
called into question the value of SARs reporting overall: ‘lots of SARs are 
filed and action is taken on only a small number … purely because they have 
finite resources to follow these things up.’ Prompt feedback on consent to 
avoid customer queries was seen as critical to avoid tipping off.215 Principals 
acted promptly to alert agents to risks: ‘A good network of contacts kicking 
around … They all tend to know each other and if there is anything untoward 
it will get out.’216 A central database217 of high-risk customers and reported 
anomalies was suggested as potentially useful.218 Sanctions lists were the 
main TF screening tool, but in practice effectiveness was compromised by 
false matches, which caused hardship and inconvenience to customers, 
effective against specific ethnic groups, who as genuine customers were 
made feel like criminals.219 This also had a cost in terms of regulatory 
confidence , adding to the compliance burden. 
 
Compliance is driven by sanctions for agents, and threat to professional 
business reputation for independents and principals, with the latter highly 
motivated regulatory implementation. Agents viewed effectiveness in light of 
the demands on time, effort and the cost of resourcing: ‘I am quite a simple 
person really I don’t want to go into too much into it’220 relying on direction 
and support from their principal. Regulation has made compliance a 
condition for improved sector reputation and for maintaining business 
relationships. 
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Regulation limited the control of MSBs through the fit and proper test was 
considered weak, excluding only the most obvious wrongdoing, and viewed 
as easy to circumvent: ‘Anyone can, you can start tomorrow, you just need to 
apply … anyone can have a licence.’221 The HMRC test was not perceived to 
be as vigorous as that of the FCA,222 where knowledge and business 
acumen223 were regarded as essential requirements for operation of an API 
and securing effective regulatory implementation. ‘You need a certain 
amount of intellectual confidence about your risk analysis and what approach 
you take, you have to take decisions about the risk.’224 Prerequisite225 
minimum qualifications or experience for agents for HMRC registration226 
was considered necessary: ‘You need to know an awful lot … I don’t see 
how someone could come into this business my God they would have to do 
their homework.’227 Smaller businesses bear the burden of regulatory 
compliance, this often falling on one person, the view that for: ‘one-man 
bands there simply isn’t the intellect there to have the confidence.’ The fit 
and proper test excludes unsuitability at a basic level,228 but successful 
regulatory compliance requires more229  particularly given the decision 
making surrounding complex assessments of risk and its management in a 
very dynamic service sector.  
 
 
6.4.1 Impact of MLR and regulatory framework 
 
This section considers the impact of regulation and the proportionality of its 
application across a diverse but discrete sector of operation. Customer 
satisfaction was a key concern amongst agents as the first point of contact: 
‘Customers they don’t always know why we are asking them these questions 
                                                             
221M3-114 
222M4-120 
223M2-109 
224M4-121 
225M3-114 
226M4-122  
227M4-121 
228HM Treasury ‘Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Finance Supervision Report 2012- 
    13'HMRC withdrew the fit and proper status from 86 individuals and removed 71 businesses from  
     its register for this period. 
229M2-109 
269  
… and they don’t fully understand the regulations.’230 Due diligence checks 
were seen as burdensome and ID requirements intrusive,231 but effectively 
limited discretion:232 ‘From a customer point of view it is annoying, they are 
not worried about AML.’233 Due diligence created a delay,234 eroding the 
informality that made MSBs preferable to banks,235 making customers feel 
doubted, and treated like ‘criminals’236 creating an 'awkwardness’237 and a 
‘barrier’ to the business relationship: ‘Can you imagine telling someone we 
need to know where your money is coming from and I am an ordinary 
shopkeeper.’238 Customers had concerns about the misuse of 
identification239 despite MSBs guarding against this.240 Privacy may be 
mistaken for suspicious behaviour where customers are reluctant to divulge 
private information. The effect on business was however considered 
insignificant: ‘Less than 2% customers who work out as an unsatisfied 
customer is due to the regulation.’241 Regulation requires a cultural shift for 
customers and operators the lack of privacy here may relate to MSBs 
operation within parallel businesses. Customer education242 as part of staff 
training243promoted understanding and protected operators by justifying 
compliance processes.244 Ethnic groups were reported as feeling targeted by 
regulation, with one operator reporting Muslim communities being sensitive 
to this.245  
 
Regulation has increased the demands on time and record keeping 
challenging agencies in securing trusted personnel to assist,246 and  in a 
competitive sector with more operators than is commercially viable247 and                                                              
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narrow profit margins,  adding to the regulatory burden on small 
businesses.248 This was most acute for agents and independents, creating a 
sense of unfairness, smaller MSBs felt ‘targeted’ 249 since larger business 
and banks were better positioned to manage this. The burden250 and effort of 
compliance was considered almost unworkable, and disproportionate in 
relation to their earning potential.251 All interviewees recognised the unequal 
impact of regulation across the sector and in treating MSBs akin to banks 
where risks were not regarded as comparable.252 Some desired change 
here: ‘There has to be a distinction … there has to be an understanding of 
how the industry works and looked at differently from a bank.’253 Regulation 
remains risk focused with MSB and banks quite fairly subject to parity of 
regulation based on risk not business size. 
 
The impact of compliance appears linked to competence and previous levels 
of compliance, regulation being less burdensome where this gap is narrow: 
‘Even before … we very much prided ourselves on having very good 
compliance.’ 254 Even larger previously diligent businesses were affected: 
‘Yes we have had to change a fair amount different aspects of the way … we 
work. The regulations have made us streamline things.’255   
 
The regulations are onerous we seem to be forced to in terms of 
policing the industry ourselves, if we fail on this responsibility the 
burden will come down on our shoulders.256 
 
Larger principals stated: ‘Don’t have a problem with it, it is commensurate 
with running a business without being onerous … I don’t think it is 
intrusive',257 although ‘not completely easy to work’.258 Another commented: 
‘The level of compliance is phenomenal I spend at least two hours every day 
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on third party alone and that is not a lot of clients.’259 Smaller businesses 
were considered to be most affected: ‘The smaller organisations … it does 
becomes quite onerous on them …with more regulations, to comply with 
it.’260 Larger ‘companies are better equipped’261 in operating out of several 
corridors and able to spread costs because they have extensive resources, 
including experienced and trained staff.262 Larger MSBs have the capacity to 
invest against market volatility and further legislative change, reducing their 
risk with the banks, more problematic for small or single operators where 
compliance and training were limited by cost and time.263  
 
It was clear in section 6.3.3 that  due diligence requires IT support for record 
keeping, data analysis, access to sanctions lists, HMT alerts and transaction 
analysis. Commercial packages were uneconomical for small businesses 
who relied on ‘open sources’264  or their principals for ‘updates’.265 
 
The RBA is dynamic and ongoing requiring a: ‘constant process of upgrading 
and adapting as different guidance has come out.’266 All businesses reported 
significant increased compliance costs267 as ‘having [a] disproportionate 
impact for businesses having a smaller capital base and … a lot of this stuff 
is fixed costs rather than variable costs'.268 Regulatory compliance was 
challenging for all MSBs in the current economic environment with falling 
prices,269 with businesses needing to minimise costs and invest to survive270 
and future proof against further regulation. This was beyond the capacity of 
smaller MSBs, but embraced by larger firms whose compliance raised capital 
for expansion.271 
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Requires investment on behalf of those MSBs in having a compliance 
function and having access to information that is not necessarily free, that 
will allow them to improve their KYC.272  
 
The view was that the regulatory burden necessitated that ‘to be able to bear 
that overhead you have to be of a certain size'.273 Larger businesses bore 
the additional cost of agent supervision. This top down and bottom approach 
exerts pressure for compliance within the sector, the quality of which is 
essential for continued registration to sector standards which were not met 
by all:  ‘a number of unprofessional MSBs that don’t apply regulation in the 
way that we think they should be applied. This is a problem in the 
industry.’ 274 
 
The RBA requires skill, experience, and sector knowledge, which are 
challenging for smaller MSBs lacking ‘the level of expertise to get that 
structure in place to run a compliant business … It has forced them to sell up 
or become agents’.275 The MLR require banks to risk assess the MSBs: 
‘Even as an SPI you can’t open banks accounts now … bottom end that 
have not made it into SPI probably I suspect because they were not being 
properly run.’276 MSB perceptions of their status as financial institutions was 
that ‘we are big enough to say that is perfectly reasonable but not a small 
SPI a one-man band, to lump them with banks and put them under the same 
regulation …its a bit of a tough thing.’277  
 
Regulation requires risk assessment and EDD of business relationships 
between MSBs and verification of funds, adding to the compliance burden. 
 
Even if the sender is giving you money from his bank account you still 
have to verify the source of funds. … it not only increases the workload 
but [is] also putting extra pressure on the sender.278  
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This has resulted in reliance on wholesale MSBs to access corridors and 
transmit funds to ‘maintain as a many different channels as they can for 
remitting funds so they wouldn’t rely on a single bank and nobody else’.279 
The limited use of wholesale hawaladars revealed in interviews may increase 
as in response to MSBs limited access to the formal banking sector.  
 
Proportionate application of the RBA, and interpretation of the MLR, avoids 
an unnecessary burden on businesses, achieving ‘a proper balance of what 
the regulations actually require and getting rid of those things that are 
onerous to the business’,280 and helps to ‘strip away anything that makes life 
more difficult for the ordinary little customer'.281  
 
The MLR control sector access: ‘The barriers to entry are I suppose … are 
rising.’ Categorising MSBs as financial institutions and SPI or API has 
reduced operators at the lower end of the sector, limiting market access,282 
with new businesses not remaining operational for long.283 Regulation has 
subjected MSBs to increased scrutiny284 by customers, MSBs and banks, 
creating a sense of unfairness.285 Regulation has been a pre-requisite for the 
API/SPI model: ‘professionalises the sector has also ‘chopped out the very 
bottom part of the market’,286and ‘weeding out’ non-compliant and 
unprofessional businesses,287 the resulting structural changes now threaten 
competition.288   
 
 
6.4.2 Attitudes to supervision and guidance 
 
HMRC has responsibility for ensuring MSB compliance with the MLR through 
on site audit inspections and enforcement action, the FCA is limited to                                                              
279M4-120 
280M4-121 
281M4-121 
282M3-112 
283M2-106 
284M2-108  
285M3-112  
286M4-120 
287M4-116 
288M4-119 
274  
oversight of MSBs for the purposes of the PSR. Effective supervision 
requires effective sector dialogue and a clear supervisory strategy. HMRC 
was generally viewed as accessible,289 visible,290 and approachable,291 the 
FCA was perceived as more experienced, competent, and more readily 
enforcing regulation but lacking sector knowledge. ‘So I think the FSA [FCA] 
generally is pretty good. I think HMRC are pretty good to if your benchmark 
is what is happening in the rest of the world.’292  
 
Enforcement strategies appeared to be a common source of criticism in 
interviews293  
 
It all comes back to enforcement, it’s all very well having a great law but 
if there is no checking that you comply with it and people can see that 
you are never going to check.294  
 
HMRC enforcement action against unregistered businesses was considered 
weak, where the ability to profit from circumventing regulation295 was not 
prevented. Some regarded enforcement as intrusive,296 questioning the 
effectiveness of the supervisory style in achieving results: ‘I think the 
regulators see themselves in the role of policeman role rather than a liaison 
role when it comes to the industry.’297 Few operators cited instances of 
enforcement action for regulatory breaches, and criminal rather than 
regulatory sanctions motivated compliance.  
 
Effective supervision requires sector knowledge, consistency, flexibility, and 
accessibility and should inspire sector confidence. Supervision models 
minimum standards for registration, but seeks maximum compliance. MSBs 
aim for ‘optimal functional compliance', balancing legislative demands, 
business efficiency, and cost control to achieve this. Action beyond minimal                                                              
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compliance to limit the risk of ML is linked to improved customer service, 
protection of reputation, and operational risks. 
 
The quality of supervision and guidance was important to the effective 
application of the RBA, in particular by small and independent MSBs, given 
the lack of formal financial training across the sector: ‘I think HMRC guidance 
is very good … if you went by the regulation themselves you wouldn’t to be 
told an awful lot so you do need the guidance.’298 HMRC guidance is 
accessed by website, telephone,299 and email alerts,300 the latter being the 
most valuable for agents.301 HMRC consult on specific issues,302 with a view 
to obtaining sector feedback about current practice and to develop further 
guidance and regulation. 
 
Principal MSBs proactively sought guidance: ‘We maintain a dialogue with 
the FCA and SOCA [NCA] both through the industry bodies and individually 
finding people there that we can talk to and engage.’303 Dialogue was 
perceived as critical in affording a sector voice for consultation on future 
changes.   
 
Companies like ours are very keen to engage … others … are less 
educated, less staffed and less wanting to go down that route and that 
colours the relationship with the regulators or has to date.304  
 
The sector appeared passive overall in their demands of HMRC, perhaps 
due to limited sector representation, particularly for small MSBs: ‘The 
feedback mechanism does tend to knock out anyone who does not have a 
dedicated corporate affairs team because it is reasonably involved 
process.’305  
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AML guidance appeared sufficient for implementation:306 ‘The misuse of 
funds for criminal purposes.  We have received lots of guidance on that and 
we proactively go out and seek guidance on that.’307 Few could recall 
specific TF guidance and none had sought this despite the difficulty in 
isolating TF risk and circumstances arousing suspicion. This could suggest 
that AML guidance suffices or that the risk of TF is considered so remote as 
to not warrant concern.  
 
HMRC was reported to be reticent in giving conclusive responses, and 
queries were often frustratingly left unaddressed. 
 
They come back and say do what you think is right. That’s all very well 
until you are caught or something, when they have a very clear idea of 
what is right and what is wrong.308  
 
Guidance needs clarity to promote confidence in supervision and 
compliance: ‘HMRC guidance says … for whatever the limit is … the 
regulation would leave you pretty much in the dark so you do need some 
kind of guidance.’309  Views as to the of quality of guidance received during 
onsite audits was mixed, some considered this: ‘very helpful …. If I made a 
mistake they gave me information, they always they give ideas … to follow 
the rules and regulations it's more awareness.’310 Guidance is important in 
securing confidence in compliance levels, given the threat of sanctions, and 
preventing overzealous regulatory application. The quality of onsite audits 
and resulting guidance was revealed to be inconsistent   and a potential 
source of contention between HMRC and the sector. Divergent views on 
supervision reflect the quality of knowledge and business experience across 
the sector, indicative of business reliance but also the need for more clear, 
targeted and consistent guidance to enable MSB to improve compliance by 
addressing identified shortcomings.  
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Saying that these are the regulations, this is how it must be done and if 
you can’t do it there will be penalties applied … never took the 
opportunity to explain what the weaknesses were we were just told that 
you’re not complying with the regulations.311  
 
Whilst audits were considered appropriately intrusive312 and stringent,313 but 
the knowledge and experience of the audit teams were considered 
inadequate by principal MSBs.  
 
The people doing that audit should not really be doing that job … they 
don’t demonstrate any deep understanding of the business or even 
know what they are looking at… they feel they are woefully 
inadequate.314  
 
Audits failed to deal with sector priorities and problematic areas: ‘No point in 
visiting people who you are confident have got systems in place and are 
pretty low risk.’315 Principals considered that audits lacked depth, were not 
cross-cutting, and failed to address issues relevant to guidance. Supervision 
was more effective for smaller business, but appeared to challenge HMRC 
for larger businesses. HMRC resourcing was considered relevant here: 
‘HMRC is looking tough and looking like a regulator but does not have the 
resources to do this.’316 This sector identified the need for improved 
resourcing of supervision: ‘I think HMRC and the FSA [FCA] put some extra 
resources in following up then the MSBs would be automatically would 
become more expert in this.’317 Larger MSBs advocated increased 
registration fees to resource318  more frequent audits319 which were currently 
not perceived as an accurately assessing compliance through competence in 
regulatory efficacy.  
 
What you have got to do is ‘appear’ to be doing the right thing … if you 
have got the policies and procedures in place … that satisfies us, but 
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what they really should be looking at is whether people are applying 
them.320  
 
HMRC was considered to lack sector knowledge and experience of audits  
 
They don’t understand the business and you spend a lot of the time 
explaining … they should be a bit more knowledgeable. … they need to 
really up their game … they don’t instil confidence.321   
 
Views on the quality of audits and guidance were divided, others operators 
expressed confidence in HMRC: ‘Quite knowledgeable in this area … able to 
offer insights into how other businesses … get around this.’ 322  
 
Audits are critical to business planning and investment; inconsistent 
standards hamper the resource allocation for effective compliance and 
undermine confidence in supervision. Not all MSBs had been audited by 
HMRC, for agents this was usually by their principal, interviews indicated 
inconsistent audit periods not linked to a clear supervision strategy. Long 
periods between audits risk the loss of business confidence and declining 
standards, effective supervision needs to be risk based, underpinned by 
guidance, timely audits, and prompt enforcement. 
 
HMRC’s approach was considered to be generally supportive and 
reasonable and offering some degree of flexibility to enable the successful 
application of the RBA. 
 
I wouldn’t say it's soft touch but I wouldn’t say it's hard touch either. It's 
not like these are the rules this is what you have to do … there has to 
be some flexibility in applying the regulation.323   
 
Some desired a more relaxed324 and supportive approach with more 
guidance, criticising the focus on minor breaches,’325 whilst others advocated 
a more proactive educational role: ‘When things come up and they finalise                                                              
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the new regulation we have to learn these things from the website and check 
regularly for our own safeguard.’326 
 
A common point of sector dissatisfaction related to guidance on EDD 
requiring the verification of the source of funds from other financial 
institutions, including those from banks.327 EDD aims to target MSB to MSB 
relationships, a flexible interpretation of the MLR by the supervisors, 
extending the scope and the burden of their application. This strategy has 
had unfortunate consequences between MSB and banks, and has also been 
criticised for duplication of effort and increasing the intrusion for customers. 
 
Guidance had been challenged by larger businesses as being too 
prescriptive,328 HMRC not always receptive to this: ‘You try and convince 
HMRC about this it falls on deaf ears.’329 Some had succeeded and 
challenging guidance,330 one agent successfully averted HMRC requiring 
single agency operation.331 HMRC’s lacked an understanding of the sector’s 
use of unregistered agents in destination countries, despite their applying 
due diligence equivalent to UK regulation and the use of banks where 
possible.332 
 
6.4.3 Summary  
 
Interviews demonstrated mistrust between MSBs and banks,333 thereby 
precluding cooperation, leading to restrictions on banking services and 
increasing the need for MSB cooperation. This was previously confined to 
being functional and short term, in contrast to Hawala. MSBs remain aware 
of the sector threat from unregulated businesses,334 ‘Imperative that they 
tighten up on control’,335misuse tainting industry reputation.336 At every level,                                                              
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trust was displaced in favour of regulatory compliance. MSBs remain vigilant, 
scrutinising transactions, with suspicion pervading all aspects of operation. 
Supervision, guidance, knowledge, experience, resources, and motivation to 
professionalism were seen as key to securing effective compliance. MSBs 
were well aware of the risk misuses for ML, but less clear in relation to TF 
risks, with mandatory registration, the extent  of regulation and the threat of 
criminal sanctions seen deterring TF. Operators appeared unable to detect 
TF to isolate circumstances arousing suspicion compromising SAR reporting 
and undermining the effectiveness of regulation.  Reliance on generic 
deterrence and the possibility of TF being revealed nebulously draw the 
conclusion that the MLR offer little protection against TF other than from due 
diligence thresholds enhancing overall vigilance. These grounds do not 
justify impetus for regulation founded on TF protection. 
 
Larger MSBs viewed smaller independent MSB as having inadequate 
compliance, lacking professionalism, and allowing self-interest to dominate 
over sector protection. ‘I struggle to believe that those run at the very bottom 
end of the market were professionally run.’337 Regulation controls MSB 
operational risks through a framework of accountability and supervision by 
principals, and HMRC imposing a RBA to risk management.  
 
If you take partial responsibility it gradually becomes more. I do not use 
the regulatory side of it … I do not want to keep it as cannot keep up to 
date so I leave it to the professional.338   
 
Most MSBs viewed HMRC as approachable and supportive, but lacking 
consistent guidance and enforcement, agents viewing HMRC as indifferent 
to the impact of their regulatory burden. Perceptions as to HMRC supervisory 
competence were divergent, some regarded HMRC as having a working 
knowledge of the industry.339  Others were more critical, some considering 
‘the most important thing is to keep the regulator [supervisor] happy.'340 
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Supervision was generally considered appropriately balanced341 but lacking 
a clear and consistent strategy.  
 
MSBs considered their designation as a financial institution justified342 by 
their activity and risk,343 but the inequality of resourcing required some 
differentiation within existing regulation: ‘No really we should be a separate 
entity we don’t operate the same facilities as banks they have got to look at 
tailoring it to be more effective and fair.’344 One suggestion was to regulate 
MSBs as payment companies,345 akin to credit card companies,346 to 
enhance regulation. Interviews conveyed a sense of unfairness about the 
disproportionate effect of the MLR on a sector previously dominated by small 
and medium businesses, outstripping profit and effort. 
 
The sector lacked cohesion, purpose, or the appetite for sector 
representation, despite the presence of trade associations such as UKMTA: 
‘An excellent forum every meeting of theirs is extremely helpful … for us 
raises our concerns and we see a lot of guidance and information from 
them.’347 Forums did not seem to be used proactively by MSBs to promote 
sector concerns, or as platforms348 for debate.349  
 
Banks' suspicions of MSBs,350 and EDD between MSBs, have resulted in an 
additional layer of internal regulation and monitoring,351 increasing ‘suspicion’ 
across the sector. MSBs felt unfairly targeted compared to the banking 
sector352 where serious infringements were not matched by sanctions,353 
banks  being  perceived as ‘getting away with murder'.354 Risk-based 
regulation drives compliance from within, and additional regulation having                                                              
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further eroded the scope for small independents, with the agency /principal 
model dominating.   
 
Given the association between ethnic groups and remittances to jurisdictions 
considered high risks for terrorist activity, there was some limited mention of 
communities feeling targeted by suspicion.355 MSBs were keen to dispel any 
perception of their customers as being potential terrorist supporter,356 on the 
basis of shared ethnicity or religion.357 In the absence of clear suspicion 
indicators, the sector had not resorted to relying on ethnicity as a single 
suspicion indicator.  
 
 
6.5 Regulator and stakeholder groups 
These groups were selected for having roles or interests connected to MSB 
regulation and which were relevant to the effective application of the MLR. 
The groups included representatives of relevant trade associations, 
supervisory agencies, agencies with a policy remit, public and private 
investigators of financial and criminal conduct, banks who service MSBs, and 
charitable organisations which make use of MSBs. Not all of the 
stakeholders approached consented to interview because research 
concerned sensitive policy areas, and decision-making where information 
regarding operational role relationships was security sensitive. Ten 
interviews were undertaken, limited by access to this group. More would 
have been preferable in order to canvas a wider sample and range of views. 
Participants’ experience was appropriate in relation to their roles and areas 
of responsibility, but this did not align to terrorist finance in particular. Access 
to specialist CTF personnel for interview, given the sensitivity of the issues 
and the need for high-level security clearance, was precluded within the time 
frames available. 
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6.5.1 Biographical profile of regulator and stakeholder groups 
In order to preserve the anonymity of the participants, they will not be 
identified individually by their category, since this may inadvertently reveal 
too much about their identities. The categories included: supervisors, 
policymakers, investigators, trade representatives (8); and charitable 
organisations (2).  
Most participants had at least five years' experience in their current or 
previous roles, involving direct engagement with the MSB sector, with the 
exception of the charitable sector. The interview data below is presented is in 
line with the central research questions and compared with that of the MSB 
group. 
 
 
6.5.2 Model of operation   
MSB interviews revealed a linear and hierarchical approach, not the network 
model, and there was no evidence of a ‘take on trust approach’ that 
characterised Hawala. The term ‘Hawala’ was little evident in operator 
interviews,358 but there were more frequent mentions in regulator investigator 
interviews, associated with illicit operations. The model of Hawala referred to 
in chapter 2 was not recognised as currently operating within the UK. 
I actually don’t think the perception we have is that the traditional way 
of doing Hawala without the actual movement of money is almost non-
existent in the UK, it does not take place.359 
The quote illustrates the problem with generic terminology. If this definition is 
assumed to encompass the movement of value outside the formal, then 
regulation has rendered Hawala obsolete, now confined to informal and 
unregistered operators. Additionally, trade-based laundering is an area 
recognised by MSBs as not currently addressed by regulation. MSBs share 
some characteristics with Hawala at agency level which operates alongside 
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parallel businesses from the same premises, and has a strong ethnic 
focus,360 offering niche services to specific corridors; and at agency and 
independent level, it has community presence. Informal unregistered 
operation361 is prohibited by regulation,362 but unregistered providers, by 
necessity, are used in other jurisdictions.363 The regulator group considered 
family connections essential to the operation of MSBs, but this was not borne 
out by the operator interviews, only two revealing family connections as 
operationally significant.   
Legislation defines MSB by activity type, each having its own particular 
method of operation and risks. The MLR show limited distinction between 
these activity types (bureau de change, cheque cashing, or remittance) for 
CDD. The regulator/stakeholder (RS) group cited supervision and 
investigation as differentiating between these, but in practice many MSBs 
provide multiple services:  
The way we look at MSB are essentially in two different sectors, money 
transmitters and money exchange business. They both present quite 
different threats.364 
Interviews confirmed a diverse range of MSBs,365 with larger concerns 
having wide international coverage, being brand led, specialising in single 
corridors, and making use of agents, with some businesses having an ethnic 
focus.366 The regulators’ model was conceived as including three business 
categories: international, high street, and ‘backstreet’.367 Interviews confirmed 
the need for regulation derived from the 'wide criminal abuse’368 of MSBs for 
ML, and the high risk of misuse for TF.369 
Regulators confirmed that regulation, and more rigorous supervision and 
enforcement, have reduced the number of operational MSBs, with family-run 
and ‘one-man’ businesses ceasing to be the norm.370 The initial threshold for                                                              
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regulation was set low, a policy decision to incentivise registration to prevent 
illicit underground operation.371 Regulation was perceived as needing to be: 
‘sufficiently relaxed that we don’t drive people out’ to ensure that: ‘you have 
some visibility of them to pull them up.’372 Subsequent phases of supervision 
have tended to reduce the numbers of independent and small MSBs, an 
intentional effect, with the more onerous fit and proper test under the PSD 
resulting in a dominance of the principal (API) and agent (SPI) models. 
The network model derived from cooperation, wholesale activity, and trust 
between MSBs was not part of UK MSB operations. Regulators were aware 
of wholesale MSB but the identification and the extent of this was difficult to 
quantify: ‘There are an awful lot of MSBs supplying an awful lot of MSBs',373 
mainly linked to currency exchange. Wholesale MSBs, due to their role and 
sector links, were seen as a ‘pitch point’ for improved regulatory compliance.  
Larger principals have an international presence which relies on established 
cash pools to avoid using banks,374 offering wholesale services to smaller 
MSBs.  For ‘illicit’ businesses the cash pools enabled the comingling of 
legitimate and illicit funds.375 Transaction ‘bulking’, and use of third party 
payments within wholesale capacity, requires:  
Cash pooling accounts and balancing money … to make all of this 
work. It really does muddy the water in terms of what is migrant 
remittance and what is a business transaction.376 
The detection of genuine remittances was made more difficult by this 
structure,377 where MSB operation is parallel to another business. 
Subsequent regulation, improving the fit and proper test and requiring 
parallel registration (independent agents) has been accompanied by a 
decline in the number of overall MSBs, and changed the sector structure. 
Larger MSBs are reliant on agents for managing customer contact: ‘they will 
have a head office in one location and an agent in every major city.’378                                                              
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Smaller independents, as SPIs, are likely to decline further or morph into the 
middle layer of wholesale MSBs. The banks’ risk adverse attitude to MSBs in 
restricting accounts has impacted negatively, driving an increasing demand 
for wholesale MSBs, which lack visibility. This is comparable to the 
observation of the operator group. Regulators regarded banks' actions as 
beyond their control; smaller operators were, however, angry at the lack of 
support from regulators to address this. 
The operator group defined the model of operation by service provision and 
the ethnic/community group, with operational activity determined by 
regulatory compliance in method and form. In contrast, regulators classified 
operational characteristics according to misuse, and three models emerged: 
registered MSBs with inadequate compliance; misuse associated with 
deliberate evasion of regulation/registration; and deliberate criminal 
complicity. The latter category can encompass the first two, but motivation 
and deliberate criminality is a critical characteristic. The misuse of 
registration to thwart further investigation derives from a hidden illicit intent; 
parallel books and the misuse of identity documents379 were used to obscure 
this.  
We are seeing higher number with sets of records like that and there 
are specialists at this in producing false documentation specifically for 
the purpose of getting around compliance visits.380 
These criminal businesses mainly operate through381 links with wholesale 
MSBs, and the resulting control of these businesses and their misuse is 
‘deliberately engineered’382 to hide illicit transactions to thwart detection. 
The concept of trust underpinning MSB operations was a clear theme.  
Literature that talks about trust and the problem is that they don’t define 
what they mean by it when you look at the definition of trust is it not an 
unreasonable word to use but I don’t think it is the right one to 
concentrate on.383 
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An overwhelming sense of mistrust was present in the operator group, but 
did not compromise operational effectiveness since consolidation and 
settlement processes are largely effected through the banks. The network 
model identified by regulators is linked to criminal networks and business 
misuse.384 Regulators saw trust as representing a reputation for the 
commercial delivery of service without loss of customer funds,385 thus 
ensuring repeat custom,386 a perception confirmed by the stakeholder 
group387 which viewed regulation as signalling trust and a guarantee of 
delivery of funds: ‘Organisations which are legitimate, regulated and signed 
up [registered] … we use them.’388 
The concept of trust controlling operational activity, as associated with 
Hawala, was irrelevant:  
‘Everything is based on trust to a greater or lesser degree … if it's trust 
based it destroys the trust base to have criminal money in the system it 
is rubbish. It is reputation.’389  
Reputation for service can relate to lawful or unlawful activity: ‘so long as 
they [MSBs] can trust you not to disrupt their livelihood they don’t want to 
know what you do.’390 For stakeholders, reputation was conceived in terms 
of guarantee of delivery, protection of fund transfers, and the need for 
legitimate operation since stakeholders required MSBs to be ‘whiter than 
white’, 391 and free from the taint of any criminal or terrorist association. 
The regulator group (RG) articulated an additional supervisory model of 
regulation comprised of policy, supervision, and enforcement, with agencies 
having distinct but overlapping and sometimes multiple roles. These were 
informed by mutually agreed goals and priorities which agencies 
implemented, with interagency liaison and cooperation creating a regulatory 
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network: ‘If we have the right risk based approach to it, between all of us 
then the whole sector',392 is protected.  
Regulators perceived wholesale MSB operations as closely resembling 
traditional Hawala in being difficult to identify in form and hard to distinguish 
genuine form illicit operation, the MSB structure here vulnerable to criminal 
misuse. The complexity of transactions flowing from this model is not 
immediately apparent to customers or other MSBs. The stakeholder group 
(SG) viewed banks and MSBs as regulated in the same manner to service 
remittances. The move post 9/11 to use banks had now reverted to using 
MSBs because they provide penetration to rural areas, have banks accounts 
with the same banks as the stakeholders, and offer better rates393 and faster 
service delivery.394 
The RG considered future operations in the light of new risks from emerging 
technology, and the need to anticipate regulatory changes to prevent criminal 
abuse from new operational methods and structures. This did not feature in 
the business strategies of MSBs, despite the potential for mobile and internet 
technology to provide low cost access.395 The risk from new technology 
warrants concern, given that Somali initiatives have been associated with Al-
Shabab terrorist finance. 
 
6.5.3 Risk assessment and management 
The risk associated with MSB operation was summarised as follows. 
Widely been used in both terrorist funding and what I would term 
serious organised criminal activity. In the past this has been 
substantially in drugs activity and tax fraud which is very substantial and 
damaging to the national economy.396  
Remittances were seen as offering cost effective speedy mechanisms for 
moving money: ‘Benefits to the criminal in that it has no single line audit trail 
of the cash going from the customer in the UK to the overseas                                                              
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beneficiary.’397 Despite regulation improving record keeping, risk 
assessment, risk management processes, and external accountability, which 
the Hawala lacked, MSB operations continue to pose a challenge to the 
identification of illicit transactions.  
The SG group confirmed that regulation enabled MSBs to provide a paper 
trail that was previously absent or problematic, this being critical to the 
detection and retrieval of diverted funds: ‘Tracking systems are in place so 
we know MSBs are regulated in the same way’ to ‘make sure there is always 
a paper trail’.398 
Operators focussed on risk assessment to protect against misuse by 
‘customers’ who are criminals and terrorists. Regulators focussed on 
countering complicity by MSBs for ML, seen as the greatest threat. 
Supervision and investigatory policy centred on educating businesses about 
methods of exploitation for criminal misuse, promoting compliance to 
improve sector protection. Whilst the RG did not include specialists in TF, the 
issue of education about TF is probably not played out to protect covert 
investigation methods, roles, and the identity of investigators. 
The low threshold for registration, a sector risk, has implications for 
increasing reliance on MSBs to facilitate payments and enhance 
jurisdictional coverage, thereby justifying EDD requirements. This needed 
regulatory adjustment to limit access to the sector by undesirable operators 
who lack competence. 
A number of cases … where a criminal MSB has entered a relationship 
with one of these wholesale MSBs and have put some money through 
….. whatever country.399 
Wholesale MSB transactions and third party settlements obscure transaction 
transparency: ‘This provides a level of anonymity to criminals for money 
transfer, a further obstacle to clear audit trails for criminal investigation.’400 
The use of intermediaries also disrupts the audit trail. 
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The complete information on the payer follows the money … the 
transfer rather than going to the beneficiary … goes to a third party who 
does not know why they have got this as they are not the beneficiary. 
The country where the beneficiary is they don’t get the complete payer 
information so the trail goes dead.401 
The EDD required between financial institutions was a point of divergent 
opinion. Operators viewed this as unnecessarily increasing their compliance 
burden, duplicating effort, and requiring internal policing of the sector. One 
operator considered this lacked purpose since HMRC audits did not address 
this. Regulators, however, supported this approach, with sector risk and 
evidence of misuse necessitating action. The regulators’ position was linked 
to their responsibilities and accountability; action against risk was taken with 
a broader view of the financial sector and reputational risk to the UK. 
Agent operators’ viewed risk as emanating from customers or businesses 
outside the sector. Regulators' perceptions assumed criminality as a norm in 
the sense that there would always be a risk of misuse, and that it was 
unrealistic to expect that this could be completely eradicated. Operators 
viewed risk as exceptional, with service quality the priority and customer 
integrity the norm. ML investigations and compliance audits have revealed 
criminal misuses of MSBs through wholesale transactions. Requiring EDD of 
MSB to MSB relationships aims to identify and trace wholesale transactions 
that are not otherwise apparent to supervisors, to restrict the capacity for 
illicit transactions between businesses. This protects against misuse 
remaining hidden within wholesale transactions, which lack transparency, 
and which EDD aims to expose, since registration is not an indicator of 
ongoing compliance and protection. Operators opposed this burden, but 
regulators viewed this as justified and effective in addressing risk, and whilst 
acknowledging sector concerns that EDD exposes sensitive commercial 
information which compromises competitive advantage, considered these 
concerns did not outweigh the risks.  
An objection to that has come from the business that say that if we as a 
retail MSB let other MSB’s see who all our customers are we will get cut 
out and lose the business.402                                                              
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The competitive nature of the sector, and the need to run MSB operations 
parallel to other businesses, is also recognised as exposing MSBs to the risk 
of misuse, poor compliance, and the diversion of funds.  
If you are running a corner shop and you have a bill to pay the 
temptation is to use the money that they have taken for you to pay their 
bills. That means people lose out.403  
The stakeholder group identified transactions to foreign banks as being at 
high risk for the loss of property from poor the regulatory compliance of 
overseas entities. Whilst this was subsequently reimbursed this risk 
prompted the selection of MSBs instead. The rates offered by some MSBs 
were considered an indicator of misuse, suggesting that criminal funds 
sustained the MSBs as a ‘front’ to criminal laundering.    
Supported, by criminal finances so the only way they are able to offer 
such rates is because they take a large amount of money that is 
knowingly or unknowingly to them the proceeds of crime.404 
Operators considered third party transactions time intensive, and their 
assessment of the effectiveness of regulation was inclusive of this impact 
balanced with risk. Regulators, however, focus solely on risk, with essential 
due diligence securing the identity of parties and the transparency of 
transaction purpose to avoid illicit misuse.  
All the money laundering … seems to be around situations where there 
is no ID or there is no proof of where the money came from and there 
have been no questions asked or answers provided. It’s just general 
ignorance.405  
Regulators were sensitive to the cultural context of MSB operation: 
Cultural thing in the Pakistani communities that is a normal thing to take 
money and give it to this person, but that looks more suspicious in a 
different context.406  
This underlies the importance of context to suspicion, and the need for 
specific indicators for TF. Regulators had a more objective view of the 
context, which was different to that of operators, and was informed by a 
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different set of normative standards and perception of risk, emphasising 
further the need for TF suspicion indicators. 
The risk of MSB misuse is their capacity for high volumes of transactions, 
enabling the intermingling of illicit funds: ‘giving the money layer of 
legitimacy.’407 These are difficult to detect at the placement stage, thereby 
compromising the integrity of funds when placed into bank accounts, and 
making subsequent detection and traceability problematic.408 MSBs are high 
risk if criminal elements perceive them as lacking regulatory compliance, or 
motivated to complicit operation for profit.409  
A number of businesses are run essentially run by criminals as well as 
those businesses who are either turning a ‘blind eye’ or who are 
through capacity constraints just not able to properly protect 
themselves.410 
Terrorist finance risks remain an important goal in light of the continued 
threat to the UK, and international AML/CTF standards aim to minimise this 
risk. The risk of misuse of MSBs post 9/11 was recognised.  
There was a lot of speculation that the funding of 9/11 was through 
money transfer through outlets ... in the States. That put a lot of weight 
behind the need to regulate money transfer systems. Then … we had 
the FATF special recommendations which … targeted to CTF and 
special recommendation 7 … we have to have an audit trail for MSB.411 
The risk to reputation for stakeholder charitable groups was a clear threat, 
given the areas they remitted to were mainly in ‘Asia, Middle East and Indian 
subcontinent’,412 where the risk of funds being diverted for terrorism was 
high. Charitable organisations recognised the need to monitor all partners, 
including MSBs, banks, and other organisations used to disseminate funds at 
destination.413 The effectiveness of the MLR in protecting against the misuse 
of funds beyond the UK is limited for overseas charitable operations.414  
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There was a divergence of opinion about the risk of MSBs misusing money 
for TF. Operators considered this unlikely considering the customer group 
and the low values remitted. Regulators regarded these amounts as 
potentially having an impact for terrorist groups,415 but recognised the 
difficulty in identifying these as terrorist: ‘How do you know that that 
individual you are dealing with is going to send £300 that is going be used to 
contribute to a bomb?’416 Whilst regulation may be sensitive to detecting 
‘smurfing’, where TF transactions are below the thresholds triggering EDD as 
linked transactions,417 low value remittance patterns disguise this. Terrorist 
purposes remain hidden,418 with both groups agreeing that detecting terrorist 
intent was impossible: ‘given the money..of legitimate provenance [could be] 
paid in by  individual, into a legitimate business,  who would withstand 
scrutiny.’419 The interviews fortunately revealed little evidence of the need to 
resort to ethnicity as a suspicion trigger here.420 
The link between areas of terrorist activity, migrant diaspora populations, and 
associated charitable donations were seen as potential risks/sources of 
terrorist support. 421  
The CTF and insurgency funding where money is collected to be sent 
overseas … is more in keeping with the normal business transaction 
size but may be more significant in relation to terrorist hotspots.422  
Stakeholder groups stated that many distinct communities made private 
Zakaat donations. Informal charitable: ‘community collection you can corrupt 
quite easily you only need to know the right people,’423 emphasising the need 
for donations through the regulated charitable sector. Charities prefer to 
capture donations by direct debit to provide a paper trail424 and maximise 
charitable potential. 
                                                             
415S201 
416S202 
417S105 
418S209 
419S201 
420S2023 
421S105 
422S209 
423S201 
424CN101, S112 
294  
The capacity to trace high-risk transactions across the transaction journey is 
essential to link any diversion of charitable funds to specific terrorist 
groups.425 Jurisdictional risk is also relevant where MSBs operate in high-risk 
corridors.  
Often deal with developing countries or countries that might traditionally 
be associated with terrorist finance or a terrorist risk to the UK. Those 
countries that you tend to have concern about from a terrorist 
perspective are also the countries that tend to have large remittance 
communities and operate Hawala in the UK and in their home 
countries.426 
MSBs' capacity for moving money at speed to other jurisdictions was 
perceived as an inherent risk,427 but terrorist transactions were recognised 
as unlikely to arouse suspicion.  
It is more difficult for the MSBs to identify because of the size of the 
transactions and the routing of the transaction may seem very similar to 
other ones that are coming across their counter. It may be they are 
routed within a community. 428   
The attractiveness of potentially using a small MSB for TF was viewed as 
substantial.   
If I were involved in terrorism I would far rather go to a small money 
remitter who has very limited resources in terms of checking who I am 
and what my motives are than go to the bank … a small perhaps a one-
man business in a particular community … then I have a much better 
chance of getting my transaction completed … my anonymity 
maintained.429 
The distinction in the misuse of MSBs for ML, and the use of complicit MSBs, 
was not as relevant for TF: ‘It may be that they prefer to use a [branded high 
street providers] as they know they can get the money in safely and they 
know it will be delivered.’ 430Evidence suggests that: ‘people who have then 
been found out to be terrorists they have used as many good regulated MSB 
as they illegitimate ones.’ 431  
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Regulators were aware that low values could easily be structured and readily 
disguised within usual remittance activity: ‘a cloaking activity to deal with illicit 
money.’432 The TF risk for complicit MSBs compared to legitimate MSBs is 
unquantifiable but high, given their propensity to depart from regulation to 
facilitate illicit transactions. Providing the sector with accurate information 
and profiles of TF is difficult given the rarity of misuse, thus preventing the 
collation of evidence of patterns for TF activity and actors.  
Both interview groups recognised regulation as challenging but in different 
ways. Regulators perceived the challenge as relating to regulatory 
compliance to control the misuse of MSBs, and the capacity of due diligence 
processes to arouse suspicion of TF. Regulation secures more robust 
standards, considered by both groups to deter potential misuse generally 
through enhanced risk of detection. Regulators did not seem to question the 
weakness of the regulatory regime for preventing terrorist finance, seeming 
to regarding it as necessary to give effect to international obligations and to 
be seen to be protecting against risks. Issues of effectiveness were touched 
on, and the conclusion appears to be that the regulatory regime here is not 
designed to be proactive or pre-emptive, but to afford after-event intelligence 
analysis for investigation. The value of the latter is unquantifiable, and often 
not made public, and does little to incentivise the sector or inform it about TF 
risks, given the threat of criminal sanctions. It also weakens the strategy 
underpinning the merger of the AML and CTF regimes. 
Trust was conceived by regulators in terms of reputation concerning service 
delivery, and the loss of reputation was seen as a pressure point for 
compliance. Community pressures were considered relevant to inducing 
non-compliance, but this did not align with evidence in the operator 
interviews.  
Because of the pressure that is on them within those communities, they 
are small communities where everybody knows each other, they 
present a greater risk at the moment than perhaps other sectors do.  
Regulators more than operators, are attuned to the misuse of MSBs beyond 
poor regulatory compliance, where parallel criminal associations within                                                              
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communities trigger this: ‘they have a symbiotic relationship.’433  Terrorists 
and criminals share the need to exploit effective systems for moving money 
without detection.  
The degree and risk of misuse of MSBs for TF was not clear. Regulators 
reflected the views of operators that detecting TF was difficult.  
 
There is objectively very little you can do to know whether that 
customer is a terrorist or not. You can always check all of your 
customers against the HMT list … but the chances are that one of your 
customers is one of the 8,000 people on that list … very very little 
chance.434 
 
It was also recognised that HMT sanctions lists are publically accessible to 
terrorists, although anonymity is crucial.  
 
The terrorists also know who is on that list and they are not going to use 
those to send money … how will anyone know they are providing a 
service for a potential terrorist.435 
 
This makes the drive pre436 and post 9/11 for international TF regulation of 
MSBs questionable if measures are ineffective in achieving these aims. 
Measures not capable of detecting terrorist finance are unlikely to be 
effective in preventing it. 
Motivation to support terrorism stems from ideological concerns, personal 
morality, and a desire to support terrorist goals,437 mixed with other 
concerns: ‘Terrorists in the countries concerned are often seen by the local 
population as altruistic care organisations. In Palestine, Hamas is doing all 
the social care.’438  
The concern of terrorist groups parallel support of social welfare, supports 
the view that MSBs were targeted to prevent the misuse of charitable funds 
for TF, although how this can be effectively achieved given the constraints in 
detecting suspicion and the relevant volumes is uncertain. Regulators used                                                              
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the exploitation of humanitarian funds to: ‘try and find a resonance with 
people’439 to incentivise community diligence about MSB selection, purposely 
drawing on community and religious interests to protect community interests 
through community intolerance for the exploitation of charitable donations.440 
Regulators were more aware of how risks arise and need to be addressed 
based on their experience, sector knowledge, and knowledge of the 
laundering methods available to exploit risks. The focus of the investigator 
groups was predominantly on ML for criminal exploitation. TF was conceived 
within this, with the possible links between organised crime justifying this 
approach and risk. 441 
I think it is about the same personally and ultimately saying it is 
terrorism is just putting a label on it. It is criminal activity and if you 
convince people that what is going on is criminal. 442 
The terror/crime nexus was not evident at policy or operational level. 
Regulators remain divided according to funding purpose, with joint ML and 
TF investigations not evident from interviews. The terror/crime nexus and 
AML measures may have been historically relevant for funding of Irish 
terrorist groups,443 but there is little evidence to justify this approach for 
ideologically based groups, particularly in the UK. 
The banks’ perception of the risk of MSBs, and the limitation of services to 
APIs,444 was understood as outweighing their supervisory effort and risk to 
reputation: ‘If they [MSBs] are involved unwittingly in a substantial ML case 
that hits the press they [banks] don’t regard that as worth the candle for the 
bad publicity they would get.’445 
This unintended consequence of the RBA was regarded as problematic, but 
regulators considered this beyond their influence although they were aware it 
may drive MSBs to greater wholesale activity, high risk, and less transparent. 
MSBs viewed this as unfairly restricting their operative capacity. Charitable 
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organisations made no mention of the withdrawal of banking services to 
MSBs when dealing with high-risk corridors, but the Dahabshill litigation was 
not an issue at the point of interview.  
Risks were viewed by regulators as the first stage in a coordinated response 
to addressing these, requiring flexibility since risks shift over time as new 
threats emerge: ‘The risks vary over time depending on how well law 
enforcement regulators and what the trade do about keeping the risky 
businesses out.’446 Regulators viewed the RBA as effective in enabling 
MSBs to proportionally and effectively manage new risks. They did not 
appear to appreciate the value of additional guidance to achieve this, but 
probably did not want this to bridge gaps in operator competence. 
 
6.5.4 Detecting suspicious activity  
Trust, or reputation, within a community was perceived as offering the 
capacity for increasing the arousal of suspicion derived from operators' 
knowledge of the community and customers.  
It may be that it is routed within a community if they are registered and 
doing everything right with their AML recording, may be at less risk 
because they know the community better.447  
Operators did not perceive their knowledge offered any advantage for the 
specific detection of terrorist finance, with many considering it unlikely within 
their existing customer base. Regulators considered the fact that MSBs 
‘know their local communities and who people are’ afforded and advantage 
in raising suspicion here.448 
The provision of information about sector risks was seen as a strategically 
important element of risk reduction, and an integral element of sector 
supervision, with audits informed by information from the investigation of 
criminality and past prosecutions and previous regulatory non-compliance. 
Policy aimed at sector education about risks aimed to ensure the sector was 
                                                             
446S209 
447S209 
448S201 
299  
well informed and to improve its capacity for protection. This only extended 
to ML and not TF investigations, the latter being security sensitive. The 
strategy was commendable but was also punitive, with awareness operating 
to establish knowledge as an unchallengeable platform from which suspicion 
should be triggered. Later failure by operators to address these risks 
presented the threat of criminal sanction by regulators for non-compliance. 
This strategy emerged from MSB evidence in ML prosecutions; their initial 
exploitation without knowledge was not subsequently capable of providing a 
defence to their recurring misuse.449 This addresses what is perceived as the 
sector’s ‘blind eye’ approach.  TF offences require reasonable cause to 
suspect the terrorist purpose, lack of which is a defence for failure to 
disclose. Reasonable cause can only be drawn in the regulatory context from 
factors identified by regulators that should have caused the formation of 
suspicion. The financial sector is liable for negligence in failing to act on 
these. The effectiveness of TF reporting is compromised where indicators 
relied on are general to ML and not TF processes, and reasonable cause is 
open to question here.  
Positive partnership and education, rather than sanctions in the first instance, 
are preventative enforcement strategies. Compliance is secured through the 
threat of personal criminal liability, unlike banks which are subject to 
regulatory sanctions and fines, and where individuals are insulated from 
liability, commercial and criminal. 
Regulators conceived the MSB presence within local communities as both a 
driver and a barrier to the operation and reporting of suspicion.  
Because they operate in small communities they are also quite exposed 
to the riskier parts of those communities and less willing therefore to 
report suspicious … they might suffer or the business might suffer.450  
Operator interviews did not indicate customer ethnicity or community 
allegiances as ousting the need to apply full due diligence, MSBs were 
motivated to protect personal and business reputations. TF remains an area 
to which too little consideration is given as the formation of suspicion. HMRC 
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approved guidance is relevant to assessing the obligation to disclose in any 
prosecution, but does not address TF sufficiently. This is perhaps due to the 
secrecy surrounding TF investigations, with prosecution being a rarity and 
ML forming the mainstay of prosecutions. It was, however, recognised that: 
With terrorist financing we are looking at very small amounts of money 
that are below the threshold for the ML … to get suspicion you have to 
do a lot of digging and most small business would not be able to do that 
… they won’t have the resources.451 
 
The need to investigate further is only triggered when suspicion is raised, 
and this is unlikely if customers, values, and transaction patterns are not 
considered to be relevant for TF. Terrorists need do no more than remit 
regularly in small values, and then increase this across several operators at 
peak times of religious festivals to avoid suspicion. Factual circumstances 
relating to the customer or transaction to arouse suspicion and prompting the 
need for further investigation, only apply where these are unusual, the key 
issue being: ‘at what point does unusual become suspicious’.452 Terrorists 
and criminals aim to: ‘enter this normal banding.’453 Suspicion is only 
triggered when: 
‘the activity is so far out of what is normal business.. unusual is 
something not quite right and if you cannot apply rational thought to it 
then.. perhaps you would become suspicious.’454 
Applying due diligence controls at a level to reveal suspicion to bridge the 
gap in the lack of TF indicators goes beyond what is demanded of the 
transaction risk, and is overly burdensome, but nonetheless appears to be 
the preferred approach. 
Regulators were keen to enforce compliance to improve financial sector 
confidence. The use of ‘comfort indicators’ to assist businesses in assessing 
the suitability of MSBs was dismissed as unreliable and customer service 
focussed, undermining the RBA which has legal force.  
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Comfort indicators around essentially saying if your say that you find 
this characteristic in an MSB you would always want to do business 
with them, you would never want to do that, you would always want 
them to take a risk based approach.455   
Regulators were aware of the banks oversight of MSBs operating as an 
additional layer of supervision, requiring greater due diligence than that 
mandated by regulation. This was considered useful for promoting 
compliance despite the risk of isolating MSBs from the formal sector and 
driving ‘them further underground’.456 Removing this valuable layer of 
oversight was thought to weaken the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework. 
Interviews revealed a desire for more information to assist the RBA, since 
many MSBs found risk assessment challenging: ‘If someone tells me what I 
have to do I’ll do it but if they don’t tell me what I have to do I won’t do it.’457 
Regulators rely on the skill and business knowledge of MSBs to effectively 
apply regulation; this was not assumed from registration but should be. 
Supervisors see their role as guiding not educating, since they lack the 
resources for this given the breadth of operational risks. 
The point is nobody has actually come up with any kind of granular 
approach that you will enable to you to say I am a money transmission 
company on the Pakistan corridor so what do I have to do particularly 
because it's going to Pakistan. 458    
Whilst more information from investigation and supervision can illuminate 
risks and circumstances that should arouse suspicion, there is no template to 
assist risk assessment in all situations. The sector was keen for: ‘case 
studies specific to their business areas.. and how the risks came about and 
what the risk looks like.’459 Regulators endeavoured to provide information 
on risk, the communication between supervisors and the MSBs assists the 
sector’s capacity to apply the MLR and provide ‘intellectual confidence’ in the 
RBA. 
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6.5.4.1 Suspicious activity reporting  
Regulators were keen to improve compliance with SARs in respect of quality 
and incidence. The free form nature of the reporting process avoided a 
prescriptive tick box approach,460 but did not always yield the quality of 
information needed, leaving regulators feeling that they were undertaking 
‘due diligence’ in place of  the MSB filing the SAR.461 
Whist aware of the efforts of MSB investigation prior to filing,462 the quality of 
SARs was not uniform across the sector. Regulators were aware,463 and 
operators confirmed, a significant level of operator misunderstanding about 
the circumstances triggering the filing of a SAR, and were keen to address 
this. Most operators were aware of the process for filing, but it is the 
circumstances triggering this which are critical.464 After-event filing and 
defensive reporting were acknowledged as problematic, limiting the 
operational effectiveness of subsequent investigation. Operators mistakenly 
thought that post-transaction filing provided a defence to ML charges, with 
regulators relying on education and the threat of prosecution for 
enforcement.   
Regulators wished to achieve prompt reporting before transactions because 
this is critical to protection where suspicions are terrorist related and is key to 
investigation. This may necessitate communication with overseas agencies 
to obtain and verify intelligence revealed in the SAR, enabling further 
investigation and a determination of the need for refusal of consent. TF 
SARs are limited by the seven-day consent period, but no moratorium period 
applies since assets will either be immediately seized or refusal will not occur 
immediately, and the transaction will be subject to subsequent ‘ongoing 
surveillance’. Offences for non-disclosure of terrorist funding activity capture 
both non-disclosure and late disclosure where there is no reasonable excuse 
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for failure to comply.465 For TF, timely disclosure is critical to prevent the 
fulfilment of the terrorist purpose, as opposed to the mere prevention of the 
movement of already criminal funds for ML. Regulators know that MSBs are 
unaware of the importance of the obligation to report suspected offending 
before entering into any arrangements, but failed to fully capitalise on this to 
improve timely disclosure.  
Persistent refusal of business in preference to SARs filing was recognised as 
a feature of non-compliance,466 evident in operator interviews. Regulators 
considered this as possibly indicating complicity, alerts from the supervisors 
having provided information on risks to arouse suspicion,467 but this was not 
acted on by the sector.  
Regulators’ concerns also centred on the low incidence of SARs for both ML 
and TF to that expected, given the volumes of remittances and the servicing 
of jurisdictions associated with terrorist activity. This begs the question as to 
how regulators determine the ‘correct’ number of SARs, in particular for TF, 
and if this is truly quantifiable, and why the relevant parameters have not 
been shared with the sector to achieve this given that the use of formal 
reporting systems is critical. Operators made little comment about the 
relevance or effect of any ‘transaction hold period’ pending consent, 
surprising given the fact given that face-to-face interaction with a customer 
requires a prompt refusal, especially for terrorist funding cases. The low 
incidence of SARs is probably explained by the strategy of refusing custom, 
and avoiding filing, rather than the risk of future loss of custom.468 Regulators 
rightly demonstrated limited concern for economic tensions surrounding 
SARs filing, but neither did they appear to advise the sector about how to 
balance an investigation needed to confirm suspicion, where further 
questions may alert customers to the operators’ suspicions and the 
operators’ duties to report. The risk of criminal liability arising from the tipping 
off offence was a real concern for operators.   
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SARs are shared between regulatory agencies pursuant to a data 
agreements confined to the supervision purpose and general data.469 
Supervisors do not have access to SARs since these are confidential to the 
sender and recipient, but this regime is discussed during audits and 
supervision contact.470 Regulators confirmed that the value of SARs for 
preventing terrorism lies in the additional intelligence yielded about current 
activity in relation to known suspects. They did not reveal new ‘targets for 
investigation, but this did not undermine their value'471 in alerting about the 
activity of known suspects not under current surveillance.  
‘SARS can be on the system for five years and have not meant 
anything  but on a particular day  when someone makes an enquiry it 
becomes ..the most important piece of information.’472 
There was a slight disjunction between the regulator and the operator groups 
regarding the issues of SARs feedback. The former were keen to educate 
the sector about relevant risks to inform the SARs process, but also had the 
parallel agenda of knowledge of sector risks acting as a trigger for non-
compliance and potential prosecution. Operators were keen to secure direct 
feedback to indicate the value of reporting activity, and to know that their 
suspicions were credible473 and to be informed about risk, given the time and 
effort taken to complete SARs. Individual feedback currently offered by the 
regulators was viewed by operators as less valuable since it was subject to 
confidentiality, which only benefitted individual businesses. Individual 
feedback was only given where a SAR was defensive, filed retrospectively, 
and of poor quality through an ‘educational correction’ process and a warning 
about the need for future improvement and compliance. The sector’s desire 
for more generic feedback was positive474  regulators incorporating this into 
existing sector outreach projects which provided a ‘broad brush picture .. the 
industry specific picture.’475 
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Regulators were concerned that reporting was confined to suspicious 
transactions, and was not inclusive of ‘activity’ which they were keen to 
address. The benefit of enforcing this approach is no doubt intended to 
capture the reporting of the suspicious activity of other MSBs in alignment 
with the EDD requirement. This will further increase the sense of distrust 
between MSBs. 
The SARs process is slightly modified to accommodate the investigatory 
process relevant to terrorist funding offences. This requires a different level 
and intensity of investigation, necessitating an interface with foreign security 
agencies within more focussed time frames, and involving different security 
parameters for effective prevention. However,  it is a contradiction that 
terrorism should require ‘specialist investigation’ based on separate SARs 
reports in recognition of the difference between TF and ordinary criminality, 
but instead rely on SARs reporting triggered by  general ML standards to 
assist in the detection of suspicion in the first instance. 
 
6.5.5 Impact and effectiveness of the MLR 2007 
Operators identified additional burdens resulting from regulation and in the 
context of the current economic climate, the sector dynamics, and 
reputational risk. Regulators’ view of impact was very different. They were 
aware of, and sensitive to, the economic impact of legislation but remained 
firm in pursuing their regulatory agenda. ‘Regulation has a cost, the more 
regulate you have the more compliance you need to have, every time you 
have compliance it puts a burden on the business.'476  Disproportionate 
regulatory demands were recognised to adversely affect smaller businesses, 
failing to provide an: ‘even playing field’477 but was regarded by regulators as 
stemming from operators lack of skilled application. The demands of the 
legislative framework and risk of criminality were not excused by the burden 
of compliance. Policymakers are attuned to considering regulatory impact 
when reviewing measures and proposing changes to regulation, requiring 
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these to be justified in line with government policy to minimise the burden on 
small businesses.478 Regulators were surprised at the sector demand for 
more legislation; this contrasts with that of the small providers who had little 
appetite for increased regulation that was not necessary and effective. Whilst 
larger operators were more tolerant and supportive of regulation, smaller 
operators were opposed to this. Thus, there was a major divide between this 
group and the regulators. 
Regulators and operators were both agreed about the importance of the 
sector’s commitment to implementation,479 and the distinction between those 
businesses misusing regulation to run corrupt businesses that appear 
legitimate, and those  ‘doing things in the spirit of the Act [even if] not strictly 
compliant.’ 480 
Recent guidance on the determination of the average transaction does not 
necessarily reveal credible suspicion, but provides a ‘statutory’ model which 
attempts to prescribe a ‘norm’ to reveal anomalies for further investigation. In 
some instances, this only imposes an artificial calculation, making due 
diligence more onerous, but it is critical to supporting the finding of suspicion 
for some operators. Some operators considered this approach too 
prescriptive, ousting capacity for sensitive application of the RBA. 
Regulators sought all means and opportunities to increase the impact and 
effectiveness of the MLR. Wholesale MSBs, being high risk, were regarded 
as a focal point connecting smaller and larger businesses.  
If we got them to comply because it is a pitch point, so basically we 
concentrated all our firepower on them to try and drive up the  level of 
compliance and then that should start filtering down.481 
An unintended consequence of creating a heightened awareness of risk is 
the action taken to address this. The size of the MSB sector makes this 
easily targeted by law enforcement, compared to the banking sector in cases 
of systematic abuse of considerable scale. The success of the RBA rests on 
a reassessment of risk once the relevant processes have been applied, and                                                              
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more could perhaps be done to incentivise further compliance by re-
categorising the sector risk in the light of regulation. The market dominance 
of banks, and their risk-averse attitude, has not been questioned. The RBA 
draws on supervision to apply minimum but effective standards of due 
diligence; however, over-zealous application can be damaging, and is not 
actionable or a concern of regulators. 
The fit and proper test limiting sector access has caused concern because it 
is regarded as easy to circumvent. 482 
Has not been that vigorous. There are no people who have failed … 
and the question is then whether or not they are still running money 
transfer business as shadow directors or in some other capacity. It is 
not difficult to get around.483   
Others commented that ‘you can fail the fit and proper test … there are 
people who have failed … who shouldn’t have. It's quite broad brush'.484 This 
suggests that the test does not effectively exclude those who are unsuitable, 
or those failing to comply with disclosure: ‘People don’t understand that they 
should disclose even if they got a caution from the police.’485 Regulators 
agreed with operators that only obvious impropriety was excluded, and that 
registration could be manipulated to evade scrutiny.486 Refusals of HMRC 
registration under the fit and proper test remain less than 22 for all years 
prior to 2012, with 55 rejections for 2012-13.487 Interviewees anticipated that 
the effectiveness of the regime would be buttressed by the more robust FCA 
test,488 but the impact of this on SPI registration489 remains to be seen. 
Additionally, agents of SPI and API are not subject to either the HMRC or the 
FCA test, a situation regarded as warranting action based on evidence of 
manipulation of this loophole.490 
Regulators considered their approach to be transparent and informative, 
having impact on SARs reporting, indicating the potential misuse of MSBs.                                                              
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This has maximised the opportunity for prompt investigation denied by 
defensive reporting, but was described as a ‘carrot and stick’491 approach. 
The sharing of information from investigations, prosecution, and supervision 
audits through targeted initiatives to reduce sector exploitation, has also led 
to possible later sanctions against businesses which fail to address 
actionable risk. Educating individual businesses about their SARs reporting 
to improve quality was one strand of sector education and feedback, but was 
narrow in effect and time intensive. A competence or qualification element in 
the fit and proper test would reduce the need for this. 
You have got to get people to understand what they are seeing and to 
report appropriately it is all about understanding risk which is why the 
thing we do is all about communication.’492 
 
Feedback from investigators in addressing risks derived from often complicit 
and ‘outright’ criminal misuse was balanced by supervisory guidance to 
assist in the day-to-day risk management that MSBs face. Operator 
interviews revealed supervisors feedback to have been of variable quality 
and not always helpful in enhancing the effective application of regulation.493 
 
Regulators considered that operators failed to take time to understand how 
the MLR applied by reference to current guidance. ‘Regulation is good in so 
much as it has the effect of discouraging illegality, abuse of MSB for ML has 
reduced I am sure because of the MLR so that is a good thing.’494 Regulators 
were, however, not as confident in their effectiveness in relation to TF. The 
RBA has given firms the option as to how they choose to manage the risks 
identified and mitigate their burden and cost. 495  
They can choose how they interpret the law, obviously within the 
framework of guidance. They can look at HMRC guidance, look at the 
law and see what they want to do. That could mean that one firm will 
approach issues around customer due diligence ongoing monitoring … 
in a different way from another.496  
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Operators considered that the potential flexibility of the RBA was hindered by 
its vagueness, given the risk of non-compliance, but prescriptive thresholds 
rather than guidance from the supervisor were unhelpful. Whilst HMRC 
assesses compliance, there is no clear overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of the regime to indicate deterrence and the value of 
prevention.497 The RBA is predicated on the application of risk management 
processes without the quantification of success that would require cross-
cutting audits, but these are unlikely to be actionable since they are time-
intensive. 
Operators considered that regulation was intrusive for customers, and HMRC 
provides support to assist complaint handling.498 Regulators viewed these 
concerns as follows.  
Understandable concern and resentment amongst ordinary members of 
the public … that are being asked for ID for trivial sums … again and 
again. This is not a direct consequence of the regulation, it is as a result 
of business taking an over-cautious approach. 499  
Customer inconvenience did not oust regulation given that ‘most people in 
the UK are law-abiding decent citizens that don’t want criminals to abuse 
[MSBs] … they understand that we have to do something to weed out the 
bad transactions'.500 An over-cautious approach to applying regulation 
derives from uncertainty from lack of experience or skill, or lack of guidance 
to assist in determining the level of risk and the appropriate response.  
 
Try to reach accommodation there, where we have effective control 
over their MSB customer without that being overbearing and risking the 
retail MSB loss of customers.501 
Regulators were mindful that the effects of regulation remain unquantifiable: 
‘We can’t say whether it has had a positive or negative impact.’502 More 
indicators of its effectiveness would incentivise implementation. SARs remain 
the sole indicator, with regulators recognising that more could be done in 
‘providing cases that SARs submitted by that MSB on that day had an impact                                                              
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in preventing this terrorist outrage'.503 Security and intelligence 
considerations probably preclude this in relation to TF. Some were sceptical 
about the potential usefulness of SARs, given their volume, and questioned 
their scrutiny. 
Stay on the database retrospectively until someone comes to look at it 
with an objective or personal interest …  a source of additional 
information but it won’t necessarily trigger an investigation.504 
Coordinated dialogue, and liaison between agencies with shared 
investigatory and supervisory responsibilities, was evident in interviews, and 
was critical to sharing information on new and emerging threats, supported 
by access to shared information resources.505  There was, however, a 
divergence of views as to the perception of threats. MSBs saw these 
stemming from unregulated operators and the banks; investigators perceived 
them as complicit MSBs, non-compliant and regulated and unregulated 
businesses.506 
Regulators seem to consider that MSBs: 
Do enough so they don’t get caught out. The reality is that HMRC 
doesn’t issue many fines for businesses being non-compliant, it issues 
fines for not being registered.507 
The lack of regulatory enforcement is a potential lacuna in driving effective 
implementation through regulatory sanctions to incentivise MSBs to do the 
‘right’ thing.508  The move from light touch to a more mature and rigorous 
approach to supervision was seen as necessary.509 However, intervening 
before misuse, or before criminal liability, is probably unnecessary since the 
threat of this already incentivises compliance for legitimate MSBs. Criminals 
using non-complaint MSBs will be undeterred by registration status, with the 
MLR assisting detection of misuse through financial investigation.510 A 
proactive approach was considered essential to assisting the visibility and 
detection of unregistered businesses: ‘Searching for businesses who are                                                              
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offering services … proactively going out and finding those businesses 
making sure they registered.’511 Unregistered business were recognised as 
problematic, the aim being to control these through registration.  
The legislative framework provides a mechanism for prevention and 
deterrence, but is not an absolute guarantor of this512, and the success of the 
MLR is conditional upon successful application of the RBA, requiring 
judgment and problem solving beyond literal interpretations.513 To this end, 
one interviewee expressed that they would be instantly concerned and 
suspicious where the MLRO role was assigned to anyone who lacked the 
relevant knowledge, skill, or experience,514 indicating a lack of commitment 
to effective compliance. The effectiveness of the MLR to investigate problem 
transactions hinges on SARs reporting to provide intelligence for 
investigation,515 but while suspicions may be raised this is no guarantee that 
a SAR will be filed.516 Risk assessment is designed to protect the whole 
business by targeting high-risk areas, but risks the possibility of insufficient 
application or over-prescription. The former fails to protect against risk, and 
the latter burdens business.  
Regulators recognised that risk derives from ‘any’ amount of money 
potentially supporting terrorist activity, and the link between some remittance 
corridors and known terrorist hotspots.517 Effectiveness is questionable 
where operators discount the importance of low values, and where terrorist 
funds can be readily disguised within genuine remittance transactions. 
Regulators recognised that occasional transactions can be enhanced 
through smurfing techniques,518 capitalising on peak transmission periods 
associated with religious festivals, and probably making them beyond 
detection. 
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Trying to spot that in the morass … some of the big MSBs have got 
turnover of over a half a million a year trying to spot those tiny individual 
transactions is very very difficult.519  
 
ID requirements were also seen as unlikely to deter hardened terrorists; but 
improved transparency, and the capacity to trace, track, identify, and link 
senders, recipients, and beneficiaries and provided valuable deterrence. 
 
  Tracing back from the person rather than detecting it upfront and 
following through. The legislation there means an electronic or paper 
trail exists. There is an evidential chain for investigators to follow that 
wasn’t there beforehand and that is certainly the case for terrorist 
financing.520 
 
SARs reporting was considered unlikely to prevent a terrorist attack, given 
the lack of specific indicators 521 and the likely difficulty developing these. 
Regulators perceived SARs as important in contributing ‘to the investigation 
of an event after it has happened or in the process is conducting surveillance 
on a suspect rather than identify someone we didn’t previously know 
about'.522 Further investigation may reveal the purpose of transactions and 
the involvement of other actors: ‘It can be preventive if it is used in 
conjunction with surveillance of individuals who are suspected of terrorist 
activity.’ 523 
 
Realistically, there may always be an element of illicit MSB operation, 
increasing where MSBs find regulation is too burdensome and challenging, 
or when they are sanctioned or deregistered. More stringent regulation 
always runs the risk of displacement.  
Have stopped doing money transfer legally but are still doing … illegally 
as some aspects of their import/export business or their travel business.  
I am sure that is going on but no one has done any objective analysis 
… a task force group that said there was about 10% money transfer 
was illegal non-regulated.524 
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Improving effectiveness requires a shift in approach from ‘one that fits all in 
terms of the MLR and I think there is scope for saying some sectors need 
more regulation than others'.525 There is currently little distinction between 
legislative requirements for specific types of MSB activity according to risk.  
 
This would reduce the burdens on business … that are low risk that the 
overhead imposed on them is substantial and arguably disproportionate 
to the risk. In some sectors we supervise, the level of regulation is 
perhaps insufficient to cope with the risk proposed.526  
 
There was clear understanding that regulation ‘is good in so much as it has 
the effect of discouraging illegality, ML and abuse of MSBs for ML'. 527 Not all 
were agreed as to the appropriate extent of regulation. Regulators were 
divided about the value of EDD for MSB-to-MSB transactions: ‘I have to say 
that is an abjuration what is the point of the HMRC regime. What confidence 
can you have if you cannot have confidence in another MSB?’528 Others 
considered that effectiveness is enhanced by lowering thresholds for 
triggering specific checks, but not all agreed.   
 
We do see people doing smurfing of transactions below the level you 
would catch that, but I am not convinced that lowering the thresholds is 
the answer. I think the answer is to do what we have been doing and 
make people much more risk aware.529  
 
The MLR are seen as an essential element protecting the UK financial 
system,530 and preventing MSBs from being a weak link. Criminal and 
regulatory investigation is essential for the detection of those complicit 
businesses which are operating within registration in order to identify their 
criminal role. This is difficult to detect from supervisory audits, requiring multi-
agency investigation and cooperation. Regulators acknowledge that a 
balance must be achieved between risk and regulation, since no amount of 
regulation can completely eradicate non-compliance and misuse. The critical 
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issue is the effectiveness of the current regime in guarding against the risk of 
TF. 
6.5.6 Attitudes to supervision and guidance  
Regulator interviews revealed a clear strategy to improve contact and 
communication with the MSB sector, underpinned by specific projects and 
initiatives targeting the registered sector through forums and conferences. 
This approach was shared by trade associations, supervisors, investigators, 
and policymakers. Trade associations were consulted and included in 
initiatives and consultations on proposed legislative changes, using their 
network of membership for discussion and to promote improved regulatory 
compliance.531 The extent to which trade associations will able to continue to 
influence change in their favour is questionable, given that regulator 
interviews indicated more contact with larger brand-named businesses. The 
position of trade associations may weaken further with changes in the sector 
structure as larger principals and branded businesses dominate, inevitably 
having more ‘sway’ in consultation. 
Supervision, initially viewed as light touch532 in order to encourage 
registration, is now more robust, and seen as a necessary shift to enforce 
standards effectively:  ‘Light touch was the idea but the reality is the regulator 
has now moved away from light touch regulation and is now very 
directive.’533 Within any regime, there is a ‘bedding-in period’ to afford the 
sector time to adjust, understand and apply the regulatory regime, and 
initially focus on education to assist application. Inevitably, as the regime 
matures, the focus shifts as regulatory awareness increases, with the onus 
resting on enforcement and raising standards: ‘Make sure they have got 
controls in place and have gradually been more prescriptive about the nature 
of the controls that need to be in place.’ 534 
Enforcement is seen as key to ensuring ongoing sector commitment to 
improving the quality of overall compliance, perceived as remaining a weak 
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link in the AML/CTF regime. Supervisors were described as being ‘in full-on 
defensive mode they don’t want anything in the guidance to suggest that 
they encourage one MSB to be overly relaxed in relation to another MSB'.535 
HMRC ‘making a conscious stand …and auditing businesses much more 
closely.’536 
The quality and consistency of guidance was a source of comment by 
interviewees, some considered this to have improved over time.537 Other 
considered it would impose: ‘quite a lot more obligations on money 
remittance companies in terms of identifying the source of funds for 
customers’538 was regarded by supervisors as necessary in relation to risk. 
Whilst the quality of general guidance has improved over time,539  guidance 
relating to TF appears poor overall and non-specific, linked to general AML. 
Advice on sending money for charitable causes to high-risk jurisdictions was 
considered ‘totally useless and totally ineffective but at least they can turn 
around and say at least they did give you guidance even if it is not 
particularly useful’.540 This was despite most guidance being industry led, 
resulting from close sector consultation.  
They have put together most of the guidance and we have put out, 
once we are happy that it is effective, into our house style. We had 
working groups that contributed to that guidance … new areas of 
guidance where new risks have developed.541 
Audits offer an opportunity for direct supervision, and are important for 
assessing compliance and detecting changes in sector practice. The 
approach to supervision was considered to be more penetrating and 
intrusive.542 This reflects mature supervision,543 and a more comprehensive 
and nuanced understanding of sector risks, reflecting the extent of guidance 
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needed to support this. ‘I think they getting a better sense of what risk is and 
what is not risk, which is probably good.’544 
All were mindful that an additional layer of supervision operates through the 
banks, which undertake their own MSB audits, and impose their own 
standards of due diligence. Large MSBs/APIs may adopt this role in future as 
the principal/agent model dominates, and APIs become sensitive to the risk 
of loss of market reputation. 
Banks will come in and do an inspection of MSB who are their client as 
they want to protect their own reputations … these aspects of 
supervision by the bank is as important as supervision by HMRC and 
the FSA [FCA].545  
Banks, however, have a different set of priorities to the supervisors; the 
economic relationship and power they exert over MSBs are unequal and 
without accountability. Their actions should not oust the supervisor’s role, 
and the interviews evidenced that this relationship is affecting the sector’s 
structure, raising concerns for future competition.  
Then banks are regulating the sector, the sector is not regulating itself 
but the banks are. They are saying who can and cannot have a bank 
account and who can be active in the sector.546 
The supervisors' role ‘is to play their part in the detection and prevention ML 
and TF through ensuring that any businesses supervised by … are fully 
aware of their responsibilities'.547 This is critical to effective regulation to 
maintain standards, address new risks, and prevent MSB misuse. 
Supervision, guidance and evidence of past non-compliance constitute 
important tools for developing typologies to inform future compliance. 
Regulators aim to inform the sector through feedback and guidance about 
potential risks and methods of misuse, focussing on problem areas but 
clearly placing the responsibility on the sector to comply or face sanctions. 
The regulatory approach is responsive, proactive,548 and protective of the 
sector. Improving standards inevitably increases the existing burden on 
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business, necessitating a payoff from increased protection and regulatory 
effectiveness. 
The regulators appeared to lose sight of the regulatory burden, focussing on 
improving sector protection to ensure ‘that the financial environment is 
hostile’549 for criminal and TF misuse. Supervisors may ultimately not agree 
with the sector about the necessity for a particular action, but consultation is 
important in explaining the purpose of measures and buying-in sector 
commitment to these.  
Business have said they need clarification, and law enforcement have 
said there is a problem here, and we have try to address it with 
guidance and we consult with industry beforehand but we are under 
attention always and we need to be effective with supervision and we 
are also mindful that we need a thriving economy not to kill it.550 
Supervisors viewed the RBA as offering businesses flexibility within guidance 
to apply the legislative framework.  
Small businesses only have limited resources and they understand 
where the risks are better than anyone else. So if they can be left to 
devote their resources to the highest risk area then that does seem 
eminently sensible. 551   
The RBA was seen as a practical mechanism, securing some degree of 
proportionality of action to risk where legislation cannot offer this in relation to 
business size. Risk and suspicion overlap in being subjective states of mind; 
but there is really no definitive template to assist detection except reliance on 
the experience and skill of operators. 
Supervision cannot assist beyond informing about sector risks and providing 
guidance on this. Definitive suspicion indicators were considered 
unworkable, and this is an area of contention between operators and 
supervisors linked to operators’ expectations. 
Tell us what’s suspicious and we'll enforce it. It doesn’t work like that 
we can’t tell you that we can’t transfer suspicion all we can do is 
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transfer lots of information and you use that to decide whether you are 
suspicious or not.552 
The comment does, however, illustrate the gap between the regulators, the 
law, and the challenge in developing SARs reporting, since the regulatory 
model and the criminal justice approach assess the formation of suspicion 
retrospectively and objectively, whilst the regulatory model aims for 
subjective action in the present. 
The RBA is subjective, coloured by different roles and priorities, and is highly 
relevant to SARs reporting. 
It's a very subjective type of regulation … the onus is on you as an 
individual to make decisions about where the risks are and what is 
suspicious and these are in many ways these are quite sophisticated 
judgements … as a one-man business whose basic function is just to 
make money it can be very onerous.553  
Different perceptions of risk are inevitable, given that supervisors are better 
informed because they have access to evidence and data from other 
agencies; but all are constantly working to improve the quality of risk 
awareness, and drive up the quality and frequency of SARs reporting. Sector 
feedback is horizontal between the different regulators and across the MSB 
sector.554 SARs reporting remains a specific concern, with the sector 
regarded as ‘highly resistant’ to accepting advice,555 and changing their 
approach from defensive reporting at some levels. The sector is viewed as 
still being at a ‘very early stage in maturity in understanding risks and 
obligations in mitigating these',556 requiring a shift from aiming for ‘minimal’ 
compliance. 
Supervision has been criticised for lacking enforcement, despite having a 
range of sanctions, and little mention was made of using these in any of the 
interviews. The approach here seems over-cautious.  
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Issue warning letters and we have the sanction of penalties and 
ultimately we have a sanction of criminal prosecution but I am only 
aware of that being that used on one or two occasions. 557   
Supervision has previously been over-reliant on law enforcement to bridge 
the accountability gap where MSBs are complicit in criminality, rather than 
seeking to create a more hostile regulatory environment in which compliance 
in advance of criminality is enforced more vigorously.558 The current 
approach was articulated as ‘increasingly inclined towards removal from the 
register on the basis that one or more of the people running the business is 
not fit and proper'.559 The current focus of supervision ‘is shifting from 
education and awareness to enforcement and that if businesses are not 
doing this that they are struck off and are not operating'.560 The most 
significant challenge to effective supervision was perceived to be: 
Whether we are properly identifying all the businesses that should be 
regulated, whether they understand what they should be doing and 
whether they are complying. 561  
Effective supervision sets standards of operation for the sector that secure 
appropriate management of AML and CTF risks. It does not follow that this 
means that criminal misuse of MSBs will be eradicated,562 and the interviews 
very much conveyed that seeking to use the legislative framework for this 
end would be impossible without harming legitimate business.   
A realisation that a certain amount of this goes on and that you really 
that it is impossible to stop as it is background noise it is below the level 
at which we can make a difference.563 
Regulators used a variety of supervision methods, formal and informal, to 
disseminate guidance, educate, and to make AML and CTF effective. The 
methods included forums, conferences, web and email alerts, consultation, 
and trade briefings. Despite this, supervision has been criticised for not 
making effective use of resources. For the future, supervision will be more  
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risk-based,564 targeting MSBs at risk of non-compliance, and focussing 
action where most needed.  
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the … HMRC to understand the risk 
in that sector and to ensure that their supervision of that sector and 
their engagement, their outreach and their enforcement, is risk 
based. 565 
Supervision strategy is obviously informed and overseen by relevant 
government departments, ensuring this aligns with other agendas, including 
the national organised crime strategy, international and national security 
threats, and international standards. Policy level review secures a 
coordinated strategy and holistic programme of activity as part of a multi-
agency approach in accordance with nationally identified priorities.566 
To ensure that they know the unique risk those countries present and 
the vulnerabilities that may present, due to the lack of capacity or lack 
of political will and that takes those specific risks into account when 
deciding on the country’s risk appetite and the measures they put in 
place including due diligence or whether they do business at all with 
other firms in those countries.567 
 
Supervision draws on international, national, and regional threat 
assessments, regional studies, intelligence, evidence, and guidance at 
different levels568 to identify and manage CTF risk. The sector diversity 
challenges their engagement, and the lack of effective representation is 
viewed by some as the ‘reason for the lack of real relationship and 
supervision'.569 The current quality of compliance is considered to be 
‘generally very poor and the level of resistance to compliance is very 
high'. 570 This contrasts with the attitudes portrayed in operators' interviews. 
MSBs need to develop a more thorough ‘understanding of the risk they face 
and the unique pressures and risks they face in relation to the communities 
in which they operate'.571 Effective supervision has not yet been achieved, 
but the UK has better AML and CTF protection than other jurisdictions, and is                                                              
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assisted by the overall quality of the supervisory regime that is inclusive and 
supportive.    
 
6.5.7 Summary  
The attitudes of those who are partners to the process of implementing the 
legislative framework for the MSB sector influence its effective application. 
Operators demonstrated a positive and mainly deferential attitude to 
supervision, with criticism centring on the burden of implementation and the 
lack of consistent audits. The regulators' perception was that all businesses 
must bear the regulatory burden according to risk, even if this is 
disproportionate. ‘We may think it's intrusive but the regulator doesn’t care … 
well yes they may find it intrusive but what choice have they got?’572 The risk 
of TF to the UK and internationally is too great to be excused in favour of 
commercial ease and profit. Operator interviews indicated that larger MSBs 
had a broader and more informed perspective of relevant issues and policy 
than smaller MSBs. Regulators/ stakeholders appreciated that most MSBs 
'don’t think about it in that policy orientated way as a whole they tend to think 
of what they have to do in terms of their customer'.573 Regulators understood 
the competitive and protective attitude of operators to their business 
interests, an attitude which is seen as having a short-term focus: ‘It’s a 
transaction business, you are not investing money.’574 This leads to a focus 
on operating costs, which is problematic since ‘you can’t necessarily rely on 
it the income from trading … the resources are not there to invest in training 
programmes'.575 Regulators remain bemused and frustrated that businesses 
appear to place compliance costs above the benefits of AML/CTF 
protection.576 Regulators regarded the wider benefits from the MLR, linked to 
the wider policy agenda, as hindered by the lack of pre-requisite knowledge 
for registration.  
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The sector doesn’t have any structure to it in terms of how you acquire 
the relevant knowledge and skills you can’t get knowledge and skills 
really without actually running the business.577 
Investigation and audits of businesses are time-intensive and potentially 
disruptive; but regulators were firm in the need and value of assessing 
compliance in situ.578 The dialogue between regulators and MSBs is 
variable, effective for larger MSBs579 but problematic for smaller businesses 
linked to limited accessibility and ineffective representation.580 Larger MSBs 
were in favour of increased regulation to professionalise the sector, and drive 
out its ‘lower end’.581 A ‘tension’ was noted as inevitably arising from the 
differing agendas and priorities but constructive dialogue existed and was 
valued.582 This was promoted by sharing platforms to promote key 
messages, demonstrating the value of consultation ‘to indicate that we 
welcome their point of view'.583 
The need for evidence of the effectiveness of the MLR was recognised:584  
‘Whatever politicians say or whatever empirical evidence suggests we are in 
a world where people want to feel safe. Safe means more regulation doesn’t 
it?’585 The CTF agenda prioritises safety in requiring businesses to take 
responsibility for their business risks. The attitude of supervisors and 
investigators was one of conditional support, with subsequent accountability 
to protect the reputation of the UK financial sector.  
Constantly seeking to improve the reputation of the industry … to use 
..supervision as a means of clearing out the non-compliant businesses. 
So there is a will amongst the industry to achieve a better reputation. 586  
The current approach is inclusive and transparent to ensure that AML/CTF 
risks are addressed, placing the UK market in the best position to trade 
internationally, with the integrity of the UK financial sector adequately 
protected. 
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6.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has successfully drawn on the fieldwork research to evidence 
the current model of MSB operation in the UK, presenting the risks and a 
unique insight into the views of operators, regulators, and stakeholders in 
addressing these. These views are obtained from a discrete but relevant 
sample, and may not pertain to the whole sector. The operators’ views 
indicated that remittances are sent for specific purposes and are driven by 
customer use, by cost and convenience.  The ‘cultural’ context was relevant 
to the motivation to remit by customers, but not to the model of operation 
within the UK, which bears some superficial similarities with traditional 
Hawala in relation to wholesale activity; however, this arises from different 
factors hindering access to the formal sector. Many of the risks associated 
with a network ‘trust’-based model of operation have been controlled or 
removed by regulation.  
 
In the post 9/11 climate, MSBs were unfairly ‘vilified’ and ‘demonised’ for 
their lack of regulation. Regulation has formalised these services from 
community to business-orientated, commercially driven, regulated 
enterprises with a clear interface with the formal sector. The franchise model 
dominates; high street brands have a clear market presence; family firms 
and independents are the exception; and high risk ‘one-man’ bands have 
been largely driven from operation or confined to agency status. Regulation 
has to some extent standardised MSB operations through the risk 
management process, raising the standards of operation, with regulatory 
duties directing action, limiting discretion, and reducing the risk of misuse 
outlined in chapter 2. The MLR address operational risks, backed up by the 
PSR addressing prudential risk; yet there remains a risk to property from 
unregistered dealers and unscrupulous traders, critically in respect of TF.  
 
The MLR have applied a system of due diligence, supporting the reporting of 
suspicious activity; but effectiveness is compromised by operators' 
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uncertainty about the nature of suspicion, and how and when to act on this. 
Effectiveness in the detection of TF remains problematic due to a lack of 
specific indicators, and poor understanding of the risk of terrorist financing 
generally. This poses a problem for regulators in improving effectiveness 
here if the construction of such indicators is impractical. Regulation has 
‘professionalised’ the sector, securing responsible compliance, but not 
without cost. Implementation in an already competitive environment 
disproportionately affects small businesses, resulting in tangible constraints 
on business and regulatory efficacy. Regulators considered impact as 
inevitable and proportionate to the risks, and were certain that business size 
should not remediate this. The increasingly intrusive due diligence checks 
compromise customer privacy, causing inconvenience and requiring a 
cultural shift, viewed as proportionate where risk were outweighed by the 
increased protection offered generally, but not specifically, against terrorism. 
 
Regulators are driven to address the high risk of MSB misuse, largely from 
illicit operations linked to ML, which also pose a risk for misuse for terrorism. 
The RBA is problematic because it relies on MSB skill, experience, and 
knowledge. These take time to develop, and have not traditionally been 
associated with, or required of this sector. The RBA also requires a sensitive 
balancing of risk and effort in relation to regulatory efficacy. This has not yet 
been achieved, creating tension amongst the different interests and agendas 
of operators and supervisors. The quality of guidance and supervision here is 
critical, and must be supported by enforcement. A gap was noted in the 
sanctioning of regulatory breaches, with room for improved assessment of 
and feedback on the quality of the supervisory regime. 
 
Regulation is guided by informed policy, to which stakeholders contribute to 
address UK risks within the wider context of international concerns relevant 
to terrorist finance. The effectiveness of regulation has been difficult to 
assess, the benefits being deterrence, disruption, monitoring, and detection 
through enhanced vigilance and diligence imposed by MLR. These benefits 
have yielded financial intelligence, and enabled action to prevent terrorism, 
largely through after-transaction analysis. 
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The risk of terrorist finance justified the regulation of these businesses, but 
the main ongoing threat appears to be from criminal misuse; however, the 
terror/crime nexus addressed by the AML and CTF agenda is not relevant to 
all terrorist groups. The RBA has led to external and internal policing of 
MSBs and the financial sector, creating a risk-sensitive culture. Banks are 
now risk averse, and impose conditions of operation that may isolate 
remittance communities, jeopardising their support of charitable donations. 
Such an approach is not in line with the proportionality requirements of the 
MLR. This risks isolating UK remittance communities, and the providers who 
lawfully service high-risk jurisdictions, within a framework of regulation that 
has only ever aspired to manage and minimise the risks of terrorist funding, 
and not entirely eliminate them.        
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
This chapter revisits the original research aims and methodology to present a 
summary of the findings from this research, in particular drawing on the 
fieldwork research, to conclude as to whether, and to what extent, these 
aims have been fulfilled. The research findings briefly are summarised and 
analysed to consider their impact for academics, policy makers, regulators 
and the MSB business sector overall. The findings are presented in the 
context of broader concerns and themes viewed as important in addressing 
the regulation of MSBs in the UK and in their contribution to the effective 
implementation of the wider international framework for CTF. The chapter 
concludes by identifying further areas of research that may add to or broaden 
the  scope of this work in illuminating further as to the effectiveness of the 
CTF regime relating to MSB operation within the UK and internationally. 
 
7.1 Research aims 
This research aimed to assess the effectiveness of the UK AML/CTF 
framework for the regulation of ARS, now termed MSBs, within the UK, 
narrowed in the fieldwork to a consideration of the application of the MLR 
2007. This research aimed to identify the UK model of MSB operation to 
assess the relevance of the socio-cultural context to this and to additionally 
investigate the effectiveness of MLR for preventing the financing of terrorism. 
Further the research aimed to investigate the impact of regulation on MSB 
operation and critical operational relationships. The effectiveness of MSB 
regulation was assessed from the perspective of the participants through 
fieldwork which aimed to capture their attitudes to regulatory implementation, 
supervision and regulatory efficacy. The extent to which the research has 
fulfilled these aims is presented below. 
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7.1.1 The challenge of the fieldwork and its limitations 
The fieldwork was challenging to implement in practice since access to both 
participant groups was problematic. Open source information was relied on 
to access the operator group, and contacting the operator/regulator groups 
posed difficulties, as did arranging the interviews given the participants busy 
schedules and limited availability (see 3.3). Time and concerns about the 
security sensitive issues raised, limited participation in some instances. 
Scheduling of interviews for both participant groups was problematic 
overcome to some extent by telephone interviews (see 3.4.3). Undertaking 
the interviews, subsequent transcription and data analysis  were all time 
consuming but worthwhile, since the fieldwork has revealed rich data which 
confirmed its value. It has successfully revealed the attitudes and 
perspectives of the interview group as to the impact and effectiveness of 
regulation for CTF and fulfilled the research aims. These perspectives could 
not be obtained from any other source and are unique to the fieldwork, 
demonstrating the value of academic research, even where small scale and 
unfunded, in revealing rich perspectives that would not otherwise be shared 
by the sector. 
 
7.1.2 The UK MSB sector – model of operation 
The UK context of MSB operation now bears little resemblance to that 
referred to in the literature in chapter 2. The interviews indicate that the 
traditional model of Hawala had been more prevalent in the UK, but  that 
post regulation its presence was now associated with unregistered illicit 
operation. 
The current UK model of MSB operation only bears superficial similarities to 
traditional Hawala, these being wholesale operation as identified through the 
interviews but was not directly investigated within the fieldwork. 
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The socio-cultural context and trust derived from shared social values and 
ethnicity is not relevant to the UK model of MSB operation, its relevance now 
confined to driving the motivation of communities to remit. The practice of 
consolidation and settlement is limited to whole sale operation, since MSB 
operating independently with little operational cooperation, with settlement 
now occurs through the bank accounts. The UK model of operation includes 
agents, small independents, medium independents, wholesale, and principal 
MSBs. UK remittances are 95% outward unlike the traditional model referred 
to in chapter 2. Trust derived from shared ethnicity or operational interests 
has no relevance to operational relationships, these are defined within 
service quality and regulatory compliance. 
The agency/principal model dominates, regulation appearing to have led to a 
market dominance of principals, APIs and branded MSBs, with the UK sector 
increasingly resembling a ‘banking’ style structure perceived to be an 
advantage in removing high risk MSBs.   UK operation is characterised by 
formality, commercial focus, procedural compliance, sensitivity to risk and 
competitiveness as drivers of operational effectiveness.  UK MSBs are 
selected for their low cost and prompt delivery, service quality and 
jurisdictional coverage; the ethnicity and social status of the operator were 
largely irrelevant. The MSBs’ presence in the UK community is unconnected 
to selection other than in terms of convenience of location. 
 
7.1.3 Effectiveness of regulation for CTF 
The MLR controls many of the risks identified with the traditional operation of 
Hawala (see chapter 2). Operators were generally confident as to their 
compliance with the MLR but were unclear as to their effectiveness for 
preventing TF, struggling to identify circumstances which would arouse 
suspicion of TF. A concern was the lack of sector knowledge about TF, the 
presenting risks and the strategies to protect against this. From an academic 
perspective this is valuable in justifying existing and further research into TF 
and the implications for dissemination to a wider non-academic audience. It 
also informs investigators as to the balance between intelligence gathering 
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and dissemination, overriding security concerns countering the latter where 
this could improve regulatory efficacy. 
The effectiveness of the MLR for CTF appears connected to general 
deterrence provided from the operational control exerted, with due diligence 
and improved record keeping deterring their misuse by enabling transaction 
transparency. In the case of CTF the value appears to derive from 
retrospective intelligence analysis. Regulation appears to have controlled 
many of the risks identified with the traditional model of operation referred to 
in chapter 2, securing normative compliance of these systems in the UK. 
Specific guidance was identified as needed in relation to preventing terrorist 
funding and to support the application of the RBA. Indices of risk linked to the 
tiers of due diligence, and suspicion indicators would assist in maximising the 
effectiveness of the RBA. Reliance on general ML indicators appears 
inappropriate given the difference between ML and TF methods and 
meaningful typologies would assist here. The fieldwork supports the post 
9/11 perspective that detecting TF at the point of placement is nigh on 
impossible, and failure here may incur criminal liability (see 6. 2.1). Further 
guidance in jurisdictional risk relevant to the TF risk would improve the 
quality and consistency of countermeasures across the sector. Existing 
intelligence and academic research into regulator and supervisory styles and 
the effectiveness of these in other jurisdictions, could support the 
development of further guidance. 
The fieldwork revealed a disproportionate burden on smaller and 
independent MSBs, who had limited capacity for investment against further 
regulation, given the nature of their business and low profit margins. 
Regulators viewed this as arising from ineffective regulatory application, the 
demands of regulation beyond the skill set of small operators. The difference 
in the financial skills and knowledge of operators was revealed by the 
interviews and was notably linked to the lack of awareness of the TF context. 
This can only be addressed by a supervisory approach that provides more 
guidance to assist the application of the RBA or by a competence or 
qualification adjustment to the conditions of operation. 
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The research has valuably revealed that even with full compliance, measures 
may not be effective for the detection or prevention of terrorist finance. There 
are few indicators currently drawn on by supervisors to review the 
effectiveness of regulation or its impact. This will be of interest to academics, 
practitioners and regulators, in developing working partnerships to realise 
strategies and methodologies for assessing the effectiveness of regulation at 
all levels. Current reviews focus on regulatory implementation, not impact, 
but FATF assessment has resulted in a shift in focus here to effectiveness. 
 
7.1.4 Impact on consumers 
Interviews confirmed, albeit indirectly, that regulation had not adversely 
impacted on customer privacy nor led to a loss of business and, in respect of 
charitable stakeholders, had brought their business back to the MSB sector. 
Customers were reported to have adjusted to the regulatory changes, and 
the MSBs’ ‘education’ of customers to support regulatory compliance is 
ongoing. Given the importance of outward remittances, their humanitarian 
value and charitable significance is often neglected, and more needs to be 
done to link policy across agencies having differing responsibilities, to protect 
these concerns and provide opportunities for customer representation. 
Consumer representation could be allied to DFID to promote the value of 
remittance activity and services for distinct communities in the UK and 
beyond. 
Regulators actively drew on customer relationships to promote the use of 
registered operators. Charitable donations have been perceived as being at 
risk of diversion for TF, with the West suspicious of the loyalties of the 
migrant community and the gifting of aid. This concern goes beyond concern 
as to ARS regulation to viewing act of charitable giving and the religious 
association on which it is founded, as dubious and suspect. The UK charities 
regulator remains subject to criticism for ineffective sector supervision and 
regulatory enforcement (see 5.3.5).1 TF concerns connect these sectors 
                                                          
1  
331 
 
through the need to verify charitable use at the end of the remittance 
transaction. The fieldwork revealed charities need to secure rural penetration 
through remittance services to deliver to areas of need. Little consideration 
has been given as to how charitable remittances can be controlled to 
minimise their risk of misuse, given the fieldwork indicated this to be a 
concern. Smaller charities lack the networks, contacts and FCO support 
available to larger international organisations. The development of ‘white 
lists’ indicating safe jurisdictions, would be helpful but does not alter the 
methods of collection and delivery. More cooperation between the charitable 
and MSB sectors to explore alternative models is needed to provide a more 
positive political and regulatory solution. 
 
7.1.5 Supervision of the MSB sector 
The research revealed concerns that there was insufficient action by 
supervisors to address unregulated and non-compliant businesses that 
compromise sector reputation. The focus of the regulators is on criminal 
misuse of MSBs, with little action taken for poor regulatory compliance. The 
field work revealed that a supervision lacked focus and a clear strategy for 
implementation. 
The quality of supervision is directly relevant to the effectiveness of 
regulation. A RBA here would enable effective targeting of supervision and 
the much needed more rigorous enforcement of compliance and more 
purposeful use of a wider range of sanctions,  the need for this revealed by 
the fieldwork.  This would bring the supervision of MSB in line with other 
areas of public and private sector supervision (see 5.3.2) 
The interviews revealed that on site audits were perceived as time 
consuming, infrequent and failed to target those who most required them, 
with little post action follow-up. HMRC would do to well to adopt an RBA to 
supervision in anticipation of the 4th MLD, and needs to include risk profiling 
within the audit process. HMRC appears to lack the expertise for supervision 
of large APIs, whose structure and use of technology is challenging. It would 
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be preferable for these businesses to be supervised by the FCA, since joint 
audits risk duplication of effort. Fieldwork suggested that HMRC was under-
resourced for its role, but a moderate and scaled increase in registration fees 
could secure improved resourcing of supervision. 
The supervisory relationship is critical to the successful implementation of 
the MLR, and supervision itself should be subject to review if its 
effectiveness, possibly achieved through partnerships between the sector, 
supervisors and the academic community to develop appropriate 
methodologies to assist this. This is critical since supervision can improve 
effective regulatory implementation and reduce the compliance burden for 
small businesses. 
Research has identified a model of UK MSB operation, with the sector 
operating within a climate of risk and distrust. The presumption is that 
regulation should yield evidence of an absence of risk and criminality. 
Regulators need to be mindful of the consequences of over regulation of a 
discrete sector where small changes can have significant consequences for 
the sector dynamics and competition. These can undermine the social 
context of remittances and  their humanitarian and socio- economic value. 
The policy of EDD for MSB to MSB transactions places a high burden on all 
MSBs rather than targeting wholesale activity as high risk. The Dahabshill 
litigation illustrates the consequences of supervisory risk management and 
policy requiring an internal policing of MSB relationships with unintended 
negative consequences that may yet have humanitarian impact. 
 
7.2 Redefining the risk – CTF and alternative remittance services 
Chapter 1 consider the effects of the heightened state of security post 9/11 
prompting the internationalisation of CTS to secure a coordinated and 
effective response to countering terrorism and the threat it presents. Post 
9/11 CTS was required to be adaptive to new global terrorist threats and the 
emergence of the ‘new model’ style terrorist groups such as Al Qa’ida. This 
ideologically and religiously motivated terrorism having a greater global 
reach raised concerns amongst stakeholders and policymakers for its the 
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potential support amongst the migrant diaspora, sharing ethnicity and 
religion, given the possibility of radicalisation. This concern led to the need to 
regulate these networks of kinship to reduce the potential risk of financial 
support being transferred through unregulated ARS. These factors and the 
deep western suspicion of ARS, appear to be implied drivers to the 
international regulation of ARS. The assumption that informal systems were 
more at risk of misuse for TF than the formal sector, has not  to date been a 
feature of academic  research but this research gap left the drive for the 
regulation of ARS without  question. 
Chapter 1 presented a complex internationalised and multi-layered global 
CTF agenda, with some key international players having enormous sway in 
policy implemented at national level. The UN Security Council has the 
ultimate responsibility for the assessment of the international threat to peace 
and security from international terrorism, informed through the country 
reports submitted to the CTC. It has, however, been subject to considerable 
academic and judicial critique for the lack of procedural protection afforded to 
human rights through its sanctions schemes that have lacked normative 
compliance. The weaknesses in the UN schemes demonstrate the value and 
importance of the normative framework offering, through a scholarly 
perspective, a check on executive and governmental action in times of 
crises. 
The UN has more recently endeavoured to include human rights concerns 
within its CTS and within measures implementing this. The Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights, while countering terrorism, recognises the 
value of a more protective rights based approach and the need for a critical 
independent review of UN measures and their implementation, to secure 
this. The appointment of the Ombudsperson for the 1267 regime similarly 
reflects a shift in approach towards securing a more accessible and 
transparent delisting process within the operation of the politicised sanctions 
regime. These changes reflect a more purposeful consideration of the 
importance of rights within the development of CTS and their regulatory 
frameworks. This concessionary approach is easier to concede when the 
post 9/11 terrorist threat has abated. The protection of the normative 
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framework remains essential particularly in times of heightened security, 
given the UN is unwilling to concede to national level the determination of the 
international threat of terrorism. 
This work has demonstrated through the presentation of the Al-Barakaat 
case study (see 4.3) the need for financial inclusion as an aspect of 
normativity. There has been considerable academic critique of the AML/CTF 
regime and FATF standards, but little research into state capacity and 
effective implementation of these standards and CTF regimes. Powerful 
stakeholders have influenced the AML/CTF agenda and the development of 
regulatory standards potentially out of kilter with the pre-existing regulatory 
context of individual states.  CTS measures need to be aligned to promote 
the financial inclusion for states with weaker regulatory regimes and those 
lacking capacity. More could be done to reflect on the effectiveness of 
current mechanisms to promote inclusion and will no doubt be of interest to 
academics already engaged in this area of research. 
Financial inclusion within financial regulation has received scant attention in 
the promulgation of CTS and financial AML/CTF standards. CTS identifies 
broad goals, to which the consideration of rights protection is not clearly 
articulated. States and the UN, espouse the protection of rights within the 
CTF framework, but show greater deference to security in practice, leaving 
the protection of rights to appear to be a hollow promise. Consequently, the 
social needs and the socio-economic context driving remittance activity and 
the human cost in balance with regulatory control, received minimal attention 
until after the Al-Barakaat listing. This is despite stakeholders acknowledging 
at the outset that regulation could not prevent all misuse of ARS. 
What has emerged post 9/11 was the near ‘demonization’ of ARS due to 
their assumed role in 9/11, although unsubstantiated, which has driven the 
agenda for their regulation, drawing on the prescient threat of terrorism for 
justification. A more transparent articulation of ARS risks prior their regulation 
would likely have incentivised greater support for regulation. The Abu Dhabi 
declaration by MSBs was not really seized on internationally as a focus for 
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cooperative implementation. This sharing of risks is a strategy now used by 
UK regulators to enhance regulatory compliance. 
Whilst there is some academic literature describing the phenomenon of ARS 
systems, their complexity and their risks have not been fully understood 
replete with incomplete descriptions and conflicting descriptions of their 
operation.  A ‘Western’ approach to regulation had dominated, with 
regulators struggling to agree on the terminology and definitions, essential to 
regulation. The understanding of these systems has become refined through 
the regulatory process but should have preceded regulation, along with a 
clearer evidence based assessment of risk and the benefits of regulation. 
Given the strength of the international drive for their regulation, there has 
been little research to assess the effectiveness of the regulation 
implemented and the selected method, registration or licensing. Nor has 
there been any review of the challenges of implementation, supervision and 
enforcement that could yield best practices for dissemination. There has also 
been no review of states that have failed to apply regulation or of the 
strategies to address the risk this poses to international CTS, a fertile area 
for comparative academic research. The lack of post regulatory review in 
light of the fearless drive to regulation suggests a western hegemonic 
approach to financial development and regulation in developing countries. 
Lamentably, despite the lapse in time and the drive for their regulation, new 
FATF definitions and re-conceptions of ARS categorise ARS by the degree 
of criminality, not methods of operation. 
This thesis has revealed that the regulation of ARS requires cooperation and 
action across the international community. The protection of UK regulation is 
compromised if not matched by regulation in remittance receiving countries, 
and further compromises the effectiveness international protection.  State 
support of international CTS can be enhanced by being more strategically 
informed by regional and national CTS and threat assessments. The EU 
model could be applied more purposefully at UN level, more effectively 
aligning the roles, commitments and strategies of the international 
stakeholders and individual states. The success of international CTS 
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requires state commitment to regulation, a failure to regulate or enforce 
regulation of ARS, may indicate resistance to a mandatory requirements that 
favours Western style regulation, without a full consideration of alternative 
models that may provide a better cultural fit in the areas of historical 
operation, where the socio-economic context is relevant to the operational 
model. 
 
7.3 Normative compliance and coherence 
The Al-Barakaat listing is a stark illustration of the gap in regulatory efficacy 
and the failure to consider the cultural and socio-economic context in 
advance of regulatory action. States have a duty to protect security and 
fundamental rights, the normative framework providing an objective check on 
state action taken to address a terrorist threat, providing a framework to 
assess the legitimacy of CT measures. The framework justifies the need for 
international action in the fight against terrorism based on cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, premised on the concept of human security and the 
effectiveness of measures. 
The human security paradigm lacks its own global enforcement mechanism 
reliant on the individual states’ commitment to rights protection and 
enforcement which risks becoming hostage to political security concerns. 
Rights risk being balanced away against the need to preserve delicate 
political and economic relations. The strong tradition of rights protection in 
the UK and rights are protected in international law. This international 
protection is supplemented by the UN and EU special rapporteurs and the 
UN sanctions Ombudsmen, offering influential accountability, supplemented 
by regional courts, the ECJ and EcrHR. These mechanisms of protection are 
necessary since the degree of rights protection has been shown to be 
relative to the immediacy of the terrorist threat and the moral panic created, 
resulting in cognitive failings. Legislative measures may disproportionately 
interfere with rights, and remain long after the threat has abated. Cognitive 
failings allow for exploitation of state interests for political advantage, which 
the normative framework seeks to constrain, to remove the disjunction 
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between aspirations expressed in CTS and adherence in reality. Normative 
compliance is reliant on internal political pressure within the global 
community and judicial enforcement and oversight of rights protection at 
state level. 
International accountability through constitutional governance is dependent 
upon the constitutional cosmopolitanism and support of the human security 
paradigm. The UN has an international cosmopolitan mandate but its 
sanctions regime has lacked normative compliance in contradiction to its 
articulated principles and purposes.  The UN as a political organisation is 
dominated by the political sensitivities of it permanent members enabling 
rights to be compromised in favour of security,  unchallenged by internal 
accountability from a wider UN membership to justify the effectiveness of this 
policy approach. 
The Al-Barakaat case study outlines the consequences of a one sided policy 
approach focusing on security interests and lacking normative compliance. 
For the regulatory action to have legitimacy it needs to be fair and 
proportionate or otherwise risk the allegation of discrimination of sections of 
the international community, compromising their commitment to 
implementation. The case study illustrates the lack of normative compliance 
in failing to attend to the humanitarian and economic consequences of 
sanctions to protect the benefits of remittances. 
The traditional mode of ARS operation lacked normativity in compromising 
the protection of property rights through reliance on informal internal 
governance, incompatible with wider international security concerns. System 
risks were not effectively connected to the AML/CTF risks and system values 
were incompatible with existing standards of financial regulation. The 
importance of ARS in supporting worldwide remittance activity, places a duty 
on states to address security risks, rights and financial inclusion within 
regulation. 
While states such as Somalia continue to lack the political, institutional, and 
financial capacity to support CTF strategy and financial regulation, 
undermining the effectiveness of international  and UK regulation. Financial 
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regulation adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach geared to full compliance 
with FATF standards fails to accommodate the individual states regulatory 
context and capacity. Regulation is predicated on Western styled standards 
and developed financial markets, promoting observance but avoiding 
financial inclusion and ignoring the socio-economic context of regulation. A 
more flexible and incremental approach to financial regulation is needed.  
Where states such as Somalia and Pakistan continue to pose a terrorist 
security risk from poor financial regulation,  more guidance is needed 
internationally (FATF), and from state supervisory bodies, to enable the 
effective application of consistent counter measures in the UK to protect the 
benefits of regulation, as revealed by the fieldwork research. 
 
7.4 The UK regulatory framework 
The UK has a significant remittance community, with an active MSB sector, 
the fieldwork research confirming the socio-cultural value of remittance 
practice aligned to the selection of MSBs over banks linked to service quality, 
efficiency and accessibility in transaction jurisdictions. The UK has 
demonstrated some sensitivity to the social and economic aspects of 
remittances at policy level, but the consumer voice is poorly represented to a 
degree comparable with other financial sectors. A more purposeful 
consultation process and representation of consumer and sector interests, is 
required, with DFID taking a more active role here. The UK has potential to 
exploit new technologies to promote financial inclusion, linked to other 
jurisdictions, and to develop regulatory models concordant with this. 
The UK CTF framework implements international obligations but terrorist 
funding offences though little used are justified in their distinction from 
general laundering crimes. The criminal justice model enables seizure and 
forfeiture of terrorist property and is less controversial than executive asset 
freezes. It provides greater protection of due process rights through a 
transparent accountable process that legitimises the interference with 
property rights and liberty, in being publically acceptable and trusted. 
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The UK framework is complex, comprising of measures implementing UN 
sanctions with rights protection pre-determined by UN processes and 
management of international sanctions schemes at a distance. Pre-emptive 
administrative and quasi-criminal measures largely implement UN, EU and 
national sanctions regimes. The UN 1267 regime has been described as 
unworthy of its international status, for the unfairness of its open ended 
measures and the lack of due process protection within, allowing 
disproportionate interference with property and Art 8 rights. Rights protection 
has been left to the ECJ and national courts to uphold, creating tension 
between international and regional constitutional orders. The lack of 
normativity of UN action has compromised its credibility and confidence in 
the effectiveness of CTF measures. 
UK measures are exposed to parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review as 
the Ahmed case illustrated. Further independent oversight and accountability 
of terrorist measures provided by the Independent Reviewer for terrorism. 
The UK implementation of the 1267 regime compromised the normativity of 
the CTF measures since the UK remains hostage to the deficits in the UN 
regime and the challenges of exerting political pressure to obtain information 
as to the listing of UK subjects. 
The UK framework for the regulation of terrorist finance is one element of the 
CTS, within a complex system of UN, EU and UK measures, interwoven, all 
offering differing degrees of rights protection and judicial oversight. The UK 
regime draws on a diverse range of measures, criminal and executive, that 
target terrorist finance at different stages, pre-emptively or preventatively, 
with varying degrees of impact on fundamental rights, but requiring that any 
interference to be justified by need for and the proportionality of measures, 
as well as the capacity to enhance their effectiveness. 
Measures are increasingly more normatively compliant demonstrating a 
sensitive consideration of their impact on rights and more effective balancing 
of the proportionality of any interference. This shift reflects the distance from 
the once immediate threat and heightened sense of security pre and post 
9/11 and 7/7. The UK has previously drawn on measures to detain without 
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trial and control orders, now revoked, these having given rise to considerable 
criticism for their infringements of the right to liberty. The hierarchy of rights 
places a higher value on restriction to liberty and due process rights than 
property rights and Art 8 rights, with measures restricting the latter receiving 
less attention given the value of these rights and the degree of permissible 
interference. Academic and judicial critique of UN sanction regimes has 
highlighted the impact of defects in due process guarantees essential to 
protecting qualified rights and necessary to check the proportionality of 
measures and their impact on these. 
TAFA now demonstrates a more considered approach to managing TF   
risks by enabling EU listing at UK level, of those individuals and entities 
associated with terrorism. Orders now only last for a year with subsequent 
renewal on new evidence to effectively constrain terrorist property. 
Procedural safeguards and licences mitigate the impact on family life and 
financial liberty from the removal of access to all financial assets, without 
compromising the effect of measures. 
Although TAFA relies on executive designation it provides for full judicial 
review, with security sensitive evidence relating to listing protected by CMP 
complaint with Art 6, balancing the protection of the rights of defence and 
security. Case law illustrates that the UK courts have not always been 
consistent in their protection of rights, more willing to demonstrate deference 
to the executive in times of emergency, providing more robust rights 
protection when security is restored. Use of CMP measures has not been 
deployed by the ECJ in reviewing the 1267 sanctions, as a compromise 
position against UN reluctance to release confidential information. 
The UK MLR stems from a complex system of interwoven measures that 
implement international suppression conventions and EU directives. They 
enable the detection and freezing of terrorist assets through the application 
of the RBA to due diligence. The proposed 4th EU MLD entrenches the 
merger of the AML/CTF regime, the fieldwork indicating that the merits of this 
alliance require further research as to their effectiveness for CTF. Here, 
instead of the usual normalisation of exceptional CT measures, there is the 
341 
 
generalisation of ordinary criminal measures to the CTF context. This raises 
concerns given that the AML approach has not successfully yielded the 
anticipated confiscation of assets and is less likely to for TF given the 
difficulties in detecting terrorist transactions revealed by the fieldwork. 
The MLR secure a framework of due diligence enabling transaction 
transparency and scrutiny assisting SARs reporting and enabling the 
application of asset freezes, Treasury directions, compliance with financial 
information orders and the application of jurisdictional counter measures. 
The sector bears the cost and burden of regulation, mitigated by a RBA and 
tiered diligence requirements to achieve a proportionate management of risk, 
limited by the categorisation of remittances and TF as high risk. The MSB 
sector was cited as having a low incidence of SARs reporting, the fieldwork 
identified this as linked to the vagueness of the RBA, the lack of suspicion 
indicators and the need for clearer supervisory guidance. 
The capacity to trace the financial footprint to yield actionable intelligence 
has prompted increased regulation and the subsequent sharing of financial 
intelligence amongst states. The interference with privacy rights is readily 
justified by the CT purpose but the effectiveness of measures relevant to this 
justification is rarely challenged.  In the absence of a global framework to 
regulate the collection and dissemination of financial data for TF and protect 
privacy rights, protection is left to individual states, where attitudes as to the 
level of proportionate interference vary. These differences have been 
overcome by individually negotiated agreements, the US-EU SWIFT 
agreement securing the necessary procedural safeguards and audits of  
procedural compliance and additionally effectiveness of the agreements 
purpose is conditional its renewal and continued protection of privacy rights. 
The agreement’s  benefits appear one sided, the US making the larger share 
of requests, with little information  proffered in return. More could be done to 
maximise the role of Europol for dissemination of EU intelligence here. 
Enterprise sharing of SARs within global businesses to enhance SARs 
reporting is supported by FIU, subject to a framework of control, but is 
conditional upon the capacity for detecting suspicion, which the fieldwork 
revealed as problematic for terrorist finance 
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Regulators and MSB operators remain challenged by the lack of specific TF 
suspicion indicators and typologies. Sector compliance expected through 
reliance on general ML indicators. The fieldwork confirms the view that the 
detection of TF at the placement stage is difficult if not impossible, 
questioning the effectiveness and burden of measures designed to protect 
against this. 
Regulatory compliance has demanded a new skill set of MSB operators and 
additional resources to manage the more formal, risk sensitive and process 
driven model of operation. The fieldwork confirms that regulation having 
changed the sector structure, entrenching the agency/principal model and 
leaving little scope for independent operation, but has effectively reduced the 
risk of ML and indirectly TF, although the extent of this remains 
unquantifiable. The pressure of criminal rather than regulatory sanctions 
drives compliance. Misuse of MSBs for criminal exploitation is minimised 
through registration, but the fieldwork reveals this protection is easily 
circumvented and may require additional regulation that will undoubtedly 
impact further on the sector diversity and structure. 
 
7.6 Further research 
This study has considered the effectiveness of the UK regime for TF and its 
capacity to address the risks associated with traditional Hawala. The 
effectiveness for preventing TF remains questionable. What is clear is that 
there has been considerable displacement of CTF risk management to the 
private sector and this adversely engages the interests of particular ethnic 
groups in respect of MSB services. It is important to consider whether the 
research findings presented in this work apply to different jurisdictions. In this 
regard further research in jurisdictions that have a strong traditional use of 
Hawala such as Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as those states 
known to have operated as financial centres having ‘clearing and exchange’ 
businesses that service ARS, namely the UAE, in particular Abu Dhabi , 
Dubai, and also Kuwait and Yemen, would be valuable. In addition to the 
investigation of the impact and enforcement of regulation controlling ARS in 
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these areas, it is also useful to compare the impact of regulation in the UK 
context with other remittance sending countries that have well developed 
financial centres but a different ethnic population composition to the UK. This 
could draw on the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to provide a 
more detailed comparison of legislative provisions and their impact and 
effectiveness for CTS compared across selected jurisdictions to assess the 
impact on MSB operation and the resulting operational, supervisory and 
enforcement models. This squares the circle in assessing the regulatory 
impact on operational risks in the original and western context of operation, 
given that different dynamics apply, as these jurisdictions are all highly 
relevant to the effectiveness of UK regulation. At a more regional level, a 
comparison of the UK context with other EU states would inform as to how 
states have chosen to implement the MLD to regulate these systems. In 
particular within states having prominent remittance communities, notably 
France, Germany and Spain, as well as drawing on states with high numbers 
of remittance service providers including Sweden Finland and Denmark. 
Given the limited parameters of this project, further research is needed to 
investigate the use of mobile phone and Internet technology to support 
remittance service transactions with a view to assessing their AML/CTF risks 
and the protection necessary to counter these. This is necessary given the 
emergence of this technology in developing countries and its potential to 
promote financial inclusion and the challenge of managing security risks, 
which may require innovative approaches to regulation to guard against 
phone loss, cloning and account hacking. 
Further research into the use of agents in jurisdictions which have weaker 
regulation and enforcement, and the management of this relationship by UK 
principals, is imperative to gain a greater understanding of the assessment of 
CTF risks for UK MSBs operating in high risk corridors, to inform as to the 
effectiveness of counter measures applied by businesses against 
jurisdictions identified as non-cooperative and high risk. 
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7.7 Conclusion as to efficacy 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of the current regime still remains conditional 
upon the capacity of the regulated sector to detect suspicious activity in 
relation to terrorist finance. The lack of clarity over the factual circumstances 
triggering this remains a concern. It would be useful to develop suspicion 
indicators and more effective typologies to avoid potential reliance on 
nationality and ethnicity, but some organisations have already concluded that 
this may not be possible.  This would be reliant on access to SARs data, 
which may be limited due to security concerns, but remains an important 
consideration to justify not only the regulatory regime’s contribution to 
security but the assurance, given the overall increased volumes of reporting 
and with no de minimis limit for TF reporting, that regulation does not actually 
impede security in directing resources to a fruitless end.  
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accessed 30/05/2012 
<http://www.iamtn.org/international-money-transfers-news/276-money-transfer-
accounts-services-by-banks>  date accessed 7/11/2013 
<http://www.dahabshiil.com/send-and-receive-money.html>  date accessed 
12/01/2013 
<http://www.undemocracy.com/United_Kingdom/greenstock> date accessed 
19/04/2013  
<http://www.remittancesgateway.org/index.php/press-clippings/other-news/1710-
dahabshiil-ceo-       and-dr-laura-hammond-discuss-preliminary-findings-of-
remittance-research >  date accessed 12/01/2013  
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 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tables-oeration-of-   police-powers-
under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation> date accessed 
22/07/2013 
 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd.html >date Accessed 
14/08/2013 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/familys-torture-as-they-face-
losing-home-under-antiterror-law-8654524.html>  date accessed 23/08/2013 
< http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/mou/mou-hmrc.pdf> 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/16/seven-charged-crown-currency-     
  collapse > date accessed 20/04/2014 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/egmont-documents > date accessed 
16/06/2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24553148> date accessed 12 /11/2103 
<http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf>  date accessed 18/12/2013 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/sep/29/israel.internationalnews>                                    
date accessed 18/12/2013 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tables-oeration-of-   police-powers-
under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation> date accessed 
22/07/2013 
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Appendix 3 Ethics forms and interview schedules 
 
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPLICATION 
FORM 1 
 
 
 
Please read each question carefully, taking note of instructions and completing all parts. If a question 
is not applicable please indicate so. The superscripted numbers refer to sections of the guidance 
notes, available at www.leeds.ac.uk/ethics. Where a question asks for information which you 
have previously provided in answer to another question, please just refer to your earlier answer. You 
DO NOT need to replicate the information.  
 
To help us process your application enter the following reference numbers, if known and if 
applicable: 
 
Ethics reference number:  
Grant reference:  
COSTA number:  
 
PART A: Summary 
 
A.1. Which Faculty Research Ethics Committee do you wish to consider this application? 2  
Biological Sciences 
Mathematics; Physical Sciences; Engineering (MEEC) 
Medicine and Health (Please specify a subcommittee) 
Healthcare Studies 
Psychological Sciences 
Health Sciences/ LIGHT/ LIMM 
Dentistry 
Medical and Dental Educational Research 
*Social Sciences/ Environment/ LUBS (AREA) 
Arts/ Performance, Visual Arts & Communications (PVAR) 
 
 
A.2. Title of the research 3 
A critical examination of the anti –money laundering legislative framework for the prevention of terrorist finance 
with particular reference to the regulation of alternative remittance systems in the UK. 
 
A.3. Main investigator 4 
  Title:                 Forename/Initials:       Surname:  Ms Karen A   Clubb 
 
Department: Faculty of Law 
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Institution: University of Leeds 
Work address: University of Derby  
Postcode: DE22 1GB  Telephone:  07846-250790   
 
E-mail: k.clubb@derby.ac.uk 
 
 
 
A.4 Purpose of the research: 5 (Tick as appropriate) 
* Research 
 Educational qualification 
 Educational Research & Evaluation 6 
 Medical Audit or Health Service Evaluation 7 
 Other 
 
 
A.5. Select from the list below to describe your research: (You may select more than one) 
 Research on or with human participants 
 Research with has potential significant environmental impact.8  If yes, please give details: 
  
 Research working with data of human participants 
* New data collected by questionnaires/interviews 
 New data collected by qualitative methods 
 New data collected from observing individuals or populations 
 Research working with aggregated or population data 
 Research using already published data or data in the public domain 
 Research working with human tissue samples 9 
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A.6. Will the research involve any of the following: 10 (You may select more than one) 
 
If your research involves any of the following an application must be made to the National Research 
Ethics Service (NRES) via IRAS www.myresearchproject.org.uk as NHS ethical approval will be 
required. There is no need to complete any more of this form. Contact governance-ethics@leeds.ac.uk 
for advice.  
 Patients and users of the NHS (including NHS patients treated in the private sector) 11 
 Individuals identified as potential participants because of their status as relatives or carers of  
patients and users of the NHS 
 Research involving adults in Scotland, Wales or England who lack the capacity to consent for 
themselves 12 
 The use of, or potential access to, NHS premises or facilities 13 
 NHS staff - recruited as potential research participants by virtue of their professional role 
 A prison or a young offender institution in England and Wales (and is health related) 14 
 Clinical trial of a medicinal product or medical device 15 
 Access to data, organs or other bodily material of past and present NHS patients 9 
 Use of human tissue (including non-NHS sources) where the collection is not covered by a Human 
Tissue Authority licence 9 
 Foetal material and IVF involving NHS patients 
 The recently deceased under NHS care 
* None of the above 
You must inform the Research Ethics Administrator of your NRES number and approval date 
once approval has been obtained.  
 
If the University of Leeds is not the Lead Institution, or approval has been granted elsewhere (e.g. NHS) then 
you should contact the local Research Ethics Committee for guidance.  The UoL Ethics Committee need to be 
assured that any relevant local ethical issues have been addressed.  
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A.7. Will the participants be from any of the following groups? (Tick as appropriate) 
 Children under 16 16 
 Adults with learning disabilities 12 
 Adults with other forms of mental incapacity or mental illness 
 Adults in emergency situations 
 Prisoners or young offenders 14 
 Those who could be considered to have a particularly dependent relationship with the investigator, 
e.g. members of staff, students 17 
 Other vulnerable groups 
* No participants from any of the above groups 
Please justify the inclusion of the above groups, explaining why the research cannot be conducted on 
non vulnerable groups. 
 
 
A Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) check will be needed for researchers working with children or 
vulnerable adults (see www.crb.gov.uk) 
 
A.8. Give a short summary of the research 18  
This section must be completed in language comprehensible to the lay person.  Do not simply reproduce or 
refer to the protocol, although the protocol can also be submitted to provide any technical information that you 
think the ethics committee may require. This section should cover the main parts of the proposal. 
This research aims to investigate the law regulating money laundering for terrorist finance relating to  
alternative remittance services (ARS)  offered by Money Service Businesses (MSB) or alternative remittance 
services in the UK. These services are service offered by individuals or businesses, other than banks or 
building societies, which allow customers to transfer either cash or equivalent value to another location either in 
the UK or another part of the world. As these services have been informal and often offered alongside another 
business activity, they have until 2007, been free of any formalities. The research aims investigate the changes 
that have resulted from laws imposed and to consider the views of those that provide ARS now MSB and 
importantly those that are now involved in regulating this type of business activity. The aim is to gain an 
understanding of how those involved in the area of activity view the current law, whether the new law has led to 
any change since it was implemented and to gain the views of parties about these changes and how operators 
have adjusted to these changes in practice. The research also aims to investigate whether parties consider the 
new laws, given their aims, effective in practice. 
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A.9. What are the main ethical issues with the research and how will these be addressed? 19 
 
Indicate any issues on which you would welcome advice from the ethics committee. 
 
The main ethical issues are: 
 
Preserving anonymity/ confidentiality of participants – the research design C2 and C12 indicates how this will 
be addressed during the research process. 
 
Disclosure by participant of criminality by themselves or a person known to them – section on risk and 
Research Project Information Leaflet describes how this will be managed along with section C15. 
 
 
 
 
PART B: About the research team 
 
 
B.1. Supervisor (for student research) 20 
   
  Title:                 Forename/Initials:       Surname:  Professor  Clive   Walker 
 
Department: Faculty of Law  
Institution: University of Leeds 
Work address: Room 2.17, The Liberty Building, University of Leeds Leeds. 
Postcode: LS2 9JT Telephone:  0113 343 5022   
 
E-mail: law6cw@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
 
B.2. Other key  co-supervisors 21 (all grant co-applicants or protocol co-authors should be listed) 
  Title:                 Forename/Initials:       Surname:  Professor Andrew    Campbell 
 
Department: Faculty of Law 
Institution: University of Leeds 
Work address: Room 2.29, The Liberty Building, University of Leeds Leeds. 
Postcode: LS2 9JT Telephone:   0113 343 7113   
 
E-mail: a.campbell@leeds.ac.uk 
 
  
Title:                 Forename/Initials:       Surname:  
     
 
Department:  
Institution:  
Work address:  
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Postcode:  Telephone:      
E-mail:  
 
 
  Part C: The Research 
 
 
C.1. What are the aims of the study? 22 (Must be in language comprehensible to a lay person.) 
The aim of the study is to investigate the impact of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 on alternative 
remittances in the UK which are now required under these regulations to be registered as Money Service 
Businesses. 
 
C.2. Describe the design of the research. Qualitative methods as well as quantitative methods should be 
included. (Must be in language comprehensible to a lay person.) 
It is important that the study can provide information about the aims that it intends to address. If a study cannot 
answer the questions / add to the knowledge base that it intends to, due to the way that it is designed, then 
wasting participants’ time could be an ethical issue. 
The fieldwork research is based on qualitative methodology involving 1:1 semi-structured interviews either 
conducted face to face or by telephone with two distinct participant groups. A set of participant questions derived 
from thesis research and commentary will be developed and sequenced. The interview preparation will also 
contain a standard explanation of key terms for consistency and reliability and a series of pre-selected extension 
questions for each question to be used a prompts. It is noted that separate research interview questions will be 
constructed to ascertain the values, attitudes and perspectives of both participant groups and to ensure their 
contribution to this research question is captured. Qualitative methodology by way of semi-structured interviews is 
the most appropriate means of obtaining this information whereas observation of participant would involve further 
issues of confidentiality (of clients) and would be overly intrusive. Quantitative approaches are less likely to 
capture insights into practice and reflection upon it. 
 
The researcher is aware of the limitations in accessing directly the ARS operatives. Should it prove impossible to 
obtain the required number of interviews for this participant groups then the questions from the interviews will be 
modified to produce a questionnaire for these groups that can be sent to operators identified by email. 
Questionnaires will be anonymised in the same way as outlined for interview in section A9 to be returned by post. 
Where questionnaires are provided by return email, participants will be made aware that once a copy of the 
questionnaire has been using the participant reference number to identify, participants will reminded that the email 
will be deleted. Only the questionnaire identified by unique participant reference number will be retained. The 
same supporting documentation will be provided for any questionnaires used based on the identification and 
recruitment of the participant groups referred to earlier.  
Section C6 describes how  participants will be recruited using stratifying sampling to isolate the relevant 
geographical locations with relevant population distribution required to support the research, from which the 
participant MSB operators will be further identified using probability sampling from a sample narrowed using a 
methodologically sound and scientific approach to identifying the relevant variables. 
The regulator/stakeholder participants to be potentially selected are those who are directly involved in the 
regulation of the MSB in the UK or the enforcement of the regulatory framework, or have a significant stakeholder 
interest in the application of this regime in the UK. The following agencies may be approached for interview as 
regulator: HMRC, HM Treasury, SOCA, FSA, FIU in UK, CTU, OFT, JMLSG, FATF, Moneyval, OSCT. Additionally 
the following stakeholder organisations are suggested to be approached to take part as participants in this 
research including: UKMTA, UK Remittances task force/ Working group (DFID), Migrants Rights Network, along 
with regional and nationally relevant community groups who represent the specific interests of ethnic groups 
associated with the use of remittance services including: Somali Diaspora UK, The Pakistan Society, UK Islamic 
Mission, Muslim Communities UK. 
A research schedule for regulator participant interviews will be compiled in addition to a research schedule for 
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each selected location and the operator participants in this location.  
 
 
 
  C.3. What will participants be asked to do in the study? 23
 
(e.g. number of visits, time, travel 
required,   interviews etc) 
Each participant will be asked to undertake one hour to hour and half long interview with the 
researcher using standardised questions relating to that participant group in relation to the 
research topic. Each participant will be asked to consent not only to the interview, but also to the 
digital recording of this or in the alternative the researcher taking notes of the interview. Interviews 
will be carried out in person where possible but participants will be given the option of a telephone 
interview as an alternative. 
 
Participants will be contacted by telephone or email in advance to request interview with a 
minimum of 24 hours notice given unless they wish to waive this for their convenience. It is 
anticipated that participants will be interviewed on their business premises so that they do not 
have to travel. Or an alternative venue will be agreed. 
 
Each participant will be asked to sign the consent form acknowledging consent and receipt of 
information about the research and including how to withdraw from the project. 
 
 
 
C.4. Does the research involve and international collaborator or research conducted 
overseas: 24 
(Tick as appropriate)  
Yes       * No 
If yes, describe any ethical review procedures that you will need to comply with in that 
country: 
 
 
 
 
Describe the measures you have taken to comply with these: 
 
 
 
 
Include copies of any ethical approval letters/ certificates with your application. 
 
C.5. Proposed study dates and duration  
Research start date (DD/MM/YYYY)  January 2012______ 
 
Research end date (DD/MM/YYYY): December 2012_______ 
 
(note this  PhD is by part-time study) 
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C.6. Where will the research be undertaken? (i.e. in the street, on UoL premises, in schools) 25 
It is anticipated that the following participants will be interviewed in their business or work premises 
in person or by telephone. 
Participant group 1 ARS Operators: 5 in each of the 5 areas identified total: 25 
Participant group 2 ARS Representatives of regulators and stakeholders of ARS:10  
 
 
RECRUITMENT & CONSENT PROCESSES 
 
How participants are recruited is important to ensure that they are not induced or coerced into 
participation. The way participants are identified may have a bearing on whether the results can be 
generalised. Explain each point and give details for subgroups separately if appropriate. 
 
C.7. How will potential participants in the study be:  
(i) identified,  
ARS/ MSB operators ARS will be identified as follows: 
• Information publicly available from services advertised yellow pages, or in local 
newspapers and by internet search. 
             On sight identification of business premises in target locations 
             Follow up referral from another research participant 
• In this instance to ensure that the participants are able to respond they will be contacted by 
telephone or in person to verify that they operate an ARS/MSB, before being asked to 
participate in the project and to identify the size, extent of  service offered, and location of 
business. 
• From the list compiled 5 ARS/ MSB will be selected at random from the key locations 
identified.  
• A list of ARS currently registered as MSB under the new MLR 2007 is not available from 
the regulator 
as they are exempt from making this information publicly available under the Freedom of 
Information Act  2000. However the regulator has been contacted to disclose the number 
of registered ARS /MSB  
within the selected areas for sample interviewing.  
 
• The geographical areas for interviewing will be selected according to relevant criteria – 
high density areas of Asian, African and Somali populations. 
 
Regulators/stakeholders: 
• Regulators identified by legal framework for regulation outlined in the MLR 2007 example 
HRC,  
      SOCCA. 
• Stakeholders identified as nationally recognised bodies relevant to and involved in the 
interests of  
      one of the participant research group, for example UKMTA. 
 
(ii) approached  
 
Operators:  
Operators will be approached initially by telephone if identified by way of advert to confirm their 
status as ARS/ MSB, or in person if from area identified by way of businesses area associated with 
ethnicity identified on sight. 
 
 
Regulators/ stakeholders: 
Initial contact by letter to ask for interview with person nominated by the regulators for this purpose 
with 
follow-up email/telephone call to make and confirm arrangements. 
 
(iii) recruited? 26 
 
No inducements will be made in terms of recruitment or participation. Recruitment will be secured 
414 
 
on the basis of verbal explanation of research project and voluntary participation to interview given 
verbally by all participants. Prior to the interview all participants will be given a Research Project 
Information Leaflet and the opportunity to ask questions about the project  before signing a 
participant consent form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.8. Will you be excluding any groups of people, and if so what is the rationale for that? 27 
Excluding certain groups of people, intentionally or unintentionally may be unethical in some 
circumstances.  It may be wholly appropriate to exclude groups of people in other cases.  
 
Only those who when contacted for interview decline to participate.  
Groups of persons are excluded by area as random selection of MSB in specific geographical 
locations is justified in order to ensure research is purposeful in ascertaining any affect of 
regulation certain ethnic groups. The geographical areas selected focus on areas of high density in 
relation to the relevant ethnic groups. This selection exclusionary in targeting those areas relevant 
to the research aims in concordance with the research design. 
 
 
 
 
 
C.9. How many participants will be recruited and how was the number decided upon? 28 
It is important to ensure that enough participants are recruited to be able to answer the aims of the research. 
 
The number of participants has been derived from the need to maintain confidentiality and limit sample size in 
some areas where there may only be a small number of ARS /MSB to interview. Whilst there is some narrowing 
of the geographical areas for interview in relation to the fieldwork design, to ensure that these are areas of 
mixed ethnicity and high density ethnicity in terms of the ethnic context of ARS operators and customers, there 
will be no deliberate de-selection of potential participants on the basis to ethnicity or race. Nor will there be any 
deliberate targeting of potential participants on this basis. Where advertising source or organisational 
membership lists are used to locate potential participant operators, a list will be compiled and selection from 
these will be at random. 
 
 
 
If you have a formal power calculation please replicate it here. 
 
 
 
Remember to include all advertising material (posters, emails etc) as part of your application 
 
C.10. Will the research involve any element of deception? 29 If yes, please describe why 
this is necessary and whether participants will be informed at the end of the study. 
 
The research will not involve any element of deception.  
 
 
C.12. Will informed consent be obtained from the research participants?30  
*Yes       No 
If yes, give details of how it will be done. Give details of any particular steps to provide information (in additi       
e.g. videos, interactive material.  
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All participants will be provided with a verbal explanation of the research project supported by a Research Project Inf      
to ask question of the researcher about the research project. The nature of the explanation will include an overview o       
group contribute to the research question. Participants will be given a reference number that will be used as an ident        
participant classification as operator or stakeholder. This will be used on all documentation to preserve confidentially       
explain how confidentiality within the research project will be maintained.  All participants will additionally be given a       
about how to withdraw from the project later if they so wish including a form to indicate this. As part of this process th       
provided in documentation and on request, and the researcher will carry University ID card.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe whether participants will be able to withdraw from the study, and up to what point (eg if data is to b     
is not possible, explain why not. 
 
 
Participants will be allowed to withdraw from the project but this will only be an option up to 18 months after the interv       
participants will be given a specific date by which they should inform the researcher of their intention to withdraw. As        
so small this is necessary to preserve the integrity of the overall reliability of the sample and to allow further time for f      
rewriting research due to withdrawal of participant and after the subsequent removal of their data.  
 
 
If participants are to be recruited from any of potentially vulnerable groups, give details of extra steps taken     
Describe any arrangements to be made for obtaining consent from a legal representative. 
 
No participant will be recruited from potentially vulnerable groups. 
 
 
 
 
Copies of any written consent form, written information and all other explanatory material should accompan      
sheet should make explicit that participants can withdrawn from the research at any time, if the research design perm   
Sample information sheets and consent forms are available from the University ethical review webpage 
at http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/ethical_review_pro
1.  
 
C.13. How long will the participant have to decide whether to take part in the research? 31 
It may be appropriate to recruit participants on the spot for low risk research, however consideration is usually 
necessary for those projects which involve risks. 
 
In some instances operator participants may be recruited on the spot but it unlikely given the nature of the 
interview and the length of time required, that they will be interviewed immediately on recruitment. All 
participants are given a minimum of 24 hours from recruitment to interview unless the participant voluntarily 
waives this. In this 24 hour period or longer until time of arranged interview, participants will have the 
opportunity to contact the researcher and remove themselves from the project or rearrange the date/ time/ or 
place of the proposed interview. 
 
 
C.14. What arrangements have been made for participants who might not adequately understand verbal 
explanations or written information given in English, or who have special communication 
needs? 32(e.g. translation, use of interpreters etc. It is important that groups of people are not excluded due to 
language barriers or disabilities, where assistance can be given.) 
 
Whilst the research involves a consideration of ethnicity, it is not anticipated that the operator participants will 
have any language problems given they are operating a business in a commercial environment. If this does 
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however prove to be the case if an onsite interpreter known to the participant is available they will be used with 
the consent of the participant and the interpreter. 
 
 
 
 
C.15. Will individual or group interviews/ questionnaires discuss any topics or issues that might be 
sensitive, embarrassing or upsetting, or is it possible that criminal or other disclosures requiring action 
could take place during the study (e.g. during interviews/group discussions, or use of screening tests 
for drugs)? 33 
 Yes, give details of procedures in place to deal with these issues 
 
In interview or questionnaire participants may disclose criminal activity related to terrorist offences or money 
laundering offences. 
 
In the previous section it has been made clear that if it is impossible to interview face to face or by telephone 
the required number of ARS/ MSB operators that the questions for the semi-structured interview will be 
reframed in a questionnaire. The planned interview / questionnaires are supported by the Research Project 
Information Leaflet which warns participants of disclosure of criminal activity by the participant relating to 
themselves or others and any action to be taken by the researcher in this event. This general statement is will 
be also read out prior to any interview and the participant will be reminded of this during the interview as should 
disclosure appears likely. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Information Sheet should explain under what circumstances action may be taken  
 
C.16. Will individual research participants receive any payments, fees, reimbursement of expenses or 
any other incentives or benefits for taking part in this research? 34 
Yes       * No 
If Yes, please describe the amount, number and size of incentives and on what basis this was decided.  
 
 
 
 
RISKS OF THE STUDY 
C.17. What are the potential benefits and/ or risks for research participants? 35 
 
There are clear benefits to all participants in being able to express their views and attitudes about the 
imposition of a legal and regulatory framework that affects their business operation as ARS/MSN operators, or 
their role in the regulation of these services, to detail the impact of legislation on these service and roles. 
 
There are no personal or security risks to any research participants other than the possible disclosure of 
criminality referred to in C15. 
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C.18. Does the research involve any risks to the researchers themselves, or people not directly 
involved in the research? 36 
*Yes       No 
 
If Yes, please describe: __________________________________________________ 
Risk to researcher: 
Unescorted female interviewing what is anticipated to be mainly male subjects in unknown environment over 
which researcher has little control. 
Management strategies: 
When fieldwork is to be carried out the following strategies will be employed at all times: 
Researcher to have mobile phone on and with her at all times and a panic alarm.  
Interviews to be pre-planned with schedule of date, time and location (this to include business address and 
telephone number only not participant name) to be forwarded to supervisors or researchers place of work. 
To negotiate access point at researchers place of work where contact can be made post interview to confirm 
safety.  
Any variance in schedule to forwarded to supervisors and work place in advance of implementation.  
All interviews to be carried out in day time during usual business hours 9-5. Where interview on site at the 
research participants place of work to contact access point and request phone call at end of interview. Interview 
to be conducted in public place or if on private premises these to be business only and only when third parties 
present on premises.  
Copies of interview schedule to be destroyed on completion of interviews except that retained only by 
researcher to preserve participant anonymity. 
At all times the researcher will carry and present her student registration card for Leeds University and the 
contact telephone number of Leeds Law School office and of supervisors. This will be offered/given to any 
potential participant in advance of interview to enable them to confirm identity and research status. 
 
 
DATA ISSUES 
C.19. Will the research involve any of the following activities at any stage (including identification of 
potential research participants)? (Tick as appropriate) 
 Examination of personal records by those who would not normally have access 
 Access to research data on individuals by people from outside the research team 
* Electronic transfer of data 
 Sharing data with other organisations 
 Exporting data outside the European Union 
* Use of personal addresses, postcodes, faxes, e-mails or telephone numbers 
* Publication of direct quotations from respondents 
 Publication of data that might allow identification of individuals to be identified 
* Use of audio/visual recording devices 
* FLASH memory or other portable storage devices 
 Storage of personal data on or including any of the following: 
* Manual files  
*Home or other personal computers 
 Private company computers 
 Laptop computers 
 
 
C.20. How will the research team ensure confidentiality and security of personal data? E.g. 
anonymisation procedures, secure storage & coding of data. 37 
 
Confidentiality will be preserved by integrity in subject identification using unique reference numbers in place of 
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client name. A master list of names matched to the reference number to demonstrate existence of an 
authenticity of participants will be retained by researcher only and stored on an encrypted USB device. It is 
possible given that the number of MSB currently registered with the registration regulator, HMRC, in the UK is 
for 2011 total 3,628 that this may inadvertently identify the participant. This is particularly so as the operators 
ethnicity is relevant to the research question for the purpose of this research.  This impact has been minimised 
by seeking to investigate 5 particular locations which are known to be areas of high density in relation to the 
ethnic groups associated with the operation and use of ARS. The names and businesses addresses of MSB in 
specific locations is not available from HMRC but a Freedom of Information request is to be made in respect of 
these specific geographical research areas, so that any potential compromise of participants by their 
identification can be overcome by reference to the participant sample group from within a larger geographical 
location. 
 
The confidentiality of the regulator or stakeholder will be preserved by making no mention of their name or 
position, as the latter alone may identify the participant. In the case of the UKMTA the person may be 
identifiable by their relationship of position within organisation where the organisation is small or the role is 
unique. Where it is impossible to preserve participant confidentiality the participant will be made aware of this 
prior to giving consent to participation. To assist confidentiality in these circumstances no mention of name or 
role will be made. 
 
All interviews will be transcribed by the researcher and only electronic copies retained on an encrypted USB. All 
data and participant identification data will be secured in the same manner. Any emails sent to participants to 
recruit will be deleted and no email contact lists retained other than encrypted USB. Any paper copies of any 
material above will be destroyed on completion of storage to electronic file. Any paper questionnaires will be 
scanned into PC to create an electronic record to be stored on encrypted USB. Any email copies of 
questionnaires will be saved electronically and the email subsequently deleted. 
 
Data analysis will be by data coding by reference to accepted practice which ensures reliability, consistency 
and integrity in application of research methodology, utilising pre-selected themes relevant to the research 
question. Nvivo software may be used for this purpose but it is likely given the small sample size that this will 
be done manually by researcher.  All data coding will be anonymous and will refer only to the geographical 
area, type of participant i.e. ARS/MSB, location of participant i.e . Leeds and unique identification number to 
preserve anonymity. 
You may wish to refer to the data protection and research webpage.  
 
C.21. For how long will data from the study be stored? Please explain why this length of time has been 
chosen.38 
 ___10_____ years, ________ months after which the USB will be physically destroyed. 
NB: RCUK guidance states that data should normally be preserved and accessible for ten years, but 
for some projects it may be 20 years or longer. 
Students: It would be reasonable to retain data for at least 2 years after publication or three years after 
the end of data collection, whichever is longer 
 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
C.22. Will any of the researchers or their institutions receive any other benefits or incentives for taking 
part in this research over and above normal salary or the costs of undertaking the research? 39 
Yes       * No 
If yes, indicate how much and on what basis this has been decided 
 
 
 
C.23. Is there scope for any other conflict of interest? 40 For example will the research funder have control 
of publication of research findings? 
Yes       * No        If yes, please explain _________________________________________________ 
 
 
C.24. Does the research involve external funding?   (Tick as appropriate) 
Yes       * No   If yes, what is the source of this funding?  
___________________________ 
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PART D: Declarations 
Eclaration by Chief Investigators 
 
1. The information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief and I take full 
responsibility for it.  
2. I undertake to abide by the University's ethical and health & safety guidelines, and the ethical principles 
underlying good practice guidelines appropriate to my discipline. 
3. If the research is approved I undertake to adhere to the study protocol, the terms of this application and 
any conditions set out by the Research Ethics Committee. 
4. I undertake to seek an ethical opinion from the REC before implementing substantial amendments to the 
protocol. 
5. I undertake to submit progress reports if required. 
6. I am aware of my responsibility to be up to date and comply with the requirements of the law and 
relevant guidelines relating to security and confidentiality of patient or other personal data, including the 
need to register when necessary with the appropriate Data Protection Officer. 
7. I understand that research records/ data may be subject to inspection for audit purposes if required in 
future. 
8. I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this application will be held by the relevant 
RECs and that this will be managed according to the principles established in the Data Protection Act. 
9.       I understand that the Ethics Committee may choose to audit this project at any point after approval. 
 
Sharing information for training purposes 
Optional – please tick as appropriate: 
 
I would be content for members of other Research Ethics Committees to have access to the 
information in the application in confidence for training purposes. All personal identifiers and 
references to researchers, funders and research units would be removed. 
 
 
Principal Investigator 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator: .........Karen Clubb.......................................................  
 
Print name: Karen Clubb................ 
 
Date: 27/07/2011: ................................................................ 
 
 
Supervisor of student research 
 
I have read, edited and agree with the form above. 
 
Supervisor’s signature: ................................................................ 
 
Print name: ................................................................  
 
Date: (dd/mm/yyyy) ................................................................ 
 
 
Please submit your form by email to J.M.Blaikie@adm.leeds.ac.uk or if you are in the Faculty of 
Medicine and Health FMHUniEthics@leeds.ac.uk. Remember to include any supporting material 
such as your participant information sheet, consent form, interview questions and recruitment material 
with your application.  
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Research Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title 
The investigation of the law regulating Money Service Businesses to prevent money 
laundering and terrorist finance. 
 
The Researcher  
My narne is Karen Clubb.  I am a PhD student studying for a Doctorate student at the 
University of Leeds. I have a keen interest in money laundering and in particular relating to 
preventing terrorist finance. I have chosen this topic as the research for my PhD. I am very 
keen to explore the effect of the law in this area on Money Service Businesses that provide 
remittance services. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
As a Money Service Business (MSB) provider in the UK you has been identified as providing  
remittance services and have therefore been invited to take part in this research. The 
research aims to investigate the effect of the law regulating these businesses, which is 
largely set out on the Money Laundering regulations 2007. These regulations require that 
MSB be registered in order to offer remittance services. As you have been identified as 
offering or being involve in the provision of these services you have been invited to give your 
views as to the effect, if any, of legislation mentioned above, on your business activity. 
 
Please take time to read this leaflet carefully and if you have any further questions please 
ask the researcher. 
 
How will the research be carried out? 
The research will be undertaken during a twelve month period in 2012-13. It involves 
interviews with those who own or are involved directly in the operation of a Money Service 
Businesses which provide remittance services. A small number of participants from these 
groups in 5 locations throughout the UK will be invited for interview. Additionally a few 
representatives from the agencies involved in regulatory process will also be interviewed. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
As you involved directly in the provision of a Money Service Business providing remittance 
services you have been asked for your views on the regulation of these types of businesses 
in which you have an important practical role as well specialist knowledge.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to take part in this study 
Your participation in this research project is entirely voluntary and without financial reward. 
If you choose to do so you will be making a significant contribution to research in this area.  
If you do agree to take part you will have to sign a consent form which, you will be given a 
copy of. You will also be interviewed by the researcher.  
If you change your mind after you have been interviewed you are able to withdraw from the 
project provided you contact the researcher within 12 months from the date of your 
interview, and before publication of the research findings. You do not have to explain your 
reasons for withdrawal. 
If you agree to be interviewed you do not have to answer all of the questions.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you take part in this project you will be interviewed at a time and place that is convenient 
for you. 
This can be at your business if this is more convenient or you can be interviewed elsewhere, 
or by telephone. The interview will last approximately an hour.  
For convenience and accuracy the interview will be recorded.  
Your interview and your views will be anonymised; you will not be referred to by name nor 
identified by the business you work in. 
 
One of the risks of taking part is that in your interview you may inadvertently, correctly or 
incorrectly give information that may seem to suggest that you or people you know may 
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have been engaged in criminal activity. If the researcher feels that this is likely to be 
disclosed, by mistake or otherwise, they will pause the interview and remind you that they 
are obliged to disclose any suspected criminal acts. The researcher will allow you then ask 
you to continue when you are ready to do so. 
 
 If such information is divulged by you, the researcher would have to disclose this to the 
relevant authorities for further investigation pursuant to S38B Terrorism Act 2000. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
One of the benefits to taking part in this study is that you will have the opportunity to give 
your views on the law which regulates Money Service Businesses and money laundering. 
These views will form part of an important study which aims to consider whether the law in 
this area is needed and to consider the advantages and disadvantages of this law in practice 
to those most affected. It is your chance to comment on in the law and its effect on your 
business, if any, and to give your views on how this is managed by you and those who 
enforce this law.   
  
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All the interviews from all the participants will form the research data for this project which 
will be analysed and commented upon by the researcher in their written report which forms 
part of this project. You will NOT be referred to by name. You will NOT to be referred to by 
reference to your business or business address. The data generated will kept securely, 
regardless of the form in which it is stored e.g. audio, paper, electronic. The original 
interview will only be accessed by the researcher and research supervisors (2) in 
accordance with the University's policy on Academic Integrity. 
 
All the research data will be securely stored for a period of 10 years after completion of the 
study, after which time which it will be destroyed. 
 
Your identity will be kept confidential and known only to the researcher, your identity will be 
recorded by reference to a unique number only i.e. participant 1 location Leeds. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Reference to your anonymous data will be made in the final report which forms part of this 
study for a Doctorate and any further publication of the research findings. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you wish to take part simply inform the researcher in person or contact the researcher at 
the address below. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is self funded. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research study has been approved by Leeds University Research Ethics Committee.  
The researcher can show you a copy of this. 
 
Contacts for Further Information 
My supervisors for my PhD and their contact detail are should you wish to contact them to 
verify the nature of this study, or should you wish to raise any concerns about the way this 
study has been conducted.   
 
Clive Walker                                                                 Andy Campbell  
Faculty of Law                                                              Faculty of Law 
Room 2.17                                                                   Room 2.29 
The Liberty Building                                                     The Liberty Building 
University of Leeds                                                      University of Leeds 
Leeds.                                                                          Leeds. 
LS2 9JT                                                                       LS2 9JT                                                                                                                                
Telephone: 0113-3435022                                          Telephone: 0113-3437113 
Email: law6cw@leeds.ac.uk                                        Email: a.campbell@leeds.ac.uk 
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Researcher   
Karen Clubb  University of Derby, 22 Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB  
Tel: 01332. 622222        Email: K.clubb@derby.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information leaflet. 
 
Date 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of Research Project: The investigation of the law regulating Money Service 
Businesses to prevent money laundering and terrorist finance 
 
Name of Researcher:         KAREN CLUBB   
 
Researcher contact details: 01332-591844   K.clubb@derby.ac.uk 
 
Participant reference Number ___________________________________________ 
Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Research Information Leaflet  
     dated                               explaining the above research project and I have had the 
opportunity to  
     ask questions about the project. 
 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time  
     without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In 
addition,  
     should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.  
 
3.   I understand that my identity will be kept strictly confidential and anonymised. 
      I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
      anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research  
      materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result 
from 
      this research.   
 
4.   I agree to my interview being digitally audio recorded 
 
 
5.   I agree to handwritten notes being made during my interview by the researcher. 
 
6.   I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research 
 
 
 
7.   I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
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8.   I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the researcher   
      at the address above,  should my contact details change. 
 
 
Name of participant Date Signature 
_________________________ ________________         
____________________ 
 
Name of researcher  Date Signature 
_________________________ ________________         
____________________ 
 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
Copies: Signing of this consent form is an acknowledgement of receipt of the Research 
Participant Information Sheet and Participant Withdrawal form. You will be given a copy of 
this signed Participant Consent forms for your records. The original copy will be kept 
securely by the researcher. 
 
Participant Withdrawal Form 
 
Title of Research Project:   
 The investigation of the law regulating Money Service Businesses to prevent 
money laundering and terrorist finance  
 
Name of Researcher:           Karen Clubb 
 
Participant reference Number ___________________________________________ 
 
I have previously agreed to take part in the research project indentified above. 
 
I have now decided that I wish to withdraw from this project. 
 
I understand that I am able to withdraw from this project any time up until 18 
months from the date of my interview. 
 
I understand that I do not have to provide any reasons for my withdrawal from this 
project and that there will be no adverse consequence to my withdrawal. 
 
________________________ ________________         
____________________ 
Name of participant Date Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
 
Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
 
Please send this original form to in an envelope marked Private and Confidential to: 
Karen Clubb 
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University of Derby 
22 Kedleston Road 
Derby. 
DE22 1GB  
Interview Schedules 
 
 
A summary of the information that is given to all participants is provided 
below to indicate the nature of the issues specifically addressed in relation to 
participant  consent  and withdrawal and the information provided to 
participant regarding this.  This summary  includes verbal discussion of these 
issues with participant prior to consent to interview ,Copies of all the relevant 
documentation is contained in the appendices at the end of this work. 
 
Research project summary  
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. You have been given a 
participant information sheet which explains the nature of this research 
project and how the research will be carried out. You have also been asked 
to sign a consent form to indicate to indicate your consent to taking part in 
the research, which you have a copy of. By agreeing to take part you are 
aware that your name/ business name/ or specific role /title will not be 
referred to and your place work / community organisation or business 
location will be anonymsied. This also applies to any data referred to in the 
final report and any further publication of the research findings. The project 
data (original interviews) will be kept securely and confidentially and only 
accessed by the researcher and supervisors.  The data from these will be 
used compile the research findings.  You have given a participant withdrawal 
form that tells you what to do should you wish to withdraw from the research 
project later. 
 
Do you have any or any further questions of queries before we begin the 
interview? 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1  OPERATORS 
 
 
 
A  ARS/ MSB BIORGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
      1. Name 
      2. Age 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60+ 
      2. How would you describe your ethnicity? 
      3. Can you describe the community you belong to? 
         (business, locality, culture, religion, ethnicity, family , work)  
  
      4. How long have you been providing remittances services? 
      5. Do you provide personal remittance services? 
 
          Confirm criteria for participation in study  
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                (i) provision of remittance services prior to December 2007  
     (ii) provision of personal remittances services 
 
       6.  How long have you been a remittance service provider? (No. of   
             years) 
       7.  Do you know of any other remittance service providers operating  
            locally?  (type of, area, source of contact) 
  
 
B  ARS/ MSB PROCESS AND OPERATION  
 
8. How would you describe the clients that use your services? 
    (local, community , same type/group, ethnicity, age, business/ private,  
    frequent/occasional users, sex, familiy)  
 
9. Why do you think clients prefer to use remittances (MSB) services rather  
    than another alternative such as a bank? 
    (choice,  recipient  needs/ preference alternative speed, location, amount  
     frequency, cost, trust, personal, quality accessibility  service, value,  
    custom, tradition, familiarity) 
10.  What is the average value of remittances sent by your customers per  
      transaction?  
 
      under £500     £500-£1000    £1,000-5,000    £5,000-10,000  more than  
      this.  
    
11.  How often do your customers typically remit funds? Would you describe  
       this a  regular or infrequent?   
      (weekly, monthly, periodically, for specific occasion, on demand) 
 
12.  Where are remittances most commonly sent to?  
13. Do you also receive remittances?  Where are remittances most often  
      from?  (purpose, timing, settlement, client type) 
14. Is your remittance service your main business? 
15. Do you use any agents in connection with any aspect of your MSB? 
16. Do your cooperate with any other MSB in providing your services? 
17. Do you ever travel abroad to meet people in connection with your MSB? 
18. What do you think are the risks of MSB being misused i.e. for the 
laundering of  
      money? 
      (location, customer,, ethnicity, verification transaction) 
 
 19. In your view, what are the risks of MSB being misused for terrorist   
       purposes? 
       (destination, ethnicity, method operation, record keeping ) 
  
 20. What might cause you to be concerned about a transaction being 
misused in   
       this way? 
       (amount, jurisdiction, client anomaly, transaction anomaly, third party)  
 
426 
 
21. If you were concerned about a transaction how would you deal with this? 
      (monitor, warn, decline, question, report, seek advice) 
 
22. Have you ever had cause to report a transaction? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C MSB REGULATION AND IMPACT 
               
 23.What are your views on the regulation of MSB? Do you agree with MSB  
     being  regulated ? 
     (good/ bad idea, necessary, inevitable, fair, unjust, cost /skill  
     implementation,onerous wieldy, disproportionate, perception as financial  
     institution) 
 
24. How have you found applying the regulations in practice? 
      (ease, onerous, workable/unworkable intrusive business/client, skill,  
      challenge, adaptation, business practice, jurisdiction) 
 
 
25. What are your thoughts about MSB being viewed as ‘financial  
      institutions’? 
     (fairness, resources, good/ bad, balanced, formal, competitors,  
      competitive) 
 26.Do you think regulation was needed?  
       (problems, consistency, standards, lack self regulation, financial  
      services) 
 
 27. Why do you think MSB were suggested for regulation? 
 
 28. Do you think MSB are treated the same as other areas of activity? 
      (banks, charities, pre-payment cards, online services, HVD) 
 
 29.Do you think that regulation has addressed the risk of misuse of MSB?  
       (CDD, risk, record keeping, destination, 3rd parties) 
 
 30 .What effect do you think that regulation has had on preventing the  
       misuse of  MSB for terrorist purposes?  
       (reduced, suspicion detection, none, significant marginal, deterred,  
       burden, cost  ease  implementation, benefits,) 
 
 31. Are you aware of any guidance in preventing the misuse of MSB for  
       terrorist purposes? 
       (usefulness, source, sector, regulator, generic, specific) 
 
 32. What has been the effect regulation on your MSB?  
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 33. What are your thoughts about the ‘regulators’? 
        (role, enforcement, advisory, guidance, application soft /hard, skill,  
        detection, parity concerns, attitude, valuable, resource, accessible,  
        experience,  problem focused/ solving ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2  -  REGULATORS 
 
 
 A.   BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
           34. Name   
           35. Job Title 
           36. Regulator  
 37. Period in current post/ summary previous role / experience 
 38. Can you summarise your role/ experience and how it relates to    
       regulation of  remittance services now termed MSB? 
           39. Does your role involve the investigation or enforcement of money  
                 laundering or terrorist finance?   
 
 
B.    MSB PROCESS 
 
40. What do you understand by the term ‘MSB or remittance service and how  
      they  operate? 
      (distinction, service, degree formality, context, community, method,  
       allegiance,  trust) 
 
41. What community/ social/ethnic group do you think MSB operators come  
       from? 
      (relevance, tight kit, trusting, religion, ethnic, diaspora, language,  
      customs , business) 
 
42. What kinds of people do you think use remittances services? 
      (community, ethnicity, local, diaspora, other, high/low risk,  
        socioeconomic) 
 
43. Why do you think people choose to use remittance services rather than  
      other options, such as a bank? 
      (ease, informal, risk, trust, service, culture, tradition, cost, recipient,  
      access) 
 
44. What are risks of misuse, if any, associated with the operation of  
      remittance services?   
      (evidence misuse, self regulation, records, client grp ,monitor, control,  
      trace, sanctions, accountability, identify 
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45. How do you think these risks might arise? 
      (characteristics operation, records, clients, jurisdiction, trust, identity,  
      anonymity,  risk, speed, suspicion, care,) 
          
46. In your work have you come across any instances of misuse of  
      remittance services? 
       (pre-postreg, incidence, nature misuse, context, action, effect regulation) 
 
47.  What do you think about the misuse of remittances services for terrorist  
       purposes?  
      (incidence, likelihood pre- post regulation, vulnerable, preventable,  
       suspicion,  targeted) 
 
C. MSB REGULATION AND IMPACT 
 
 
48. What are your views on the regulation of remittance services?  
      (necessary, fairness , balanced, need, suspicion, proportionate, control,  
       supervision, risk, distrust, reputation protective, timely, reactionary, EU,  
      international, motivation, visibility) 
 
 
49. How would you describe the relationship between the regulators and the  
      remittance service sector? 
      (supportive, engaged, dialogue, remote con/strained, informative, trust,  
      confidence, knowledge, skill, proactive/ reactive, bias , resistance) 
 
 
39.  What impact do you think regulation has had on the provision of  
       remittances services generally? 
       (cost, practicality, usage, operatives, cooperative, ST, LT, upheaval,  
       constrained, competitive, inclusive, divisive, disruptive, effect, protect) 
 
40. What impact do you think regulation has had on the users of remittance  
       services? 
      (formalise, modernise, integrate, mainstream, decline, identify, risk,  
       monitor, intrusive, culture, language ,privacy, suspicion, access,  
      visibility) 
 
41.  What effect do you think the regulation of remittances services has had,  
       in  addressing their misuse? 
      (reduced, control , visibility, detection, prevention, sanction, none, limited,  
      ST, LT  displacement, monitoring) 
 
42. What effect do think regulation of remittances service has had on their  
      misuse for terrorist purposes? 
      (intelligence, monitoring, network, members, trace, track recipient,  
       location, facilitation, risk detection, sanction, incidence, volume) 
 
 
43.  Are you aware of any misuses of MSB that are not captured by the  
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       current  regulations?  
       (incidence, context, issue, action, problem, extent) 
 
44. Are you aware of any guidance is given to the MSB sector to prevent  
      their misuse for terrorist purposes? 
      (client relationship, risk assessment , suspicions, risk profiling, culture,  
      intrusive)  
 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 3  STAKEHOLDER  COMMUNITY GROUPS  
 
A.  BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
45. Can you please tell me which organisation/ group you represent and the  
     purpose of this organisation or group? 
 
46. How would you describe your membership? 
      (common characteristics, class, culture, purpose, tradition, age,  
       religion, business) 
 
 
B. MSB PROCESS   
 
47. What kinds of people do you think use remittance services? 
      (class ,social, ethnic diaspora, poor, affluent, local, suspicion, anonymity,  
       secrecy) 
 
48. Why do you think people choose to use remittances services? 
      (as opposed to bank) 
      (purpose, sender, recipient, access, choice, service, speed, cost) 
 
49. Do you think any members from your group /community use remittances  
      services?  
 
C. MSB REGULATION AND IMPACT 
 
50 .Do you think that there is a risk that remittance services could be used  
      for an   illegal purpose? (for example laundering money) 
      (awareness, suspicion, identified, customer, operator, location) 
 
51. What are your thoughts on the risk of misuse of remittance services for  
       terrorist  purposes? 
      (suspicion likely, evidence, community, risk, culture, generalisation) 
 
52. Do you think that the regulation of remittance services will prevent their  
       misuse  for terrorist purposes? 
      (vigilance, suspicion, action , sanction, prevention , protection. 
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53. Are there any other effects of regulation that you are aware of? 
      (fairness, suspicion, control, sanctions , formality, protection, cost,  
       access,  balance individual/ community interests) 
 
Thank you for your time and your contribution to this research project.  
I am very grateful for your contribution. Before we conclude the interview are 
the any further comments you wish to make in relation to the questions 
asked or in relation to the research topic generally?I will now give you an 
information sheet and my contact details. If you have any question or 
concerns later, or in the unlikely event you change your mind about your 
participation please contact me. Thank you once again for your time and 
contribution.  
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Appendix 4 
Table A Cases concluded by the CPS Counter Terrorism 
Division 2007 -2013 
Year 
No. Cases 
concluded 
Total No. of 
defendants 
convicted 
No. terrorist  
property 
cases 
No. of defendants 
terrorist finance cases 
2013 7 25 1 3 
2012 9 21 1 2 
2011 9 15 1 1 
2010 12 25 0 0 
2009 15 20 0 0 
2008 17 39 2 4 
2007 15 42 1 3 
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Appendix 5   Typology of UK MSB operation 
Type of 
MSB  Operational characteristics  
Agent  
Single agency with branded principal or multiagency  single operator                                                                               
reliance on the supervision and AML processes of principal uses principal's IT system                                                                                                                                                             
some keep their own paper records                                                                                         
MSB business situated within same premises as parallel business                                                                                                        
Operators ethnicity most likely to match that of the customers served                                 
A variety of jurisdictions served reliant on  principal's geographical reach                                
Personal remittances only , if linked to branded provide then also offer incoming 
remittance as 
Small 
independent  
Operates form a single location                                                                                       
Makes use of agents overseas only in very localised areas                                                       
Serves a niche area / corridor                                                                                          
Strong community presence and long serving                                                               
May travel abroad to further contacts                                                                                
Offer some bespoke remittances services for businesses Has small staff team business 
owner generally assumes MLRO role                                                                                        
If servicing business then will have incoming and outgoing remittances 
Medium 
Independent  
Number of business location confined to regional geographical area                                    
Has small staff team                                                                                                                         
Person allocated to MLRO role                                                                                                 
Makes use of agent overseas only                                                                                             
Personal and some business remittance                                                                           
MSB in own right or on a par with other business interests                                               
Limited incoming remittances                                                                                                
Services niche corridors / areas                                                                                             
Most likely to have family link to business here                 
Wholesale 
Not identified by fieldwork but interviewees revealed this type of business                             
Most likely to be engaged in a business alongside MSB that trades internationally or 
solely as MSB business                                                                                                
Has access to large cash pools                                                                                                 
Engages in consolidation and settlement  for other MSBs                                                    
May  resemble a medium independent or a large principles                                   
Difficult to identify its wholesale activity                                                                                                                         
May be a large SPI or small API                                                                                                                        
Principal 
Large branded  or multinational business                                                                             
Serves a  number of corridors or niche service to single jurisdiction                                                                                            
High IT capacity                                                                                                                                          
May have internet presence                                                                                         
Makes use of agents in UK and overseas                                                                                  
Has  MLRO to oversee AML processes                                                                                    
Highly engaged at policy level with regulator                                                                             
An API                                                                                                                                         
Ethnicity of owners/ management  team irrelevant  
